FORTIFICATIONS (PROVISION FOR
EXPENSES) BILL-[BILL No. 168.]

SECOND READING.

Order for Second Reading read.

SIR

GEORGE LEWIS moved the

every day, and every word that passed in
the Committee was known all over Lon-
don by all
persons
whose interest or desire
it was to be acquainted with what oc-
curred. If there has been a breach of
confidence, the House would be best able
to judge who committed it; but as to ac-second reading of this Bill.
cusing my right hon. Friend of a breach of
confidence, you might as well say that it
was a breach of confidence to send to a
person, not being a Member of the House,
on the
a statement at seven o'clock
Wednesday evening of what passed in
the House in the morning, because by so
doing you would anticipate The Times of
next day.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."

SIR FREDERIC SMITH moved, as an Amendment

"That there be laid before this House a Return showing the original and every subsequent Estimate for each work recommended by the Defences Commissioners; the amount of any Contract for each work; what proportion of each work is completed; and what inconvenience or injury, if any, to the Public Service would result from the postponement of any of the projected works."

SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFE said, he did not wish to enter into details as to what had taken place in the Committee; but as the noble Lord had entered into various statements, he was sure the House would feel that full justice ought to be done to the members of the Committee. For himself he could say that he had entered on the duties cast on him by the House free from any bias, and with the determination to discharge them to the best of his ability, and he had heard with great pain-moved for. Some of the works proposed ["Order!"]

MR. SPEAKER informed the right hon. Member that it was competent for him to make a personal explanation as to words spoken in that House, but not to enter upon the general substance of the proceedings of the Committee.

Several Returns, bearing on this subject, had already been laid before the House; and he begged to thank the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War for the Return which had just been presented, and which contained much of the information that he had desired to obtain, and had

to be constructed were far advanced, but some were not yet commenced; surely, then, they ought, at any rate, to inquire into the progress of those in hand. One was a work, or rather a series of works, of very great cost, for the defence of Plymouth, with respect to which no contract SIR WILLIAM JOLLIFFE said, he had been entered into, and no money exwould confine himself to personal explana-pended; the question as regards this tion. He had heard for the first time that proposition was therefore fairly open to night of certain meetings held by members discussion. The work was, in his mind, of the Committee, but he did not attend of a very questionable character, and them. On one occasion he went into the might be very well dispensed with. This library a little before six o'clock, without bore upon the subject of invasion. Now, knowing that there was a meeting, and he this country could only be invaded in found several members of the Committee the event of the British fleet being dethere. He supposed he was behind the feated at sea, or the British commanders rest of the world; for when on Friday at sea being eluded by the enemy; but night he addressed the House, he had never since, in the last war, when they were heard anything of what had occurred, nor opposed by the French, Spanish, Russian, of the gossip that was flying about. He Swedish, Danish, and Dutch fleets, formdid not allude to it; he merely alluded to ing an array well-nigh overwhelming, this a suppression which by accident or some country was not invaded, why were they means had been made in the report of the to expect an invasion now? No doubt, a proceedings of the Committee. few years ago the relations of this country with France were critical, the English army was then, numerically, in a low state, and the navy was still lower; the artillery was only an artillery in nameso much had it been reduced in the long peace. Such was not the case at present. The artillery was now the pride of

Motion agreed to.
Copy ordered,

"Of all Correspondence between the Treasury,

the Office of Works, and the Commissioners of Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues, relating to the works under the Thames Embankment Bill, and the plans relating thereto."

