made (it appearing to be assumed that such would be reasonable), yet that even if the notice created such a special contract beyond the scope of the Carriers' Act, it would be necessary to show plaintiffs' express consent to its terms before the claim to recover the value of the articles stolen could be barred.—[The Irish Law Times. Book Notices. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES AND BILLS OF ExCHANGE. BY THEOPHILUS PARSONS, LL. D. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1875. 2 volumes, 8vo. and some cision was reversed by a majority of one. Dowse, B., observed: "If we affirm this judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, we will practically repeal the statute. Every loss unaccounted for will be made a felony, and, by applying Vaughton v. London and North Western Railway Co., a felony by the servants of the company. I can not join in creating an artificial felony-one which would be the creation of the judicial mind as much as John Doe and Richard Roe." The majority of the court coincided in this view, and we refer our readers to the report for a very full and very able defence of this view of the law, which will be found contained in the judgments of the learned judges who formed the majority. The opposite view is stated in a most lucid manner, in the judgment of the Chief Baron. First addressing himself to the The preface to this edition is dated in February, 1874. This edition has, evidence as to a felony having been committed, he remarks: "Thǝ we understand, been in the hands of the profession about a year, and they are fact that a label was attached to the box, with the name and ad- no doubt tolerably well advised by experience as to the additions which have dress, is evidence from which a jury might infer that its loss, acbeen made in it. By comparing the table of cases in this edition with that in the edition of 1862, we should judge that about two hundred cases have been companied by the absence of any tidings of it for many months, cited in this which were not cited in that. We observe that the numbers of was not reasonably consistent with accident; and if not thus conpages of each volume of the present, is the same as the corresponding page of sistent, I see nothing to prevent the jury from inferring that it had the former edition. This fact has led us to examine the manner in which the been feloniously dealt with." As to the point of the company's new cases have been added, and we find that this has been done by recasting servants being the guilty parties, he says: "In my opinion, it was a page or a part of a page in the stereotype plates, here and there, where it competent for the jury to draw the inference, that the company's has been necessary to insert the new matter. By doing this, sometimes by arrangements at Portarlington were such, that a box being car-lengthening the page slightly, where it could be got in in this way, ried by a porter charged with that duty, from one train to another, ditional matter has been sandwiched in, without any appreciable change in the times by re-setting the page and "drawing the leads," as printers say, the adcould not have been stolen without the connivance of some serappearance of the volumes. This plan is frequently pursued by book-makers, vant of the company in the theft." Looking at the whole case, where the scope of the revision embraces only the making of certain additions, we must, though with the greatest respect for the opinions of the without a re-writing of the entire work. The few additions which the lapse of learned judges who formed the majority, express our opinion that twelve years has been thought to render necessary have been thus scattered the decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, differing as it through these two volumes in the shape of brief notes, added in the manner indidid from the opinion of the majority of the judges on the Irish cated. We have not time to examine in detail the character of these additions, Bench, went too far in limiting the just province of a jury in drawnor even to search for omissions; but we may say that we have looked in vain for ing inferences from facts, and in attempting to lay down a fixed several very important cases decided prior to the date of this revision, viz: Fosstandard of evidence, up to which every case must come, before a jury may draw an inference of felony by the company's servants. At the same time, of course, no one can deny that in a total absence of evidence on such a point, the court would be justified in forbidding the jury to come to such a verdict. But, where there was evidence on the point, we can not see why the jury should be forbidden to exercise their right of drawing inferences from facts. Dealing with the question merely from a legal point of view, we should of course, not allow ourselves to be affected by the mysterious hints alluded to by Baron Dowse, as to the ultimate fate of the box there in question; but it may be of some interest to mention, as we are enabled to do on reliable authority, that the box was ultimately reecovred, and its contents restored to the owner, and that the case was in consequence settled. In Drayson v. Horne, the case lastly above referred to, it appeared that the plaintiffs had delivered a small box, containing jewels and gold ornaments, to the defendants for carriage, without any declaration of its contents, or intimation of their value. The articles were stolen by the defendant's servants whilst in their charge. The plaintiffs had been aware of a notice affixed to