would seem to be just if one knew only the grounds on which the grand jury based the indictment, and then, at the trial, heard only the witnesses and the lawyers for the defence. Yet this is a fair illustration of the disproportion shown in the official records. And it is on this account that it is so easy to misrepresent the whole system.

For the general policy as practised toward political offenders in the border states, there is no more occasion to apologize than there is for the fact that cannon caused destruction. The Confederacy found it necessary to adopt a similar system. It is extremely doubtful if Maryland could have been saved from secession and Washington from consequent seizure if the mayor and police commissioners of Baltimore, several members of the legislature, and many prominent citizens of both Maryland and Virginia had not been deprived of their power to do harm. Governor Hicks, who was probably the best judge, approved the arrest of the legislators, and opposed the liberation of some of them even after their successors had been elected.' But there were some serious abuses of this arbitrary power in the far northern states.

The least excusable feature was the treatment of the prisoners. Month after month many of them were crowded together in gloomy and damp casemates, where even the dangerous "pirates" captured on privateers, and soldiers taken in battle, ought not to have remained long. Many had committed no overt act. There were among them editors and political leaders of character and honor, but whose freedom would be injurious to the prosecution of the war. Fortunately for Seward's reputation, their custody belonged to the

1114 War Records, 705.

22 Coleman's Crittenden, 334, 341, 342; 115 War Records, 470; American Bastile, 652-80, 687 ff.

War Department. It was largely due to Seward's care, recommendations, interference even, that their unnecessary hardships were not greater.'

It was inevitable that innocent men should be caught in the dangerous machinery. It offered rare opportu nities for the gratification of personal enmities and the display of power on the part of United States marshals and military officers. Seward could not fairly be blamed for things concerning which he himself was deceived, for he often had no time to take precautions. But he should have foreseen that a safety-valve was indispensable in the form of some arrangement whereby all cases should be promptly and impartially reviewed. It happened more than once that men languished in prison for weeks before any one at the department even heard their names.' At the gates of the chief forts there should have been an examining board of two or three able men versed in judging evidence and familiar with the military and political problems in the localities from which the prisoners were taken. They would quickly have separated the innocent from the guilty, and the harmless from the dangerous. They could have decided in a few hours or days as to what restraints or punishments were necessary. Instead of making some such provision, Seward relied upon occasional examinations, chiefly by Seth C. Hawley, the chief clerk of the New York police commission; by Robert Murray, the United States marshal at New York, and by Allan Pinkerton, the head of the United States secret service. This plan was so very inadequate that the prisons became overcrowded. Although there is nothing to in

1115 War Records, 36, 37, 121, 123.

2 Department's Record-book, War Records, 290-348, furnishes evidences of this and of other abuses.

The following sentences are from a report made by a United States marshal to Seward, October 28th:

"Amongst the prisoners we found a number of men who occupy

dicate that Seward was fond of keeping men in confinement-in fact, the contrary seems to have been the case-yet his other duties were so engrossing that he naturally fell into the habit of waiting for political and personal pressure to be exerted before he paid much attention to the individual cases. The guilty could often command this more readily than the innocent.'

Seward's mental and physical traits were such that he undoubtedly liked the theory, but was greatly annoyed by the exercise of so much authority in this peculiar field. Without doubting his own abilities, he probably realized that the resources of the War Department were much better suited than those of the Department of State to deal with every phase of the question of arbitrary arrests, whether military or political. Accordingly, on February 14, 1862, the whole responsibility was given over to Secretary Stanton. Soon a great many prisoners were released on parole. In a few days John A. Dix and Edwards Pierrepont were appointed

no social position and who have no standing in the community, and whose room would be more beneficial to the government than the space they occupy. The main difficulty with regard to the comfort of the prisoners in the fort is the want of sufficient room, and by discharging those whom it is of no interest to the government to retain this difficulty would be obviated. These men, it would appear to me, could not do the government any mischief, and it is only a matter of surprise how they came to be arrested. I would, therefore, advise that some competent person or persons should be named by you to examine into the charges against these men and report to you for your final action in the premises."-115 War Records, 121.

1 Morehead told Crittenden that the guilty uniformly got out. (2 Coleman, 335.) His own case, Gwin's, and those of several others who could then command the services of distinguished Unionists, indicate that there was truth in the statement.

23 Seward, 72, says that this was done at Seward's suggestion to Stanton. "There is nothing whatever [in the official records] showing that Seward gave up the authority voluntarily or that Stanton sought it."-Leslie J. Perry, of the board of publication of the War Records, to the author, July 27, 1898.

commissioners to examine those still in military custody. They quickly caused nearly one hundred more to be liberated. In a note to Stanton, April 8, 1862, they said: "We have this day examined the cases of several prisoners who have been long in prison and who are detained without just cause."1

There was current a story that Seward boasted to Lord Lyons that he could ring a little bell and cause the arrest of a citizen of Ohio or order the imprisonment of a citizen of New York, and that no one on earth except the President could release the prisoner. If he made the remark, it is of no special importance. It was a fact that he was almost as free from restraint as a dictator or a sultan, and he was charged with acting accordingly. But the surprising thing is that in the great mass of documents on the subject of political prisoners there are no manifestations of improper motives or of extreme prejudice or of personal considerations except in the Pierce episode. His mistakes, save in one case, were perfectly natural and almost inevitable, considering the constant anxiety of the administration about military affairs in front of Washington, and the need of suppressing words and acts in the North that might indicate to Great Britain and France that the Federal government was declining in strength. But no one will deny that Seward sought and was given too much responsibility.

1 115 War Records, 277-79, 282.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION, 1862-63

1

THE outcome of the Trent incident disabused the minds of many Englishmen of the belief that Seward desired a foreign war, but it did not affect the economic influences working toward intervention. Louis Napoleon once remarked to one of the Confederates that "the policy of nations is controlled by their interests, and not by their sentiments." The actions of France and of Great Britain during these years furnished excellent illustrations of this rule. It was not difficult to estimate approximately the losses that the two countries were suffering on account of the blockade; but the question that no one could answer was: What will intervention cost if it entails a war with the United States and a general disturbance of European politics? The belief that the North could not conquer the South, and that the attempt would not continue very long, was an additional reason for postponing all direct efforts to influence affairs in the United States.

After the beginning of 1862 there was no substantial reason to doubt the efficiency of the blockade. But the Confederacy argued at one time that it was folly to respect a blockade through which scores of ships ran with impunity; at another time it maintained that the blockade prevented Confederate independence and cut off the exchange of cotton and merchandise, without

'Bigelow's France and the Confederate Navy, 121.