the nation-nothing could be finer or bet- | the field. It had been said by a high ter appointed; the ships of the navy were military authority, that in the event of an admirable, and the army was of the best enemy landing on the coast of Kent, and description, though not numerous enough marching on to the attack of the metroto provide garrisons for the extensive polis, we should have the garrisons of defensive works now projected. He pro- Dover and Portsmouth, which, be it rememtested most strongly against the policy bered, are proposed to consist chiefly of of locking up a number of men in fortifi- raw troops, marching on the rear of the cations where they would be almost use- enemy, and harassing his rear and flank. less, instead of being enabled to act in But good results could, in his opinion, the open field. If the best troops were to hardly be expected to follow from their be locked up in fortresses, it was quite attack under those circumstances, upon clear, that in the event of an enemy obtain- valiant and, at the same time, highly dising command of the Channel for three ciplined soldiers. Again, it was alleged weeks or longer, and making a descent on that Dover was to be an intrenched camp, the coast, the capital of the country would and that in the event of an enemy be in danger, and it would be also pe- landing an army on the coast of Kent, rilous to leave the defence of forts to inex- troops might issue from Dover to attack perienced troops. He might also observe it; but if an enemy were so to land, that the other day he was present in it would march forward at once, and another place, when a high authority upon knowing that there were 6,000 men in this subject informed his hearers that the Dover, it would leave a corresponding effect of enormous guns upon iron-plated force to hold them in check. But, be ships would be so to shake the plates that that as it might, there were some works they would come off bodily from the ship; with respect to which the most complete and in such a case an iron-plated ship Returns had been furnished, and which, would be inferior to a wooden one. This with the fullest consideration he could was an alarming statement, and one which give the subject, might, he thought, be called for close investigation before they suspended without any injury to the proceeded to lay out more money on iron- public service. There were, in the first cased ships on the present system. What, place, the gigantic works on Portsdown he would ask, was the Government about Hill, which were stated to have cost, or to leave such a vital point in doubt? He which would cost by the end of July, had been accused in another place of being about £10,000 each. Now, the number opposed to fortifications; but no one had and extent of those works were, in his a higher appreciation of the science of en- opinion, too great to admit of our ever gineering properly applied. If they had being able to man them, and he would the money to complete these works, and therefore strongly urge on the Government skilful troops to defend them when com- the expediency of not being in a hurry to pleted, he should be the last man to construct the whole of them. It was said hold up his hand against them; but, in- that Portsdown was the key to Portsdependent of the want of funds, he denied mouth; but he knew that the opinion of that they had troops enough to man the the late Duke of Wellington was, that proposed forts; and to construct fortifica- the true defence of Portsmouth was the tions without the means of manning them line of forts in front of Gosport; and cerwas to create a source of weakness rather tainly he never contemplated such fortifithan of strength, and an absolute folly. cations as were now being erected round We were not in a position, he believed, to Portsmouth. They might depend upon it man all those works, if constructed. It that a very limited number of works upon was said, indeed, that we should be able Portsdown Hill would be sufficient; and to garrison Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chat- an enemy landing at Christchurch, or on ham, and other large fortresses in a very the south-eastern coast, would not stop to great degree, if not entirely, with raw attack Portsmouth, but would march on at troops and Volunteers, and there was no once to the capital. Those persons who doubt that untrained troops, generally talked of an invading force, calculated to speaking, fought better behind fortifica- besiege Portsmouth, effecting a landing in tions than in the open field; but, know- Chichester harbour, let it be said with due ing the valour of Englishmen, nine out of respect for their high authority in other ten of the Volunteers would, he thought, matters, knew little of this subject, for prefer meeting the enemy in fair fight in the thing was simply impossible. Those

works at Portsdown were not called for, | enemy hand to hand, attacking him in and ought not to be carried on. He his ports instead of defending our own. hoped that they would be able to stop some of these works. Then there was the Fareham work, on which as yet only £8,000 had been expended, but on which there was to be a further outlay of £105,000-a very large sum in the construction of a work of questionable necessity. To that work, also, his argument in favour of delay might, he thought, be very fairly applied. Again, the Plymouth defences on the Eastern side were to cost £360,000, of which a sum of £50,000 was to be expended in the coming year. That line of defence would prove far too much for our military forces, and, moreover, he did not believe that an enemy would ever sit down before Plymouth. It was too perilous an operation; for, in that position, he would be exposed both in flank and in rear, and we should be able to pour upon him almost the whole of our disposable force. It appeared to him that it would be much wiser to construct but one fort on that side, which would be sufficient for all useful purposes, and might be made the nucleus for other works, should they be subsequently found requisite. He was persuaded that the Plymouth eastern line of defence, as now proposed, would eventually be given up; for it is too extensive for the garrisons that could be spared, and yet not sufficiently distant from the dockyard to secure it from bombardment -- in fact, it is an ill-chosen line. He wished to ask the Secretary for War, what he proposed to do if an enemy were to land in Essex? how we could operate upon either his flank or his rear? Such a contingency, in the event of an invasion, was by no means improbable. It had been projected before, and might be projected again. In the reign of Louis Philippe, one of the French Marshals actually drew up a plan of invasion, in which he proposed that while one division of the army was to land at Weymouth, another was to make an attempt somewhere in Essex. The Secretary for War appeared altogether to overlook the importance of defending that part of the coast. But he (Sir F. Smith) agreed with Admiral Robinson, who gave admirable evidence before the Defence Commissioners, that all defensive war should resolve itself into violent aggression upon the enemy. No war worthy of the name could be carried on by England unless the main object were to deal with the

