sued for and recovered in the same action or suit. The words, "flag, standard, color or ensign," as used in this section, shall include any flag, standard, color, ensign, or any picture or representation of either thereof, made of any substance or represented on any substance, and of any size, evidently purporting to be, either of, said flag, standard, color or ensign, of the United States of America, or a picture or a representation, of either thereof, upon which shall be shown the colors, the stars, and the stripes, in any number of either thereof, or by which the person seeing the same, without deliberation may believe the same to represent the flag, colors, standard, or ensign of the United States of America.

The possession after this act takes effect, by any person other than a public officer, as such, of any such flag, standard, color or ensign, on which shall be anything made unlawful by this section, or of any article or substance or thing on which shall be anything made unlawful by this section, shall be presumptive evidence that the same is in violation of this section, and was made, done or created after this act takes effect, and that such flag, standard, color, ensign or article, substance, or thing, did not exist when this act takes effect.

SEC. 2. In effect. This act shall be in full force and effect on and after January 1st, 1914.

Approved April 14 A. D. 1913.

Miss Evelyn Beatrice Longman, who was awarded the commission for the Allison Memorial at Des Moines, is one of the few women sculptors who have won renown for themselves. Of this few, the larger proportion has come from the West, and to this group belongs Miss Longman. Born in Winchester, Ohio, of English parents, her earliest years were spent amid humble surroundings. She received an ordinary public school education and at the age of fourteen years began to earn her living in a large wholesale house in Chicago. Inheriting a love for the artistic from her father who was a musician and something of an artist, she used her first savings in studying drawing and painting in Olivet College, Michigan. Here she began her first efforts in modeling. In

1899 she returned to Chicago and studied at the Art Institute under Lorado Taft for two years. After her course there she went to New York and worked with Hermon A. MacNeil, Isidor Konti and as assistant in the studio of Daniel C. French. Her first work of importance was a colossal "Victory" which was placed on Festival Hall, at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis, and won a silver medal for its designer. She has executed notable portrait busts of John Stewart Kennedy, Col. Robert M. Thompson, J. G. Schmidlapp and Kate Parsenow. Her work on the Foster mausoleum at Middleburgh, New York, and the Wells memorial and the Storey memorial at Lowell, Massachusetts, is significant for its virility and beauty. Another phase of her work is seen in the magnificent bronze doors for the chapel of the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and the less elaborate but equally interesting doors for the library building at Wellesley College. Miss Longman is a member of the National Sculpture Society and her studio is at present in New York City, overlooking Central Park.

Mr. Henry Bacon, associate architect of the Allison Memorial, is the designer of the Lincoln Memorial at Washington, D. C. He is a western man, born at Watseka, Illinois, November 28, 1866. His parents were from New England. In 1884 he spent a year in the University of Illinois, after which he worked in the office of Chamberlin & Whidden, architects, Boston, for three years and then in the office of McKim, Mead & White of New York. In 1889 he won the Rotch traveling scholarship which gave him opportunity to spend two years abroad, studying the buildings of Italy and Greece. In 1897 he formed a partnership with James Brite which lasted until 1903. He has practiced alone since that date and has designed the architectural setting for more than sixty monuments, working with Augustus Saint Gaudens, Daniel C. French, Charles H. Niehaus, Karl Bitter and others. He has also designed the public library at Paterson, New Jersey, the general hospital at Waterbury, Connecticut, and other public buildings.

INTERPRETATION OF THE CAPITOL GROUNDS EXTENSION LAW.

(Concluded.)

III. In so far then as the act authorizes the issuance of warrants or certificates in anticipation of taxes to be collected during a biennial period and to cover any deficiency therein to meet expenses incurred in executing its purposes, not exceeding $250,000, it ought not to be denounced as inimical to the provisions of the Constitution quoted. If the last four sections of the act were to be construed as plaintiffs contend these should be, however, a different conclusion would necessarily follow. They say that these authorize the executive council to anticipate the taxes to be levied during the entire ten years amounting in the aggregate to over $2,200,000, $1,200,000 of which must be collected after the first biennial period. Were it to be so construed, the limit of $250,000 might be exceeded, and unless the principle which governed in Swanson v. City of Ottumwa, 118 Iowa, 161, 91 N. W. 1048, 59 L. R. A. 620, shall obtain, this would be in violation of section 2 of article 7 of the Constitution. There, the city was authorized to levy a tax annually for a series of years out of which to create a sinking fund for the purpose of the purchase or erection of a system of waterworks, and, in order to meet the present cost, to create a specific fund, by issuing bonds payable only from said sinking fund, from which and the sinking fund on hand to pay the contract price for the erection and completion of said system of waterworks. For the payment of these bonds with interest "shall be pledged the entire proceeds of the two mills sinking fund tax," "and so much of the proceeds of the water rates and rentals collected from consumers and of the water tax * as shall not

