suspend the liability of the United States for wrongful acts committed by said States.

That by the treaties of 1794, 1815, and 1827, the United States had stipulated with Great Britain for the protection of her subjects in the State of Louisiana, as well as in all other territory of the United States; that the United States not having allowed the claim of Louisiana to be released from her constitutional obligations and restrictions, but having held her to her constitutional obligations, and having insisted that their political relations with foreign powers were in no wise affected by the insurrection in the Southern States, and that the Government of the United States was rightfully supreme in Louisiana and the other States in rebellion, and having finally maintained its authority over those States, its liability to Great Britain for violation of these treaties by those respective States remained precisely as if there had been no insurrection or civil war.

Her Majesty's counsel further contended that, as a principle of international law, if the rightful government of a country be displaced and the usurping government becomes liable for wrongs done, such liability remains, and devolves on the rightful government when restored; that this principle equally applied when the usurpation was only partial; that the restored and loyal government of Louisiana was liable for wrongs done by the insurrectionary government of the same State; and that it was only by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States that the State of Louisiana was prevented from being compelled to discharge that liability toward foreign governments, and that on this ground the Government of the United States must be held responsible for the acts of the State of Louisiana.

He cited in support of these propositions the treaties of 1815 and 1827 between the United States and Great Britain, (8 Stat. at L., p. 228, art. 1; id., 361, art. 1;) Phillimore, vol. 1, pp. 36, 94, 139; Wheaton, p. 77; Constitution of the United States, art. 1, sec. 10; Works of Daniel Webster, vol. 3, p. 321 ; id., vol. 6, pp. 209, 253, 265; U. S. Att. Gen. Op., vol. 1, p. 392; The United States vs. Palmer, 3 Wheat., Sup. Ct. R., 210; The Collector vs. Day, 11 id., 113, 124 to 126; The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635; the treaty between the United States and Great Britain of August 9, 1842, (8 Stat. at L., 575, art. 5;) and the acts of Congress of December 22, 1869, (16 Stat. at L., 59, 60,) and of April 20, 1871, (17 id., 13 to 15.)

The argument on behalf of the United States was summed up as follows:

First. That whatever may be the relations of the separate States of the Union to the Government of the United States, it is manifest that no respon sibility can attach to the United States for the destruction of the claimant's property under color of the authority of the State of Louisiana, because its destruction was not authorized by any officials representing or authorized to represent or act for the State of Louisiana under the Constitution and laws of the United States. There can be no legitimate officers of a State to constitute its government, except such as have taken an oath to support the

Constitution of the United States. All others are usurpers and pretenders. But, further, a State of the Union has no political existence which can be or has been recognized by Great Britain, except as a part of the United States, in subordination to the National Government. The rebels, who, by usurpation, undertook to act for the State of Louisiana, declared their action to be in behalf of the State, which they claimed as a component part of another and hostile nation.

Secondly. The destruction of the claimant's cotton was done under the order of the commander of a military force engaged in hostilities against the United States, and whose acts Great Britain had recognized as those of a lawful belligerent, having all the rights of war against the United States that any foreign invader could have had. The men professing to act as the local authorities, in concurring in the order of destruction acted as the assistants and allies of the hostile and belligerent power, and subject to its control. It is as absurd to hold the United States responsible in the case of Hanna as it would be to hold France responsible for the destruction of the property of a British subject in the part of France held by the German armies in the late war, on the ground that a French official, at the head of some arrondissement or commune, might have joined in the order of the German forces for its being done, he having been put in office or retained there by the German forces for the very purpose, and having first renounced his allegiance to France and taken an oath of allegiance to Germany.

The commission unanimously sustained the demurrer in the following award:

The claim is made for the loss sustained by the destruction of cotton belonging to the claimant by men who are described by the claimant as rebels in arms against the Government of the United States.

The commissioners are of opinion that the United States cannot be held liable for injuries caused by the acts of rebels over whom they could exercise no control, and which acts they had no power to prevent.

