quent acts done and expense incurred by her owners on the faith thereof, in continuing to lade their cargo on top of the saltpetre, in reliance on the ordinance, constituted a contract, and entitled the vessel to the observance of that contract by the Indian authorities.

Under the treaty between Great Britain and the United States, the claimants respectively contended that the right of the vessels in question to sail with the saltpetre on board was guarantied by the terms of the treaty. That "exportation" of saltpetre "from the said territories" was not "entirely prohibited" by the terms of the ordinances, for such exportation was allowed to England. That transportation from India to England was an "exportation from the said territories," and was so recognized by the terms of the proclamation itself, which recited, "it shall not be lawful for any person to export saltpetre from any part of Her Majesty's territories in India, except in a British vessel bound either to the port of London or to the port of Liverpool." That the acts in question were plainly not "in time of war between the British government and any state or power whatever." That the language of the treaty providing "that in all that regards this article, the citi zens of the United States shall be subject in all respects to the laws and regulations of the British government from time to time established," could not be construed so as to authorize the local authorities to deny rights expressly stipulated for in the treaty, and formed no bar to the right of the claimants to sail with the saltpetre on board their vessels, the same having been lawfully taken on board.

The claimants' counsel cited the Boedes Lust, 5 Rob., 246; Beawes Mer. Law, 276; U. S. Stat. at L., 381, re-imbursing sufferers from the Bordeaux embargo; Dana's Wheaton, p. 4, §15; p. 373, § 293; 3d Phill., 42; Honeyman arguendo, in Aubert vs. Gray, 3 B. and S., Q. B., 179; letter of Lord Clarendon to Mr. Dallas, of May 15, 1856, Br. and Am. Dip. Cor.; Gardn. Inst. of Int. Law, 546.

Her Majesty's counsel maintained that both under international law, irrespective of treaty stipulation, and under the treaty stipulations between the United States and Great Britain, the proclamation and ordinances in question were lawful and valid, and involved no liability for compensation to parties injured by their provisions. That they were general regulations, not directed against the ships or cargoes of these claimants in particular, nor subjecting the ships or commerce of the United States to any discrimination or disadvantage not common to all other foreign nations. That even British ships were subjected to the same disadvantage; and the right of exporting saltpetre to the mother country reserved to them was a right which never had belonged to the United States. That commercial adventures of this character were, in the nature of things, subject to any modification of law which might affect the anticipated profits, and perhaps defeat them altogether. That the ordinances did not constitute an embargo in any just sense, whether hostile or civil. That they were municipal regulations of trade,

not forbidden by any principle known to the law of nations. And that, aside from the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, they were clearly authorized by international law. That a just interpretation of the third article of the convention of 1815 must hold it not to prohibit the British government from regulating the exportation of products of the Indies, from time to time, as might be deemed expedient, or in its discretion from temporarily prohibiting the exportation of some or all of such products to any foreign nation whatever. And that of the occasion of such prohibition and its extent, every nation must of necessity be for itself the sole judge.

That the treaty permitting the trade between the Indian ports and the United States in articles the exportation of which "shall not be entirely prohibited," gave no right to those citizens to export saltpetre at the time in question, the exportation of that article being by the terms of the ordinances entirely prohibited. That the word "exportation" referred to foreign commerce, and not to the transportation from the Indies to the home ports of Great Britain. That the reservation of the right of transportation to such home ports was in no respect preju dicial to the commerce of the United States, they having no right to participate in the trade between Indian ports and the ports of Great Britain. That the treaty itself providing for this trade also provided that the citizens of the United States should be subject in all respects to the laws and regulations of the British government, and thus expressly subjected them to the operation of ordinances like those in question authorized by the statute upon which they were based. That the ordinances of 27th December and 3d January were just, caused by an act of an armed vessel of the United States in violation of international law, and affording a reasonable apprehension of hostilities to ensue between Great Britain and the United States. That in such case all means of protection and self-defense, not in themselves at variance with the ordinary principles of justice, and impartially used, were permissible to every government, and that this prerogative having been exercised bona fide for the safety of the realm on a particular emergency by a prohibition equally affecting native subjects and foreign merchants, the latter have no ground upon principles of international right or justice to require compensation for such an unavoidable diminution of their commercial profits.

The commission disallowed all the claims, Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting and reading a dissenting opinion, a copy of which will be found in the appendix, E."

Tripp's case.

Josiah Winslow Tripp vs. Great Britain, No. 15.

The claimant in this case alleged, in substance, by his memorial that prior to August, 1862, he was lawfully possessed of a certain limestone

quarry and lime-kiln, together with some 1,500 barrels of lime, tools, furniture, &c., on San Juan Island, in the Territory of Washington, belonging to the United States.

That in his absence from the island in August, 1862, his wife was ejected from the premises by one Roberts, a British subject, who took possession of the real estate and appropriated the personal property. That claimant commenced a suit against Roberts in a justice's court of the Territory of Washington to recover the possession of the premises, and obtained judgment for restitution of the property, which was followed by a warrant of restitution for its enforcement.

That Roberts thereupon appealed to Captain Bazalgett, commander of the British forces on the island. That Bazalgett thereupon applied to Major Bissell, commanding the American forces on the island, and that Major Bissell thereupon arrested the claimant and the justice of the peace who had rendered the judgment against Roberts, put them in the guard-house, and shortly after expelled the claimant from the island.

