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THE OBJECTIVE POINT OF THE WAR.

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CHAPTER XLI.

Movement to draw forth the Enemy.-Advance to Culpeper Court-House.-Cavalry Engagement at Beverly's and Kelly's Fords.-Movement against Winchester.-Milroy's Force captured.-Prisoners.—The Enemy retires along the Potomac.-Maryland entered.-Advance into Pennsylvania.-The Enemy driven back toward Gettysburg.-Position of the Respective Forces.-Battle at Gettysburg. -The Army retires.-Prisoners.-The Potomac swollen.-No Interruption by the Enemy. Strength of our Force.-Strength of the Enemy.-The Campaign closed. Observations.-Kelly's Ford.-Attempt to surprise our Army.—System of Breastworks.-Prisoners.

In the spring of 1863 the enemy occupied his former position before Fredericksburg. He was in great strength, and, so far as we could learn, was preparing on the grandest scale for another advance against Richmond, which in political if not military circles was regarded as the objective point of the war. The consolidated report of the Army of the Potomac, then under the command of Major-General Hooker, states the force present on May 10, 1863, to be 136,704.

General Lee's forces had been reorganized into three army corps, designated the First, Second, and Third Corps. In the order named, they were commanded by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill.

The zeal of our people in the defense of their country's cause had brought nearly all of the population fit for military service to the various armies then in the field, so that but little increase could be hoped for by the Army of Northern Virginia. Under these circumstances, to wait until the enemy should choose to advance was to take the desperate hazard of the great inequality of numbers, as well as ability to reënforce, which he possessed. In addition to the army under General Hooker, a considerable force occupied the lower part of the Valley of the Shenandoah.

It was decided by a bold movement to attempt to transfer hostilities to the north side of the Potomac, by crossing the river and marching into Maryland and Pennsylvania, simultaneously driving the foe out of the Shenandoah Valley. Thus,

it was hoped, General Hooker's army would be called from Virginia to meet our advance toward the heart of the enemy's country. In that event, the vast preparations which had been made for an advance upon Richmond would be foiled, the plan for his summer's campaign deranged, and much of the season for active operations be consumed in the new combinations and dispositions which would be required. If, beyond the Potomac, some opportunity should be offered so as to enable us to defeat the army on which our foe most relied, the measure of our success would be full; but, if the movement only resulted in freeing Virginia from the presence of the hostile army, it was more than could fairly be expected from awaiting the attack which was clearly indicated.

Actuated by these and other considerations, the campaign was commenced on June 3, 1863. Our forces advanced to Culpeper Court-House, leaving A. P. Hill to occupy the lines in front of Fredericksburg. On the 5th Hooker, having discovered our movement, crossed an army corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, but, as this was apparently for observation, it was not thought necessary to oppose it.

On the 9th a large force of the enemy's cavalry crossed at Beverly's and Kelly's Fords and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, when Stuart forced his assailant to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving four hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, and several stands of colors in our hands.

Meantime, General Jenkins with a cavalry brigade had been ordered to advance toward Winchester, to coöperate with an infantry expedition into the lower Valley, and General Imboden made a demonstration toward Romney to cover the movement against Winchester, and prevent reënforcements from the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Both these officers were in position when Ewell left Culpeper Court-House on the 6th. Crossing the Shenandoah near Front Royal, Rodes's division went to Berryville to dislodge the force stationed there, and cut off the communication between Winchester and the Potomac. General Ewell, on the 13th of June, advanced directly

1863]

BEHIND THE HILLS OF STAFFORD.

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upon Winchester, driving the enemy into his works around the town. On the next day he stormed the works, and the whole army of General Milroy was captured or put to flight. Most of those who attempted to escape were intercepted and made prisoners. Unfortunately, among the exceptions, was their commander, who had been guilty of most unpardonable outrages upon defenseless non-combatants.

General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, entering the latter place on the 14th, and capturing seven hundred prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of stores. These operations cleared the Valley of the enemy. More than four thousand prisoners, twenty-nine pieces of artillery, two hundred and seventy wagons and ambulances, with four hundred horses, were captured, besides a large amount of military stores. Our loss was small. On the night that Ewell appeared at Winchester, the enemy at Fredericksburg recrossed the Rappahannock, and on the next day disappeared behind the hills of Stafford.

