Cook before the commissioners under the convention of 1853 between the United States and Great Britain, (United States Senate documents, first and second sessions Thirty-fourth Congress, vol. 15, No. 103, pp. 169, 463;) also, the case of the United States vs. O'Keeffe, in the Supreme Court of the United States, (11 Wall., 178;) and the cases of Waters, (4 C. Cls. Rep., 390;) Russell, (5 id., 120;) Filor vs. United States, (9 Wall., 45 ;) also, Campbell's case, (5 C. Cls. Rep., 252;) and Provine's case, (id., 455.)

On the part of the claimant it was contended that, while the claimant was entitled to compensation for the use of his property under the Constitution of the United States, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in the case was taken away by the act of Congress of July 4, 1864, (13 Stat at L., 381,) citing Filor vs. United States, (9 Wall., 45.)

The demurrer was overruled, and an award was subsequently made in favor of the claimant for the value of the use and occupation, in which all the commissioners joined.

The case of William H. Lane, No. 9, was a claim for occupation by the United States of a building of the claimant in Memphis, in 1864; that of Eleanor W. Turner, No. 34, was a claim for like occupation of a house in New Orleans by the United States military authorities; and that of Eliza B. Nelson, No. 140, was a claim for like occupation of a building at Helena, Ark; all said occupations being while the respect. ive places were permanently held by the United States. Awards were made in favor of the claimant in each case, Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting in Nos. 34 and 140.

e. Claims for property taken under the abandoned and captured property act of March 12, 1863, (12 Stat. at L., 820.)

This act provided in effect for the turning over of property captured or seized as abandoned by the military and naval authorities of the United States to agents, to be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, for the sale of such property, and the payment of the proceeds into the Treasury; and provided that the owner of such property might, within two years after the suppression of the rebellion, bring suit for the pro. ceeds in the Court of Claims, and, ou proof of his ownership and right to the proceeds, and that he had never given aid or comfort to the rebellion, should be entitled to recover the net proceeds. The act was undoubtedly intended to apply particularly to cotton and the other staple products of the Southern States. To such products only it was in practice applied.

commission for property, Most of the claims thus

Many claims were brought before the principally cotton, taken under this act. brought had been prosecuted in the Court of Claims, some of which were still pending in that court; some were pending on appeal in the

Supreme Court; in some the Court of Claims had given judgment in favor of the claimants for the net proceeds, the claimants now claiming here that such amount was less than the full value of their property, to which they claimed themselves entitled; and in some judgment had gone against the claimant in the Court of Claims, and no appeal had been taken. In some cases the claimants were domiciled within the insurrectionary States, and in others within the British dominions. In a few cases no suit had been prosecuted in the Court of Claims. The agent of the United States interposed demurrers in several cases, including all the different classes above named.

On the argument it was contended for the United States that the right of capture, by a belligerent, of private enemy's property on land was permitted by the laws of war; that that right was specially applicable to the case of a great staple like cotton, upon which the enemy principally depended for his military and naval supplies, and for his credit and means to carry on the war; that by the abandoned and captured property act of 12th March, 1863, the United States had in no respect abandoned or waived this right, but that that act constituted merely an act of grace in favor of individuals who might show themselves personally free from complicity with the rebellion; that under that act neutral aliens stood upon the same footing with loyal citizens, and were entitled to the same rights given to such citizens by the act, and subject only to the same disabilities; that the owner of property thus captured within the enemy's country had no right of reclamation against the United States, except that given by the act, and that that remedy must be pursued in the form given, and before the tribunal specified in the act.

He cited Vattel, book 3, c. 9, §§ 161, 163, 164; Twiss, vol. 2, (war,) pp. 122 to 124; Rutherforth, book 2, c. 9, § 16; Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall., 404; the United States vs. Padelford, 9 id., 531; the United States vs. O'Keeffe, 11 id., 178; 1 Kent's Com., pp. 92, 93.

