'Common Sense.' By May 1776, the Congress, which had acted for a year as a revolutionary general government for the United Colonies, felt justified in entering upon consideration of the subject. Increasing consciousness of the need of foreign assistance, and clearer perception of the necessity of independence as a condition of such assistance enforced the more strictly domestic reasons for the development of the sentiment of separation and on 4 July 1776 the formal Declaration was signed.

In summary, it may be said that, fundamentally, the causes of the American Revolution are to be found in the differences of characteristics progressively developed in the two English communities on the different sides of the Atlantic. These differences made the administration of the system of government by which these communities were connected a matter of difficulty under any circumstances. When a change was made in the manner and purpose of the administration of this system, an issue was raised which the English community was particularly ill-prepared to meet. The Americans practically demanded recognition of a new theory of the Empire, precedents for which existed, not in the law, but in the facts of administration of the existing theory. At the beginning of the controversy the apprehensions of the Americans were concerned with the possibilities of the existing theory for despotism than with any serious tyranny actually exercised. But the conduct of this controversy over this issue was SO unskilfully managed, as it turned out, that the feelings of discontent operative in the colonies for nearly a century were stimulated to the point of resistance. Opportunity was created for what was probably hardly more than a large and aggressively active minority to carry this resistance to the point of separation from the mother country. That a more skilful management of the controversy would have prevented the ultimate separation cannot be affirmed with confidence. The scale and character of the development of the colonial governments was making of them commonwealths not likely to be satisfied with a relation very far short of that which existed between Canada and England after 1837. And for such a relation England was hardly prepared much before that date. See COLONY.

Bibliography.- Fiske, The American Revolution'; Trevelyan, The American Revolution'; Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. III.; Doyle, Chap. V. in Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VII.; Bigelow, Chap. VI. in Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VII.; Osgood, The American Revolution,' Political Science Quarterly, March 1898; Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, Vol. VI.; Frothingham, 'Rise of the Republic.'

CHARLES WORTHEN SPENCER, Professor of History, Colgate University. United States-The American Revolution (Military Events). The fundamental fact in the British strategy of the American campaigns was their possession of control of sea-power, for the use of which in penetration of the seaboard strip by the openings of the Hudson River and Chesapeake Bay, the topography afforded pre-eminent opportunities. In defense the Americans had the advantage of moving rapidly on lines of interior communica

tion; and the holding of a position somewhere between the coast and the mountains from which they could keep control of these interior lines and thus prevent the success of British detachments, quite as often by refusing as by giving battle, was an essential feature of American strategy throughout the war. As a matter of fact, both sides were seriously handicapped in the course of working out their respective policies. On the American side, the prejudice against a standing army, the undue influence assumed by the States after the first flush of the enthusiasm of the Union had passed and the precarious character of the support given to military operations made the maintenance of a reliable military force a matter of supreme difficulty for the genius of Washington himself. On the other hand, after 1778, the British were involved in war with France, after 1779, with Spain, and after 1780, with Holland, and in this quadruple contest found no allies.

The first three years of the war constitute, in a way, the most critical period from the strategic point of view, for it was in these years that the British held undisputed possession of all the military advantage which control of the sea could give, and it was in this period that their most serious attempt to break the confederacy in two by occupation of the Hudson-Champlain-Saint Lawrence waterway was made and frustrated. In 1775 the Americans succeeded in keeping the British force confined in Boston while the attempt at the capture of Quebec by a double expedition north from Ticonderoga and northwest and west through the Maine forest under Montgomery and Arnold was made. This invasion collapsed and the evacuation of Boston by the British in March, 1776, left each side in possession of its own territory.

