Eminent Domain-Property of Railroad Company.-P. P. & J. | legal authority to enquire into the offence charged, by reason of it not being R. R. Co. v. P. & S. R. R. Co., p. 174. The lands of railroad corporations not actualy in use by them, or not absolutely necessary for the enjoy ment of their franchises, are subject to be taken under the exercise of the right of eminent domain.

dence, that the persons in charge of the engine in question saw the top of the plaintiff's wagon as it approached the crossing, and continued to see the same until the wagon reached such crossing, and that persons approaching such crossing from the east could not see a train until they were within about thirty feet of such crossing, then it was the duty of such persons in charge of said train to have slackened the speed of said engine, and to have warned the plaintiff of its approach by sounding its whistle or ringing a bell, and a failure to do so would be negligence on the part of the defendant." Held, that the instruction was calculated to confuse, and ought not to have been given.

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER FOR SEPTEMBER.

An Abstract of Title.-This number of the Register contains a long article under this head by James P. Root of Chicago.

New Trial-Misconduct of Jurors.-Tomlinson v. Town of Derby, Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, opinion by Park, Ch. J., and note by Judge Redfield. [14 Am. Law Reg. (N S.) 543.] 1. A motion to set aside a verdict for the misconduct of a juror, and a motion for a new trial for errors in the rulings of the court, can be filed in the superior court at the same time, and can be reserved together for the advice of this court. 2. Where a juror has conversed with a person not of the panel, respecting the case on trial, it is sufficient cause for setting aside the verdict, unless it appears that the successful party in the suit has not been benefited or the defeated party injured, by the fact of the conversation. 3. Where a juror allowed such a conversation, in which it was stated to him that if the plaintiff should recover five thousand dollars damages he would have nothing left after paying his expenses, in which the juror expressed his concurrence, it was held, after a verdict for the plaintiff, that the effect of the conversation was presumably to increase the damages allowed, and that the verdict ought to be set aside.

Injury through Defective Highway-Sunday Travelling.—Johnson v. Town of Warburgh, Supreme Court of Vermont, opinion by Ross, J., and note by L. C. R., whoever he may be. [14 Am Law Reg. (N. S ) 547-] One travelling on Sunday without excuse, can not maintain an action against a town for any damage he may suffer through defects in its highways. Railway Negligence-Fires from Locomotives-Duty of Co

from the sale of the land. Those words could not refer to title by descent, as the children could not take their share until long after the death of the testa tor, and even then the legal title did not descend to the seven youngest, but to all his children, there being others, and, besides, the legal title was not to be divided, but the money to arise from its sale. 4. Contingent interests are not, ordinarily, assignable at law, and yet they may sometimes be assigned at law if coupled with some present interest. So, a law, such rights and interests may pass by way of estoppel, by lease and re lease, or, under the English system, by fine. But in equity, contingent interests and expectancies may be assigned and may be the subject of a contract, such as a contract of sale, and, when made for a valuable consideration, will be enforced in a court of equity after the event has happened. 5. In such case, until the event has happened, the party contracting to buy has nothing but the contingency, which is a very different thing from the right to immediately recover and enjoy the property. He has not, strictly speaking, a jus ad rem any more than a jus in re. It is not a mere interest in the property, but a mere right under the contract. So, what purports to be an actual assignment in equ ty, a nounts not to an assignment of a present interest, but only to a contract to assign when the interest becomes vested. 6. Therefore, a contingent legacy which is to vest on some future event, such as the legatee's coming of age or surviving the period of distribution, may, in equity, become the subject of an assignment or a sale. So, even the naked possibility or expectancy of an heir to his ancestor's estate, may become the subject of a contract of sale or settlement; and in such cases, if made bona fide, for a valuable consideration, it will be enforced in equity upon the happening of the event, or death of the ancestor, not as a trust attaching to the estate, but as a right of contract. 7. A testator, after giving his wife a life interest in his home farm for her support, by his will, provided that, at the death of his wife, and upon his youngest child coming of age, the same should be sold and the proceeds divided amongst his seven youngest children, and if any of them should die before the period of distribution, the portion of such should be equally divided among the survivors. Under the supposition that the interest had already vested in the seven children, one of them, by deed, conveyed his interest to the complainant for a valuable consideration, describing it as all right, title interest, claim and demand, whether in possession or expectancy, of the gran-pany to ke pits Track clear of Combustible Materials.-Salmon tor's part, "being one of seven heirs: " Held, that the grantor had a contingent interest, depending upon his surviving the period of distribution, which was assignable in equity; but that, in order to give the deed effect, it must be treated as a mere equitable assignment, and, consequently, as not passing any greater interest than the assignor had at the time of the execution of the deed. It did not pass any interest subsequently acquired by the right of survivorship but only the one-seventh part of the proceeds of the farm. 8. Where land is, by will, directed to be sold, and the proceeds divided among certain devisees, they have the right to elect to take the land itself; and it seems that, if they all unite in a conveyance of the land to a third party, this will be an exercise of their right to treat the interest devised as realty. But such a conversion of the property from personalty to realty or the contrary, can not be made by a part only of the beneficiaries. Therefore, if the conveyance of either of them is insufficient to pass real estate, the deeds of the others will not have such an effect. 9. Where a will required land to be sold on the happening of a certain event, and the proceeds to be divided among the survivors of the testator's seven youngest children, and the complainants purchased the interest of all the children before the period of disbution, and where, subsequent to such purchase, and before the time fixed for distribution, two of the children died, it was heid, on bill by the purchaser to have the land sold and the proceeds paid over to him, that each of the surviving children, and their husbands, where they were married women, were necessary parties, being interested in both the equitable and legal title. 10. Where the certificate of the acknowledgement of a deed, made by husband and wife, of an interest of the latter in real estate, fails to show that she was "personally known to the officer taking the same, it will be wholly insufficient to pass her estate.

