ized men, having nothing that belongs to soldiers except arms and a willingness to use them for the restoration of their country. He was a man of exact, formal, unpliant mind. Accustomed long to the first place-accustomed also to that extravagant adulation which we used to bestow upon conspicuous persons, he was less likely to suspect his infinite insufficiency.

This was well known, however, to every thinking man familiar with Washington. Mr. Lincoln was not familiar with Washington. He, too, had been accustomed to survey General Scott from a great distance, and he took for granted the correctness of the popular estimate, which pronounced him the first captain of the age! Mr. Cameron, the secretary of war, was totally ignorant of the first rudiments of the military art; and he had, too, a painful sense of his ignorance, which he frequently expressed. Hence, the military resources of the country were laid, as it were, humbly at the feet of General Scott, for him to use or misuse according to his good pleasure.

Baltimore was the ruling topic in those days. Baltimore, still severed from all its railroad connections with the North, and still under control of the secession minority. One of the last reporters who made his way through the city, two or three days after the attack of the mob upon the Sixth Massachusetts, gave a striking narrative of his adventures, which kept alive the impression that Baltimore had gone over, as one man, to the side of the rebels, and meant to resist to the death the passage of Union troops.

"In the streets," he wrote, "of the lower part of the city, there were immense crowds, warm discussions, and the high pitch of excitement which discussion engenders. The mob-for Baltimore street was one vast mob-was surging to and fro, uncertain in what way to move, and apparently without any special purpose. Many had small secession cards pinned on their coat collars, and not a few were armed with guns, pistols and knives, of which they made the most display.

"I found the greatest crowd surging around the telegraph office, waiting anxiously, of course, for news. The most inquiry was as to the whereabouts of the New York troops-the most frequent topic, the probable results of an attempt on the part of the Seventh regi ment to force a passage through Baltimore. All agreed that the force could never go through-all agreed that it would make the

attempt if ordered to do so, and none seemed to entertain a doubt that it would leave a winrow of the dead bodies of those who assailed it in the streets through which it might attempt to pass.

"I found the police force entirely in sympathy with the secessionists and indisposed to act against the mob. Marshal Kane and the commissioners do not make any concealment of their proclivities for the Southern Confederacy. Mayor Brown, upon whom I called, seemed to be disposed to do his duty-providing he knew what it was, and could do it safely. He was in a high state of exsitement when I mentioned my name and purpose. He manifested. a disposition to be civil, and to give me information, but was evidently afraid that I was a Northern aggressor, with whom it was indiscreet for him to be in too close communication. Seeing his condition, I left him and went out in the crowd to gather public opinion again."

Wild rumors were afloat. "At one time government had backed down-then it was going ahead; Virginia was coming-Virginia was not coming. The New Yorkers, Pennsylvanians, the Massachusetts men and the Rhode Islanders, were at one time marching one hundred abreast over the state, looking neither to the right nor the left-at another, no 'd-d Yankee' would dare thus to pollute the sacred soil of Maryland. One told that Fort McHenry had been blown up, another that it was going to 'shell' the city, a third that it was only garrisoned by a handful, while a fourth was positive that at least a force double the full war allotment was within its walls. There was some talk that the fort would be attacked, but the opinion that there was a full garrison, having generally obtained, the attacking part of the programme was postponed. Though large crowds remained in the streets until morning, no unusual events transpired. Curiosity to see what was going on appeared to be the prevailing motive with those who were tramping about. * * *

"About eight o'clock the next morning, the streets began again to be crowded. The bar-rooms and public resorts were closed, so that the incentive to precipitate action might not be too readily accessible. Nevertheless, there was much excitement, and among the crowds this morning, there were many men from the country, who carried shot and duck guns, and old-fashioned horsepistols, such as the Maryland' line might have carried from the

first to the present war. The best weapons appeared to be in the hands of young men-boys of eighteen, with the physique and dress and style of deportment, cultivated by the 'Hook Boys' and 'Dead Rabbits' of New York, as villainous looking compounds of reckless rascality as were ever produced in any community.

"About ten o'clock, a cry was raised that 3,000 Pennsylvania troops were at the Calvert street dépôt of the Pennsylvania railroad, and were about to take up their line of march through the city. With a portion of the crowd, I made my way to the dépôt to find it by far the most quiet place in the city. There it was said that the 3,000 were at Pikesville, about fifteen miles from the city, and were going to fight their way around the city. The crowd did not seem disposed to interfere with a movement that required a preliminary tramp of fifteen miles through a heavy sand. But the city authorities, however, rapidly organized and armed some three or four companies and sent them toward Pikesville. Ten of the Adams express wagons passed up Baltimore, loaded with armed men. In one or two there were a number of mattresses, as if wounded men were anticipated. A company of cavalry also started for Pikesville, I supposed to sustain the infantry that had been expressed.

