of 1824. Stanwood's Elections, 79-95: Schouler's United States, III, 304-329. friends, but as yet the strength which lay behind him was The election unorganized. As it was, he received eighty-nine electoral votes more than any other candidate; Adams received eighty-four votes, Crawford forty-one, and Clay thirtyseven. No candidate had obtained a majority, and the election went to the House, voting by states, and confined in its choice to the three highest on the list (p. 341). Clay was therefore out of the contest. His views and those of his supporters coincided more nearly with those of Adams than with those of either Jackson or Crawford. He advised his adherents to vote for Adams, and the latter was elected. Cry of corruption and bargain. J. Q. Adams. States, III, 336-343, 397-409. The Constitution had expressly given the House the right to choose from the three highest on the list. Nevertheless, the adherents of Jackson declared that the representatives had thwarted the will of the people. In a few days it became known that Adams had offered Clay the position of Secretary of State, which the latter had accepted, most unwisely, as events were to show. The opponents of Adams and Clay at once raised the cry that a bargain had been made between them. Jackson, who seldom calculated his words, and who had probably never forgiven Clay for his attempt to bring him to account for his raid of 1818 (p. 375), announced that Clay was "the Judas of the West"; and John Randolph of Roanoke, the bitter opponent of the nationalizing tendencies of Adams and Clay, asserted in his virulent way that it was "a combination between the Puritan and the blackleg." There is probably not an atom of truth in the charge of a bargain between the new President and his Secretary of State; the accusation was repeated, however, until even its inventors must have believed in it, and it did incalculable harm to both Adams and Clay. 265. J. Q. Adams's Administration, 1825-29. — Adams was in every way fitted for his new office. Absolutely fearless, honest, and upright, with a good mind and well trained to the administration of affairs, he would no doubt have succeeded admirably had he become President eight, or 1825] Foreign Relations 391 even four, years earlier. He represented the sympathies and aspirations of the generation which was now fast losing its hold on the confidence of the people. With the forces that were to direct the future destinies of the country, he had little in common. His opponents reiterated the charges of "corruption and bargain"; they set on foot constant and causeless inquiries into the conduct of public officials; they discovered little wrongdoing, but the ceaseless round of charges kept alive the suspicions that many persons undoubtedly felt as to Adams's honesty and good faith. On his part, Adams made many mistakes. He proposed a vast system of public improvements which alienated the support of the Southerners; he set his name to the worst tariff bill that the country has ever had; and he failed to carry on successfully the foreign relations of the nation. Britain. 266. Foreign Relations, 1825-29. — The most unfortunate Relations event in the foreign relations of these years was the closing with Great of the British West India ports to American commerce. This was not due to any fault of Adams, but to untimely legislation by Congress. The administration did what it could to settle the matter amicably, but the British government refused to negotiate on the subject at all. In one respect, Adams and Clay were fortunate: they concluded many commercial treaties; but their good effect was more than offset by the loss of the British West India trade. Schouler's The administration took a warm interest in a Congress The Panama of all the American Republics, which met at Panama, in Congress. response to an invitation issued by General Simon Bolivar, the South American patriot. Adams was anxious to extend States, III, the influence of the United States over the other American 358-365. states; he also desired to secure a general recognition of the principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine. Acting on these ideas, he at once accepted Bolivar's invitation. When Congress met, however, the opposition seized on this as a favorable point of attack. Among the American states invited to be present at the Congress was the negro Georgia, the Indians, and the federal government. Schouler's United States, III, 370-381. republic of Hayti. The slave owners dreaded the example of the black republic on their slaves; they disliked the idea of sitting at a table on equal terms with the free negroes of Hayti; and they were alarmed lest the Panama Congress should adopt resolutions hostile to slavery. After considerable delay, Congress voted the funds necessary to enable the United States delegates to go to Panama. They did not arrive there until after the Congress had adjourned, and the whole affair ended in a ridiculous failure. 