the alert. The principal value of your movement upon Suffolk is, that it would be the easiest route to the Gosport Navy Yard, and the objects (including many ships of war) which our people on the former occasion left undestroyed. The possession of Norfolk in itself is of no importance whilst we blockade Hampton Roads; but the destruction of the railroads leading from that city, as far as you may find it practicable, would be a valuable coercive measure. The naval commander should aid you in the collection of boats, and the secretary of war has said that he would cause some eighty horses to be bought and shipped to you for a light battery."

These were the "full and explicit instructions" for which General Butler had written. He must have been puzzled to decide whether the letter was designed to sanction or discourage his enterprise. Nor was it easy to see what the naval commander could do in the way of providing the requisite number of boats. If, however, the words of the commander-in-chief were equivocal, his conduct was not. No horses were sent, nor battery of field artillery, nor vehicles, nor cavalry, nor boats. No objection to the railroad, the artesian well, the bake-house, the intrenched camps; but whatever was needful for an advance beyond half a day's march was withheld. Such was the scarcity of horses that the troops were constantly seen drawing wagon loads of supplies. A reporter writes: "A picture in the drama of the camp has this moment passed my quarters. It is a gang of the Massachusetts boys hauling a huge military wagon, loaded. They have struck up 'The Red, White and Blue.' They believe in it, and consequently render it with true patriotic inspiration. They pause and give three rousing cheers; and now they dash off like firemen, which they are, shouting and thundering along at a pace that makes the drowsy horses they pass prick up their ears." To supply the most pressing occasions, General Butler had nine horses of his own brought from Lowell, and these were all he had for the public service for more than two months. Another reporter writes, June 28th: "Among the passengers on board the steamer to the fortress was Colonel Butler, brother of the general, who went to Washington last week to get orders for the purchase of horses, without which not a single step can be made in advance, simply because the forces here are entirely destitute of the means of transportation. He got orders and succeeded in buying one hundred and thirty-five very good horses, mainly in Baltimore,

whereupon the government immediately sent up and took one hurdred of them for the artillery service at Washington. This was pretty sharp practice, and gives rise to comment on the inability of the authorities at the capital to see anything but Washington worthy of a moment's thought in connection with the present war." The state of things certainly gave rise to comment, as the replies of official persons in Washington to General Butler's solicitations, abundantly show. One gentleman, who was necessarily acquainted with all that was going on at the seat of government, expressed himself with remarkable freedom in a letter to our general.

June 8th, "I received your letter and dispatch, and, contrary to your orders, I read both to the president, under the seal of confidence, however. I have told him that would never let you have any troops to make any great blow, and I read the dispatch to show that I understood my man. He intended to treat you as he did and as he has always treated those whom he knew would be effective if he gave them the means, retaining everything in his own power and under his own immediate control, so as to monopolize all the reputation to be made.

"I have been a little afraid lest you might attempt more than your means justified, under the impression that you would otherwise disappoint the country. But I am pleased to see that you have not made this mistake. You must work on patiently till you

feel yourself able to do the work you attempt, and not play into your enemies' hands, or those of the miserable do-nothings here, by attempting more than in your cool judgment the force you have can effect. You will gradually get the means, and then you may make an effective blow. Unfortunately, indeed, the difficulties increase as your force increases, if not more rapidly. We have forty thousand men, I believe, and provisions and transportation enough to take them to Richmond any day, and yet our lines do not extend five miles into Virginia, where there are not, in my opinion, men enough to oppose the march of half the number to Richmond. Old- is at with 20,000 men, and is moving as cautiously toward the Potomac as if the banks were commanded by an army of Bonaparte's best legions, instead of a mob, composed for the most part of men who only wait for an opportunity to desert a flag they detest. This war will last for ever if something does not happen to unseat old in the West, with 60,000 men under

canvas, has not made a movement except let a few regiments march up the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, at the urgent solicitations of the people. So we go. Congress will probably catch us without our having performed any service worthy of the great force we have under pay."

"I grumble this way all the time, and to every body, in the hope that I may contribute to push on the column. I am very much in hopes we shall be pushed into action by the indignation of the people, if not by our own sense of what is due to the cause we have taken in hand."

CHAPTER VII.

GREAT BETHEL.

WHEN this letter reached the fortress, General Butler was immersed in the last details of a movement, the result of which was to show him, and show the country, that sitting in an office arranging a masterly plan of action is one thing, and the successful execution of the same is another. His correspondent read the answer to his letter in the newspapers; first with exultation, then with bewilderment, lastly with dismay. For the news of Great Bethel came to us as so much of the news of the war has come; first, in enormous flattering lies; secondly, in exaggerated contradictory rumors of disaster; finally, and gradually, in a dim resemblance to the truth.

