contracts, not illegal in their character, to be enforced as made by the parties, even against any state interference with their terms. The extreme depreciation of Confederate currency at the time the wood, which is the cause of the suit, was purchased, gives a seeming injustice to the result obtained. But until we are made acquainted with all the circumstances attend rency mentioned therein, is to as certain the true value of the subject-matter about which the contract was made. This is what the legislature of North Carolina authorized to be done, and what was done in this case. I think the judgment should be reversed. Courts. ing the transaction, we can not affirm anything on this point. Municipal Bonds - Mandamus against County The answer alleges that the wood was to be cut by the defendant's hands, and that the plaintiff's testatrix was only to furnish the trees standing. It may be that under such circum- UNITED STATES EX REL MCKEE, v. stances the costs of felling the trees and removing the wood was COURT OF VERNON COUNTY,* nearly equal to the value of the wood by the cord as found by the jury, which was fifty cents. Be that as it may, it is not for the United States Circuit Court, Western District of Missouri, Novem court to give another value to the contract than that stipulated by the parties, nor is it within the legislative competence of a state to authorize any such proceeding. ber Term, 1875. THE COUNTY Before Hon. JOHN F. DILLON, Circuit Judge, and Hon. AR The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina must be NOLD KREKEL, District Judge. reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Justice BRADLEY dissenting. 1. Municipal Bonds-When Judgment Creditor may have Mandamus.A judgment creditor of a county who has received a warrant on the treasurer which is refused payment, may have a mandamus to enforce the collection of a tax to pay such In this case motion was made by respondent on the 18th inst. to quash the alternative writ which had been issued requiring respondent to levy and cause to be collected a special tax for the payment of the relator's judgment. It seems that upon representation that there was money in the county treasury for the purpose, the court at the last term ordered a warrant issued for the amount, but said warrant when presented was not paid. Township organ I dissent from the judgment of the court in this case. The parties never contracted that the price to be paid for the wood was to be equivalent to any amount of specie. The price contracted for was one dollar per cord. Specie at that time was worth twentyone dollars to one of Confederate currency. Can it be supposed that the parties agreed on a value of five cents per cord for the wood? The suggestion does not appear to me to be reasonable. The truth is, that the relation between Confedetate currency and specie in North Carolina at that time is entirely unsuitable to be used as a rule in estimating the value of contracts. Specie could not be had at all, and consequently the relations between currency and specie was no guide as to the value of currency in pur-ization has been adopted by the county, and May last, the three chasing commodities. The verdict finds that the wood, at the time of the contract, was worth fifty cents in specie per cord, and yet it sold for a dollar in currency. This shows that currency was equivalent to fifty cents on the dollar in purchasing capacity. I hold, therefore, that the law of North Carolina, in allowing the jury to estimate the real value of the consideration, in cases where it is impossible to get at the true value of the money named in the contract, is a most sensible and just law. By what authority do we scale down the price named in the contract at all? Is it not on the ground that the value of the money named by the parties is not a true criterion of the value of the contract? When once we admit this we make that money a mere commodity, and endeavor to find its true value. How, then, is its true value to be measured? Is it to be measured only by the amount of specie it would purchase at the time, when, perhaps, no specie existed in the country? Why not measure its value by the amount of United States treasury notes which it would buy? They were money, as well as specie. But suppose they were not to be had in the market any more than specie. Under such circumstances, is not the true method of ascertaining its value the purchasing capacity which it had? I hold that this is the true test, when, as stated by the legislature of North Carolina in its preamble to the act, it is impossible to scale the value of Confederate money accurately for all parts of the state under the varying circumstances that arose. Under such circumstances, the only fair mode of ascertaining the purchasing value of the currency used, is to ascertain the true value of the consideration or thing purchased. This is not to set aside the contract of the parties, but to carry out their contract. It is the proper method of ascertaining what their contract really meant, and giving it full force and effect. Where a regular merchantable ratio exists between a paper currency and specie or other lawful money, of course it ought to be used as the rule to ascertain the true value of contracts. But when no such regular marketable value does exist, then the next best mode of getting at the value of the contract, or of the cur judges of the county court went out of office and one single judge came into office to continue the court