267. Adams and Georgia, 1825-27. When Georgia had ceded her claims to Western lands to the United States (1802), the state and the federal governments had agreed that the latter should in some way remove the Indians from the lands remaining to Georgia. It was found very difficult to accomplish this. Georgia became impatient and proceeded to take possession of a portion of the lands, in virtue of a treaty which probably had no force. The government interfered to protect the Indians from unjust spoliation, and brought upon itself the anger of Governor Troup of Georgia, and of the legislative authorities of that state. The governor, echoing the Kentucky and Hartford Convention resolutions, stated that "between states equally independent . . . between sovereigns the weaker is equally qualified to pass upon its rights" as the stronger. A committee of the legislature went further, and reported that the time was approaching when the Southern states would be obliged to confederate. Adams, on his part, informed Congress that he intended "to enforce the laws, and fulfill the duties of the nation by all the force committed for that purpose to his charge." In Congress, however, the opponents of Adams and Clay were in the majority; they grasped the opportunity to humiliate the administration, and declined to support him. Adams was obliged to draw back, though at great loss to the national prestige. Georgia had successfully defied a weak administration; it remained to be seen whether South Carolina would be able to withstand a strong one (p. 418). 393 -"The Tariff of The and the United 1828," says Professor Taussig, ". was a political job." No politicians political faction dared to oppose it in view of the approach- tariff. ing election. The Southerners were now very unfriendly Schouler's to its protective policy, but, owing to the necessity of pro- States, III, curing the votes of the Jackson men in the protective North 420-426. and West, they were obliged to find some expedient by which, while seeming to favor a high protective tariff, they might secure its defeat. According to Calhoun, the scheme adopted was the invention of Martin Van Buren, senator from New York, and chief of a political clique in that state known as the Albany Junto. Van Buren had opposed Jackson in 1824, but had since warmly attached himself. to his cause and had organized his faction. The plan of these men was to promote the passage of a bill which should contain such high duties on raw materials — most of them produced in the West that the representatives of the manufacturing states in the East would not vote for it. It was expected that the latter would join with the Southern representatives at the last moment, and by their votes insure its defeat. The scheme was a "curious commentary," to quote again from Professor Taussig, "on the politicians who were now coming into power." In the beginning, everything worked happily for the conspirators. A committee of the House of Representatives, composed mainly of Jackson men, reported a bill containing high duties on manufactured goods, which the manufacturers desired, and high duties on raw materials, which the Westerners wanted. The latter duties completely destroyed the effects of the former, so far as the manufacturers were concerned. When the bill came before the House, the Jackson men refused to allow amendments, except one, which slightly bettered the case of the manufacturers of coarse woolens. The same course was pursued by the Jackson men in the Senate. The bill, abominations and all, was better for the manufacturers than no bill. They doubtless expected to be able to secure the removal of some of the things which bore The "abominations." Calhoun's Exposition. See on this general subject, Cal houn's letter to Hamilton, in Stedman and Hutchinson, IV, 478. most harshly upon them,― an expectation that was verified in 1830. The Adams men, therefore, much to the chagrin of the plotters, voted for the bill, the President signed it, and it became law. A few illustrations will serve to show the character of the measure. For instance, the duty on hemp, which was not produced in the country in any quantity, but was much used in Northern shipyards, was raised from thirty-five to sixty dollars per ton and the duty on coarse wool, used in the manufacture of carpets and cheap woolen goods, was more than doubled, but no corresponding increase was made in the duty on the manufactured article. 269. Calhoun's Exposition, 1828. The Southerners were greatly angered by the passage of this measure, although it is impossible to say how much it injured them, if it injured them at all. There was a sense of grievance, at all events, and the leaders used it to promote the promulgation of states'-rights doctrines. Five Southern legislatures protested against the act, and the legislature of South Carolina embodied its ideas in an Exposition and Protest, drawn up by Calhoun (December, 1828). In this celebrated document Calhoun, reverting to the precedents of 1799 and 1815 (pp. 308, 365), argued that "the existence of the right of judging of their powers, clearly established from the sovereignty of the states, as clearly implies a veto or control on the action of the general government. . . . There exists a case [the Tariff of 1828] which would justify the interposition of this state, in order to compel the general government to abandon an unconstitutional power, or to appeal to this high authority [the states] to confer it by express grant." He suggested that a convention of the state of South Carolina should be held, to decide in what manner the Tariff Act "ought to be declared null and void within the limits of the state." So threatening, indeed, was the outlook at the time, that Webster wrote, "I became thoroughly convinced that the plan of a Southern confederacy had been received with favor by a great many of the |