The campaign of 1776 saw the British attempt at occupation of a Southern port, Charleston, repulsed, and the advance south from Canada checked by Arnold's impromptu naval force on Lake Champlain till so late in the season that it got no further than Crown Point. New York, however, was occupied by the British army, supported by the fleet, and Washington's army was forced across New Jersey, leaving the mouth of the Hudson and large parts of both East and West Jersey in the hands of the enemy. supposedly for the winter. But Washington's masterly surprise at Trenton and maneuver at Princeton in the last days of 1776 enabled him to hold northern New Jersey and keep the British confined to New York city and East Jersey only as far as Amboy and New Brunswick. The campaign of 1777 should have been devoted by the British to the single great object of occupying the whole length of the Hudson-Champlain-Saint Lawrence waterway, both ends of which lay in their possession. This fact made it the most available opening for their purpose and once the connection between the termini was made, the task of reducing the confederacy by sections would become practicable. But Howe's move on Philadelphia by sea so reduced the strength and delayed the co-operation of the force at the mouth of the Hudson with the southward movement of Burgoyne that the latter, hindered in his movements and unable to maintain himself at so slow a rate of advance, was surrounded and captured before the former had

covered half the distance between New York and Albany. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this achievement of the Americans. It made possible the French Alliance, which not only increased the military resources of the American defence by the use of the French sea-power, but involved the dispersion of the total military resources of the British against several opponents instead of allowing them to concentrate on the task of subduing the Americans. The consequences became apparent in the campaign of 1778 which was opened by Clinton's withdrawal from Philadelphia across New Jersey toward New York, close-pressed at Monmouth by Washington, who now took up a position north and west of New York, from which he could watch and attack any movement of the enemy toward either New England or Philadelphia. This position these armies practically maintained without decisive engagement till the end of the war. There was an attempt of the French fleet and American land force against Newport in 1778 which ended in failure. There were numerous marauding expeditions by the British, designed to draw Washington from his commanding position. There was on the other hand the capture of the posts in the country west of the Alleghanies in 1778 and 1779 by Clarke, which had important consequences for the future development of the country. But from 1778 on, the most active endeavors of the British invading force were directed against the Southern States. The bold dash of Wayne on Stony Point in 1779 and the narrow escape from loss of the Highlands of the Hudson through Arnold's treason in 1780 were only episodes in a situation in the North which showed no decisive changes from 1778 to 1781.

The British attack on the South was renewed in 1778 by the capture of Savannah and the reduction of the greater part of Georgia. The British seem to have counted on the large number of slaves in the Southern States as an element of weakness in the defensive capacities of the region and to have planned to roll up the South from Georgia to Virginia by combining use of sea-power with the threat at the altars and fires of the interior by an overrunning force. An attempt in the summer of 1779 at a recapture of Savannah by the combination of the French fleet and American and French land force under Lincoln was repulsed. The capture of Charleston in 1780 by the British fleet and army made the soil of the Carolinas for the two following campaigns the scene of an interesting conflict between two efficient armies, each under competent leadership, and, at first, on something like even terms, as far as aid from local partisans is concerned. The crushing defeat of Gates by Cornwallis in August 1780, at Camden, S. C., seemed to promise Cornwallis the control of the whole State and a threatening position towards North Carolina, but the American victory at King's Mountain in October 1780, served to keep him close to territory controlled from the sea. Greene now succeeded Gates in command of the American army and after King's Mountain and the battle of the Cowpens had largely deprived Cornwallis of his light troops, succeeded in drawing him away from the coast and northeastward across North Carolina almost to the Virginia line. Here, at Guilford Court House, in March

1781, in an action which was tactically a defeat for the Americans, Cornwallis was so weakened that more thorough invasion of the Carolinas became impossible. He retired first to Wilmington on the coast and then, as it became evident that Greene was returning southwestward again, crowding the British back to the coast at Charleston and Savannah, himself turned away and joined Arnold in Virginia in May.

en

The French Alliance now supplied, for the first time in an effectual manner, that indispensable element in the American defense, lack of which had prevented development of its more aggressive possibilities-viz. control of access by the sea. The threat upon New York by the French fleet and the forward movement by the American force drew off strength from Cornwallis in Virginia and kept Clinton close in New York till the strength of Washington's and Rochambeau's force was far on its way to Virginia. In the meantime, De Grasse's seizure of the entrance to Chesapeake Bay and the five days' action with the relieving British fleet off the entrance isolated Cornwallis, now trenched_on_the peninsula between the York and the James Rivers, for a long enough period to allow of the complete investment of his position by superior numbers in front and the French fleet in his rear. Having exhausted the resources of such a position before the English fleet could appear again, Cornwallis surrendered 19 Oct. 1781. It is worthy of note that this was the first failure of the British seapower on the coast during the war and the thoroughness with which this first opportunity was exploited for purposes of aggressive defense indicates the grasp of the situation as a whole and the cautious daring which characterized Washington's strategy. The British were now in possession only of the ports of New York, Charleston and Savannah, and by reason of the moral effect of the capture of Cornwallis the war was practically at an end.