under the new law. The present mandamus was served, as well on the retiring judges as the new judge. The former made return of their departure from office, and the motion to quash was made on behalf of the single judge now constituting the court. The grounds of the motion were: (1) That it was premature, not showing failure in respondent to comply with any demand. (2) That this court has not power to order a special tax for the purpose. In support of these positions, the township organization law of 1873 was cited by the defendants' counsel to show the process and machinery therein provided for the inanagement of county affairs and collection of its revenues. And it was urged that the only duty or power of the county court is to levy the tax annually in April, after proper assessment has been made; that said relator, although he has a judgment, must have his warrant endorsed by the treasurer- no funds "—and take his turn with other creditors could not create a revenue law and appoint officers and levy spein succession in obtaining payment of the warrant; that this court cial taxes every time a judgment is obtained against a municipality. If this be so, it was argued that every time a physician attends a all the machinery of the law and have a special tax levied and pauper, and gets a warrant for his services, he can put in motion collected for his benefit. Ewing & Smith, for the relator; C. G. Burton, for the respondent. DILLON, Circuit Judge, orally rendered decision, in substance Saying: We can not go through all the maze of procedure proposed by counsel for enforcing the judgments of this court against municipal corporations. If we should adopt the views of the defendsham and a farce. The practice in these proceedings is largely ant's counsel, the judgments of this court would be reduced to a * Reported for this Journal by Joseph Shippen, Esq., from notes taken in court when the decision was rendered. settled already in this circuit. Our course is not to require a spe- The only manner in which sale for such taxes could be made afcial assessment, and levy a at special and arbitrary time, but to ter said date was by a decree in chancery granted by the district have the tax levied and collected with the general annual levy. court of the state, after judicial proceedings had therefor in the Such special levy can then be made on the books and collected manner pointed out by the aforesaid statute, in which proceedings without much additional expense or trouble, and in the exercise of every party interested would have an opportunity to be heard its discretion the court aims to avoid all unnecessary severity and upon the merits and equities, and which proceedings to obtain useless costs. Some delay may thereby be occasioned to the creditor, but in theory of law, he is compensated therefor by interest. This is the method we have taken and carried out in all cases. such a decree have been duly instituted and are now pending. The effect of a decree herein, then, would be to enjoin the action of a court of competent jurisdiction from rendering a decree of sale, or hearing the rights of the respective parties therein. MR. JUSTICE MILLER.—I am satisfied that the case comes within the principle of Bradshaw v Omaha, 1 Neb. 16, and that this court is bound by it. The only doubt I have had is raised by the 15th When we have the right to order a special levy, we do not hesitate to do so, if it becomes necessary; but if the respondent appears and gives satisfactory assurance that the requisite amount will be embraced in the general levy, and that sufficient will be therefrom proposition of Mr. Thurston's printed argument, but as the pres appropriated by a proper order to pay the particular debt, in such case a special levy may be dispensed with. We are governed by the circumstances of each case. ent plaintiff is entitled to come into the federal court, I see no In the case at bar, McKee recovered a judgment against Vernon County in November, 1874, whereon execution issued in December and payment was demanded. The execution was returned nulla bona. It was the duty of the county court, after what had been done by the relator, to levy a tax the following April to pay this debt, but it did not do it. It was represented to us at the last term, that funds therefor were in the treasury, and if warrant were drawn the creditor would have a short road to obtain payment. United States Circuit Court, Western District of Missouri,` NoHaving received his warrant he was met with response of "no funds," and he is asked to register his warrant and wait for his turn to get his money in the order that warrants are presented. We hold he is not required to do so. The motion to quash is refused, and let order go for a peremptory writ on respondent to levy at the next April term, a special tax, at the time when the general annual levy is made for county purposes, to pay the judgment. The costs of the writ served on persons not officers must be paid by the relators. Krekel, J., conORDERED ACCORDINGLY. curs. vember Term, 1875. Before Hon. JOHN F. DILLON, Circuit Judge, and Hon. ARNOLD KREKEL, District Judge. An action by the collector of internal revenue against the deputy collector on his official bond, may be removed from the state into the federal court, under the act of March 3, 1875. On motion to remand cause to the state court. The plaintiff was the collector of internal revenue for one of the districts of Missouri, and appointed the defendant his deputy. The defend. ant gave the bond which the plaintiff by the act of Congress was authorized to require and accept. This action brought in May, 1875, is upon this official bond, and alleges various breaches of the same. The plaintiff in due time, before answer filed, applied to remove the cause into this court under the act of March 3, 1875, as one "arising under the constitution and laws of the United States." United States Circuit Court, District of Nebraska, May Term, The removal was ordered, and the defendant now moves to re 1875. Before Mr. Justice MILLER. 