On the part of Her Majesty's counsel representing the claimants, it was contended

1. That the personal property of the inhabitants of the insurrectionary States whether citizens or aliens, neither by its locality nor by its character as product of the soil, was the lawful subject of capture as prize and booty of war.

2. That in this respect the article of cotton is not distinguishable from other property. 3. That the Government of the United States has never claimed or asserted title to such personal property as prize and booty of war, but, on the contrary, by legislation has impliedly disclaimed such title.

4. That the property for the destruction or appropriation of which these claimants demand indemnity never ceased to be their property, but continued such, notwithstanding the fact of war and the fact of seizure or appropriation by the military authorities of the United States.

5. That their right to be indemnified for such seizure or appropriation does not depend in any degree upon any municipal legislation of the United States either recognizing the right or providing a remedy complete or partial, but rests upon principles of the public law, recognized as well by the United States as by all other civilized nations.

6. That, therefore, the act of March 12, 1863, neither gave any right which the parties had not before by settled principles of public law, nor purported to give a remedy commensurate with that right under the public law. That act was purely a municipal measure, dictated by considerations of domestic policy.

7. That, therefore, it is wholly immaterial to the determination of these international claims whether those parties had or had not a remedy under that statute, or did or did not avail themselves of such remedy. The Court of Claims in no degree exercised the functions or fulfilled the duties of this tribunal, whose obligations under the treaty and the public law must be discharged according to its own judgment and conscience in cases coming within the treaty, whether the Court of Claims, in executing the act of 1863, exercised or not a wholly distinct jurisdiction conferred upon it by that statute.

8. If under that statute the claimant has obtained a partial indemnity, the United States can only claim a credit for so much of the indemnity as the party has received in that form. In no other way, and to no other extent, can the proceedings in the Court of Claims affect the awards in these cases.

He cited 1 Kent's Com., 91; Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall., 404; United States vs. Klein, 13 Wall., 128; United States vs. Padelford, supra; Brown vs. United States, 8 Cranch, 110; Grant's case, (decisions C. Cls., October term, 1863 ;) Vattel, book 3, c. 5, § 75; c. 7, § 109.

The arguments of the respective counsel were filed in the cases of James B. McElhose, No. 225, and of Thomas Arkwright, No. 302. Many other cases were submitted under the same arguments.

The commission unanimously sustained the demurrers in the cases in which suit had been brought in the Court of Claims, whether still pending in that court, or on appeal, or previously decided, and dismissed those cases.

In the case of Elizabeth Knowles, No. 175, and other cases in which no suit had been brought in the Court of Claims, the commission (Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting) overruled the demurrers, and took jurisdiction of the claims upon their merits. Mr. Commissioner Frazer read a written opinion upon the questions involved in these cases, a copy of which will be found in the appendix, G.

2.-Claims for property alleged to have been wrongfully injured or destroyed by the forces of the United states.

These claims were also numerous, and involved a large variety of questions. They included claims for property injured or destroyed by the bombardment of towns of the enemy, as in the case of Charles Cleworth, No. 48; and in other ordinary operations of war, such as the passage of armies, the erection of fortifications, as in the case of Trook, administrator, No. 58, &c. Also, claims for property available to the enemy for military purposes, or for the prosecution of the war, and purposely destroyed in the enemy's country as a means of weakening the enemy, as in the cases of Samuel H. Haddon, No. 107, and John Murphy, No. 326. Also, for property incidentally involved in the destruction of public stores, works, and means of transportation of the

enemy, as in the cases of John K. Byrne, No. 200; Charles Black, No. 128, and A. K. McMillan, No. 250. Also, for timber felled in front of forts and batteries to give clear range for the guns and deprive the enemy of cover, as in the cases of Trook, administrator, No. 58, and of William B. Booth, No. 143. For property alleged to have been wantonly and without provocation or military necessity destroyed or injured in the enemy's country, as in the cases of Anthony Barclay, No. 5; Godfrey Barnsley, No. 162, and in the Columbia cases.