Railway Negligence-Collision between Train and Wagon-Doctrine of Comparative Negligence.-Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Maffit. [67 Ill. 431.] 1. The rule adopted by this court in respect to comparative negligence is, that the plaintiff, although guilty of some negligence, may nevertheless recover if the defendant is guilty of such a degree of negligence as, when compared, that of the plaintiff is slight, and that of the defendant is great. 2. In a suit against a railway company to recover for injury sustained by a collision with its train, on the ground of negligence is not giving the statutory signals before reaching a public crossing, an instruction leaving the jury at liberty to find for the plaintiff, even if they found he was guilty of great negligence, provided the defendant was only guilty of more negligence, does not state the law of comparative negligence correctly. 3. In such action, the court instructed the jury that, if they "believed, from the evi

v. Delaware, Lackawana & Western Railroad Co., Supreme Court of New
Jersey, opinion by Beasley, Ch. J. [14 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 554]
1. A
railroad company is bound to keep its track and contiguous land clear of
materials likely to be ignited from sparks issuing from its locomotive properly
constructed and driven. 2. A person owning land contiguous to a railway,
is not obliged to keep the leaves, falling from his trees, from being carried by
the wind to such railway, nor to keep his lands clear of leaves and combusti-
ble matter; nor on failure to perform such acts, does he become contributory
to the production of a fire originating in the carelessness on its own land, of
the railroad company,

Specific Performance of Contracts interfering with Public Rights.-Marsh v. Fairbury, Pontiac & Northwestern Railway Co., Supreme Court of Illinois, opinion by Sheldon, J. [14 Am. Law Reg (N. S.) 561.] 1. The specific performance of a contract is a matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound descretion in the court. 2. Railroad companies are incorporated not for the promotion of mere private ends but in view of the public good they may subserve; hence, contracts with them which can not be specifically enforced without interfering with the rights of the public, will not in equity be enforced.

Sale of Good-Wili-Restraint of Trade -Bell v. Chase et al., Supreme Court of Michigan, opinion by Campbell J. [14 Am. Law Reg. (N S.) 563.) A contract by the vendor of good will, etc, not to engage in a special business within the state, so long as the vendee should continue in the said business, is not void as in restraint of trade, and may be enforced by a court of equity.

CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS, SEPT. 25.