1. Restraining Taxation-Conclusiveness of State Decisions.-On a question of restraining the collection of city taxes, upon lands within the city limits, used exclusively for agricultural purposes, this court is bound by the decision of the supreme court of the state. 2. When Suit may be commenced Originally in Federal Court.-A citizen of another state, in the case of an illegal tax upon his real property, levied under state authority, may proceed originally in this court, notwithstanding a provision of the state statutes requiring a previous decree in the state chancery court, before any sale for taxes could be made. This was an action brought to restrain the collection of taxes by the city of Omaha upon plaintiff's lands lying within the corporate boundaries of said city, but used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Submitted upon the pleadings and an agreed state of facts. mand the cause. Philips & Vest, for the motion; Mack 7. Leaming; Crittenden & Cockrell, contra. DILLON, Circuit Judge. We have no doubt that the cause was properly removed. It is one arising under the laws of the United States. [Rev. Stats. sec. 3148: act of March 3, 1875, secs. I, 2, 3; act of February 8, 1875, sec. 12 (18 Stats. at Large, 309); Osborn v. U. S. Bank. 9 Wheat 739.] Indeed, this last act gives this court original jurisdiction of such actions, concurrent with the state courts. MOTION DENIED. Correspondence. RAILWAY MORTGAGES AND MECHANICS' LIENS. LITTLE ROCK, ARK., Nov. 16th, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-Do you not use some illustrations under the above title, in your paper of November 12th, which are not sound? 7. M. Woolworth, for the plaintiff; J. M. Thurston, for the It is not the purpose of this to review your criticism of Nelson v. Iowa Eastern defendant. Ry. Co., as controlled by the Iowa statutes. But there is ground to question The 15th proposition in Mr. Thurston's brief, referred to below, the correctness of some of your positions. You seem to be unsound, or some is as follows: of your modes of expression unhappy, or some of your readers are too obtuse to comprehend your true meaning. You illustrate by putting the case of XV. The relief sought is to restrain the sale of the land for the taxes, which sale if made, would cast a cloud upon plaintiff's ti-a house built upon a mortgaged lot, where you ask, "Would the specific lien tle. By general statutes in force at the commencement of this suit (see Gen. Stat. page 940), after the first day of December, 1873, no sales of land could be made by treasurers for taxes levied thereon prior to the year 1872. of a material-man who had furnished doors and windows, against those doors and windows, be postponed to the mortgage of the contractor; or would it not rather be held that the doors and mindows entered the house encumbered with the material-man's lien?" There are too apparent errors sticking out of this proposition: Ist, that a machanic or material-man's Book Notices. lien is not real instead of personal; i. e.,that the windows and doors, when put in the house, do not become fixtures, and a part of the realty, and that all the THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REGISTER REPORTS. Vol. 13. No. 1. ORlien which the material-man has, is not upon what he puts in alone, but LANDO F. BUMP, Editor. New York: McDivitt, Campbell & Co. upon the whole house, and every part of it, and the ground upon which it stands; 2nd, that by reason of his having put his material there, he has some We have received No. 1, comprising 48 pages of Vol. 13 of the Bankruptcy sort of a chattel lien on the stuff furnished, separate and distinct from the lien Register Reports, bearing date November 1st, 1875. Mr. Bump's practice of existing on the soil upon which the house is built, and of which lien, if re-imprinting the date of the publication of these numbers, began with No. 5 of corded, he must have notice, and so refuses to put his work there without con sent of the mortgagee, which, if had, would give him priority as against an owner. It may be true in the particular case put by you, that of this materialman furnishing a contractor for the building, who had a mortgage on the real estate on which it was situate, for the cost of it, that he would be subrogated pro tanto, in equity, to the rights of the contractor-mortgagee under the mortgage. But this subrogation would not be the result of any particular lien which this material-man has on any particular stick of timber, but because it would be inequitable to allow the contractor to claim priority under a mortgage which was given to secure the same expense which the material-man had borne, and because the contractor stands by and directs this to be done, and, like an owner, is bound by his acts and estopped to deny the lien. The objection to your illustration is, that it seems to imply that an owner may improve a mortgagee out of his lien. S. W. W. in COMMENTS.