the defendants' receiving house, and were content to risk the provisions of the Carriers' Act. It appeared that this notice expressly referred to the Carriers' Act, and adopted the words of the Ist section; it contained the usual increased charges for insurance of the articles mentioned, and also a reference to the carriage of horses and cattle under other acts. There was, however, no mention in it of the exception as to loss arising by the felonious acts of servants, provided by the 8th section of the Carriers' Act. It was contended for the defendants, that the contract was declared by the notice, and that as that exemption was not expressed, the defendants were not liable. The court, however, held that the notice merely incorporated the Carriers' Act in the contracts of carriage made by the defendants, and did not create a special immunity from loss arising from their servants' felonious acts; and that while there was nothing to prevent such a special contract being ter v. McKinnon, L. R. 2 C. P. 704 (1869); Douglass v. Matting, 29 Iowa, 498 (1870); and Taylor v. Atchinson, 54 Ill. 196 (1870); which relate to the rights of bona fide holders where the signature of the person sought to be charged has been obtained by deceiving him as to the character of the paper signed. Singularly enough, Whitney v. Snyder, 2 Lansing, 477, decided in the Supreme Court of New York in 1870, is the only case noticed by Prof. Parsons on this important question. It should really seem that "due diligence" would not have overlooked the others. Next to Prof. Parson's work on contracts, this is probably the most valuable of his works. We understand that it has a larger sale in this country than any other work on commercial paper, and it appears to be much more frequently quoted by American judges than any other. This is the highest praise that can be bestowed upon any law book; for in works designed for the assistance of a busy profession practical usefulness must yield to mere excellence as a work of art. In our judgment the excellence of the present work consists in the fact that while it discusses with adequate fullness the principles of law which relate to commercial paper, it exhibits in a succint form the results of a we have to the state of the law on the subject of which it treats. The value of a work of this character could best be stated by some one who had used it, or attempted to use it, in the instruction of students. Its object is to afford a manual for the instruction of students at the English Universities. The author wisely concieved that the best way to lead the minds of such persons into an understanding of the elementary principles of the law of real property, would be to sketch its history and to map out, in brief outlines, the long and curious process by which it has grown into its present state. In this we should judge he has succeeded, as far as the difficulties attending the subject would permit. He divides the subject into ten chapters. The first treats of the elements of the law of land before the reign of Henry the Second. It comprises an account of Saxon Customary Law, discussing the effect of the Teutonic settlement in Britain, and giving an account of the village communities of the Germans, and the relation of lord and man. It also discusses the effects of the Norman conquest; the relation of the king to the land; the development of the idea of tenure, and the relations of the lords of districts or manors to their tenants. The second chapter gives an account of the state of the law relating to land in the reign of Henry the Second; embracing an account of the supremacy of the Curia Regis in matters relating to the freehold; of the relation of lord and free tenant; of the feudal incidents of reliefs, aids, guardianship, chivalry or knight service, guardianship in socage and marriage of female tenants; of escheat and forfeiture; of the descent of an estate of inheritance; of alienation, of fine lands, of the modes of recovering the seisin of lands; of assizes of mort d'ancester and of novel disseizin. The third chapter gives an account of the state of the law from the end of the reign of Henry the Second to the end of the reign of Henry the Third, embracing the subjects of magna charta, reliefs, guardian and ward, marriage, dower, scutage and aids, forfeiture, alienation, mortmain, rights of the lord of a manor over the waste, and the Statute of Merton; also the subject of tenures; of a common law conveyance of a freehold estate, namely, by charter of feoffment, or by livery seisin; of villenagium and non-free tenure; of the differences of freehold estates in respect of their duration; of estates of freehold and estates less than freehold; of conditional gifts; of tenancy by the curtesy of England; of terms of years; and of servitudes, including rights of common. The fourth chapter introduces us to the legislation of the reign of Edward the First. It presents, with suitable comments, a number of famous statutes.embracing the 4 Ed. 1. c. 1 (Extenta Manerie) which is said to show the legal conception of a manor during that reign. It comments briefly upon alienation in mortmain, and sets out briefly the Statute De Viris Religiosis, 7 Ed. I, Stat. 2, c. 13, and also the statute of Westminster II., 13 Ed. I., c. 32. It introduces us to the subject of estates tail, and gives us the text of the celebrated Statute De Donis, 13 Ed. I, c. I. It gives us the text of the statute of Westminster II. 13 Ed. I., c. 46, which extended the provisions of the statute of Merton to those who enjoyed rights of