Page images
PDF
EPUB

ordered careful watch to be taken of the alleged sale of the rams and the corvettes to foreign governments, and then he caused two United States war-ships in European waters to be placed under Dayton's orders.'

Seward had his reasons for being so cautious. When he first heard that the war-ships were building in France, the relations with Great Britain were for a similar reason in a very critical state. Although the likelihood of a rupture with Great Britain diminished during the autumn and winter of 1863-64, there was still some danger that new and serious complications might be used as an excuse for foreign interference. On February 22, 1864, Seward wrote a note to Bigelow that contained these sentences: "Before we decide what to do more in France, we wait to be a little better assured about our affairs in England. You can infer from this what I do not think it perfectly safe to write." On the same day he replied to a letter from William M. Evarts, written in Paris: "We want to know whether, if we have a difficulty on one side of the Channel, we must expect an enemy also on the other -two enemies instead of one. Circumstances favor a good understanding with the Cabinet at London. We could clear up all difficulties if Great Britain should be willing." It was shortly after this time that Congress became very excited over the Mexican question, as will soon be noticed, and the French government seemed to be almost ready for a conflict. Seward saw that we were not prepared for a foreign war; therefore, he made a special effort to pitch his despatches in a friendly tone. Bigelow, who had not been fully informed as to all the perplexities of the case, very frankly told Sew

13 Dip. Cor., 1864, 115, 117; MS. instructions to Dayton, June 27, 1864.

2 Seward MSS. Possibly this letter was never sent, for it is not in the Bigelow MSS. The autograph draft is in the Seward MSS.

'Seward MSS.

ard that his "charming compliments to the French government," which was "doing all it can [could] to cut our throats," discouraged the opposition from attacking the Emperor, and he thought that a decisive tone would soon be necessary.' But in dealing with France the Secretary knew the importance of waiting, and replied:

"I regret that you think my course towards the French government is too conciliatory and courteous. If our armies succeed, as we hope, we shall have no conflict with France, or with any foreign power. So long as our success in suppressing the slavery faction at home is doubted abroad, we shall be in danger of war with some one of the maritime powers upon some sudden provocation. If we have war with one, we may expect to have war with more than one. If we escape war with all, my courtesy to France will have done no harm. If we shall at last, through unavoidable delay here, fall under the calamity of a foreign war, it will then have come soon enough; and we shall be none the less able to meet it for all the prudence we practised in trying to delay and, if possible, to avert it."2

This was certainly the perfection of logic and of diplomacy.

Napoleon insisted on the disposal of all the ships to foreign nations. Only one, the Sphinx, finally came into the possession of the Confederates, but this was brought about so late that peace was declared before it could reach American waters.

The disappointment of the Confederate diplomatists was intense. They had firmly and correctly believed that Napoleon was in sympathy with them. Their mistake was in concluding that he would, therefore, give them substantial aid, regardless of his own interests. Benjamin devoted a large part of a long despatch that he sent Slidell to a formal arraignment, under eight heads, of

'Bigelow, 42.

May 21, 1864. Bigelow MSS.

the Emperor of the French for his unfriendly acts toward the Confederacy.' He made himself believe that Napoleon had promised that the ships might go to sea. But Slidell had distinctly stated that the Emperor had not committed himself to permit the sailing of the rams unless their destination could be concealed. The consent to the arming and sailing of the corvettes was given by the Minister of Marine on the representation that they were for commercial purposes, although he understood the fact. But when Napoleon found that the misrepresentations were no longer a shield, he did not feel bound to stand by the Confederates in the altered circumstances. Undoubtedly his original expectation was that a turn in American affairs favorable to the Confederacy would be reached before any international question could be raised about the ships.

With Great Britain Seward had negotiated as with a drawn sword. With France he either pleaded for peace or made his warnings very mild. The result showed that his method in each case was essentially right. Neither government failed to see that there was a sword. Slidell unintentionally gave high praise to Seward when he wrote: "The two strongest powers submit to the insolent demands of the Lincoln government that their commerce may be safe on the ocean, and Mexico and Canada unmolested. And why? Because they have formed an exaggerated estimate of its capacity to do mischief." Seward had caused them to make that estimate.

3

'Text in Bigelow, 161-65.

'Bigelow, 153.

'Bigelow, 160.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE END OF THE WAR

ONE night in July, 1863, during the rejoicing over the victory at Vicksburg, some paraders stopped in front of Seward's house, serenaded him, and called for a speech. His impromptu response displayed patriotic fervor and sentimental egotism, but it also truly represented his recent aims and his hopes for the future:

"When I saw a commotion upheaving in the state, I thought it consistent with the duty of a patriot and a Christian to avert the civil war if it was possible, and I tried to do so. If this was a weakness, I found what seemed an instruction excusing it in the prayer of our Savior that the cup, the full bitterness of which was understood by himself alone, might pass. But I found, also, an instruction in regard to my duty in his resignation: Nevertheless, not my will but thine be done.' When it was clear that without fault on your part or mine the civil war was inevitable, I then thought it consistent with the duty of a patriot and a Christian to take care that the war should be begun not by the friends of the Union, but by its enemies, so that in maintaining the Union we should not only maintain the cause of our country, but should be maintaining it in righteous self-defence."

"I thought, further, that it was consistent with my duty as a patriot and a Christian to do what was in my power to render the war as light in its calamities and as short in its duration as possible. Therefore, I proposed to retain on the side of the loyal states as many of the states which were disturbed by elements of sedition as could be retained by a course of calm and judicious conduct. I would have had, if possible, the insurrection confined to

the seven original so-called seceding states. When all these conditions had been secured, so far as was possible to secure them, I thought still further that it was consistent with my duty as a patriot and a Christian to combine the loyal states and consolidate them into one party for the Union, because I knew that disunion had effectually combined the people of the disloyal states to overthrow the Union."

"Once engaged in the contest, I was prepared to demand, as I have demanded ever since, that no treasure, no amount of human life necessary to save the nation's life, should be withheld. I thought that the war might be ended in three months-in six months-in a year-and I labored to that end. . . . We failed to make that exhibition [of zeal, determination, and consistency], and so the war has been protracted into its third year.

66

[ocr errors]

But we have reached, I think, the culminating point at last; we have ascertained the amount of sacrifice which is necessary to save the Union, and the country is prepared to make it."

[ocr errors]

"The Union is to be saved, after all, only by human efforts by the efforts of the people."

[ocr errors]

"You must be prepared to do more. If the capital must fall before it can be saved, which I have always thought unnecessary, and which now seems impossible, even in that case, let us be buried amid its ruins. For myself, this is my resolution. If the people of the United States have virtue enough to save the Union, I shall have their virtue. If they have not, then it shall be reward that my virtue excelled that of my countrymen.

my

991

The administration decided early in July, 1863, to issue a proclamation calling for a day of thanksgiving for the great military successes that had been achieved. Its preparation was given to Seward, who sat himself down, as he wrote to his wife, "to compose a presidential call upon the people for thanksgiving, prayer, and praise to our Heavenly Father. I think you must have read in it and under it what I think and how I feel."

15 Works, 485-88.

23 Seward, 176. He referred to Lincoln's proclamation of July 17, 1863.

[blocks in formation]
« PreviousContinue »