-Our corresponent seems to have fallen into two errors: 1. He has not kept in view the terms of the Iowa statute; 2. He has consequently misapprehended our illustration, which was designed to embrace only a case arising under that statute. The Iowa statute gives, first a general lien upon the whole realty, such as our correspondent seems to have in mind; second, a special lien upon the buildings, erections or improvements * preference to any prior lien, or incumbrance, or mortgage." We admit that the general lien would not have preference of a prior recorded mortgage; but the special lien has such preference, by the positive terms of the statute. What, then is the nature of this special lien? It was not questioned by the Iowa court that railroad ties fall within the terms 'buildings, erections or improvements." On the contrary the court say (p. 741) that "his lien was a general one upon the road, or a specific one upon the ties, if they were in a condition that he could remove them." The suggestion of our correspondent that this lien is in its nature real and not personal, and the common law doctrine of fixtures which he invokes, do not, in our judgment, help his argument; for the statute which gives the specific lien against the "building, erection, or improvement," manifestly gives also that without which the right granted could not be enjoyed, namely, a right to the purchaser under the sale made in pursuance of the decree enforcing the lien, to remove such "building, erection or improvement." And the Iowa court recognize this principle when they say (p. 741), "We have no doubt that a party who should erect a depot upon a railroad covered by a mortgage, might, under our statutes and decisions, enforce his lien upon it, and cause it to be removed, if necessary." And yet a building is, of course, real property and a fixture. So far as we can see, the only reason invoked by the Iowa court as a justification for disregarding the positive provisions of their statute, was that the ties could not be removed "without the distruction of the road or of the labor of others." This reason we noticed in our previous observations on the case, and shall not again recur to it. One word more. In the case of Galveston R. R. v. Cowdry, 11 Wall. 459 which the Iowa court invoke in supporting their decision, Mr. Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion, took especial pains to distinguish the case from that of a mechanic's lien; and we think that the case in 11 Wallace is clearly distinguishable from cases arising under the Iowa statute; for in the latter case the lien was given by a public law of the state, existing at the time the mortgage was executed; and of the existence of this law the mortgagebondholders, in whatever market of the world they may have purchased the bonds, were, on principle, clearly chargeable with notice. They took these bonds, therefore, affected with knowledge that the mortgage securing them might be postponed to mechanics' liens subsequently intervening. In respect of such liens they therefore have no stronger equity than the contractor to whom the bonds were originally issued. And what rights the contractor has, our corespondent has told us: "It would be inequitable to allow the contractor to claim priority under a mortgage which was given to secure the same expense which the material-man had borne." We go further: we say that it would be doubly inequitable-yea, the most palpable injustice-to allow the contractor to have priority over a sub-contractor who had put his materials into the structure on the faith of a statute which declared in positive terms that he should have priority over any prior lien, or incumbrance, or mortgage."-[Ed. C. L. J. vol. 12, July 15, 1875, and with page 193 of that volume which contained 576 pages. In four months then, Mr. Bump has published 416 pages of bankruptcy cases; a very respectable volume in itself. At this rate we may expect three volumes a year of these reports, which is only another instance of the startling rapidity with which our book cases are filled to overflowing with new books. We notice that Mr. Abbott has greatly added to the value of his Annual United States Digest for 1874, by incorporating therein under the title "Bankruptcy,' the contents of the first ten volumes of this series, in so far as the cases contained in them had not been digested in previous volumes from other series of reports. Mr. Abbott's digest is not as full and complete as that of Messrs. Moses & Shinn, recently published by McDivitt, Campbell & Co., with its numerous and exhaustive tables of cases, though covering the same ground; and for thorough and careful examination of the authorities, the practitioner in bankruptcy can not well do without the latter work; still a digest claiming to embrace all reported cases in the United States, could not well omit the very many important United States district and circuit court cases in bankruptcy which reach the profession in a permanent form only through the National Bankruptcy Register. We take the liberty of again suggesting that Mr. Bump would confer a favor upon the profession if he would add the dates when the decision was rendered. In this as in many other respects, the current reports of Massachusetts are worthy of universal imitation. E. T. A. CASES ARGUED and DetERMINED IN THE CIRCUIT Courts of THE UNI- The cases reported have been judiciously selected from a vast number which were decided during the four years which the volume