common appurtenant-that is, to those who, without being tenants of the land, were entitled to common of pasture over the lord's wastes. This chapter also touches again upon the subject of alienation, and gives us the text of the Statute Quia Emptores. In his fifth chapter the author completes the earlier history of the law of real property. It introduces again, briefly, the subject of leaseholds and also that of estates tail, and gives a brief account of the fiction of "suffering a recovery" by which estates tail were turned into estates in fee simple. sus It is interesting, when we hear courts now-a-days accused of "judicial legislation," to turn back to those old times, and see how, after the legislature had, by the statute De Donis, enabled the great landed proprietors to tie up their estates in strict entail, the courts set themselves to work diligently to re peal and nullify that statute. In order to accomplish this, they resorted to a trick, that is to say, to a fiction. In our day a judge who would invent and put in practice a fiction in order to nullify a plain act of the legislature, would undoubtedly be impeached. And it is certain that the old judges would not have dared to resort to so bare-faced a trick as the device of a common recovery, in order to nullify an act of parliament, if they had not been tained in doing so by public sentiment. The question then naturally arises, why did not this public sentiment repeal this obnoxious statute? The answer must be that the parliament only in part represented public sentiment, and that the great landowners had, through their representation in the House, of Lords, the power to render hopeless any attempt at repeal. How different is it with us! Our legislatures represent public sentiment in the largest sense, that is to say, they represent more largely the lower than the better sentiment of the people. They represent the rabble more largely than they do the better classes, because the rabble outnumbers and outvotes the better classes. If this were not so, it would be impossible to find on the statute books of any American state such shameless laws as those which various legislatures of Chinese. Therefore, since California have enacted against the legislatures so fully represent the people, should any law on our statute as obnoxious as the statute books become De Donis, the remedy would be quickly found, where in every society it ought to But be found, in legislative repeal, and not in judicial nullification. the fact that the old judges had the courage (although by means of falsehood, the device of slaves), to repudiate these unwholesome statutes, should be forIt affords a strong proof that the legal ever mentioned to their honor. profession, on those great questions, arrayed itself on the side of popular right. Our Mr. Digby's fifth chapter takes us through the subject of reversions and remainders; of joint tenants, tenants in common and co-parceners; of creditor's rights, remedies by legal process and mortgages. The sixth chapter introduces us to the modern law of real property, and gives an account of the origin and early history of uses or equitable interest in land. The seventh chapter treats of the statute of uses and its principal effects on modern conveyancing. The eighth chapter gives a history of the law of wills of land. The ninth chapter treats of the abolition of military tenures. The tenth chapter treats of titles or modes of acquisition of rights over things real; including title by alienation, by succession, and by escheat; loss and acquisition by lapse of time; compulsory acquisition for public purposes; acquisition under enclosure acts; compulsory enfranchisement of copy-hold; and bankruptcy. Perhaps one-third of this work is devoted to what Mr. Digby aptly terms "authorities," which consist of ancient charters and statutes, of copious extracts from Bracton and other authors, and of extracts from the Year Books. Of such of these authorities as were in law French, Mr. Digby has favored the student with translation; but such as were in Latin, he has left the student to translate for himself. Many American law students (and, we doubt not, some English ones, too, outside the Universities), would have been equally obliged to him for a translation of the Latin. We think that it was unnecessary to give the originals in an elementary work of this kind, but that translations should have been given in all cases. The advantage of a translation, even to instructors, is too obvious to dwell upon. Without being able, from lack of experience, to express a decided opinion as to the value of this work to American students and instructors, our impression is, after perusing a large portion of it, that it will be found an exceedingly useful manual, and we advise an examination of it. Correspondence. SOME STATUTORY CURIOSITIES. TRINIDAD, COLORADO, Sept. 17, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-The laws of a people may always be taken as a good index to their moral and intellectual advancement. The statutes of New Mexico contain many legal curiosities; some of which I present to the curiously inclined of your readers. WILLS. The statute concerning wills (28) provides that, "All written wills shall be permanent and irrevocable, but should the testator desire to revoke the same, he may do so by making special mention of the first will, and in case this should not be done, or should have escaped his memory, he shall refer to it in the following manner: 'That it is revoked and would have been repeated verbatim, could he have remembered it.' 27. " 44 All wills to be valid shall possess uniformity of context. The witnesses shall understand clearly and distinctly every part of the will." 10. A person having no direct heirs, but legal heirs, may constitute a stranger his heir on condition that it be not an infamous or stupid person." 