Maritime Liens--Innocent Purchasers.-U. S. Dist. Court, E. D. of Mich., May 31, 1875. The Hercules. In Admiralty. Opinion by Brown. J. 1. Creditors of vessels plying upon the lakes must enforce their liens as against bona fide purchasers without notice during the current season of navigation, or within such reasonable time after the commencement of the next season, as may be necessary to arrest the vessel. 2. Circumstances may occur which would greatly abridge or lengthen this time. 3. The fact that the former owner of the vessel told the buyer, when purchasing her, that there might be some small claims against the vessel which he would pay; that he did not know what the claims were or who held them, would not affect the purchaser with 4. The fact that the purchaser takes a knowledge of any particular claim. mortgage upon another vessel indemnifying him against any claims upon the *Phila.: D. B. Canfield & Co.

vessel purchased, does not operate to extend the time within which creditors should pursue their claims, or deprive him of his rights as a bona fide purchaser without notice. 5. Nor can mere notice of the existence of a certain claim affect his rights, unless such notice be had at the time of purchase or of payment. 6. Where a claim accrued in August, 1873, and the libel was not filed until September, 1874, and the vessel in the meantime was easy of access, and several times in the port where the supplies were furnished, held, that as against a person who bought and paid for her in January without notice of the claim, that the lien must be deemed waived.

5. The

author. 3. There is no copyright in a published work at common law;
such copyright exists by statute only. 4. Davie made a voluntary publi-
cation of his maps, and whatever right he had, as the author of
them, were lost to him, and the maps became common property.
owner of a copy of Davie's maps could confer a right on any one to
make copies of them, and no injunction could restrain him. 6. The addition
of streets, etc., in appellant's copy is not new, it did not change the plan;
there was no authorship, and consequently no author's right. 7. But what-
tever rights appellants acquired by the accession of the new matter was lost to
them by the sale to the city of Chicago, of the privilege to make a copy for
public use, without restriction; that contract made the maps common prop-
erty of the community. 8. For the acts of Ogden & Sheldon, were the acts
of the appellants by reason of the partnership between them. 9. Ogden's
participation as a public officer of the city of Chicago, in making the sale
without restriction, estopped the appellants from setting up any allegation of
restriction. 10. Equity will not grant rel ef upon alleged rights arising out
of such a transaction as this with the city of Chicago, for it is, constructively
at least, fraudulent, by reason of Ogden's interest in the contract; and the
appellants were jointly interested with him. II. Any person may make cop-

Debts not Provable against a Bankrupt's Estate.--United States Circuit Court, Western District of Pennsylvania. Black v. McClelland. Opinion by McKennan, C. J. The plaintiff in this case was adjudicated a bankrupt on his own petition. Before the filing of the petition an action in trespass against him for an assault and battery, brought by the respondent in this proceeding, in the state court, had beed tried, and a verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff, but a motion for a new trial was made by the defendant, and judgment was not entered upon the verdiet until after the adjudication in bankruptcy. Held, that the respondent's debt was not, therefore, in the category of debts provable against the bankrupt's estate at the time of the adju-ies of the whole or any part of these maps, with the permission of the city dication. The question on which the result of this proceeding turned, was, whether the amount of the verdict was a provable debt against the estate o1 the bankrupt. The English decisions are in direct conflict on this subject. But in ex parte Hill, 11 Ves. 646, where the question arose incidentally; and in ex parte Charles, 16 Ves. 256, Lord Eldon decided that a verdict in an action for damages for a tort was not a provable debt in bankruptcy, and this view was sustained by the judges of the King's Bench in ex parte Charles, 14 East, 197. The American act is even more restrictive as to debts which can not be proved against a bankrupt.

UNREPORTED DECISIONS--NEW YORK WEEKLY DIGEST.*

Copy-right at Common Law-Lost by Unrestricted Sale of Right to make Copy.--Rees et al v. Peltzer et al. Supreme Court of Illinois, June 16, 1875. Opinion by McAllister, J. W. P. Davie, an engraver, in 1860, at the suggestion of S. H. Kerfoot, a real estate broker in Chicago, compiled, from the public records, maps of Chicago showing the sub divisions, streets, alleys, etc., of the town. Davie sold these maps to several real estate dealers, amongst whom were Rees & Slocum, whom the appellents succeeded, and Ogden & Sheldon. No copyright was taken out by Davie or Kerfoot.

In the great fire of 1871 all the maps sold by Davie, except those belonging to the appellants and Ogden & Sheldon, were destroyed, and these firms sought to make a monopoly upon these two sets of maps and their uses. They formed a copartnership to control this use, and to participate in the profits. In the maps published there were added new streets, etc.