The decisive battles may be selected as follows: Bunker Hill, 17 June 1776, which inspired the British commanders with a firm notion of the inexpediency of a front attack on American forces behind breastworks; Long Island, 27 Aug. 1776, which gave the British the control of the mouth of the Hudson; Saratoga, 17 Oct. 1777, which frustrated the attempt to break the confederacy in two and which brought the French Alliance; King's Mountain, October 1780, and the Cowpens, 17 Jan. 1781, which deprived Cornwallis of his light troops in his overrunning of the Carolinas, and the naval action at the entrance of Chesapeake Bay, in the early part of September 1781, which made the siege of Yorktown possible.

Bibliography-Fiske, The American Revolution'; Trevelyan, The American Revolution'; Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century, Vols. III. and IV.; Doyle, Chap. VII. in Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VII.; Bancroft, History of the United States (Author's last revision), Vols. IV. and V.; Winsor, Narrative and Critical History,' Vol. VI. CHARLES WORTHEN SPENCER,

Professor of History, Colgate University. United States-The Declaration of Independence. On 10 June 1776, the Continental Congress appointed a committee to draft a

Declaration of Independence. (See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.) Jefferson, the most radical theorist on this committee, wrote out a rough draft of the Declaration. This was carefully revised by the committee and reported to Congress on 28 June. After further revision by that body it was adopted on 4 July, and after being engrossed was signed on 2 Aug. 1776, by the members of Congress then present. The contents of the document fell under four heads: (1) the preamble, (2) theories of government, (3) an enumeration of a "long train of abuses," and (4) the resolution declaring independence. Of these the second and third portions are the most important. The philosophical doctrines underlying the Declaration as well as the phraseology in which they were given expression were not new. The document was simply the embodiment of ideas which had been prevalent for many centuries and which had crystallized into the systems of political philosophy of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. Jefferson had borrowed the ideas and even the language of Locke. The latter had found predecessors in Hobbes and Hooker. Hooker, a churchman, was simply giving expression to ideas which had been prevalent among church writers during the religious wars in France, the struggles concerning the powers of church councils in the 15th century, the strife between Louis of Bavaria and the popes of the 14th century and the investiture controversy of the Hildebrandine epoch in the 11th century. For the introduction of the ideas to churchmen probably no one was more responsible than Saint Augustine (354-430 a.d.).

The five fundamental theories of the Declaration are: (1) The doctrine of equalityall men are created equal; (2) the doctrine of inalienable rights; (3) that the origin of government was in a conscious act or compact-"governments are instituted"; (4) that powers of government rest on the consent of the governed; (5) the right to throw off government, that is, the right of revolution or resistance. The compact theory of the origin of government is first found in the theories of Protagoras and the Sophists (481-411 B.C.). The Stoics at the time of Zeno (308 B.C.) brought forward the doctrine of the common brotherhood and equality of men. Cicero (106-43 B.C.) gave expression to the theory that all men in a state of nature have certain equal rights. The Roman jurists of the Empire declared that though the will of the prince had the force of law, it had such only because the prince's power was conferred on him by the people. This idea was expressed more definitely by Saint Augustine when he said that government rested on a general pact of human society to obey kings-in other words, that government rested on the consent of the governed. The theory of resistance to the mandates of a ruler was given expression_to by Socrates (469-399 B.C.) and the Apostle Peter, but Saint Augustine was the first to give unqualified approval of it in a general statement. He said that it was not always bad not to obey a law, for when the ruler makes one which is contrary to God, hence to divine and natural law, then it is not to be obeyed. Augustine thus contributed the idea of resistance to a law contrary to natural rights, while the jurists had merely stated that laws should not be contrary to

natural rights. They had not advocated resistance.