11. "Any person capable of making a will may authorize any other intelligent person to do it for him." 19. "If the deceased person makes no will, the estate shall be administered by the surviving partner, if married, and in the absence of such person, by the nearest relative or other person having an interest, be it an executor, legatee or creditor." The italics are mine. Natural, in the absence of legitimate, children, inherit from the father. Spurious children inherit from the mother." Ch. V, ? 10. "Parents and ascendants have the right to disinherit their decendants for the following causes: Ist. For having lain violent hands on 2. For having contrived their death. 3. For them, or for accusing them. having given great cause for waste of the estate. 4. For having accused them of crimes the penalty of which is death, disgrace or banishment. 5. For having access to the wife or friend of the parent, knowing her to be such. 6. For not furnishing means to free them from prison, being able to do so. 7. For preventing them from making their will. 8. For becoming a prostitute before arriving at 21 years of age, but not after that age. 9. When the descendant will not aid a deranged ancestor, who is roaming over the country, 10. For not redeeming them from captivity, being able being able to do so. to do so. 11. For denying their parents. Descendants may disinherit their ancestors for the same reasons." whom the property is conveyed, his heirs and assignees, shall be limited to the following cases : "1. If the conveyor is in possession of an unreclaimed title in fee simple to the property so conveyed. 2. If the real estate is free from all encumbrance suffered to be made by the conveyor, or by any person claiming it under him. 3. For the greater security of the purchaser, his heirs and assigns, suits may be instituted the same as if the conditions were stipulated in said conveyance." No preceding or subsequent section throws any light on these provisions or this confusion worse confounded." 817. All interest in any real estate, either granted or bequeathed, to two or more persons other than the executors or trustees, shall be held in common, unless it be clearly expressed in said grant, that it shall be held by both parties." ་་ of a ring of government officials who deserve the attention of the department of justice at Washington. OBSERVER. N.TE. I once asked the Hon. Wm. Gardner Blackwood, who was one of the judges of New Mexico under President Buchanan's administration, how he construed these and many other statutes of the territory; to which he replied, "If Lord Eldon or Lord Mansfield had lived and applied themselves a thousand years in the effort to place a rational construction on these statutes, they would have ignominously failed. My oath of office did not require me to attempt impossibilities. I had but one course left me, Sir. I disregarded that which it was impossible for me to understand, and followed the com mon law, and my successors have followed the precedent." O. SUNDAY CONTRACTS. ones, and some at least of the leading cases, are entirely ignored. Of the latter class are Bennett v. Brooks (9, Allen, 118), and George v. George (49 N. H. 27, 46). The former was decided in 1864, and the latter in 1866. Neither of these cases raise, in form, the validity of Sunday contracts, but they contain thorough discussions of the principle upon which such contracts must stand or fall, and the latter case contains a very thorough review of the principal authorities. ANDOVER, N. H., Sept. 21, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-The opinion of C. J. English on "Sunday Contracts," may be " exhaustive" in some respects, but it certainly 24 is apparently designed to test the wisdom of a Philadelphia lawyer, is not in others. Not only decisions on minor points, but many modern to whom it is here referred for interpretation. It is as follows: That from and after the passage of this act, whenever a conveyance or bequest is made wherein the conveyor or testator shall hold possession of property, be it lands or tenements, in law or equity, as under the English Statute of Edward the First, styled the ' entail statute,' and said property is to be perpetuated in the family, each one of said conveyances or bequests shall only invest the conveyors or testators with possession during their lifetime, who shall possess, and hold the right and title to said premises and no others, the same as a tenant for life is recognized by law, and at the death of said conveyor or testator, said lands and tenements shall descend to the children of said conveyor or testator, to be equally divided among them as absolute tenants in common; and if there should be but one child, it shall descend absolutely to it; and if any child should die, the part which he or she should have received, shall be given to his or her successor, and if there should be no such successor, then it shall descend to his or her legal heirs." Perhaps the next section will fully enable your learned readers to interpret and the present Chief Justice of the Circuit Court, Foster, in opposition to its this one. It is as follows: 8 25. When a balance or residue, in lands or tenements, goods or property, are limited by writing or otherwise, to take effect