The Board of Public Works of the city having daily necessity for the use of these maps, it applied to the owners of these firms to obtain a copy of them. The price demanded was $5,000. The board had no legal authority to make such a contract, and it undertook to lay the matter before the Common Council, and nothing more. In this condition of the matter Ogden & Sheldon permitted the work of the copying of the maps to be commenced. The Board addressed a communication to the mayor and aldermen of Chicago in common council assembled, stating the necessity there was for the use of the maps, and giving an opinion that the price" was as reasonable as could be expected under the circumstances." This was the only mode under its charter to bind the city of Chicago. Ogden was a member of the council, and also of the finance committee, through which the matter was to be brought before the council for action. On the report of the board the finance Committee first acted, and Ogden insisted that the $5,000 should be paid, on the ground that the owners of the maps would thereby lose their mo nopoly. He asked for no restrictions, and there were none in the report of the board. The finance committee reported in favor of making the contract, and the council passed an ordinance to that effect.

The appellants filed a bill to restrain the respondents from publishing an atlas containing these maps, which were taken from the copies made by the Board of Public Works, for which the $5,000 was paid, on the ground that it was an invasion of a copyright therein attaching to appelants' ownership of such an atlas.

The bill was dismissed and this appeal was taken.

Held, 1. There is no right here under the acts of Congress relating to copyright. 2. Whatever right there is springs from the common law. That gives an exclusive right of property in maps, charts, writings and books, and mechanical inventions, as long as they are kept within the possession of the New York: McDivitt, Campbell & Co.

authorities. 12.. And the bill was properly dismissed on the ground that Ogdon and Sheldon were necessary parties thereto.

Mines-Leases.-Ganter et al. v. Atkinson et al. 35 Wisc. pp. 48-53 Here the sole right to mine for lead ore was given by a verbal contract, the consideration to be one-eighth of the ore taken out. The court held that the essees had an interest in the lead and minerals sufficient to enable them to maintain trespass against persons mining and taking away ore.

ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, OCTOBER, 2.

Trade Mark of One's Own Name.-Meneely et al. v. Meneely et al. New York Court of Appeals, September 21, 1875. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

Held, that a man has a right to use his own name in his own business, even though he may thereby interfere with and injure the business of another bearing the same name, providing he does not resort to artifice, and do acts calculated to mislead. A person can not make a trade mark of his own name, and thus debar all other persons having the same name from using it in their business.

WEEKLY NOTES OF Cases.*

Estoppel of Creditor by Acquiescence in Assignment of Debtor.-Guiterman et al. v. Landis et al., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In October, 1871, M. made an assignment of all his property to trustees for the benefit of creditors, in pursuance of a previous agreement. Under this agreement and assignment the trustees took possession of M.'s furnace and manufactured iron. Subsequeutly some railroad cars came into their possession under the feregoing assignment, and were levied upon as belonging to M. by the plaintiffs who had obtained judgment against him in 1873. There was a conflict of evidence as to the amount of encouragement of, and acquiescence by the plaintiffs (who had not signed the agreement of the creditors) in the assignment. The court below left it to the jury to say whether the defendants were misled by the plaintiff's acts, instructing them that positive evidende to that effect was not necessary if the fact could be inferred, and that the plaintiffs might give their acquiescence to the assignment by participating in meetings, making no objections, etc. Evidence was admitted of declarations, made by the plaintiffs to third parties, expressing satisfaction with the trust, without its being positively shown that they were communicated by the direction of the plaintiffs to the defendants, or that they influenced their action. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that in this there was no er The following authorities were cited: Plaintiffs were concluded by their silent acquiescence. Karr v. Wallace, 7 Watts. 400; 1 Story Eq. Jur. secs, 384. 394; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 298 9; Robinson v. Justice, 2 Penn. Rep., 22. And by their acts of encouragement: Burke's Est., 1 Par. 473 Gray v. Bell, 4 Watts 413; Adlum v. Yard. 1 Rawle, 171; Pearsoll v. Chapin, 8 Wright, 15; Ingram v. Hartz, 12 Ill., 381; Share v. Anderson, 7 S. & R. 63; Meason v. Kane, 17 P. F Smith, 133; Com'th v. Green, 4 Wharton, 604; Lippencott v. Baker, 2 Benney, 185. As to what is necessary to constitute an estoppel in pais.-Com'th v. Moltz, 10 Barr, 531; Sergeant's Exrs. v. Ewing, 6 Casey, 81; Hill v. Eppley, 7 Ill. 334; Brubaker v. Okeson, 12 Ill. 522; Miranville v. Silverthorn, 12 Wright, 149; Millinger v. Sorg., 5 P. F. Smith, 225; Chapman v. Chapm in, 9 Il. 218; Reel v Elder, 12 Ill, 317; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Ad & El. 469; Kreiser's Appeal, 19 P F. Smith, 200; Ream v. Harnish 9 Wright, 376; Langdon v. Doud, 10 Allen, 433: Keating v. Orne, Leg. Int., May 7th, 1875; Bigelow on Estoppel, 481-3. Kay & Brother, Philadelphia.

