CHAPTER XLIII

I. NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE ALABAMA CLAIMS.-II. SOME

TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE

I. NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE ALABAMA CLAIMS

CLAIMS against Great Britain for the destruction of American merchantmen by the Alabama and other cruisers were duly presented by the United States Minister as they arose.' This was very unpleasant to Earl Russell. In September, 1863, he insisted that because the Alabama had not been actually fitted out in a British port as a war-vessel, there was nothing to warrant such claims. "I have only, in conclusion, to express my hope that you may not be instructed again to put forward claims which her Majesty's government cannot admit to be founded on any grounds of law or justice." To this Seward responded that "the United States do insist, and must continue to insist, that the British government is justly responsible for the damages which the peaceful, lawabiding citizens of the United States sustain by the depredations of the Alabama." Still, he said, there was no intention "to act dogmatically or in a litigious spirit"; and he admitted that the time was not favorable for a candid examination of either the facts or the principles involved. If the British government should decline to receive the evidence on which the claims

'See ante, 385, 386.

1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 380.

were based, then a record should be kept for future

use.'

When war ended, the "Alabama claims," resulting from actual losses amounting to many millions of dollars, were still unrecognized. Adams reported, September 7, 1865, that Russell then seemed less fearful of being suspected of good-will toward the United States; and the British Secretary himself soon suggested the appointment of a joint commission to which should be referred "all claims arising during the late civil war, which the two powers shall agree to refer." But he expressly said that there could be no arbitration of the question whether his government had honestly adhered to its neutrality proclamation, or whether the law officers had properly understood the foreign enlistment act, or whether there should be reparation "for the captures made by the Alabama." As this was hardly as much as a short first-step in the right direction, it was promptly declined by Seward.' He was determined to obtain more. Early in 1866 he informed Adams that both the Cabinet and the people of the United States expected Great Britain to redress the wrongs of which these claims were a result. A little later he said: "I see now no reason for apprehending that we shall at any time or under any circumstances be willing to negotiate for future contingencies without having first due regard paid to past injuries and damages." As the Secretary informed the British Minister at Washington of this opinion, it was a very important indication of strained relations between the two powers. In July, 1866, the House of Representatives unanimously passed a bill designed to remove the prohibition against selling ships and munitions of war to foreign citizens or govern

11 Dip. Cor., 1863, 395, 396. 31 Dip. Cor., 1865, 630.

1 Dip. Cor., 1865, 545. 41 Dip. Cor., 1866, 66, 74.

ments at peace with the United States, and thus to enable American citizens to take a profitable revenge for the devastations of the Alabama the first time Great Britain should become involved in hostilities.

The Fenian movement, which was an attempt to establish an independent republic in Ireland, tried to increase and use for its own ends the resentment Americans felt against the British government. For several years a large number of Irish-Americans had taken a zealous interest in this cause. Conventions had been held in several American cities, and in the autumn of 1865 a general convention in New York elected a socalled president of the would-be republic, and he appointed heads of departments of war, navy, and finance. From the United States these "Irish patriots" sent emissaries to England and Ireland to give active support to the revolution. After a few thousand Fenians had invaded Canada, in June, 1866, the arms and munitions of war that the brotherhood had collected and left behind were seized, the United States garrisons on the frontier were strengthened, and President Johnson issued a proclamation against the enterprise. Many IrishAmericans were arrested in Ireland, on suspicion that they were stirring up sedition and perhaps inciting others to commit treasonable acts. They were treated as if they were subjects of Great Britain and not as American citizens, for Great Britain had never recognized the right of expatriation. As the writ of habeas corpus had been suspended in Ireland, Adams was soon very busy mak ing representations in behalf of his indiscreet and unfortunate fellow-citizens.

In August, 1866, Seward sent to Adams a long list of Alabama claims. He said that it was the President's desire that the attention of Lord Stanley, Earl Russell's successor, should be called to them "in a respectful but earnest manner," and that he should be in

formed of the President's opinion that a settlement of them had "become urgently necessary to a re-establishment of entirely friendly relations" between the two governments.' If Great Britain had claims against the United States this government would be disposed to take them into consideration so as to remove by one comprehensive arrangement all existing causes of misunderstanding. Then he again referred to the precipitancy and unfriendliness of Great Britain's recognition of the Confederates as belligerents, and charged that "the misconduct of the aggressors [against United States commerce, etc.] was a direct and legitimate fruit of the premature and injurious proclamation of belligerency, against which we had protested, and that the failure of her Majesty's government to prevent or counteract the aggressions of British subjects was equally traceable to the same unfortunate cause." In language almost threatening, he said that when one state showed a disregard of international obligations so injurious to the citizens of another state as to awaken a general spirit of discontent and dissatisfaction, they were likely "to conform their own principles and policy, in conducting their intercourse with the offending state, to that of the party from whom the injury proceeds.' And he added, emphatically: "Thus we have seen ruinous British warlike expeditions against the United States practically allowed and tolerated by her Majesty's government, notwithstanding remonstrance; and we have seen similar unlawful attempts in this country against Great Britain disallowed and defeated by the direct and unprompted action of the government of the United States."

Lord Stanley's reply showed that Seward's statements were too sweeping. In defence of what Seward

11 Dip Cor., 1866, 178.

1 Dip. Cor., 1866, 179.

regarded as the original fountain of the evil - Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality-Stanley said that the Supreme Court of the United States and the Court of the District of Columbia held that a state of war existed prior to that proclamation. While his government could not consent to arbitrate the question as to whether the Confederates were prematurely recognized as belligerents, there would probably be no objection to arbitrating the other questions at issue between the two governments in reference to the war.'

On January 12, 1867, Seward made a long rejoinder, which was very ambitious and ardent, but inconclusive in respect to his main contention about the recognition of belligerency. With characteristic persistency, he said that in case of arbitration the United States would expect this question to be considered along with the claims, although there was no disposition to require that any question of national pride or honor should be ruled and determined as such.

Another year passed without progress in regard to the claims. Meantime it had become apparent in England that other differences were increasing the ill-will of the United States. At the beginning of 1868 Seward called Adams's attention to several questions of great importance: a divided occupation of the island of San Juan, in the Pacific; Great Britain's treatment of IrishAmericans; the extradition of criminals; and the fisheries in the North Atlantic waters.

"Any one of these questions may at any moment become a subject of exciting controversy. The naturalization question is already working in that way.

"It was in view of all these existing sources of controversy that the thought occurred to me that her Majesty's government, if desirous to lay a broad foundation for

11 Dip. Cor., 1867, 184-88.