nation upon a great principle. We are humbled and disgraced, not by the act of the surrender of four of our own citizens, but by the manner in which it has been done, and the absence of a sound principle on which to rest and justify it. . . . We might and should have turned the affair vastly to our credit and advantage; it has been made the means of our humiliation."1

James G. Blaine concludes his criticism of Seward's argument by saying: "It is to be regretted that we did not place the restoration of the prisoners upon franker and truer ground-viz., that their seizure was in violation of the principles which we had steadily and resolutely maintained-principles which we would not abandon either for a temporary advantage or to save the wounding of our national pride.""

Not only has Seward's dictum, that diplomatic agents are contraband of war, remained unsupported by authorities on international law, but the United States have taken care to prevent the repetition of such a blunder as Wilkes made. Early in the war against Spain the "Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers,' prepared by the Department of State" said:

"A neutral vessel carrying hostile despatches, when sailing as a despatch vessel practically in the service of the enemy, is liable to seizure; but not when she is a mail packet and carries them in the regular and customary manner, either as a part of the mail in her mail bags, or separately, as a matter of accommodation and without special arrangement or remuneration. The voyages of mail steamers are not to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of contraband or blockade.

hat man nichts weiter vernommen, und in der That möchte es schwer sein, vom Sewardschen Standpunkte aus, in einer ferneren Discussion dagegen aufzukommen."-Der Trent-Fall, 174.

14 Pierce's Sumner, 54.

21 Twenty Years of Congress, 585.

"A neutral vessel in the service of the enemy, in the transportation of troops or military persons, is liable to seizure."

The highest type of statesmanship is to extricate one's country from danger in the best way. But that is not the only type. Whether the last opportunity to save the Union should be thrown away depended upon Seward's decision to hold or to release Mason and Slidell. Had he favored retaining them, there was no one that could and would have overcome his influence. Therefore, what was done he did, and but for him it would not have been done. That his argument was so effective, although unsound, was a tribute to his truly marvellous skill in making bricks without straw. It was at least a political masterpiece. And, as the world of politics goes-but not as scholars think it should be— politicians that effectively serve the state are classed as statesmen. It sometimes happens that a general wins a great battle although he violates the most fundamental rules of strategy or tactics. A grateful country, whose failing cause he has saved, will not forget his service, even if military critics demonstrate that he wasted ten thousand lives and realized only a fraction of the possible victory. So, Seward's method was far from perfect, but what he accomplished was one of the greatest feats of the war-period, and has rightly given him lasting fame and honor in American history.

1 1 Navy Department, General Order No. 492, June 20, 1898.

CHAPTER XXXIV

SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS, TO FEBRUARY, 1862

OUR record of Seward's various activities in 1861 is not yet complete. Although he performed a much larger proportion of the work of the department than any Secretary of State would now think of doing, it is doubtful if it consumed more than half the time and thought he gave to public affairs. Probably the detection of political offenders and the control of political prisoners were the most distracting of all his cares.

The firing upon the Massachusetts regiment as it was hastening through Baltimore, April 19th, surprised and angered the North. Governor Hicks soon became alarmed lest the sympathizers with secession might become excited beyond control and precipitate a civil war in Maryland. Hoping to avert this, he wrote a letter to Seward requesting that northern troops should be entirely excluded, and suggested that Lord Lyons should be asked to act as mediator between the Washington and the Montgomery governments, so as to prevent an effusion of blood.

Washington was still in extreme danger, and alarm had become panic. It was necessary for the administration to temporize until northern troops should arrive. By direction of the President, Seward declared that "the force now sought to be brought through Maryland is intended for nothing but the defence of this capital," and that the new route via Annapolis had been chosen with the expectation that it would be "the least

objectionable." There had been times, he remarked, when United States soldiers were not unwelcome in that state; and the actual sentiment of national independence was such that no domestic contention "ought in any case to be referred to any foreign arbitrament, least of all to the arbitrament of an European monarchy." These were discreet expressions, considering the dangers of the hour; but the people of the North, who had answered the call to arms with such patriotic enthusiasm, had assumed that the period of hesitation and mere self-defence had ended. Lincoln and Seward at once became objects of criticism and warnings that must have startled them."

1 1 Moore's Rebellion Record, Docs., p. 133.

2 Moses H. Grinnell, one of the wealthiest and most influential of Seward's friends and followers in New York, wrote to him, April 25th: "The correspondence between the government and Governor Hicks does not suit our people. There is a deep sentiment in this quarter repugnant to concession, and I assure you there will be trouble among our people if there is the least appearance on the part of the government yielding to these rascals. I beg you to treat these villains [in Maryland] as they deserve. No more soft words to traitors. The Post of last evening gave you hard hits, and, I assure you, your name is freely spoken of and with some censure." Again, the next day, acting as the spokesman of "twenty-five as influential men as we have in New York," he asked that his views be laid before the President, and added that the feeling was so strong that necessity if not patriotism would compel a response to it in order to prevent serious trouble. The correspondence with Hicks, he said, had caused intense indignation on the part of all classes. The New York Evening Post of April 24th asked: How much longer is open rebellion to be met with assurances of distinguished consideration? How many more days will the government spend in elegant letter-writing?" From Erie, Penn., H. Ely reported, April 27th, that there was great dissatisfaction because a clear and free passage had not been made through "the rebel city Baltimore." "You must demolish it if necessary, and at once, or the strong indignation sentiment now resting upon the rebels will be turned upon the administration." N. P. Tallmadge, who had all along been for a peaceful solution, declared, April 28th, that the people would "not brook unnecessary delay. They require action-prompt and vigorous action-and they will not hold the admin

At first Lincoln was unwilling to do more than order General Scott, in case the Maryland legislature should attempt to arm the people against the United States, to adopt the most efficient measures to prevent it, even to the extent of bombarding their cities, and, " in the extremest necessity, suspending the writ of habeas corpus."1 But there was so strong a current toward secessionand the secession of Maryland would put the national capital at the mercy of the Confederates-that on April 27th, the President authorized Scott to suspend the writ anywhere between Washington and Philadelphia. This rendered it less difficult to deal with the most dangerous men. Soon the authority was used and arbitrary arrests began to be made: the Baltimore marshal of police, the police commissioners, and other men of prominence were seized and sent to a United States fort. According to a plan devised by Seward, Dix, and General Banks, several members of the Maryland legislature that were expecting to push through an ordinance of secession the next day were arrested in September, 1861, and treated like the other political prisoners.

One of the earliest cases was that of John Merryman, arrested near Baltimore by United States military officers because he was lieutenant in a company organized to aid the Confederacy. Chief Justice Taney issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding Major-General Cadwalader, who had Merryman in custody, to appear before the court with the prisoner and explain the cause

istration guiltless in any other course. This rebellion must be crushed out in the least possible time. Such a course will be the most economical in money and lives. You must not wait for the deliberations of Congress. Act whilst the spirit is up-let it not die down by the discouragement of delay. Make an example now that will last for all time so that treason will not again show its head-and so that the southern right of secession will never again be exercised."-Seward MSS. 12 Lincoln's Works, 38.