ror.

Book Notice.

THE COLLECTION COMPENDIUM. Compiled for the use of Lawyers and Business Men Generally. Containing a New and Original System for the Collections of Claims on all Points in the United States, Canada, etc., upon stipulated rates of per centage, without the aid or instruction of a third party; a digest of the laws of every state pertaining to collections, together with the court calendar, and instructions for proving and forwarding claims for collection; a digest of bankrupt, patent, trade mark and copyright laws, together with the banking laws of the United States, and a reliable list of banks and bankers for the year ending September 1st. 1876. E. A. SMITH, author and compiler, 516 Pine St., Saint Louis, and 316 Broadway, New York. Price six dollars. St. Louis: Riverside Printing House, 302 North Main St. 1875. 8vo. pp. 599.

The title of this book pretty nearly indicates its character, except the statement that it is for the year ending September 1st, 1876. This must not be understood hereafter as meaning that the information it contains is brough: down to that date but that it is intended to serve those for whose use it is compiled until that time, when a new edition will probably be published.

Mr. Smith's new plan of making collections at low rates and without the intervention of a third party appears to be this: He has established a union o lawyers residing in various parts of the United States and Canada, a list of whose names he has given in this book, who have agreed with him to receivef claims for collection from subscribers to this book at certain low rates therein

specified. In order to avail themselves of the privilege of having collections

made at these rates, subscribers must endorse upon the claim sent for collec tion these words, " E. A. Smith's Compendium Rates." We do not see that any safe-guard has been established to prevent any one from endorsing these words on his claim, and so availing himself of this privilege, if indeed it is desirable to prevent any one from doing so.

The principal labor of this compilation appears to have been performed by Messrs. Hermann and Rainey of the Saint Louis bar, who, in giving digests of the collection laws of the various states, have had the assistance of competent local attorneys. Messrs. Hermann and Rainey have also contributed a synopsis of banking laws, embracing sixty-two pages, which must prove of great value to bankers and to members of the legal profession. In preparing this, they state that they have followed Mr. Morse only where he is sustained by the decisions of courts of high standing, and where any of his positions have been subsequently rejected by the courts, the cases have been carefully analyzed and referred to.

We recommend this work as one which will be likely to prove of decided advantage to business men, and also to lawyers engaged in commercial collections.

Legal News and Notes.

-THE government of India having failed to secure the conviction of the Guikwar of Baroda, deposed that prince, and, from such information as we have, we suppose that he is now in prison awaiting another trial For the Marquis of Salisbury, the Secretary of the State for India, has refused him permission to see his solicitors except in the presence of a government official. Thus the government still persists in denying him the ordinary privilege of an accused person. And this is British justice!

-THE CHARLEY ROSS ABDUCTION CASE.-The trial of Westervelt for the kidnapping and harboring and concealing of Charlie Ross, has resulted in a verdict of guilty on three counts. The Legal Intelligencer for September 24 publishes the lengthy charge ofJudge Elcock in the case. The learned judge ruled that an indictment for kidnapping a child may contain counts charging the kidnapping, and also the harboring and concealing it with a knowledge that it was enticed away.

preferable to the new rules, which he said settled nothing and unsettled everything.