If

The five fundamental philosophical theories of the Declaration were, therefore, in existence by the time of Saint Augustine. They were used separately or together throughout the middle ages. The struggles between the temporal and spiritual powers of the time-the Empire and the Papacy-gave excellent opportunities for their use. This is especially true of the fight which broke out between Henry IV. of Germany and Pope Gregory VII. (1073-1085). If the popes could get a general acceptance of the above theories, the power and pretensions of the temporal rulers would be thoroughly undermined. It was natural, therefore, that in the works of those church writers who supported the popes frequent expression should be given to just such doctrines as those which later found place in the Declaration of Independence. The theories of Manegold von Lautenbach (1081), a participant in the above struggle on the side of the pope, will serve as an example. He declared that the state was the mere work of man. Kingship does not exist by nature or by merit. Even the word king is a mere word of office. The power which he has was given him by the people. They did not exalt him above themselves so as to concede to him the free faculty of exercising tyranny, but they exalted him so that he should defend them from tyranny and interference by others. The people established government for mutual protection. They made a compact with the king and chose him king that he might force evil men to obedience and defend the good from the bad. he falls into tyranny himself, the people are freed from his dominion and from subjection to him. As you would dismiss a swine-herd for not taking care of his herd, so must you with better and more just reason remove a king. Similar expressions of some or all of the doctrines are to be found in Gratian's codification of the canon law, in the writings of Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, Saint Bonaventura, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Engelbert von Volkersdorf, Marsiglio of Padua, William of Occam, Wiclif and others. Nikolaus Cusa (1401-1464) may be said to have been the first writer who combined the various theories into a systematic whole. "Since all men," he says, "are by nature free, then government rests on the consent of the governed"; and so he proceeds, deriving one doctrine from another. The connection of Cusa and the men before him with Hooker, Hobbes, Locke and Jefferson is to be found in the writings of such authors as Languet and others who wrote during the Wars of Religion in France. Undoubtedly all of these writers, including even the makers of the Declaration, firmly believed in the doctrines to which they gave expression. The fact that they used their theories for political or partisan purposes does not warrant the opinion that they did not believe in them. The doctrines no doubt had their origin in man's ideals of what should be and in that sense are purely philosophical in their character. The attempt to give them a historical foundation proved successful so long as scientific historical and legal studies were in a backward state, but during the course of the 19th century, the historical foundation for the doctrines received scant consideration from the hands of publicists

and students of history. Notwithstanding the unhistorical character of the principles of government embodied in the second portion of the Declaration, their influence has been enormous, and the world at large clings to them as if they had a historical origin in a primitive state of

nature.

The third portion of the Declaration like the first is based on precedents. The enumeration of the "long train of abuses" is similar to the Grand Remonstrance of Parliament in the reign of Charles I. The list of abuses really forms a history of the relations between the English king and the colonies during the second and third quarters of the 18th century. The actions of the king are held to be in violation of rights which Englishmen had embodied in such documents as the Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement. As Englishmen the colonists regarded themselves as entitled to the rights of Englishmen. They did not share the belief prevalent in England that the inhabitants of colonies were to be treated somewhat differently from Englishmen who stayed at home. Their ancestors had left England when English ideas of representation in Parliament were undergoing a change during the control of Long Parliament and Cromwell. In the new land of America they developed theories and customs of representation essentially different from those restored by Charles II. Englishmen at home might feel that they were represented by Parliament whether they voted for any one of its members or not, but in the colonies the idea had grown that a representative in a legislative body only represented the men who had a voice in his selection and who lived in the territorial district from which he was chosen. So to the colonists "the imposing of taxes without our consent" meant one thing, while to Englishmen it meant another. The other grievances enumerated, such as the deprival of the benefits of trial by jury and the quartering of armed troops among the colonists, undoubtedly played an important part in bringing about the War of the American Revolution, but probably no one thing contributed so much to the opening of that war as the feeling expressed in the phrase "the imposing of taxes without our consent."