Upon this ground, and without giving any opinion upon the other points raised in the case, which will be considered hereafter in other cases, the claim of John Holmes Hanna is, therefore, disallowed.

Mr. Commissioner Frazer read an opinion, which will be found in the appendix, H.

This was among the earliest of the decisions of the commission, and it is understood that in consequence of it a large number of claims of similar character awaiting presentation were never presented to the commission.

The cases of Laurie, Son & Co., No. 321; Samuel Irvin & Co., No. 322, and Valentine O'Brien O'Connor, No. 404, likewise arose out of property destroyed by the rebels; but in each of them it was attempted on the part of the claimants to take the case out of the decision in Hanna's case.

In each of the cases it was alleged that the claimant was the owner of tobacco stored in the State of Virginia at the breaking out of the rebellion; that, early in the year 1861, the ports of Virginia were blockaded under the proclamation of the President of the United States, and before the claimants could remove their property by land, the Congress of the United States, by act of 13th June, 1861, prohibited the transportation of merchandise from Virginia into the loyal States, except under license and permission of the President, and in pursuance of rules to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury; and that

under the rules prescribed the claimants were unable to remove the tobacco. In the cases of Laurie, Son & Co. and Irvin & Co. it was alleged that the tobacco remained stored in Richmond until the burning of that city by the rebels on the 3d April, 1865. In the case of O'Connor it was further alleged that in April, 1865, claimant sent a vessel from Ireland destined for Richmond, for the purpose of carrying away his tobacco, which vessel arrived at Hampton Roads in June, 1865, but was warned off by a public armed vessel of the United States and compelled to return to Dublin without the tobacco. In this case it was further alleged that a part of the tobacco was destroyed by the conflagration kindled by order of the confederate authorities on the 3d April, 1865; that another portion was destroyed by an accidental fire in March, 1863, but which occurred in consequence of the disturbed condition of affairs then existing in Richmond; that another portion was seized for taxes levied by the confederate government, and another portion used and destroyed by the authorities of the Confederate States for experimental purposes; and it was alleged that all these losses of Mr. O'Connor were solely in consequence of the failure of the United States to maintain and enforce their authority in the State of Virginia, and to suppress the civil and military disorders then existing there.

A demurrer was interposed on behalf of the United States in each of the three cases.

Her Majesty's counsel filed an argument in Nos. 321 and 322, in which he contended that the memorials showed a case where, by the acts of the United States, the claimants were prevented from removing their tobacco from the seat of war, where it was exposed to danger; and that but for such prohibition they would have removed and saved it; but that they were compelled to leave it in the hostile country, where it ultimately perished from one of the dangers incident to the war; that the acts of the United States alleged in the memorial, by which the claimants were prevented from removing their tobacco, were not lawful acts under international law.

That, by the statute of 13th July, 1861, (12 Stat. at L.,) commercial intercourse between the States in rebellion and the loyal States was prohibited, subject only to the license and permission of the President "in such articles, and for such time and by such persons as he in his discretion may think most conducive to the public interest, and such intercourse, so far as by him licensed, shall be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury;" that by the regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury under this act, a tax was imposed upon such permits, and a special tax upon property to be brought out under them, and it was provided that such permits should only be granted to loyal citizens of the United States.

That this act and the subsequent legislation of the United States did

not provide for blockade or non-intercourse jure belli, but were acts regulating intercourse by municipal statute between different sections of the territory of the United States; that these statutes worked injustice to the claimants, and deprived them of privileges to which they were entitled by the treaty between the United States and Great Britain; that the loss of the property in question was caused by them, and therefore was a legitimate subject of international reclamation before the commission.

That, considering the prohibition in the light of a belligerent act, the United States were bound, in analogy to maritime blockade, to allow a reasonable time for the claimants to bring out their property; and, in further analogy to the law of maritime blockade, that, as a belligerent cannot blockade a port against neutrals while he allows his own or his enemy's merchant-vessels privilege of ingress and egress for the purposes of trade, the United States cannot rightfully permit their own citizens to trade with the insurgents under permits, while prohibiting trade to neutral aliens and others without permits.