covers. This makes this book a substantial addition to the existing law. The profession will be gratified to find a large number of valuable opinions from Mr. Justice Bradley, or as the statute now styles him, the Circuit Justice, some of which, so far as our recollection serves, have never before been in print. The relation of a stockholder to the corporation of which he is a member, has never been more tersely stated than in the opinion of the eminent circuit justice, in Morgan v. The Railroad Company, p. 15. A majority of the opinions reported, however, are those of the circuit judge, who is justly ranked as among the very best judges on the federal bench. The editorial work of the learned judge has been performed with exceeding care. J. F. D. Some Recent Decisions in Bankruptcy. Debt Created by Fraud-Judgment-Merger-Agreement not to Arrest.-William S. Warner v. Aaron H. Cronkhite; United States Circuit Court Eastern District of Wis. Dyer, J. Sept. 1875. 8 Chicago Legal News, 17. i. Debt created by fraud is not discharged in bankruptcy, even through reduced to a simple judgment for money in which there is no mention of fraud; if its original action was based upon fraud, the fraud is not merged in the judgment. 2. A stipulation between the parties, after the judgment, by which the plaintiff waived his right to execution against the body of defendant, does not affect this question of discharge. 3. Cites and comments on McButt v. Hirsch, 4 Abbott, 441; Mallory v. Leach, 14 Abbott, 449; In re Patterson. I N. B. R. R. 308; In re Whitehouse, 4 N. B. R. R. 63; Shuman v. Strauss, 52 N. Y. 404; S. C. 10 N B. R. R. 300; Wood v. Henry, 40 N. Y. 124; Prouty v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 594; Roberts v. Prosser, 53 N. Y. 260; Bangs v. Watson, 9 Gray, 211; Palmer v. Preston, 45 Vt. 156. Landlord and Tenant-Lien for Rent.-In re Browne and Ten Eyck; United States District Court, New Jersey. Nixon, J. (12 N. B. R. R. 529,) If a note taken for rent is not paid at maturity, the landlord is entitled to all his remedies for the security or collection of his claim, in the same manner as if the note had never been given. If a tenant makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors to a trustee who sells the goods on the premises after the -SOLICITOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN HOLKER, M. P., has been appointed commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and turns the proceeds attorney-general of England. over to the assignee, the landlord is entitled to payment of the rent out of the proceeds. Citing 2 Greenl. on Ev. 2 520; Burden v. Halton, 4 Bing. 454; Holmes v. De Camp, 1 Johns 33; Edwards v. Derrickson, 28 N. J. 39, and Haskins et al. v. Paul, 9 N. J. 110. Attaching Creditor may intervene and oppose an adjudication in invol untary bankruptcy, In re Mendelsohn, U. S. District Court, Cal. Hillyer, J. (Ib. 533); In re Hotje, United States District Court Eastern District of Wis. Dyer, J. (Ib. 548); citing 6 N. B. R. 209; 8 N. B. R. 106; 12 N. B. R. 39; Id. 385. Limitation. In re M. Eldridge & Co.; United States District Court Eastern District, Va. Hoyle. J. (Ib. 540). The statute of limitations ceases to run against the creditor of a bankrupt at the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and if not barred at that time, his claim may be proved afterwards, though at the time of proof it would be otherwise barred. Citing Minot v. Thacher, 48 Mass. 348; Ex parte Ross, 2 Glynn & Jarn. 46 330; Bowie v. Henderson, 6 Wheat. 514; 3 Cow. 159; 2 W. Blackstone, 702; Collistor v. Hailey, 79 Mass. 57; 24 Penn. St. 482; 14 S. & R. 487; 4 Mason, 16. Landlord and Tenant-Damages.-In re Peter Hufnagel, United States District Court Eastern District, Mich. Brown, J. (Id. 554). The assignee should pay from the assets the rent of a store occupied by him, from the filing of the petition to the date of surrendering possession. Rent and damages for non-performance of covenants in lease, accruing after commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, are not debts provable against the es tate. Jurisdiction.- Augustine v. McFarland, United States District Court, Kan. Foster, J. (13 N. B. R. R. 7). If the assignee voluntarily appears in a proceeding in a state court to foreclose a mortgage, instituted after the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, he can not, after a sale of the property, apply to the district court for an injunction to restrain further proceedings in the state court. Citing, and following Mays v. Tritton. 20 Wall. 414; S. C. II N. B. R. 229. Discharge.-Platt v. Parker, Supreme Court N. Y. Tappen, J. (Id. 14). The claim of a creditor is barred by a discharge, although his name was not placed on the schedule, nor any notice given to him of the proceedings. Citing Hubbell v. Crump, 11 Paige, 310; Payne v. Able, 4 N. B. R. 220; 7 Bush (Ky.) 344; Burnside v. Brigham, 49 Mass. 75; Brown v. Rebb, 1 Rich. 374; Beake v. Birdsall, 1 N. J. 12; Gassett v. Morse, 21 Vt. 627; Stevens v. M. S. Bank, 101 Mass. 109. Wife's Equity.-Canby, Assignee, v. Amelia F. McLear; United States District Court, Del. Bradford, J. (Id. 22). The right of a wife to have interposed by bill in equity to prevent her husband from reducing to possession her chose in action by proceedings at law-even conceding such right to be es tablished by the authorities-held insufficient to support a promise by the husbaud, to pay to the wife a sum equal to the proceeds arising from the sale of the wife's legacy, where the promise was made subsequently to its reduction to possession by the husband. Citing, Tritt's Admr. v. Colwell's Admr., 31 Penn. St. 228; Est. of B. Hinds, 5 Whart. 