"All through the day, the accessions from the country were coming in. Sometimes a squad of infantry, sometimes a troop of horse, and once a small park of artillery. It was nothing extraordinary to see a solitary horseman' riding in from the counties, with shotgun, powder-horn and flask. Some came with provender lashed to the saddle, prepared to picket out for the night. Boys came with their fathers, accoutered apparently with the war sword and holsterpistols that had done service a century ago. There were strange contrasts between the stern, solemn bearing of the father, and the buoyant, excited, enthusiastic expressions of the boy's face. I had frequent talks with these people, and could not but be impressed with their devotion and patriotism; for, mistaken as they were, they were none the less actuated by the most unselfish spirit of loyalty. They hardly knew, any of them, for what they had so suddenly come to Baltimore. They had a vague idea only, that Maryland had been invaded, and that it was the solemn duty of her sons to protect their soil from the encroachments of an invading force."

N. Y. Daily Times, April 24th, 1861.

*

Upon reading such letters as this, a great cry arose in the North for the re-opening of the path to Washington through Baltimore, even if it should involve the destruction of the rebellious city. The proceedings of General Butler at Annapolis, and the departure from Baltimore of the leading spirits of the mob to join the rebel army in Virginia, quieted the city, and gave the Union men some chance to make their influence felt. But this change was not immediately understood at Washington, and General Scott was meditating a great strategic scheme for the conquest of the city.

His plan, as officially communicated on the 29th of April, to General Butler, General Patterson, and others who were to cooperate, were as follows: "I suppose," wrote the lieutenant-general, "that a column from this place (Washington) of three thousand men, another from York of three thousand men, a third from Perryville, or Elkton, by land or water, or both, of three thousand men, and a fourth from Annapolis, by water, of three thousand men, might suffice. But it may be, and many persons think it probable, that Baltimore, before we can get ready, will re-open the communication through that city, and beyond, each way, for troops, army supplies, and travelers, voluntarily. When can we be ready for the movement on Baltimore on this side? Colonel Mansfield has satisfied me that we want, at least, ten thousand additional troops here to give security to the capital; and, as yet, we have less than ten thousand, including some very indifferent militia from the district. With that addition, we will be able, I think, to make the detachment for Baltimore."

A day or two after the receipt of this letter, General Butler went to Washington to confer with the general-in-chief. He conversed with him fully upon the state of affairs. One suggestion offered on this occasion, by General Butler, has peculiar interest in view of subsequent events. He was of opinion, with Shakspeare, that the place to fight the wolf is not at your own front door, but nearer its own den. Manassas Junction he suggested, not Arlington Heights, was the place where Washington should first be defended; and he offered to march thither with two thousand men, destroy the railroad connections with the South, and fortify the position. As there were then no rebel troops at the Junction, this could have been done without loss or delay. General Scott negatived the proposal. The Committee on the Conduct of the War have since character

ized the omission to seize Manassas Junction at this time, as "the great error of that campaign." "The position at Manassas," add the Committee, "controlled the railroad communication in all that section of country. The forces which were opposed to us at the battle of Bull Run were mostly collected and brought to Manassas during the months of June and July. The three months' men could have made the place easily defensible against any force the enemy could have brought against it; and it is not at all probable that the rebel forces would have advanced beyond the line of the Rappahannock had Manassas been occupied by our troops."

General Butler strongly urged his scheme of seizing Manassas, both in conversation and in writing, to various influential persons. General Scott's veto was decisive.

The reduction of Baltimore was, however, the chief topic of discussion between General Butler and the commander-in-chief. General Scott was still of opinion that some time must elapse before troops could be spared for the attempt; but he consented to General Butler's taking a regiment or two, and holding the Relay House, a station nine miles from Baltimore. Before leaving on this expedition, he asked General Scott what were the powers of a general commanding a department. The reply was, that, except as limited by specific orders and by military law, his powers were absolute; he could do whatever he thought best. Upon receiving this information, General Butler privately consulted an officer of engineers, who ascertained for him, by reference to authoritative maps, that the city of Baltimore was within the Department of Annapolis, as defined in the order creating it.

Saturday afternoon, May 4th, the Eighth New York, the Sixth Massachusetts, and Cook's battery of artillery received the welcome order to be ready to march by two o'clock the next morning. General Butler had given a solemn promise to the Sixth, his own home regiment, which he had joined before his beard was grown, that they should, one day, if his advice was taken, march again through Baltimore. His selection of the regiment on this occasion was the beginning of the fulfillment of that promise. At daylight on Sunday morning, a train of thirty cars glided from the dépôt at Washington; from which, two hours later, the regiments issued at the Relay House, where they seized the dépôt and swarmed over the adjoining hills, reconnoitering.