Bibliography. Channing and Hart, 'Guide to the Study of American History); Dunning, Political Theories'; Willoughby, Political Theories'; Nature of the State'; Merriam, American Political Theories'; Sullivan, Antecedents of the Declaration of Independence, in American Historical Association Proceedings,' 1903. JAMES SULLIVAN, PH.D., Professor of History, High School of Commerce, New York.

United States-The American Revolution (Diplomatic Conditions during the War and the Peace Negotiations). Attempts to enter into relations in some form with foreign powers are to be found in the very early stages of the existence of the United States. In November 1775 Congress appointed a committee to correspond with friends in other parts of the world, and this committee very soon came into communication with agents of the French Government, sent to observe conditions in the colonies. Early in 1776 this committee appointed

come to a

Silas Deane as their agent to go to France for the purpose of obtaining military supplies and by the last of July he had been admitted to an interview with Vergennes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had been put into connection with Beaumarchais, through whom, with the connivance of the government, important supplies of war were furnished. Deane had been instructed to inform Vergennes that France had been selected as the first power to whom this application should be made "from an opinion that if we should total separation from Great Britain, France would be looked upon as the power whose friendship it would be fittest for us to cultivate." After the Declaration of Independence, France and Spain, as powers most unfriendly to England, were still courted with the greatest diligence, but ministers or plenipotentiaries were also commissioned from time to time to the other courts on the Continent. From none but France and Holland, however, was recognition obtained, and from only these two was any official aid or countenance given before the conclusion of peace. Holland's recognition was extended just before the completion of the peace negotiations, and Spain, though refusing to recognize the United States, in the early days of the struggle, afforded a limited amount of financial assistance. In many regions of Europe among the people, and at several of the courts, there was a disposition friendly to the American cause, but in no case was this disposition serious enough for practical purposes to lead the governments away from the path of strict neutrality, except in the limited way afforded by the Armed Neutrality.

From the first, the French government had taken great interest in the colonial revolt and, before the arrival of Deane, had determined for the present to remain nominally at peace with England, but to assist the revolt surreptitiously with just enough energy to keep both sides actively and, if possible, exhaustingly, occupied. In this policy the Spanish government joined, and between the two governments two million livres were placed at the disposal of the insurgents in the summer of 1776. In September 1776 Congress adopted a general plan for treaties to be proposed to foreign powers, and joined Franklin and Arthur Lee with Deane as commissioners to lay such a treaty before the French government. The coming of Franklin increased the general popularity of the American cause, but the government was not disposed to change its attitude for the relations of the proposed treaty, which was concerned largely with commercial relations and provided for no political alliance. Apparently Congress' appreciation of the need for foreign aid grew stronger after the British capture of the mouth of the Hudson, and shortly after the meeting of the commissioners in Paris they were instructed to abandon the commercial basis of the proposed treaty and to propose to France and Spain a political connection, offering assistance to France in conquest of the West Indies, and to Spain in the subjugation of Portugal. Little substantial progress was made, however, in this direction till December 1777, when news was received of the surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. This signal achievement of the Americans entirely changed the face of affairs by convincing France of the probability of ultimate American success,

and within a few days of the receipt of the news, the commissioners were informed, in reply to their peremptory inquiry as to the intentions of the government, that the king was determined to acknowledge the independence of the United States and to enter into treaty relations in support of that independence. Accordingly, on 6 Feb. 1778, two treaties, one of commerce, on the most-favored-nation principle, and one of alliance, which provided for an intimate political association of the two countries, were signed. The treaty of alliance, which was very different from the original American proposals, stated the object of the alliance to be the maintenance of the sovereignty and independence of the United States in government as well as in commerce, provided for mutual aid in case of war between France and Great Britain, agreeing that territory reduced by the United States in the northern part of North America and in the Bermudas should belong to the United States, and that conquests in the West Indies should belong to the King of France, stipulated especially that neither party should conclude peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained, and provided for the continuance of the war with Great Britain till formal or tacit recognition of the independence of the United States by the treaties ending the war. Articles XI. and XII. provided for a mutual and perpetual guarantee of possessions in the western hemisphere, which was to give serious trouble in the subsequent relations between the two States. Whatever the sentiments of the French people, the French government entered into this relation, as was plainly stated in the announcement to the commissioners of the king's determination to recognize the new state, from no purely disinterested motives in favor of the Americans, but on the ground that it was manifestly to the interest of France that the power of England be diminished by the separation of the colonies. The popular sentiment for the American cause simply co-operated with Vergennes' aggressive designs on England in opposition to the more prudent suggestions within the government as to the ruinous effect of such an expensive enterprise upon French finances.