138; Woodworth v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 8; Jaycox et al. v. Caldwell, 51 N. Y. 395; Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154 Turner v. Nye, 89 Mass. 176. Right of United States to Priority.-United States v. Lewis; United States Circuit Court Eastern District, Penn. Strong, J. (Id. 33). The United States is entitled to priority of payment out of the separate estate of the partners, although its demand is against the firm. If the United States holds a demand against a firm, some of the partners of which reside in a foreign country, and the resident partners become bankrupt, it is entitled to priority of payment out of their separate estates, and may enforce its right to priority, without first exhausting the securities it may hold for the claim. Off-Set.-In re Geo. Law, Brett & Co., Ex parte, Dreyfes; United States District Court Mass. Lowell, J. (1d. 45). A debtor of a bankrupt who merely accepts a transfer of the bankrupt's note without any stipulation concerning the terms of the transfer, holds it merely as trustee for the creditors, and can not set it off against the debt due by him. A note which is held by a party as trustee for another, must be proved by the holder as trustee, or by the real owner. Recent Reports. E. T. A. REPORTS OF CASES HEARD AND DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Vol. 4. By J. S. G. RICHARDSON, State Reporter. Columbia Republican Printing Company. 1875. This is a handsome looking volume of 544 pages, with an index covering 31 pages, compile 1 in the usual manner, being simply a reprint of the syllabi. The volume contains reports of 62 cases, and the ability and experience of the reporter are manifested in the care with which he has done his work, The South Carolina court has not been held in high repute since the war, but some of the opinions to be found in this volume are of a high standard. One of the justices, a negro, has exhibited, in the few opinions he has delivered, strong evidence of the possibilities within the reach of at least some individuals of his race. We note the following cases. Suits between Administrators.-Harris v. Stilwell, p. 19. Where an administrator with the will annexed has a final settlement with legatees and then dies, a suit against his administrator, to impeach the settlement, on the ground of fraud or mistake, can not be sustained by an administrator de bonis non of the testator, for the benefit of the legatees. Express Company-Limitation of Liability by Terms of Receipt. Porter v. Southern Express Company, p. 135. A clause in the receipt given by the express company, for goods received for conveyance, that “it is not to be held liable for any loss or damage whatsoever, unless claim be made therefor within ninety days from the delivery to it," was held not to limit the liability of the company in an action upon the contract to recover for the nondelivery of the goods. Such receipt is of itself evidence to bind the com pany. Mandamus-Issue of Illegal Scrip-Levy of Tax to pay Same. -State ex rel Shirer v. Comptroller-General, p. 185. Where an act of the legislature directed the state treasurer to issue certain scrip, known as "Revenue Bond Scrip," the same to be receivable for taxes, and directed a tax to be levied to pay the scrip, it is sufficient ground for the refusal of mandamus to the comptroller requiring him to order the levy, that the state and county taxcollectors have been enjoined from receiving such scrip, on the ground that it is void; because, consisting of certificates of indebtedness, payable to bearer issued by the state in its sovereign capacity, with the faith of the state pledged for their ultimate redemption, the same was issued contrary to the constitutional inhibition against the emission of bilis of credit by a state. The record of this case occupies about fifty pages, and the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Moses, is a long and carefully prepared review of the facts and authorities. Express Company-Contract Limiting Liability.-Levy v. Southern Express Company, p. 234. A contract entered into by the shipper of goods by express, with the company receiving the goods, by which such company is authorized to deliver the goods to another company, and that such other company shall have the benefit of all 'imitations inserted in the contract for the benefit of the first company, is good, and the second company is so entitled. Where the value of goods shipped is not stated or agreed on, the ex. press company is entitled to the benefit of a stipulation in the contract limiting the value recoverable to the sum of $50. Partnership-Joint Liability of Separate Firms trading together.-Beall v Lowndes, p. 258. Two several firms may by their course of dealing with a third party, as by holding out the idea that they constitute but one firm, incur, as to him, a joint liability to the same extent as if they did in fact constitute one partnership. Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings-Effect of in this Country.Ibid. Real estate in this country does not pass by operation of foreign bankrupt laws. A deed of inspectorship, granted under the English bankrupt ław, containing an express saving of the rights of creditors against any person jointly liaable with the debtors, and acceptance of the deed by a creditor, will not discharge a party in South Carolina, who is jointly liable for the debt. Crop-Lien for Advances-Prior to Lien for Rent.