In these claims for destruction of property, it may be stated generally that, with very few exceptions, and those mostly insignificant, no awards were made against the United States.

The claims for injuries by bombardment, the passage of armies, the cutting of timber to clear away obstructions, the erection of fortifications, &c., in the enemy's country, were all disallowed by the unanimous voice of the commissioners.

The same may be said of the incidental destruction of innocent property involved in the destruction of public stores and works of the enemy.

In several cases there were allegations of the wanton destruction of property by United States troops, and in some cases satisfactory proof was made of the fact of such destruction by soldiers without command or authority of their commanding officers, and in defiance of orders.

In the case of Anthony Barclay, No. 5, allegations were made of wanton destruction of property, including valuable furniture, china, pictures, and other works of art, books, &c. The proof was conflicting as to whether the injuries alleged were committed by soldiers or not; but if committed by soldiers, it was plainly not only without authority, but in direct violation of the orders of General Sherman. In the award made in favor of Mr. Barclay, I am advised that nothing was included for property alleged to have been destroyed.

Several claims were brought for property alleged to have been destroyed by the burning of Columbia, on the allegation that that city was wantonly fired by the army of General Sherman, either under his orders or with his consent and permission. A large amount of tes timony was taken upon this subject, including that of General Hampton and other confederate officers on the part of the claimants, and of Generals Sherman, Logan, Howard, Woods, and other Federal officers on the part of the United States. The claims were all disallowed, all the commissioners agreeing.

I am advised that the commissioners were unanimous in the conclusion that the conflagration which destroyed Columbia was not to be ascribed to either the intention or default of either the Federal or confederate officers. The commission did not pass on the question whether, in case the city had been burned by the order or permission of the com

manding officer, any liability for resulting losses would have existed against the United States.

The claim of Henry E. and Alfred Cox, No. 229, was for a saw-mill and its motive-power, machinery, &c., destroyed by raiding parties from General Sherman's army, near Meridian, Miss., in February, 1864. The expedition by which the mill was destroyed was sent out by General Sherman for the express purpose of destroying the confederate mills, supplies, railroads, and means of transportation.

The proofs showed that the saw-mill in question had been actually employed in the sawing of railroad-ties for the confederate government, and was available for this and similar purposes.

On the part of the defense it was claimed that the destruction was a lawful act of war.

The claim was unanimously disallowed.

The case of William Smythe, No. 333, was a claim for an iron and brass foundry, machine-shop, and machinery, fixtures, supplies, &c., for same, destroyed by General Sherman in Atlanta, after the capture of that city, and before his advance upon Savannah. The establishment had been employed in the manufacture of shot, shell, and other military supplies for the confederate government.

The claim was unanimously disallowed.

The case of James and Richard Martin, No. 434, was a claim for the value of the British ship York, which, in January, 1862, on a voyage in ballast from Valencia, Spain, to Lewistown, Delaware, was alleged to have been driven ashore on the coast of North Carolina, one of the insurrectionary States, and, while there stranded, to have been destroyed by United States cruisers.

The proofs satisfactorily established that the vessel was actually wrecked without intent of her officers, and while on a lawful voyage. An officer of the United States Navy, believing her to have been intentionally beached for the purpose of running in her cargo for the use of the enemy, and that the cargo, with the rigging and furniture of the vessel, was actually available to the rebels, boarded and burned her.

The commission made an award for her value in favor of the claimants, in which all joined.

The case of James A. Macaulay, No. 260, was a claim for certain cotton, the cargo of the steamship Blanche, which was alleged to have sailed from the port of Lavaca, Tex., in June, 1862, and on her voyage to Havana to have been pursued by the United States war-vessel Montgomery, commanded by Lieutenant Hunter, to have run aground on the coast of the island of Cuba, and, while so aground, to have been boarded by the crew of the Montgomery, set on fire, and, with her cargo, totally destroyed.