chiefly to the welfare and the treatment of the emigrants after becoming residents of the new state. Lord Russell declined the proposition of the United States as to the British West Indies, and no one of the other replies was satisfactory. On November 18, 1862, Seward again wrote to Adams, as follows:

"While some of them [the projects from foreign countries] are thus ascertained to be impracticable, it may be hoped, nevertheless, that we are drawing near to the discovery of a feasible policy which will solve, perhaps, the most difficult political problem that has occurred in the progress of civilization on the American continent."

Unfortunately the discovery was never made. The projects that seemed least impracticable were to settle colonies on lands near the harbor of Chiriqui, in the state of Panama, New Granada, and on Île à Vache, belonging to Haiti. A little inquiry caused a doubt as to the title to Chiriqui, but left no doubt that the district was wholly unsuited to the purpose. By special arrangement and under the protection of the administration, nearly five hundred negroes sailed for Île à Vache, in April, 1863. The dream came to a sad end: within a few months the colonists were overtaken by hunger and sickness, so that a large proportion of them died. Within eleven months from the time the hapless expedition sailed, the government had to bring back the survivors, or they, too, would soon have perished.'

Seward's attitude toward slavery was due to his continued belief that the chief business of the administration was to restore the Union, and that any attempt to make emancipation a leading aim-unless a clear majority of the loyal voters demanded it would be hazardous

1 The particulars of the whole question of colonization are given in 6 Nicolay and Hay, 354-67.

and unwise. Being convinced that the election of Lincoln had sounded the death-knell of slavery as a power in national politics, and that the war was inevitably antislavery in its effects, he was confident that the institution would rapidly decline in strength, even without being made the object of Federal attack.' The position was true and statesmanlike, although military failures, the rapid growth of the power of the radicals, and the interests of the United States abroad compelled him to yield to the new and rapidly changing conditions.

'Carpenter's Six Months in the White House, 72; 1 Dicey's Federal States, 232-34.

CHAPTER XXXVII

SOME MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS

SEWARD was an eccentric and many-sided political genius. He illustrated Mirabeau's theory that "Jacobins that are ministers will not be Jacobin ministers." Before December, 1860, he had been chief of the radicals, and his ambition had been primarily personal and partisan. Since the summer of 1861 probably no public man of the time had been governed by more patriotic impulses. Yet he desired as ardently as ever to be master of affairs, and it is doubtful if it ever occurred to him that he could not best perform any task falling to the President or to any member of the Cabinet. When Cyrus W. Field sent him a letter of condolence on his defeat at Chicago, he wrote: "If the alternative were presented to a wise man, he might well seek rather to have his countrymen regret that he had not been President than to be President." Seward aimed to show such abilities in saving the Union-notwithstanding popular blunders, sectional disloyalty, and the malice of factions -that the mistake at Chicago should become apparent to all. Although his patriotism was egotistical, it was essentially unselfish. Here we have the main-spring of his incessant activity.

From the beginning he was much more than Secretary of State. Either with or without formal approval he assumed scores of tasks that naturally belonged to other

1 Judson's Field, 127.

departments. To him, and often to Lincoln and to political leaders in the East, this seemed a matter of course. He acted as the President's agent in calling the meetings of the Cabinet and in looking after the performance of numerous acts that needed to be done quickly. In two sentences, one in a letter written in the spring of 1861, and the other a year later, he gives an almost perfect description of what he conceived to be his importance in the administration: "I am counseling with the Cabinet one hour, with the Army officers the next, the Navy next, and I visit all the troops as fast as they come." "I dare not, because I cannot safely, leave this post from which all supplies, all directions, all inquiries must radiate, to armies and navies at home and to legations abroad." He was fond of mentioning to friends and callers how busy he was, and how many irons he had in the fire. His son quotes him as saying, occasionally: "I am sure I am the senior of some of my colleagues, but they seem to think I am the youngest member of the Cabinet. When there is some one to be seen, some place to be visited, or some journey to be made, they seem to think it easier for me to go than for anybody else." It was true; and Seward was not the one to conceal the fact.

At first no one of Seward's colleagues stood so close to him as Simon Cameron. It was not supposed that Lincoln's first Secretary of War had any special fitness for the duties that were severe enough to employ the energies of ten able men. Yet during most of the time the cause of the Union depended upon the enterprise, expedition, and spirit of the War Department. Seward's subtle influence with Scott, the military head of the army for several months after the war began, made it easy for him to keep abreast of the leading

12 Seward, 586; 3 Seward, 72.

2 2 Seward, 622.

plans in that department. After the call to arms he was most ready and resourceful in suggesting how the troops and munitions of war, especially from New York, should be hurried forward; in fact, he seems to have helped the military organization whenever he had an opportunity. The man that had led so many political campaigns knew the importance of popular enthusiasm. It early became Seward's favorite recreation to drive to the neighboring fortifications and camps, in which he always found old friends and gave encouragement to the soldiers. More than once he visited the armies in the field. He was happiest when he appeared with the President, either on such occasions or when reviewing troops passing through Washington. This occurred so often that Seward's enemies began to ask sarcastically whether he was head of the army or only general manager of the whole administration.

It was one of the best phases of his activity that it was never merely meddlesome; he did not bewail the mistakes of others; he let the past go, and was eager -too eager, perhaps to influence the present and the future. But he had the virtue to meet every military reverse with equanimity, and to be willing to give his whole time and energy to help reorganize and strengthen the shattered forces. The evidence of an impartial English traveler' is not necessary to convince us that, after the fall of Fort Sumter, Seward was among the first to recognize that the North was in earnest, and needed the most vigorous measures, and that that was why Lincoln showed so much confidence in him at critical times.

The numerous battles in different parts of Virginia since the beginning of the spring campaign of 1862 had sadly depleted the Federal forces. In June, several days

1 1 Dicey's Federal States, 229.