-Visauska v. Bradley, p. 288. A lien under the act to secure advances for agricultural purposes, given by a tenant of rented land, has preference over a prior contract to pay the landlord, for the use of the land. Confederate Sequestration Act-Purchaser's Rights.-Spratt v. Pierson, p. 301. A purchaser of real estate at a sale under the act, is not entitled, by subrogation or otherwise, to the benefit of a debt of the owner secured by a mortgage on the premises, which the receiver who made the sale paid in order to give the purchaser a clear title. Confederate Money-Liability of Guardian for.-Waller v. Cresswell, p. 353. A guardian is liable, if at all, only for the value, in lawful money, of an investment of Confederate money of his ward. He is liable to the same extent to account for Confederate money of his ward received from an administrator. Illegal Tax-State v. Railroad Corporations, p. 376. In this case, the court was compelled to decide that the act of the legislature of South Carolina, which requires every railroad company within the state to pay to the treasurer, for the use of the state, a sum of money determined by the length of its road! was a tax upon property, and unconstitutional and void, because not laid upon the value of the property. This may be taken as a fair specimen of the legislation which has prevailed of their receiving the President's signature. 3. The proviso in the act of in the South since the war. Constitutional Law-Validity of Tax to meet Interest on Public Debt-Mandamus.-Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller-General, p. 430. This was a decision of five several petitions for mandamus to compel the comptroller to levy a tax to meet the interest on bonds of the state issued and sold to the petitioners. The comptroller claimed that the rate per cent. of tax necessary, had not, as required by law, been ascertained by the legislature; that registration of the bonds had not been made according to law; that a large number of the bonds had been returned to the treasury, redeemed, and other bonds issued in their place, so that the number outstanding could not by him be ascertained, and the bonds so issued in lieu thereof, had not been issued lawfully and were void; and that the act authorizing the issue of the bonds is unconstitutional, and void in failing to levy a tax sufficient, to pay the annual interest on the J. Summary of Our Legal Exchanges. CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS, OCTOBER 16. March 3, 1875, entitled "An act to protect the Sinking Fund and providing for the Exigencies of the Government," declaring that the increase of tax on tobacco therein provided shall not apply to tobacco on which the tax had been paid when the act took effect, refers to the hour of the day on which the President's signature was affixed, and not to any antecedent part of the day. Legal News and Notes. -JUDGE VAN BRUNT, of the Supreme Court of New York, was recently married in violation of the state law, it is said, because his former wife, now divorced, is still living. -HON. C. K. HARVEY, of Knox county Ill., has in his possession a revolutionary land warrant, signed by Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia at the time, and dated 1786. -A LAWYER, about to finish a bill of costs, was requested by his client, a baker, to make it as light as possible. Ah!" said the lawyer, "you might properly enough say that to the foreman of your establishment; but that is not the way I make my bread. -THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS of Fulton county, Ills., at their last annual meeting, resolved not to pay any officer or witness fees in criminal cases, unless there is a conviction. This is rather severe on such innocent men as may be accused; but it speedly disposes of all cases where the defendant is guilty. -A SOMEWHAT singular suit was recently concluded before Judge Robinson in the Court of Common Pleas in New York city, in connection with a raised check. An Upton storekeeper, in changing a $100 bill, gave a genuine check for $24 on the Security Bank of that city. This check was subsequently raised $4.222.55 and the endorsement also altered. The check as thus raised was certified by the bank. Soon afterward it was deposited in the National Bank of the Republic, and next went through the Clearing House, the Security Bank paying the amount to the National Bank of the Republic. The lat Foreign Attachment-Assignee's Action thereby.-Guillou v. Fontain; United States Circuit Court, Pennsylvania. Opinion by McKennan, 1. Under the provisions of the act of June 5th, 1872, revised statutes, 915, the federal courts may issue process of foreign attachment against the property of non-residents, where the same would lie under the laws of the state in which such court is held. 2. An action of debt, by the assignee of a bank. rupt firm, against a special partner, upon his statutory liability under the laws rity Bank against the National Bank of the Republic to recover the difference of Pennsylvania, to restore the amount of his original capital, where the same has been reduced by the payment of interest or profits to him, may be commenced by process of foreign attachment. PITTSBURGH LEGAL JOURNAL, OCTOBER 13. Executory Trust and Equity-Probate Court-Assignment of Insurance.