after the decease of any person without heirs or bodily heirs, or succession, the words 'heirs' and 'successors' shall be construed to mean heirs or successors living when the ancestor died." Section 26 throws additional light on the subject: "When the remainder of a possession is limited to the heirs or body heirs of a person who holds said property as a 'life estate,' in these premises the persons to whom at the termination of said life estate are to be heirs or body heirs of said life estate, shall be authorized to purchase the same by virtue of the remainder of the possession so limited in them." Many other statutes of the territory are equally felicitously worded. MORALITY. Those who live in concubinage may be reprimanded by a justice or probate judge, and, if there is no legal impediment, required to marry or dissolve the connection. They are then to be dismissed. Then if they persist in the unlawful connection they may be fined not less than $25 nor more than $80. If a father, mother or guardain deliver up or sell the person or virtue of any female under their charge, they may be fined not less than $25, nor more than $80. George v. George was an important case and received careful consideration, on account of the parties to it, the amount involved, and the great ability of the counsel employed. The written arguments of counsel, which cost immense labor, were not published, 1st, because they would have taken nearly half the volume, and 2d, because no mere abstract could do them justice. The other counsel were strong men, and eminent in the profession, but the burden of the argument devolved upon Caleb Cushing in support of the will, probate. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-In reply to the enquiry of "C." in your last number, whether a citizen of a territory can sue a citizen of this state in the United States Circuit Court, I would refer him to the following cases, in which the Supreme Court of the United States has decided a similar question negatively. In Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445, it was held by Chief Justice Marshall, that a citizen of the District of Columbia, is not a citizen of a state within the meaning of the judiciary act, and could not sue Any person who entices, seduces or abducts any female may be fined not in a Federal Court. In New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheaton, 91, the same less than $80, nor more than $100. If male or female discover the faults of married persons, from which disagreement and evil may result, they shall on conviction be fined not less than $25, nor more than $80. Another statute provides that abusive and insulting words shall be con strued and punished as an assault, provided, the defendant may justify by showing that the abuse was given for the benefit of the territory or prosecutor, in which case he shall be discharged. Singularly, in a Catholic country, we find a statute denounced against the priesthood, the preamble to which recites that " Whereas, various ministers of the gospel are frequently committing grave slanders against particular persons, in temples and chapels, losing sight of charity and evangelical meekness, and profaning those sacred places which are dedicated exclusively to the worship of the Supreme Being; therefore, if, in the future, any minister of the gospel of any denomination whatever, or any other person, by word or any other manner, slander any person or persons within any temple, they shall on conviction before a justice of the peace or probate judge, be fined not exceeding fifty, nor more than twenty-five dollars." Nine-tenths of the legislators in New Mexico are Mexicans, a few of whom are lawyers, one of whom drafted the statutes on conveyancing and wills and testaments quoted, from crude ideas of law gathered from reading the Amercan or Common Law system. The territory is under the baneful influence principle was asserted in reference to a citizen of a territory. See also, Bar- Respectfully, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-PART PAYMENT-SURETY. VANDALIA, ILL., Aug. 23, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-In 1856 A. gave his note to B. for $1,000, with C. as surety. A. has made several small payments upon the note amounting to about $200, one payment in 1859, one in 1862, one in 1869, and one in 1872. In 1874 A. and C. were sued upon the note. C. pleads statute of limitations. The question is, does a payment by the principal made before the note is barred, extend the time when the note would be barred as to the surety. I am inclined to the opinion that the defence is good; but I am interested the other way. I find an Alabama case in American Reports See vol. 6, page 693; but it was rendered upon a statute differing from ours. our Statute of 1869, Gross, page 430. [See Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N. Y. 558; Caldwell v. Sigourney, 19 Conn. 37; and also the cases cited in 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 657, 658.-Ed.] POWER OF NATIONAL BANKS TO TAKE MORTGAGES OF LAND. TOPEKA, KAN., Sept. 27, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-The power of national banks to hold mortgages except to secure debts previously contracted is denied in Fowler v. Scully, 72 Penn. St. 456, and in 2 Dillon, C. C. 371. F. ANOTHER ANSWER. EMPORIA, KAN., Sept. 28, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-In your issue of Sept. 24th, 1875, "H." of Osage Mission, Kansas, enquires as to " power of national banks to take mortgages of land," and specially "would such mortgage, i. e., a mortgage taken by a national bank to secure the payment of a contemporaneous loan, be void as against a subsequent mortgage taken expressly subject to it." The case of Kansas Valley Nat. Bank v. Rowell, 2 Dillon, C. C. p. 374, decides that under ?? 