Our regular army had an admirable aux-
iliary in the Militia. He trusted that next
year steps would be taken for having more
of the militia embodied, or the period of
training greatly increased. It was a mis-
take to suppose, however, that we could
shut up the whole of our untrained force
alone in our fortresses. We must always
appropriate a large proportion of our regu-
lar troops to our forts. To depend upon
fortifications for the defence of the metro-
polis would be, he thought, very unwise.
It would be very hard if we could not
dispose of an enemy before he reached
London, if we did not shut up too great a
number of regular troops in fortresses.
Great peril would result from defending
the capital by forts. The Duke of Wel-
lington used to say, referring to the
march of the Allies to Paris, that it was
lucky for France that Paris was not for-
tified; because, if the Allies had been
obliged to assault it, they would not
have left one stone standing upon ano-
ther. He was afraid, that if we were to
attempt to defend the metropolis, some
such terrible calamity would befall us in
the event of a successful attack. He was
sorry to find, from what had been said
in another place, that the Spithead forts
were not altogether given up. Already
we had a formidable series of works along
our coast, and he thought we should con-
tent ourselves with doing that which the
Government, strangely enough, had not
yet done-namely, covering the existing
works with iron plating, and rendering
them in other respects more formidable.
The stones of some parts of Southsea
Castle, for example, were crumbling to
pieces, and he was at a loss to under-
stand why that work should not be
strengthened with iron-casing. The same
remark applied to other works.
He was
far from wishing to weaken the hands
of the Government, but he implored them
to consider whether some reduction could
not be made. There was no reason why
the works at Plymouth should not be
delayed for a year or two, or why the
works at Fareham should not be suspended,
or why the works on Portsdown Hill
should not be diminished from five to
threc. He agreed with Sir John Bur-
goyne that there should be no works but
fieldworks on Portsdown Hill, and, cer-
tainly, the Government would exercise a
wise discretion in restricting the number

of works to three. He was impelled by a sense of duty to submit this statement to the House. He was as anxious as any man to see the country well defended, and to see fortifications where they ought to be; but he was extremely reluctant to see them placed where they ought not to be. One portion of his Motion had been in a great measure met by the Return presented by the right hon. Gentleman; but, entertaining the views he had expressed, he felt it his duty to move his Amendment.

Amendment proposed,

To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words" there be laid before this House, a Return showing the original and every subsequent Estimate for each work recommended by the Defences Commissioners; the amount of any Contract for each work; what proportion of each work is completed; and what works can be postponed without injury to the Public Service," -instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

efficiency of these forts rested on an hypothetical gun; and until that gun were constructed, he was of opinion that the forts should also be hypothetical If Spithead forts were to be suspended, he thought there were much stronger reasons for abandoning Plymouth fort. He was informed that no hostile vessel need approach nearer than 1,500 yards, and as yet we had no gun which could destroy an iron-plated vessel at 200 yards. He would remind the House, that considering the distress that existed in Ireland and in Lancashire, they were not warranted in expending the large sums of money on works which might turn out to be worthless. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his speech at Manchester, when referring to the expenditure of the country, said that expenditure was caused partly by "works of real necessity." If that was correct, there must be some part of the national expenditure caused-if he might use the term-by works of "unreal" necessity. He looked upon the construction of ships and floating batteries as works of real necessity; but these forts MR. GREGORY seconded the Amend- for the alleged protection of our dockyards, ment. He must confess, however, that he and inland defences to protect the country could not see how the Government could against invasion, he looked on as works of satisfy the latter part of the Motion or the most unreal necessity that the wit of make a Return as to "what inconvenience man could devise. As to the Report of or injury, if any, would result from the the Commissioners upon the Defences of postponement of any of the projected the country, he did not think it was warworks." He wished very much that a ranted by the evidence which they had different course had been taken with re- | heard. When military and naval men gard to this question of fortifications. He were called upon to report as to the most wished to see the question tested by some perfect system of defences they could deprinciple. He should have liked an issue vise, it was natural, notwithstanding the to be raised which would have given him- weight of evidence the other way, that self and others who were opposed to those they should produce a Report of this dedefences, as far as the evidence already scription. The Secretary for War said the given on the subject warranted an opposi- other night that that was a question of tion to such works, an opportunity of re-insurance. He (Mr. Gregory) would say cording their opinions. He thought his that the question was whether they were hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. prepared to insure at a hazardous rate of Osborne) had taken the right course the interest at a time when there was nothing other evening to effect that object. His to justify the payment of a high premium own impression was that the works of when there was nothing in the position every fort should be suspended until it had been proved that they were worth any expenditure at all upon them, and he should have been glad to see the votes of hon. Members recorded on the question of suspending the execution of all the works at the forts until further experiments should have been made. As far as the evidence on the subject went, it showed that those forts would not be worth the expenditure. The whole question of the

of the country involving any extraordinary risk. They had to deal with an expenditure which the House could reach, which it could moderate and diminish. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had often delighted the House with his eloquence, the other day created quite a sensation by the speech he delivered in Manchester. He showed, that if the House of Commons would only exert itself, great reductions might be made, and that finan

cial limit might at last be reached where | Then with respect to the large guns that