The whole army of General Hooker, in retiring, pursued the roads near the Potomac, offering no favorable opportunity for attack. His purpose seemed to be to take a position which would enable him to cover the approaches to Washington City. To draw him farther from his base, and to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who had left for the Valley, Longstreet moved from Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. The cavalry under General Stuart was in front of Longstreet to watch the enemy, and encountered his cavalry on the 17th near Aldie, and drove it back. The engagement was renewed on the next day, but the cavalry of the latter being now strongly supported by infantry, Stuart was compelled to retire. He had, however, taken in these engagements about four hundred prisoners and a considerable number of horses and

arms.

Meantime, General Ewell, with the advance of his corps, had entered Maryland. Jenkins, with his cavalry, penetrated as far as Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. As these demonstrations did not cause the hostile army to leave Virginia, nor did it seem disposed to advance upon Longstreet's position, he

was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah. General Hill had already reached the Valley. General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should seem best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced. General Longstreet says:

"General Stuart held the gap for a while, and then hurried around beyond Hooker's army, and we saw nothing more of him until the evening of July 2d, when he came down from York and joined us, having made a complete circuit of the Federal army."

Longstreet and Hill crossed the Potomac, to be within supporting distance of Ewell, and advanced into Pennsylvania, encamping near Chambersburg on the 27th of June. cavalry, under Colonel White, advanced to the Susquehanna.

The

On the night of the 27th information was received that General Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached South Mountain. This menaced our communications, and it was resolved to prevent his further progress by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountain. Accordingly, the different commands were ordered to proceed to Gettysburg. This march was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of Hooker been known. Heth's, the leading division of Hill's corps, met the enemy in front of Gettysburg on the morning of July 1st, driving him back to within a short distance of the town; the advance there encountered a larger force, with which two of Hill's divisions became engaged. Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions, joined in the engagement; and the opposing force was driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about five thousand prisoners and several pieces of artillery.

Under the instructions given to them not to bring on a general engagement, these corps bivouacked on the ground they had won.

1863]

THERE WAS UNACCOUNTABLE DELAY.

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In an address delivered at Lexington, Virginia, on January 17, 1873, General W. N. Pendleton, chief of artillery, makes the following statement:

"The ground southwest of the town was carefully examined by me after the engagement on July 1st. Being found much less difficult than the steep ascent fronting the troops already up, its practicable character was reported to our commanding General. He informed me that he had ordered Longstreet to attack on that front at sunrise the next morning. And he added to myself, 'I want you to be out long before sunrise so as to reexamine and save time.' He also desired me to communicate with General Longstreet as well as with himself. The reconnaissance was accordingly made, as soon as it was light enough on the 2d, and made through a long distance-in fact, very close to what there was of the enemy's line. No insuperable difficulty appearing, and the marching up-far off, the enemy's reënforcing columns being seen the extreme desirableness of immediate attack there, was at once reported to the commanding General; and, according to his wish, message was also sent to the intrepid but deliberate corps commander whose sunrise attack there had been ordered. There was, however, unaccountable delay. My own messages went repeatedly to General Lee, and his, I know, was urgently pressed on General Longstreet, until, as I afterward learned from officers who saw General Lee, as I could not at the time, he manifested extreme displeasure with the tardy corps commander.. That hard-fighting soldier, to whom it had been committed there to attack early in the day, did not, in person, reach the commanding General, and with him ride to a position whence to view the ground and see the enemy's arriving masses, until twelve o'clock; and his column was not up and ready for the assault until 4 P. M. All this, as it occurred under my personal observation, it is nothing short of imperative duty that I should thus fairly state."

For the reasons set forth by General Pendleton, whose statement, in regard to a fact coming under his personal observation, none who know him will question, preparations for a general engagement were unfortunately delayed until the afternoon, instead of being made at sunrise; then troops had been concentrated, and "Round-Top," the commanding position, un