That in April, 1864, the claimant returned to the island, and finding his claim vacant, took possession of the same, providing a new stock of tools and supplies, and commenced to work the quarry; but after ten days spent in it, was again forcibly removed by command of Captain Bazalgett, put in the guard-house, detained two weeks, and then ban. ished from the island and forbidden ever to return.

The memorial alleged the value of the quarry at $50,000, and claimed damages by occasion of the premises $100,000.

Evidence was taken on the part of the claimant tending to sustain his allegations as to his possession of the property and removal therefrom.

At the time of the acts alleged the title of the island of San Juan was in dispute between the United States and Great Britain, and the island was occupied by a joint military force of the two governments under an arrangement made between them for such joint occupancy, by which the citizens and subjects of each government were made amenable to the authorities of their own government only.

Pending the case before this commission, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, to whom the decision of the question was referred by the treaty of 8th May, 1871, decided the island to be the property of the United States.

The proofs filed on the part of the defence showed that the arrest of Tripp and his expulsion from the island were by order of the commander of the United States forces upon the island, and not through any assumption of authority on the part of the commander of the British forces.

The claimant filed an argument admitting that the arrest and order of banishment on each occasion came from the American commander, but claiming that it was on the complaint of the British commander, who represented his own government and made unfounded charges

against the claimant, which were the cause of his arrest and banishment, and that by reason thereof the British government was liable. to his reclamation for damages.

The commission, without hearing any argument for the defense, unanimously disallowed the claim.

Hubbell's case.

William Wheeler Hubbell vs. Great Britain, No. 17.

The memorial of the claimant alleged, in effect, that prior to the 1st of July, 1844, the claimant was the inventor of a certain improvement in breech-loading fire-arms, for which letters patent were issued to him by the United States, dated 1st July, 1844.

That in the year 1844 the British government, through Her Majesty's consul at Philadelphia, ordered of the claimant two specimen guns made. under the claimant's invention and patent, which were thereupon procured to be made by the claimant, and furnished through the consul to Her Majesty's government in 1815, and paid for by that government.

The memorial further alleged that "it was understood and agreed that the invention of said mechanical principle" of the claimant "should be paid for by Her Majesty's government whenever it should be determined upon for adoption in Her Majesty's service." That after the receipt of the specimen guns, in 1845, it was determined by Her Majesty's government, in the same year, that it was not expedient to adopt them for use, but that subsequently, on the 14th March, 1865, Her Majesty's government made "a full determination of adoption in Her Majesty's service of breech-loading fire-arms" known as the Snyder Enfield rifle, containing and embodying the mechanical principle covered by the claimant's invention and patent; and that after such official "determination of adoption," in March, 1865, Her Majesty's government issued to Her Majesty's army and navy 500,000 muskets of the pattern named and covered by the invention and patent of the claimant.

The claimant claimed a royalty of $1 each upon these muskets, amounting to $500,000, besides interest.

A demurrer was interposed by Her Majesty's counsel to the memorial, on the ground that the commission had no jurisdiction of the claim stated in the memorial, and that the memorial alleged no sufficient ground of claim against Great Britain, in that—

1. The claim was based upon a contract, express or implied, which was not a claim within the terms or intent of the treaty, not being a claim" arising out of acts committed against the persons or property of citizens of the United States."

2. That if such claim on contract were within the jurisdiction given by the treaty, the claimant could have no standing before the commission as an international tribunal until he had exhausted the remedies in

all the municipal courts of Great Britain, and until justice had been denied him by such tribunals in re minime dubia.

3. That the facts alleged in the memorial established no such contract as claimed by the claimant for the payment of a royalty upon guns subsequently used and covered by his invention.

4. That no act of Her Majesty's government was alleged as happening within treaty time, except the "full determination of adoption " alleged to have been made in March, 1865, and that this was not an act committed against the property of the claimant.

5. That the claimant did not appear to have had any property in his alleged invention in England, and that his property in the invention in the United States had expired prior to March, 1865, and was open to the whole world.

On hearing on the demurrer, the claim was unanimously disallowed by the commission.

V.-CLAIMS OF SUBJECTS OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

1.-Claims for property alleged to have been taken and appropriated to the use of the United States.

The claims embraced under this head were very numerous, and arose under various circumstances. Most of them may be grouped under the following heads:

a. Those for property in the nature of military supplies, taken by authorized officers for military use, and vouchers given for the same. These claims arose sometimes within the loyal States, sometimes within the Federal lines, in territory reclaimed from the enemy within the insurrectionary States, and sometimes within the enemy's lines. Among them may be named the case of Thomas Ward, No. 1, which was for cotton taken from the claimant at Wilmington, N. C., shortly after the capture of that city by the Federal forces, and appropriated for the use of the United States hospital.

On the part of the United States it was contended that the claimant, being a resident of North Carolina, was, by domicile, an enemy of the United States. He was found in a town captured by them, and his property was liable to levies and contributions for their benefit. The voucher given was in the following words:

CFFICE PROVOST-MARSHAL GENERAL,

Wilmington, N. C., March 3, 1865.

Received of Thomas Ward, two bales of cotton.

P. C. HAYES,

Lieut. Col. and Provost-Marshal General, U. S. A.,

and was accompanied by a certificate of an assistant surgeon that the

cotton was used for beds in the hospital.