be needed for maintenance and operation, repairs and proper and necessary extensions, additions and improvements of said waterworks." The plan was approved by a vote of the electors, a contract entered into, and the city was about to issue bonds such as contemplated, when suit was instituted to enjoin the issuance of the bonds for that, as was claimed, the indebtedness of the city then equalled the constitutional limit and such bonds would create a debt within the meaning of section 3, art. 11, of the Constitution, declaring that "no county or other political or municipal corporation shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount in the aggregate, exceeding five per

centum on the value of the taxable property within such county or corporation." On great consideration, the bonds were held not to create a "debt" such as contemplated in the above section; the court, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, saying: "Were we to give the word 'debt' the broad significance that some of the authorities would justify, we should destroy the corporate life and efficiency of every municipality which reached the allowed limit of indebtedness. But the construction we give it has strong support in the decisions of the courts of other states, is in strict line with the opinion we have heretofore frequently expressed, and preserves the integrity of the Constitution according to its evident meaning and intent, while entailing no disastrous consequences to the city or to its citizens. The right of a city to construct and own works of public utility, if such rights exist, is one of great importance, and should not be embarrassed or rendered nugatory by strained or technical construction of the Constitution or of the statutes. Its importance is not so much in the fact that public ownership is in itself wise or desirable (concerning which there may be much difference of opinion) as in the fact that with such power in reserve municipalities are placed in position to deal with private owners on equal terms, and avoid vexations which their helplessness might otherwise invite."

That case is readily distinguishable from that now before us. After the bonds were issued and the system of waterworks purchased or erected, the municipality would have no escape from the levy and collection of the taxes stipulated and the application thereof to the satisfaction of the bonds and interest. In this case, however, the action of one General Assembly is not binding on its successor unless so declared in the fundamental law, and, though the ThirtyFifth General Assembly did enact these statutes relating to the extension of the state capitol grounds, the succeeding General Assemblies are in no manner inhibited from repealing them. Indeed, it will be within the power of the next General Assembly, or any of its successors, if so disposed, not only to repeal chapter 14 of the acts of the Thirty-Fifth General Assembly in its entirety but to dispose of the property acquired thereunder. It is said that the holders of the certificates or warrants take that risk, as these are payable only from the taxes provided in the act. But this is so with every state debt. Though the debt created may constitute a legal obligation, no remedy exists for its enforcement, unless possibly held by another state except as the state may permit, and necessarily the holder must rely upon payment at the option of the state from the only resource available, i. e., taxation. State v. Young, 20 Minn. 474, 9 N. W. 737. Being nonenforceable, such a debt is akin to a moral obligation, and, though condemned as in violation of good morals and as against sound public policy, no one has ever

questioned the power of a state to repudiate its debts. A subsequent Legislature might repeal chapter 14, and this would leave the certificate without a fund from which to be paid; but it is scarcely conceivable that, after having received the proceeds of the certificates and made use of its own purposes the state would deem the denial of any obligation to repay as consistent with the honor and integrity of a great people. Moreover, section 5 of article 7 of the Constitution prescribes how a debt exceeding $250,000 shall be created and paid: (1) For some single work or object; (2) to be paid with interest from an annual tax within 20 years; and (3) applied only thereon. The particular method of creating a fund out of which the state debt, authorized by a vote of the people, shall be paid, is precisely like that contemplated in this act and approved in the Swanson Case. The only possible distinction between the statutory method of providing for the payment of municipal bonds and the constitutional method of providing for the payment of a state debt, voted by a majority of the people, is that, under the former, the bonds are expressly made payable from the sinking fund created by the levy and collection of the taxes authorized only while under the latter the limitation of payment therefrom only is plainly to be implied. The Constitution having particularly prescribed the manner of raising a revenue out of which a debt of the state shall be satisfied, an obligation for an object such as defined in the Constitution and to be discharged as therein directed ought not to be denominated as other than a debt of the state.

Nor do we find the weight of authority otherwise. Section 10 of article 7 of the Constitution of New York, though differing some, is in substance like section 2 of article 7, and is in words following: "The state may, to meet casual deficits or failures in revenues, or for expenses not provided for, contract debts, but such debts, direct and contingent, singly or in the aggregate, shall not at any time, exceed one million of dollars; and the money arising from the loans creating such debts, shall be applied to the purpose for which they were obtained, or to repay the debt so contracted, and to no other purpose whatever." Section 12, art. 7, Const. 1846 (section 4, art. 7, Const. 1894) is, in all essential particulars, like section 5 of our article 7, and the Court of Appeals, in Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 11, declared an act authorizing the creation of a fund by the sale of canal revenue certificates for the enlargement and completion of the Erie, Genesee Valley, and Black River Canals and the payment of these from revenue to be derived from taxation during 21 years void as creating a debt in excess of the limitation contained in the section quoted.

Article 12 of the Constitution of North Dakota declares that "the state may, to meet casual deficits, or failure in revenue, or in case of extraordinary emergencies, contract debts but such debts shall never in the aggregate exceed the sum of two hundred thousand