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Siege of Boston, 1775-76.

Winsor's

America,

VI, 128-134;
Fiske's
Revolution,
I, 136-146.

less in some regions it was not a hundred miles wide. When hard pressed, the colonial armies were nearly always able to retire to inaccessible hilly regions, where pursuit was dangerous, if not impossible. The long, thin fringe of the continent was intersected by large and deep rivers and by arms of the sea: there were a dozen fields of operation in place of one. For instance, the Hudson River, with Lake Champlain, divided New England from the rest of the continent (p. 13); the Mohawk separated the Hudson valley into two distinct parts; Delaware and Chesapeake bays and the rivers of Virginia (p. 557) made a campaign of invasion south of the Hudson a matter of great difficulty; and the Carolinas were cut up into several geographical districts by marshes, by large regions of sandy, sparsely settled country, and by long deep rivers unusually subject to floods. Portions of this territory were still hardly better than a wilderness: good roads, suitable for the movement of army trains and artillery, were to be found only in the vicinity of the larger towns; and even these were impassable during a large portion of each year. On the other hand, good harbors everywhere abounded and made the business of the privateer and the blockade runner peculiarly easy.

142. Bunker Hill, 1775. — The siege or blockade of Boston lasted for almost eleven months, from April 19, 1775, to March 17, 1776. During those months, a force drawn from all the New England colonies, and, after July, 1775, from the other colonies as well, blockaded the British army. In all this time there was but one action deserving the name of battle, the battle of Bunker Hill. On June 16 reports reached the colonial headquarters that the Bunker Hill. British commander intended to seize Dorchester Heights. To divert him from the execution of this plan, the ComVI, 134-140. mittee of Safety ordered the seizure of Bunker Hill. On

Winsor's

America,

the night of the 16th, Colonel Prescott occupied Breed's Hill, which was nearer Boston. When day dawned, he must have seen that his position was untenable: there were no

1775]

Bunker Hill

195

batteries on the mainland to guard the neck leading to Charlestown; it was possible for Gage to station vessels in the Charles and Mystic rivers and concentrate such a fire on the isthmus that no one could cross it; the British could then occupy Bunker Hill and hold the force in the redoubt at their mercy. On the morning of the 17th, Stark and his men from New Hampshire hastened to

[graphic]

Prescott's succor.

Joseph Warren (Killed at Bunker Hill)

Under Gage's orders, five thousand British soldiers, commanded by Howe, Clinton, and Pigott, attacked the Americans in front; they were twice beaten back, and only the failure of the American ammunition made their third assault a success. The British loss on that day was from one thousand to fifteen hundred men; that of the colonists was about four hundred. The Americans were beaten, although they were not captured to a man,

[graphic][merged small]

After a

painting by C. W. Peale the earliest known portrait of Washington

1776]

Evacuation of Boston

197

as they should have been. Seldom has a defeat proved so inspiriting to the vanquished and so disheartening to the victors. The caution which Howe,

who soon succeeded Gage, showed hm Stowk

as long as he commanded the British

army can be traced directly to the lesson he received on this memorable field.

assumes

ingham's Republic,

419-431.

143. Evacuation of Boston, 1776. Meantime, the Sec- Continental ond Continental Congress had met at Philadelphia in May Congress (1775), had adopted the army blockading Boston as a charge of national force, and had given it a commander,- Colonel war, Fiske's George Washington of Virginia. He assumed direction Revolution, I, 132-136; of the military operations on July 3, 1775, and at once Frothfound that he had a most disheartening task before him. A full understanding of the difficulties which beset him can best be learned from his correspondence: his army, based on short terms of enlistment, constantly changed in number and personnel; he had no heavy guns suited to siege operations, and for weeks at a time had no powder, save what the men had in their pouches. Washington was obliged to present a bold front to the enemy, but was unable to undertake any active movement or to explain the reasons for his inaction. In the winter of 1775-76, heavy guns, which Fiske's had been captured in May, 1775, at Ticonderoga and Revolution Crown Point, by men from western New England, were drawn over the snow to his lines, and the capture of a British vessel provided the necessary powder. Now, at last, Washington was able to assume the offensive. In March, 1776, he seized and held Dorchester Heights. The Winsor's town and harbor of Boston were no longer tenable by the British, and on March 17 they evacuated the town, and shortly after left the harbor.

129-132.

Evacuation

of Boston.

America,

VI, 142-158.

Invasion

of Canada. Winsor's

Meantime two columns, led by Richard Montgomery and Benedict Arnold, had invaded Canada. Montgomery America, perished gallantly under the walls of Quebec. The rem- VI, 160-167; nants of these forces were rescued with the greatest difficulty in the spring and summer of 1776.

Fiske's
Revolution,
I, 164-169.

Change of sentiment in regard to independence, 1775-76.

Jefferson in
Congress.

The "Olive Branch Petition," 1775. Frothingham's Republic,

435, 444-447, 451.

Effect of the king's

answer.

Changes in local

government,

men.

144. Growth towards Independence, 1775, 1776. — In 1776, Washington wrote, "When I took command of the army [July, 1775], I abhorred the idea of independence; now, I am convinced, nothing else will save us." There is every reason to believe that Washington's feelings on this subject were those of a large portion of his countryBetween July, 1775, and May, 1776, there was a great revulsion of feeling against the further continuance of the union with Great Britain. This change in the sentiments of thousands of colonists can be traced directly to a few leading causes: (1) the contemptuous refusal by George III of the "Olive Branch" petition; (2) the formation of the state governments; (3) the establishment of a national organization; (4) the arguments embodied in the writings of Thomas Paine; and (5) the employment of the "Hessian" soldiers by the British government.

In 1775 Thomas Jefferson succeeded Washington as a member of the Virginia delegation. It is not probable that he at once exerted much influence in Congress; but the petition which that body addressed to the king in July, 1775, was much bolder in tone than the preceding petition. Congress now demanded the repeal of "such statutes as more immediately distress any of your Majesty's Colonies." The king refused even to return a formal answer to this "Olive Branch" petition, as the colonists regarded it; instead he issued a proclamation denouncing the colonists as "dangerous and ill-designing men . . . who had at length proceeded to an open and avowed rebellion." As to the effect of this proclamation on the public mind, John Jay wrote, "Until after the rejection. of the second petition of Congress in 1775, I never heard an American of any class or of any description express a wish for the independence of the colonies."

145. The State Constitutions, 1775, 1776. Another important step in bringing about the change in sentiment noted in the preceding section, was the necessity for making new provisions for government in the several colonies.

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