to vote for the necessary appropriations, but they were opposed to making the railroad a governmental enterprise.

1

It was decidedly to Seward's credit that he looked with disfavor upon the lavish and probably impossible "log-rolling" scheme of constructing three railroads to the Pacific. At the same time he admitted: "It is the very extraordinary extension of that [the railroad] system, indeed, which has, to a great extent, produced the present depression in the country." While he thought the building of a Pacific railroad so urgent as to make the adoption of any special plan secondary in importance, he had very clear ideas about the advantages of a northern route "in continuation of the northwestern track of the emigration which has been pursued from the time when the navigation of the great lakes was opened." .. "I would directly employ the capital and credit of the United States, increasing the revenues of the United States from commerce for the purpose of defraying the cost, and establishing, at the same time, a sinking fund which should, within a reasonable period, absorb the public debt thus created. And I would surrender the public lands in the vicinity of the road to actual settlers for cultivation, so as to secure the speediest possible production of revenue from it."

Believing a Pacific railroad to be essential to the safety of the Union, the matter of appropriating fifty or a hundred million dollars, or of pledging ten millions a year for maintaining the system, seemed to him to be comparatively insignificant. "It is necessary; and, since it is necessary, there is an end of the argument." In his opinion it had the same claims upon the United States treasury as the postal system and the main2 Globe, 1858-59, 157.

'Globe, 1854-55, 750.

tenance of the army and the navy; and if it could not otherwise be built, there should be retrenchment in these departments.'

Year after year he begged Senators to stop quibbling and to come to a vote. He repeatedly urged that it was folly to think of a foreign war or to negotiate treaties for routes across Central America until we had done what was possible to make one people of the inhabitants of the East and of the West. In the winter of 1858-59, when there were many indications that the Democrats were in search of a foreign war as the best way to retrieve the fortunes of their party, Seward pleaded for his enterprise as "a peaceful direction of the activity of the nation. Peaceful activity is safer; it is cheaper; it is surer; it saves all the elements of national strength and national power, and increases them." Again, in January, 1861, when the Union was about to be rent in twain, he begged the Senate to appropriate ninety-six million dollars for the building of a northern and a southern railway to the Pacific, insisting that the measure was one "of conciliation, of pacification, of compromise, and of union." A few days later, after several southern Senators had made their valedictories, he tried to lay aside the disputed question as to their resignations, so that he might bring the Pacific railroad bill to a vote. Although Congress did not settle upon a plan until a year after Seward had become Secretary of State, he lived to see the completion of the leading features of the great enterprise.

Long before 1850 the custom of making appropria

Globe, 1858-59, 158. In his zeal he called it "the realization of what all Europe has been striving for for the last four hundred years,” for it made practical the expectations of a discovery of a western passage from Europe to the shores of Cathay.-Globe, 1857-58, 1585. 2 Globe, 1858-59, 159. Globe, 1860-61, 250. Globe, 1860-61, 505.

tions for the improvement of the navigation of rivers and harbors had become well established. Many of the strict constructionists still believed that the Constitution had not given Congress the right to make such improvements within the states; but as in the case of land appropriations for railroads, Democratic Congressmen of any state to be especially benefited were generally ready to vote with the Whigs or the Republicans. Seward was so confident that Congress had this power that he seems never to have considered it worth while to undertake its defence. A careful search of the Globe during the years when he was Senator has not revealed any evidence that he ever objected to any item in any river and harbor bill, even where there was a large appropriation for deepening some little river, creek, or cove, as was often the case. He frequently had the management of these bills when before the Senate, and he pursued almost the same policy as in his efforts to promote the distribution of the public lands. He favored granting the utmost that anybody would propose, but he would accept what could be obtained: "I prefer internal improvements somehow to internal improvements nohow; I prefer internal improvements any way to a defeat and subversion of the system."1

The self-confidence resulting from the rapid growth of population and riches had inspired the United States with a desire to rival the greatest of maritime nations. England began to subsidize the Cunard steamers as early as 1839. Two years later, Thomas Butler King, of Georgia, urged that the United States should adopt a like system. In 1847 a line of steamers, aided by our national treasury, began to ply between New York and Bremen. Shortly afterward provision was made for

1 Globe, 1854-55, 661.

other lines. Edward K. Collins agreed to build five fast ships, suitable for use by the government in time of war, which should make twenty round trips per annum between New York and Liverpool, and carry the United States mail for three hundred and eighty-five thousand dollars a year for ten years. In 1852 the United States wanted the number of trips increased to twenty-six, but the Collins company claimed to have suffered great losses, and it demanded that the subsidy should be increased to eight hundred and fifty-eight thousand dollars.

R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, who was chairman of the Senate committee on finance, led the opposition, urging that we were trying to rival England by subsidizing these steamers from the United States treasury; that the plan rested upon the same basis as the protection of iron factories; that it was injurious to all other lines carrying freight and passengers, and that the ships would not be suitable for use in time of war.'

Seward became deeply interested in the enterprise. On April 27, 1852, he defended it in one of his carefully prepared speeches.' He maintained that it was necessary to break the English monopoly of carrying the mails; that it was essential to our national greatness, and would be invaluable in case of war; that the increase in postage accruing promised to defray the expense in the near future; that a few more years were necessary to decide whether steam navigation would be self-sustaining; that to surrender it at this time would be nothing less than to yield "the proud commercial and political position we have gained by two wars with Great Britain" and to take "the position of Mexico, of the Canadas, and of the South American states." He had a vision of the world embraced in a single "great commercial system, ramified by a thousand nerves pro

1 Globe, 1851-52, 1148-49.

21 Works, 222-35.

jecting from the one head at London. Yet, stupendous as the scheme is, our own merchants, conscious of equal capacity and equal resources, and relying on experience for success, stand here beseeching us to allow them to counteract its fulfilment, and ask of us facilities and aid equal to those yielded by the British government to its citizens." He concluded with an eloquent tribute to America's mechanical genius, and expressed the belief that, considering our superior resources in soil and in the influence of freedom, our "enterprise will be adequate to the glorious conflict, if it shall be sustained by constancy and perseverance on the part of their government."

The subject fired Seward's imagination, so that he made one of the most eloquent speeches of his life. No other argument in the debate was so finished and inspiring. The Tribune printed it in full and praised it editorially. Writing to Seward about it, Greeley said: "Dana, who has been correcting the manuscript for the press, says it is the speech of the session."

While the proposition for increasing the subsidy was under consideration, the Baltic, one of the best of the Collins steamers, came to Washington. Seward moved that the Senate should adjourn over one day so as to accept the invitation of the company to inspect the vessel. Several members thought they scented corruption, and strenuously objected to the proposition, but Seward carried his point. The various influences at work were so strong that Congress voted the desired subsidy of eight hundred and fifty-eight thousand dollars per annum, reserving the right to cut off the increase after giving six months' notice any time after the end of 1854.

11 Works, 233, 234.

Tribune, April 28, 1852.

3 Letter of April 27, 1852. Seward MSS. This showed that Seward had furnished the Tribune a copy of the speech in advance.

4 Globe, 1851-52, 657-59.