Then, there is the case of a man, a citizen of St. Louis, who sent his family to the State of New York with the intent that they should reside there, he remaining in St. Louis. He maintained that he was a resident of Brooklyn, New York, inasmuch as he had remained with his family in Brooklyn for about three months, from which place he again went to St. Louis and from there went traveling as a salesman. The Court held that he was not a resident of New York and that, despite the fact that he had sent his family to New York to live and had, himself, visited his family for three months, he had not changed his actual residence from Missouri to New York.

The Chief Justice again said:

"The cases cited above establish that the transient visit of a person for a time at a place, does not make him a resident while there; that something more is necessary to entitle him to that character. There must be a settled, fixed abode, an intention to remain permanently at least for a time, for business or other purposes, to constitute a residence within the legal meaning of that term." Penfield v. Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co., 134 U. S. 357.

While in the above set out cases we have had the interpretation of the words "to reside out of the State" and "residence," there is still a better analogy in naturalization cases. The Statute there provides that

"It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Court admitting any alien to citizenship that immediately preceding the date of his application he has resided continuously within the United States for five years at least, and within the State or territory where such Court is at the time held one year at least." Comp. St. 1913, Para. 4352.

The department, therefore, has the benefit of the interpretation of the words "resided continuously." It is perfectly obvious that these words go beyond the word "resident" alone, as there is a

qualifying adjective which imports that the applicant for naturalization must have remained in this country for a period of five years without departure, but the Courts have held otherwise.

One Reichenburg, a native of Germany, came to the United States in 1903 and applied for naturalization. In 1907 he was sent abroad by his firm to sell lumber in Europe, from which trip he returned in April, 1908. From April, 1908, to December, 1912, he was sent on business trips to Europe, always returning to his legal residence in America after his business was completed. From 1912 to 1913 · he traveled for his employers in the United States. In April, 1913, he was sent by his firm to Europe on a business trip, and in October, 1914, having finished his business in Europe and being in Paris, he endeavored to secure return passage, but on account of the outbreak of war the French authorities would not allow him to sail. In June, 1915, he was successful in returning to the United States.

The government, through the Naturalization Bureau, opposed the granting of citizenship to this man on the ground that under the statute the applicant had not established residence for naturalization purposes, inasmuch as he had not "resided continuously" in the United States, as provided by the statute. The Court held that an alien, after establishing residence in the United States, temporarily absent on business trips as a traveling salesman, is not prevented from securing citizenship on the ground that his residence was not continuous. In so holding, Judge Witmer followed the case of In re Schneider, 164 Fed. 335, and said:

"The word 'continuously', which is not found in the Act of 1802, cannot be construed literally; else a resident of New York would lose his right if he paid a visit to Europe at any time during the first four years of his residence, or spent a day in Jersey City within the year immediately preceding the day of filing his petition. The use of the word may be to prevent any intermediate change of domicile during the five years. If Congress had meant that the alien must remain actually within the terri

tory of the United States uninterruptedly
during the five years, it would have used
language like that of the Act of March 3,
1813. * * *""

The case of In re Reichenburg, reported in 238 Fed. 859, is directly in point and construes the words "resided continuously" to the effect that an alien, who has applied for naturalization, has a right to go to Europe and make extended business trips.

In this connection please see the following:

"The words 'resided continuously' as used in the Naturalization Law, requiring five years' continuous residence immediately preceding application for naturalization, do not mean that the alien's residence shall not be interrupted at all for such a period, but the question whether he has resided 'continuously' in the United States for five years immediately preceding his application is a question of fact to be determined from all the facts and circumstances of the case." (Opinion of Circuit Judge McPherson) U. S. v. Cantini, 212 Fed. 925.

So the respective authorities herein quoted interpret the words "to reside out of the State," "residence", and "resided continuously." The cases are directly in point and will be referred to in the opinion immediately following.

The issue, as has been hereinbefore set out, is whether or not, under these circumstances, claimant was a resident of Germany. If his mere presence in enemy territory is to be taken as constituting residence, then he is a resident of that enemy country and is not entitled to the return of his property, because there is no question that claimant was in Germany during the war. It is endeavored, in the discussion of the law under the preceding sub-heading, to distinguish between a transient, a resident, an inhabitant with domicile, and a subject or citizen of a country. It is evident that claimant did not have a domicile in Germany, because that would involve his staying there with an intent to reside permanently in that country, and the evidence is all to the con

trary. He is a subject of Germany, inasmuch as he has never taken out naturalization papers in the United States, but he left Germany in the year 1885 and established a domicile in the United States and, at the time he was in Germany, maintained this domicile in the United States. The act specifies "resident." Is this claimant a resident, in view of his actions indicating his plans to return to the United States, and in view of his being caught, through no fault of his own, in Germany upon the declaration of war? The general definitions have been cited before in this opinion, and it can be well accepted that in order for one to be a resident there must be a settled and fixed abode or an intention to remain for at least sometime. There is obviously a difference between a transient, a resident, and one having a domicile. Domicile may include a resident, providing that resident intends to remain for an unlimited time at his place of domicile. There has been some confusion, owing to the synonymous use of "residence" and "domicile." It is evident that these terms are not synonymous.

However, the United States Courts have been consistent in their interpretation of the status of a "residence" and "domicile." The authorities have been quoted before, interpreting the word "residence" (Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. (U. S.) 39), the word "resident" (Penfield v. Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co., 134 U. S. 351), the phrase "to reside out of the State" (Barney v. Oelrich, 138 U. S. 532), and the words "resided continuously" (In re Reichenburg, 238 Fed. 859; U. S. v. Cantini, 212 Fed. 925).

The Reichenburg case is directly in point, and the interpretation therein of the words "resided "continuously" is applicable to a situation created by the World War and is somewhat analogous to the situation before the department. If the Courts will determine that a native of Germany arriving in the United States in 1903 and making frequent and extended trips to Europe during the first years of continuous residence required to qualify him for admismission to citizenship in the United States, and being caught in France at the outbreak of the war, is entitled to naturalization papers by reason of his continuous residence in the United States, under the

facts and circumstances set out, then what defense
would this department have in this case? In other
words, if "resided continuously" does not require
constant uninterrupted presence in this country, and
permits extended business trips abroad, then as-
suredly the word "resident" as used in the Trading
with the Enemy Act could not include one with such
a status as this claimant has.

There is no question that claimant resided in
this country until two months prior to the outbreak
of the war in 1914. In going to Europe at that time
he did the usual and customary thing. He was pre-
vented from returning and, while there, rendered
such services as would entitle him to nothing but
commendation. After the war he immediately re-
turned to the United States.

SECTION THREE

UNLAWFUL ACTS. TRADING WITH OR TRANSPORTING ENEMY. SENDING OR RECEIVING LETTERS TO OR FROM THE UNITED STATES, EXCEPT BY MAIL. OTHER WRITINGS OR PLANS TO OR FROM ENEMY PROHIBITED, UNLESS LICENSE FIRST OBTAINED. CENSORSHIP. EVASIONS PUNISHABLE.

Act Oct. 6, 1917.

Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful

(a) For any person in the United States, except with the license of the President, granted to such person, or to the enemy, or ally of enemy, as provided in this Act, to trade, or attempt to trade, either directly or indirectly, with, to, or from, or for, or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other