No. 45.] Mr. Pike to Mr. Seward. UNITED STATES LEGATION, SIR: Since my last I have received a communication from the minister of foreign affairs, of which the following is a copy: SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 22d and 28th of March, relative to the admission of the armed vessels of the secessionist States into the ports of the kingdom of the Netherlands and its colonies, and the recognition of the rights of belligerents to those States. "You ask, in the name of your government, that that of the King may submit this question to a new examination, in the persuasion which the cabinet of Washington feels that if the moral support given to the confede rates by this recognition of the principal states of Europe were once with drawn the struggle which now desolates the great American republic would soon come to an end. "It is useless to renew to you, sir, the assurance so frequently reiterated of the profound interest that the cabinet of the Hague takes in the events which, to its great grief, are passing in America, and that it most heartily desires a solution favorable to the interests of the Union, as well as those of all humanity. "I am unable, however, to give you an immediate response to your proposition. Its importance requires a profound examination, and the concurrence of the members of the cabinet, of which I am a part. "I shall not fail to inform you, in due time, of the result of our deliberations, and I beg you, meantime, to receive the assurance of my high consideration. "Monsieur PIKE, &c., &c." "VANDER MAESEN DE SOMBREFF. The late combat at Fortress Monroe between the iron-clad vessels continues to be the talk of every salon in Europe, and is conceived to point directly to the inevitable triumph of the United States over the rebellion. I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant, JAMES S. PIKE. Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington. Mr. Pike to Mr. Seward. No. 46.] UNITED STATES LEGATION, The Hague, April 16, 1862. SIR: I have the honor to enclose you the communication of this government, in reply to mine of the 22d and 28th of March last, asking for a review of their position on the questions of granting belligerent rights to the seceding States, and of excluding the piratical vessels of those States from the ports of the Netherlands. You will perceive that the government declines to change its present attitude on these subjects. I neglected in my last to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of March 15, (No. 47.) I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, JAMES S. PIKE. Secretary of State, Washington. Mr. Maesen De Sombreff to Mr. Pike. [Translation.] THE HAGUE, April 14, 1862. SIR: As a continuation of my communication of the 1st of this month, I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that the government of the Netherlands considers that it ought to sustain the principles held in 1861. Whatever may be its desire to please the cabinet at Washington, it cannot withdraw from the self-styled Confederate States the rights of belligerents, nor modify the instructions given in the month of December, 1861, to its colonial authorities relative to the duration of the sojourn of armed vessels of the United States of the north and of the south in the Netherlands ports, without limit of time, as well as privilege which has been given to them to ship coal without limit as to quantity. A fresh examination of the question has only confirmed the King's government in the opinion maintained by those who preceded them in power, that is to say, that civil war exists in America, and that the Netherlands have proclaimed their neutrality, it followed logically that the States self-styled confederate should be recognized as belligerents. This opinion, based in theory on the authority of the best publicists, and confirmed in practice by the conduct pursued not only at an anterior epoch but even in modern times by the principal European powers, and, what is more, by the United States themselves; this opinion has guided the ministers of the King in their line of conduct towards the two parties in opposition in America, and is the same as that which prevailed in the councils of France, of Great Britain, and of other powers. After the developments entered into upon this subject in the communica.. tions to the legation of the United States, under date of 17th September, 15th and 29th October, and 14th December, 1861, it will be, without doubt, useless to turn back to them, or to support them by new arguments. Recognized as belligerents, the secessionist States might, according to the law of nations, arm privateers, and they could not be treated as pirates, as the cabinet at Washington would have it, only seeing such States in the light of rebels, and in the violation by them of the Constitution, only rebellion. Besides, all their armed vessels could not be regarded prima facie as privateers. This lies in the very nature of things, and results likewise from the definition of privateer, (corsair.) It followed, consequently, from the attitude taken by the government of his Majesty, that the vessels-of-war of both parties should be admitted on the same conditions into the ports of the Netherlands, our proclamations excluding only privateers, except in case of stress. This consequence was admitted, in what regards France, by Mr. Dayton, American minister at Paris, who writes to Mr. Seward the 12th June, 1861, "that part of the declaration ('the French declaration of the 10th June') which puts the vessels of the United States in the same category as the vessels of the Confederate States, may, I think, be justly complained of; but this grows, at most, out of the recognition of those States as belligerents.” The recognition of the rights of belligerents in the Confederate States is not a question of opportunity nor of policy; if such were the case, one might discuss its maintenance in relation with the ever-varying exigencies of the latter. But the question here treated belongs to the law of nations, of a consequence inherent in neutrals towards belligerents. I will content myself with citing an author generally esteemed, Mr. Hautefeuille, on rights and duties of neutral nations, (I, 450:) "Nations," says he, "which desire to remain neutral, must accept the position; in fact, if they would be respected by the two parties, they must recognize and respect alike both of the two. The foreign prince who should refuse to fulfil the obligations of neutrality towards insurgents could not require of them to consider him as neutral; he would be in their eyes the ally of their enemy, and they would treat him as such with justice." It is therefore impossible to the King's government to change the line of conduct thus far followed. How could it, besides, by no longer conceding to the southern States the rights of belligerents, by excluding their vessels from its ports, by treating them, in a word, as pirates, apply to them a treatment from which the United States themselves have recoiled, as has been observed in the despatch of December 14, 1861? The northern States have not condemned as pirates the privateers of the southern confederates, but have considered them as lawful combatants. We cannot do more than the government of the Union. This is what caused the remark, so far back as the month of June, 1861, of Lord Russell in his despatch to Lord Lyons, (North America I, p. 42:) "We could not treat 5,000,000 of men, who had declared their independence, like a band of marauders or filibusters. If we had done so we should have done more than the United States