8 and 28 of the National Banking Act, a mortgage to secure a contemporaneous loan, is clearly unauthorized and invalid,-also see cases cited at end of opinion. It seems to me that a subsequent mortgage given to another party who could legally take it, expressly subject to this invalid mortgage, would not tend to complicate matters. The bank has no power to hold such a mortgage, and when the facts are made to appear, the mortgage is void, and ceases to have any effect as a prior security-and the facts may be shown as well in the case suggested, as the fact that a prior mortgage has been paid off, when a subsequent mortgage has been taken expressly subject to it. Legal News and Notes. G. acts. The law holds everyone liable for the direct and natural consequences of his Hence, when a claim such as the above is made in any court, the real points to be determined are whether any damage had been caused, and if so, whether it is the direct and natural consequences of the defendant's act. In the case cited (Hume v. Oldaker, Starkie, 352) in support of the plaintiff's claim, a huntsman was held liable for damages caused by people following the hounds. But it was scarcely necessary as an authority. In future, æronauts must not forget that their dangers in the sky may be only exchanged for liaabilities on the prosaic earth at the very moment when all their cares and anxieties seem to be at an end for the time.-[The Law Times. -THE LATE JUDGE GROVER.-In the N. Y. Court of Appeals, 21st ult., the proceedings of the members of the bar of the city of New York, on the death of Judge Lewis B. Woodruff, were alluded to by Judge Davis. The following was also read by Chief Justice Church: In the consultation room, Friday, September 17, 1875, the judges of the court of appeals, on coming together from the summer vacation, bring with them an abiding thought of the recent death of their late associate, the Honorable Martin Grover. In view of the public loss sustained by this sad event, and of their private sorrow thereat, they deem it proper to place upon the records of the court some estimate of his character and his career. His services as a judge were not of recent origin. In November, 1857, he was elected to the bench of the Supreme Court in the Eighth Judicial District, wherein he had assiduously pursued his profession of law almost from the date of his admission to the bar. In November, 1859, at the expiration of his first term of office, he was re elected. In that court he sat often as circuit judge on the trial of causes with the aid of a jury, and had opportunity for showing forth the peculiar faculties for that judicial duty which he possessed in a great degree. He was patient when patience was needed. He was of speedy discernment of the facts of the case and of the material issues involved."—[Daily Register. -HOW CRIME DEFIES LAW.--The legislative committee now engaged in the investigation of crime in New York was not needed to prove that the police and the officers of our courts and prisons are in constant collusion with the men it is their duty to punish; but the investigation is making that which was well known in the abstract notorious in the concrete. Yesterday some very interesting cases were examined. As one of the witnesses said, Law Reporting for England and Wales, have issued a prospectus on opening "Any man with money might feel pretty sure of getting away." When the committee reports, it will have a tale to tell of justice in New York which will horrify the whole country.-[N Y. Herald. -ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR.-A large class was examined for admission to the bar last week, at Ottawa, and several of the applicants rejected. It is a fact worthy of mention, that in the class there was one woman and a colored man, The colored man failed to pass. Miss Mary Perry was more successful. One of the examiners, who is not noted for being a woman's rights man, informed us that she took the court, the examiners and the bar by surprise, and passed by far the best examination of any member of the class. Miss Perry is polite and lady-like in her manners, and so conducts herself as to gain the respect of all who make her acquaintance. She has been a thorough student, and enters upon the practice of law with a good knowledge of the principles upon which it is founded. Miss Perry will honor the profession, and being a lawyer, will be none the less a lady. We know nothing of her intentions for the future, but we should like to see her connected with some one of the leading law firms in the city.-[Chicago Legal News. -A NEW SERIES OF ENGLISH REPORTS.