Since the Family Compact between the Bourbon kingdoms in 1761, the relations of France and Spain in all matters of external policy had been of the closest alliance, and the FrenchAmerican treaty of 1778 contained a clause providing for the accession of the King of Spain to its terms. Nevertheless Spain found the general spirit and the precise terms of this alliance not at all to her liking, and announced to England that she held herself free from any such engagement, and proceeded to offer mediation on terms which would leave England in possession of the Saint Lawrence Valley and the territory northwest of the Ohio, and herself in possession of everything west of the Alleghanies and south of the Ohio. On the refusal of the British government to accede to such mediation, Spain at length, on 12 April 1779, allowed herself to be urged into war with France against Great Britain, but expressly refrained therein from alliance with, or recognition of, American independence. In the meantime, Luzerne, the French minister to the United States, was trying to persuade Congress

that Spain's price for an alliance with the United States, namely, the Floridas and exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, was not too high, and that the accession of Spain to the alliance would be likely to bring about peace speedily. In September of the same year Jay was sent as United States minister to Spain, with instructions to the purport that if Spain would accede to the treaties with France she should not be precluded from receiving the Floridas, and that if she should wrest them from Great Britain, the United States would guarantee them to her, provided that the United States should enjoy the free navigation of the Mississippi, and this proviso was laid down as an ultimatum. Jay was further instructed to secure a port on the Mississippi below the 31st parallel. Jay's mission was entirely unsuccessful, even after the change of his instructions, which abated the American claim to navigation of the Mississippi as an ultimatum.

In the meantime, in preparation for any opening that might develop, Congress had been preparing instructions for a commissioner to participate in negotiations for a general peace. In addition to recognition of independence, boundaries, substantially such as actually were finally adopted, the Newfoundland fisheries, free navigation of the Mississippi, with a port below the 31st parallel were laid down, at first, as ultimata, with John Adams, appointed as sole commissioner. But in 1781, under the influence of Luzerne, these instructions were revised, by referring to the claims therein indicated as expressing the desires and expectations of Congress, but by leaving the commissioners at liberty to secure the interests of the United States as circumstances might direct and enjoining them to undertake no negotiations for peace without the knowledge and concurrence of the French ministers, and ultimately to be governed by their advice and opinion. Franklin, Jay, Laurens, and Jefferson were joined with Adams as commissioners.

The news of Cornwallis' surrender had so strengthened the hands of the opposition in England that in March 1782 North resigned, and the recognition of American independence was made a condition of acceptance of office by Rockingham. In proceeding to negotiations, considerable difficulty was experienced over the matter of the relation between the recognition of independence and negotiation of other topics. For reasons of his own, Vergennes encouraged the American commissioners in holding out for unconditional acknowledgment as a prior condition to negotiation. In the meantime Jay and Adams became convinced that Vergennes would, for the sake of Spain, as well as in conformity with his own plans for America, oppose the American claims in the matter of the western boundaries and of the fisheries. In conscious disregard of their instructions, they independently suggested to Shelburne an arrangement which fully recognized independence before negotiation and at the same time allowed him to see that a majority of commissioners present in Paris were willing to proceed in negotiations with Great Britain separately from their ally. Shelburne immediately took advantage of the division of the allies, and with Franklin's reluctant consent, preliminary articles, exactly coincident with the treaty signed in connection with