He cited the letter of Mr. Cass, Secretary of State, to Mr. Mason, United States minister to France, in June, 1859, reported in Dana's Wheaton, 672, n.; 1 Kent's Com., 146; The Grey Jacket, 5 Wall., 342; The William Bagaley, id., 408; The United States vs. Lane, 8 Wall., 185; The Francisca, 10 Moore's P. C. R., 87; The Ouachita Cotton, 6 Wall., 531; Mitchell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115.

The commission unanimously, and without hearing argument for the United States, sustained the respective demurrers, and disallowed the claims.

In the case of James Stewart, No. 339, it was alleged that the claimant, having purchased certain cotton situated upon the Mississippi River, at Dead Man's Bend, below Natchez, sent a steamboat to remove the cotton, but that the steamboat was improperly forbidden to land by the captain of a gun-boat then cruising opposite the place where the cotton was stored; that the claimant was thus prevented from removing his cotton, which was soon afterward burned by rebel scouts.

Various questions of fact arose in this case as to the title of the claimant; but it was maintained on the part of the United States that, upon the facts alleged, no reclamation could lie against the United States; that the discretion of the commanding officer of the gun-boat as to per. mitting or not permitting vessels to land, even for the removal of property for which permits from the civil authorities were held, was absolute; and that the alleged act of the officer, in prohibiting the steamboat from approaching the land and removing the property, was within the scope of his authority, and in the exercise of his duty; that the subsequent destruction of the property by the rebels was not à necessary or natural consequence of any wrongful act of the United States or any officer of the United States, and that no liability existed against the United States in respect of the transaction.

The claim was disallowed, all the commissioners agreeing.

4.-Claims for damages for alleged wrongful arrest and imprisonment.

These claims were one hundred in number, and the total amount of damages claimed, in all, was nearly $10,000,000, exclusive of interest; or, adding interest at the rate allowed by the commission, say $16,000,000. In thirty-four of the cases awards were made in favor of the claimants against the United States, in all amounting to $167,911. In sixty-four cases these claims were disallowed; one case was dismissed without prejudice for impertinent and scandalous language used in the memorial, and one was withdrawn by Her Majesty's agent by leave of the commission.

The question early arose before the commission whether in case of death prior to the presentation of the claim of the party against whose person the wrongful acts were alleged to have been committed, the claim for such injuries was to be considered as surviving to the personal representatives. This question was raised by demurrer interposed on behalf of the United States, in the cases of Edward McHugh, No. 357; Elizabeth Sherman, No. 359; and Elizabeth Brain, No. 447.

In the case of Mrs. Sherman, No. 359, all connection between the injuries alleged and the death of the intestate was disclaimed by the memorial.

In the cases of Mrs. Brain, No. 447, and of McHugh, No. 357, there were allegations that the injuries complained of caused or contributed to cause the death of the intestate; but there was no allegation of any local statute allowing damages in favor of personal representatives for a wrongful injury causing death.

On the part of the United States it was claimed that, as by the common law both of Great Britain and of the United States, claims for injuries to the person did not survive to the personal representatives, such claims were not to be considered as within the submission by article 12. That the claims which by that article were submitted could not be taken to comprehend claims of a character not recognized by the municipal laws of either of the countries parties to the treaty.

Her Majesty's counsel contended that the municipal laws of the two countries were not to be taken as controlling the rights of claimants in this regard; that claims for injuries to the person, whether such injuries caused death or not, were, in the diplomatic intercourse of civilized nations, treated as a proper subject of international reclamation in behalf of the personal representatives of the person injured atter his death. He cited the practice of the commissions under the convention between the United States and New Granada, of 10th September, 1857, (12 Stat. at L., 985,) and under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, of 2d February, 1848, between the United States and Mexico, (9 Stat. at L., 933, art. 13.)

In the case of McHugh, No. 357, where the deceased died unmarried and leaving only collateral relatives not dependent on him for support,