"Severe engagement near Fortress Monroe-Two hours' fight at Big Bethel-Terrible mistake of the Seventh and Third regiments-Masked batteries of Rifled Cannon open on our troopsTwenty-five killed, and one hundred wounded-Withdrawal from the Field-Renewal of the Battle by General Butler-The Rebel Batteries Captured, and One Thousand Prisoners taken."

Thus was the disaster first Heralded. Then came news, that our unfortunate regiments had been hurled upon a battery armed with thirty pieces of rifled cannon, protected in front by an impassable creek, from which, after standing "a terrific fire" for an hour and a half, they had recoiled, with a loss, variously stated, from twenty

five to a hundred. Other accounts assured us that our men were on the point of taking the battery, when an order came from some unknown source to retire.

The whole truth about Great Bethel does not appear to have been anywhere published. Mr. Pollard's rebel account is a little nearer the truth than any other which I have seen; though, of course, it is distorted by the insanity of hatred common to all our "Southern brethren."* Our "Southern brethren" excel in the business of hating through constant practice. Mr. Pollard would have been a man of honor and truth if he had been reared five degrees north of Richmond. As it is, he only escapes being one, when certain imaginary beings, whom he names Yankees, are the theme of his vigorous pen.

The affair of Great Bethel happened thus:

The forced inaction of General Butler had the effect of making the enemy bolder in approaching his lines. They would send parties from Yorktown, who would come down within sight of the Union pickets near Hampton, and seize both Union men and negroes, conscripting the former, using the latter on their batteries. Major Winthrop, always on the alert, learned from a contraband, George Scott by name, that the rebels had established themselves at two points between Yorktown and the fort, where they had thrown up intrenchments, and whence they nightly issued, seizing and plundering. George Scott described the localities with perfect correctness, and Winthrop himself, accompanied by George repeatedly reconnoitered the road leading to them. On one point only was the negro guide mistaken: he thought the rebels were two thousand in number; whereas, when he saw them, five hundred was about their force. They had eleven or twelve hundred men in the two Bethels on the day of the action, but not more than five hundred took part in it; the rest having arrived, on a run, from Yorktown while the "battle" was proceeding, and, before they had recovered breath, it was over.

Major Winthrop reported to General Butler, who resolved to at tempt the capture of the two posts. His orders restricted him to advances of half a day's march. Great Bethel being nine miles distant, might be considered within the limit.

"First year of the war." New York Edition. p. 77.

Now, all was excitement and activity at head-quarters-no one so happy as Winthrop, who threw himself, heart and soul, into the affair. The first rough plan of the expedition, drawn up in his own hand, lies before me; brief, hasty, colloquial, interlined; resembling the first sketch of an "article" or a story; such as, doubtless, he had often dashed upon paper at Staten Island.

PLAN OF ATTACK BY TWO DETACHMENTS UPON LITTLE BETHEL AND BIG BETHEL.

A regiment or battalion to march from Newport News, and a regiment to march from Camp Hamilton-Duryea's. Each will be supported by sufficient reserves under arms in camp, and with advanced guards out on the road of march.

Duryea to push out two pickets at 10 P. M.; one two and a half miles beyond Hampton, on the county road, but not so far as to alarm the enemy. This is important. Second picket half as far as the first. Both pickets to keep as much out of sight as possible. No one whatever to be allowed to pass out through their lines. Persons to be allowed to pass inward toward Hampton-unless it appears that they intend to go roundabout and dodge through to the front,

At 12, midnight, Colonel Duryea will march his regiment, with fifteen rounds cartridges, on the county road towards Little Bethel. Scows will be provided to ferry them across Hampton Creek. March to be rapid; but not hurried.

A howitzer with canister and shrapnel to go.

A wagon with planks and material to repair the Newmarket Bridge. Duryea to have the 200 rifles. He will pick the men to whom to intrust them.

Rocket to be thrown up from Newport News. Notify Commodore Pendergrast of this to prevent general alarm.

Newport News movement to be made somewhat later, as the distance is less.

If we find the enemy and surprise them, men will fire one volley, if desirable; not reload, and go ahead with the bayonet.

As the attack is to be by night, or dusk of morning, and in two detachments, our people should have some token, say a white rag (or dirty white rag) on the left arm.

Perhaps the detachments who are to do the job should be smaller than a regiment 300 or 500, as the right and left of the attack would be more easily handled.

If we bag the Little Bethel men, push on to Big Bethel, and similarly bag them. Burn both the Bethels, or blow up if brick.