themselves. We surely could not be expected to go beyond the United States government themselves in measures of severity." It must, then, be well understood that, under such conditions, and whatever may be its regrets for the evils which now afflict the great American republic, the King's government cannot consider the two contending parties otherwise than as two belligerents, the one employing against the other the forces at its disposal, conformably to the principles of the law of nations. It refers to its anterior communications, and repeats the assurances given again and again that, in continuing to receive in the Netherlands ports the vessels-of-war of the northern States and of the secessionist States, it will not be permitted that such vessels should make of one or other of her ports the base of their operations against the commerce of their adversaries. I pass now to the second question contained in your letter of 22d March last, to wit: whether the government of the Netherlands, if it refuses to exclude from its ports the vessels of the confederates, will return to the restrictive measures adopted when the Baron de Zuylen was at the head of the department for foreign affairs, and which have since been changed under Mr. Strens. In this regard I permit myself to observe to you that I could not understand how your government could desire the re-establishment of measures which actually were, and would again be, applicable to both parties, and which were, at the time, the cause why the Union ship Iroquois would not enter the port of Curaçɔa under the rule of said restrictive measures. It was on that occasion that the last were modified, which was brought to your notice the 30th of December, 1861. It follows, from advices which have since reached the government, that the new commander of the Iroquois has expressed himself well satisfied to find the precedent restrictive measures withdrawn, and thus to have the privilege of taking as much coal as he might wish. These measures are also favorable to Netherlands commerce with the United States, so that the interests of the two countries are in perfect accord. If the instructions given before the month of December, 1861, were now returned to, the government of the Netherlands might not only be taxed, with good reason, with trifling, but would hurt its own interests, as well as those of the Union, considering that the consequence of said instructions would be, as has been remarked in the communication of Baron de Zuylen, idated October 29, 1861, that the vessels-of-war of the United States, also, - could no longer be able to sojourn in the Netherlands's East Indian ports more than twice 24 hours, nor supply themselves with coal for a run of more than 24 hours. The cabinet of the Hague will never refuse to that of Washington anything that is really just, or even not essential nor prejudicial to the rights and interests which it is called upon to defend. It leaves with confidence to the government of the republic the just appreciation of motives which have, in the present juncture, guided the policy of the King's ministry, and they venture to cherish the hope that the judgment which will be formed of it at Washington may conform with the sentiments of sincere good will which so happily exists between the two peoples and their respective gov ernments. Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my high consideration. SIR: Your despatch of March 26 (No. 43) has been received. The series of successes upon which you commented in that paper has been continued. The nation already sees, as Europe must soon come to understand, that the counsels of the Union are wise, its forces strong, its resources unexhausted, and its purposes equally firm and generous. It may be doubtful whether American pirates will any longer disturb the peace of Europe. But it is very important that the course of the government of the Netherlands shall be such as to prevent complaint. Every interest of the Netherlands, as well as of the United States, and even every interest of humanity, require that these two countries remain friends. It cannot be too well understood that the people of this country, now that the crisis in our affairs is supposed to have passed, are already forming judg ments upon facts, as to what states have been friendly and what states un, friendly, and are adopting partialities and prejudices according to the results of that investigation. Is it well for a state which is greatest in its colonies, like the Netherlands, to disregard the good will of a chief maritime power, whose commerce with those countries is intimate and important? I am, sir, your obedient servant, JAMES S. PIKE, Esq., &c., &c., &c. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. No. 52.] Mr. Seward to Mr. Pike. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SIR: Your despatch (No. 45) of the 9th instant, containing the copy of a note from Mr. De Sombreff, the Netherlands minister of foreign affairs, upon the subject of the treatment of insurgent piratical vessels, and the concession of the rights of belligerents to the States in insurrection against this government, has been received. I am, sir, your obedient servant, SIR: Since my last I have had the honor to receive your despatches Nos. 48, 49, and 50. The new liberal cabinet of M. Thorbecké is already proposing important modifications in the administration of the internal affairs of this country. Here, as everywhere else in Europe, the American experience of iron-clad ships-of-war is instituting a radical change in naval affairs, and disturbing that most sensitive of all balances, the balance of power in Europe. Even Holland feels she can again be defiant in maritime warfare by the aid of newly-developed forces of attack and defence. The experience of the Monitor has reassured the secondary naval powers, and nowhere is the sentiment of increased strength enjoyed with a more lively satisfaction than among this commercial people. Though their own soil is destitute of every raw material but sand and muck, they are among the most skilful of workers where wood, coal, and iron are the agencies of production. When Holland shall be iron-clad, she will, with her feet under the sea, be the turtle among the nations. Europe groans daily more and more under the growing dearth of cotton. This country feels that want less than almost any other, for wool and flax are here extensive domestic staples, and universally in use. But the cries of England, France, and Belgium are sufficiently audible to attest the severity of the calamity. In other respects the war largely affects the industrial interests of Europe. In Belgium the wages of manufacturing workmen in some departments are reduced to 25 centimes (five cents) per day, and work difficult to be found. The fact is but a sample of the many bearing upon this point. It is these aspects and bearings of our affairs that cause them to be still regarded with undiminished interest, while in other respects they still attract great attention. For example, some of the bishops in France have lately issued instructions to their clergy, saying that while it was manifestly improper for them to meddle with the concerns of foreign nations, it could not be objectionable to pray for the emancipation of the four millions of slaves which the President of the United States had proposed should be liberated— a circumstance indicating at once the healthiness of European sentiment, and showing the very general character of European information on American affairs. The more popular branch of the legislative department of this kingdom |