-AT the recent meeting of the Association for the Reform and Codification' of the Law of Nations, Mr. Jencken of London read a paper on Negotiable Paper and Paper to Bearer. He dwelt upon the importance of paper to bearer securities, and remarked that while in France and commercial Holland their employment was all but universal, merchants in England had tardily compelled the courts to admit the transferability of paper to bearer, even in the case of bills of exchange. He proposed :

1. That the minimum value of a bond or share shall be limited to 47. (100 francs).

2. That, after 50 per cent. of the nominal value has been paid up, bonds or scrip to bearer shall be issuable.

3. That they shall be transferable by delivery.

That the property conveyed by delivery shall not be hampered by any rights of third parties.

5. That the words "to bearer" shall appear on the face of the instrument itself.

6. And, finally, that no private person shall be allowed to issue paper to bearer.

-A GRAVE QUESTION-"CAN SUCH THINGS BE AND OVERCOME US LIKE A SUMMER CLOUD?"—The following letter to the supreme court is one involving such grave questions that after unsuccessfully wrestling with it, the judges turned it over to the attorney-general, He being unable to come to a decision, has referred it to the governor It is to be hoped that some conclusion may be reached, as the writer has already been “procrastinated "' sufficiently. His being kept out of any office for one year is a serious thing to him. The names of the writer and the city from which he sends forth his grievances are here omitted:

To the Most Respectable Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.

GENTLEMEN :-The undersigned was a professor in Germany and in this country for many years. These two years he was teaching languages in the seminary of the city of. The board of education, according to decision of the supreme court, illegally elected here, dismissed on account of personal vengeance of one of the members, Professor, in spite of a large petition of 212 citizens, three-fourths of the inhabitants, signed by the mayor and five councilmen out of six, in favor of re-election of said professor. There is a great loss and damage to the petitioner, because he is for one year without any office,having been procrastinated by said board from days to weeks till last of July. The supplication, therefore, very modestly made to the most respectabie supreme court, is what may be done legally for a citizen of the United States to come to his rights and justice after all inquisitions with lawyers? The Supreme Court's most humble servant, PROF.-Indianapolis Sentinel.

-NOVEL incidents appear, now and then, to enliven the practice of law in Southern India, and give occasion to judicial remonstrances such as the following from the judge of the Salem sessions : "Circular No. 10 of 1875. The sessions judge brings to the notice of the district magistrate that a submagistrate, in a case committed by him to the court, sent up the head of a sheep which had been severed from its body some three months previous to the special sessions, evidently with a view to its being identified as the head of the animal forming the subject of the theft. The sub magistrate in question evinced an utter want of discretion in sending up this sheep's head, as he must have known, as remarked by the judge, that it would be so decomposed before the commencement of the trial of the accused as to be beyond the possibility of identification. The district magistrate hereby directs all sub-magistrates to use discretion in sending up to the court such things as decomposed sheep's heads, decomposed human bones decomposed vegetables, and other -AT the recent meeting of the Association for the Reform and Codifica similar property, in cases committed by them for trial; all the above having, tion of the Law of Nations, Mr. John Hosack read a paper on the declaration at some time or other, been sent up to the sessions court. —June 29 1875." A regarding maritime rights appended to the treaty of Paris of 1856. He short time ago the chief magistrate of another part of the presidency had to pointed out that the declaration had led to much discussion both in Europe remonstrate still more seriously with the head official of a remote village for and America, and that great uncertainty existed as to its true character and exercising" undue discretion." It appeared that a stranger, an East Indian its probable effects. The United States had, in the first instance, refused to died with suspicious suddenness while he was passing through the village. become parties to the treaty, on the ground that they could not abandon the After due consideration and consultation the official determined to have the right of privateering. In England, meanwhile, the shipping interest had taken body decapitated and the head exposed on a pole in the highway" for pur the alarm, because in the event of war the whole commerce of the country poses of identification." This not proving very successful, the head was, after would be transferred to foreign bottoms. A party had consequently arisen the lapse of three or four days, duly dispatched to the chief station in the which maintained that all private property at sea ought to be as free from cap- district as the "massam" of a probable crime. "Massam means the chief ture as private property on land. He maintained that this notion was founded piece of criminating circumstantial evidence; and it is, according to the noon a singular fallacy, for in no age or country had private property on land tion of the majority of South Indian Hindus, so necessary for conviction that ever been respected in time of war. Mr. Hosack asserted that the old rules they will prefer a decomposed and unrecognizable massam to none at all, of maritime war, which were well defined and universally understood, were [Pall Mall Gazette.