—In re Webb; Supreme Court of California. Opinion by Crockett, J. [6 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 30.] 1. A court of equity will lend no assistance towards perfecting a voluntary contract for the creation of a trust, nor regard it as binding, so long as it remains executory. 2. The question not decided whether the probate court has jurisdiction to enforce a trust created by an intestate. 3. If such contract is executed by a conveyance of the property in trust, so that nothing remains to be done by the grantor or doner to complete the transfer of title, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust is deemed to be established, even if there was no consideration, and a court of equity will enforce the trust. 4. If one who has had his life insured writes to his father and sister that the insurance was made for their benefit, but makes no assignment or delivery of the policy to them, it amounts only to an executory agreement to create a trust in future, and can not be enforced in equity. INTERNAL REVENUE RECORD, OCTOBER II AND 17.* "Goods of Similar Description."-Greenleaf et al. v. Goodrich : United States Circuit Court, Massachusetts. Opinion by Shepley, J. [21 Int. Rev Rec. 324.] Under the act of 1862 (12 United States Statutes at Large, p. 553) the cloths commonly known as “' Saxony Dress Goods" and not exceeding in value forty cents per square yard, are subject to an additional duty of two cents per square yard, the words "goods of similar description" in the ac. referring not to similarity in the process of manufacture, but to similarity of the resultant fabric and the uses for which it can be employed. Statute in Force on Day when passed-Tax on Tobacco-Construction of Act.-Salmon and Hancock v. Burgess; United States Circuit Court, Virginia. Opinion by Hughes, J. [21 Int. Rev. Rec. 333.] 1. The fiction of law requiring a statute to be construed as in force during the whole of the day on which it passed, is a rule of mere convenience, and must give way when the priority of different events comes in question, and the right and justice of the case require. 2. An act of Congress increasing taxes and denouncing penalties, falls within the first article of the national constitution, prohibiting ex post facto laws, and giving effect to statutes only from the time *New York: W. C. & F. P. Church. ter bank soon discovered the check had been raised, and applied to the former bank for payment of the difference, which was refused on the ground of its certification before payment. Suit was accordingly brought by the Secu claimed to be due. It was decided at the General Term that the certification was not an estoppel to the suit. After hearing the testimony, Judge Robinson directed a verdict for $5,602.60 in favor of the Security Bank. -TO THE Home Fire Ins. Co., of this city [New York] belongs the credit of proving, in the United States Supreme Court, the inalienable right of insurance corporations to appeal from the courts of an unfriendly state, where they are doing business by courtesy, to the United States courts, despite any state law forbidding such removal. And now to the Hartford Fire Ins. Co. belongs the honor of having established that a "foreign" insurance company exercising that right of appeal to the United States courts cannot, because of such exercise, be expelled from the state from whose courts such appeal is taken, by the insurance commissioner—any law of the state, or agreement of the company, to the contrary notwithstanding. The commissioner of Wisconsin sought to expel the Hartford from that state, because it had in a certain case appealed to the federal courts; but he has been permanently enjoined from revoking its certificate for that reason.-[The Chronicle. -DRAMATIC COPYRIGHT.--To sustain an action for breach of dramatic copyright, the part of the plaintiff's production which is copied must be a material and substantial part. Stage business is a subject-matter of dramatic copyright, and the copyright therein is assignable at law. By the Dramatic Copyright Act (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15), the author of any tragedy, or any other dramatic piece or entertainment, or the assignee of such author, shall have as his own property the sole liberty of causing such production to be represented, or any person who shall, contrary to the intent of the act or right of the author or assignee, represent "any snch production, or any part thereof," is liable to certain penalties or damages recoverable at the suit of the proprietor of the production. L. adapted from the French a drama called "The Wandering Jew," and assigned to the plaintiffs his right to represent the same, and the same was in fact represented at a theatre of which one of the plaintiffs was lessee. Afterwards, the defendant, being the lessee of another theatre, represented at such theatre an adaptation from the same French drama, and bearing the same title. The version of the defendant differed from that of the plaintiffs in the dialogue throughout. The stage business was generally the same in both versions, being adapted from the common original, except that in two scenes certain variations introduced in the plaintiffs' version were also introduced in the version of the defendant. Lord Coleridge, C. J., having upon a perusal of the two plays, directed a verdict for the defendant. Held, no misdirection, and a rule to enter a verdict for the plaintiffs' discharge. Chatterton and Webster v. Cave, 33 L. T. N. S. 255. C. P.—[The Law Times. |