--The Incorporated Council of their subscription list for 1875, which is in many respects, a rather remarkable document. Beginning with the announcement that the important changes made by the Judicature Acts, have induced the council to wind up the current series of the Law Reports with the present year, 1875, and to commence a new issue with the year 1876, the prospectus proceeds to unfold the arrangement of the plan of reporting under the new legislation." The plan when unfolded, seems to be, to go on very much as before. The reports of the Ist or Chancery Division are to be kept separate; so are the reports of the 5th Division, which embraces the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty business, and, " as each of the 2d, 3rd, and 4th Divisions, that is to say, the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer Divisions, has exclusive jurisdiction given it over certain branches of business, and as each division will furnish matter enough for one volume of reports a year," there are to be separate volumes for each of these divisions. So far, the plan has not developed any very striking novelty, but we now come to a slight change in the old arrangement. In the words of the prospectus, the whole of the intermediate appeals, will be distributed among the volumes of the courts of first instance ** ་་ -AS BEARING on the constitutionality of the proposed reform in proced-upon a uniform plan, and there will be no separate volume of reports in reure so as to allow less than twelve jurors to return a verdict, we would recall the fact that unanimity has not always been a characteristic of trial by jury. In ancient times verdicts were often taken according to the voice of the majority, or, as it was termed, ex dicto majoris partis." 2 Hale's P. C. 297; Fitz. Ab. Verd. 40; Bro. Ab. Jurors, 53. It appears also to have been in the power of the judge when there was a division of opinion among the jurymen to " af force the Assizes," that is, to dismiss the minority and to substitute new jurors continually until a unanimous decision of twelve persons was obtained. Glanville, c. 17; Fleta, 230; 4 Bracton, c. 19. However, in the reign of Edward III. it became settled by a solemn decision that a verdict by less than twelve jurors was nugatory (41 Ass. 11), and there seems to be a doubt whether the contrary rule ever prevailed. Fleta, 52. Barrington advanced the opinion that the causes leading to the requirement of unanimity in jurors were lenity to the prisoner in criminal cases, and the practice of attaints in civil Observations on 29th chap. of Magna Charta - [Albany Law cases. Journal. 2 -TRESPASS BY ERONAUTS.-A decision of the Judge of the Hinckley County Court will teach æronauts that they have other dangers to fear than such as are directly traceable to the adventurous nature of their mode of travelling. An action of trespass was brought by a farmer in that court a few days ago, against an aeronaut whose balloon had descended on one of the plaintiff's cornfields, causing damage to the extent of £5. Judgment was given for the whole sum claimed, although the damage was partly caused by persons following the balloon. In all such cases there can be no difficulty about the rule of law, and they will generally be found to resolve themselves into questions of fact. spect of her Majesty's Intermediate Court of Appeal." In other words, the council have determined to adopt the method now practiced by them with respect to the Exchequer Chamber cases, and not that applied to the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Chancery. This determination is not without its drawbacks, as it will be impossible to tell from the reference of a case whether it bears the stamp of the Court of Appeals, or is merely a decision of a court of first instance. In order to avoid the clumsy system of odd parts, the Crown Cases Reserved are to go into the Queen's Bench Division, and one volume to be cited, under the appropriate style of "Misc. Div." (i. e.; Miscellaneous Division), is to comprise Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty cases, the Ecclesiastical cases in the Court of Arches, and the Admiralty and Ecclesiastical appeals to the Privy Council. The Bankruptcy cases are to be mixed with the cases in the Chancery Division. "As the appellate jurisdictions of the Privy Council and the House of Lords are to be continued for the present, the reports of the cases before those tribunals will be published as hitherto," with this alteration, that the Privy Council cases (except, we suppose, those to be given in the "Misc. Div."), the English, Scotch, and Irish appeals, and the Divorce appeals, are all to be crammed into the same volume. These changes may do away with the nuisance of odd parts, but the removal of this nuisance, will be dearly bought by the majority of practitioners who never find it necessary to consider Scotch or Divorce appeals, and very rarely Privy Council cases. The prospectus concludes with an intimation that a consolidated digest of the Law Reports, down to the end of 1875, will be issued in 1876, which, unlike the digests which the subscribers had grown accustomed to expect, will not be supplied to them without payment.-[The Solicitor's Journal. SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, Editor. } ST. LOUIS, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1875. PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER VERSUS PARENT.-In Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. Rep. 59-67, the plaintiff, a teacher in a public school, punished defendant's son for refusing to pursue a tudy which his father had forbidden. The defendant brought action for assault and battery, which action was discontinued. Whereupon plaintiff sued because of malicious prosecution. Judge Cole, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, eld that no authority over a pupil is implied as coming from the parent to the teacher; that the teacher can not prescribe a course of study contrary to the parent's wishes; nor has the teacher any authority to forbid a parent indicating his choice of studies for his son and insisting upon it. The chastisement of the child was pronounced unjustifiable. ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION NOT ASSIGNABLE.The case of Noonan v. Orton, in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin (12 N. B. R. 405-413), aims to distinguish between actions which pass to the assignee of a firm in bankruptcy, and those which do not. In this instance, one member of a firm, prior to the bankruptcy, brought an action for malicious prosecution, because of abuse of legal process in proceedings against the firm. The defendant answered that the plaintiff and his firm had been adjudged bankrupts, that an asssignee had been appointed, and, therefore, by the bankrupt act, the interest in the action passed to the assignee. Judge Lyon, in delivering the opinion of the court, held that this was an action for a personal injury, as distinguishable from an injury to property; that, just as assault and battery, libel, slander and the like, may occasion loss of property, and yet are all personal injuries, the same is true of malicious prosecution. The bankrupt act intends that the assignee shall take only the bankrupt's right of property. tort must be for an injury to the property, in order to pass the right of action to the assignee. And further, it was held, that the cause of action was not assignable in law or equity; nor should the action abate, since it remained solely in the plaintiff. erroneous. The intent to murder would not be conclusively inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon, where the circumstances under which it was used were such as would excite the fears of a reasonable man that the person upon whom the deadly weapon was used was about to inflict upon him a great bodily injury, or to feloniously break and enter his dwelling-house. This error does not appear to be cured by the other instructions." VALIDITY OF A WILL WRITTEN ON A SLATE.-The Pennsylvania statute of wills provides that "every will shall be in writing;" and the question has lately arisen in the case of Court of Chester Read v. Woodward, Common Pleas County, in that state (reported 8 Chicago Legal News, 1), whether a will written upon a slate is a good will. Butler, P. J., who delivered the opinion of the court, in holding that it is not, used the following language: The writing is within the terms of the statute-for they are general, requiring simply that every will shall be in writing." But it is within the spirit? For this enquiry also, is involved in the interpretation; and when considered we see plainly that all writing is not embraced. The purpose of the statute is obvious. It was to avoid the uncertainty and danger attending proof of nuncupative wills. Ordinary writing-as with the material in common useserves to accomplish this purpose. Such other writing as does not, was not contemplated, and is not embraced. One may write in the dust, or the sand, or with charcoal or chalk, leaving the impression so evanescent that a breath will efface them. Such writing, though embraced by the terms of the statute, is excluded by its spirit. Then again, one may write on a rock or a wall, or a tree; and this also is excluded, for it is incapable of the use and treatment prescribed. We think it may be said with safety, that no writing effected with material not designed for, or suited to the purpose, is within the statute. It could not have been contemplated that men would so write.-But does the statute embrace all writing effected with material designed for the purpose? This proposition includes lead pencil and slate, for they are designed and prepared for writing. Here the enquiry is narrower and the question more difficult. Still, the true test-the adaptability of the writing to the end in view-is the same. If all such writing answers this end, then all is included. If a part does not, it is excluded. But the results of the test here, are not so marked as in the instances before stated. It may be said that the difference consists merely in the degree of appropriateness. The common judgment of men, however, as shown by almost universal experience, is against the fitness of lead pencil and slate for writing of a permanent character. Deeds, leases, and all similar instruments are uniformly written in ink ; and the judicial records of this country show no will in other material; while those of England show but two. Granting, therefore, that a will in lead pencil may, in some degree, answer the purposes of the statute, it may well be doubted whether the use of this material was contemplated. Under a statute similar to ours, the English Ecclesiastical Court have, however, admitted wills in pencil to probate: Dyer's Estate, 3 Ecc. Rep 92; Dickson v. Dickson, 1 Ecc. Rep. 222. Whether we will follow this lead is yet to be shown. In Patterson v. English et al., 21 P. F. S. 454, it is said that no will should be written or such wills would be greater than in England, where the statute requires subscribing witnesses, and thus avoids the uncertainty attending proof of hand altered or effaced." It may be remarked that the danger here from admitting THE "IDEAL REASONABLE MAN."-In the case of The People v. Newman, 10 Pacific Law Reporter, 21, the Supreme Court of California, has summoned from the vasty deep of metaphysical things the "ideal reasonable man against which Dr. Wharton argues so sturdily in the second edition of his work on Homicide. The defendant was indicted and convicted of the crime of assault with intent to commit mur-signed with lead pencil, on account of the facility with which the writing may be der. There was no direct evidence tending to prove that he committed the offence, but there was circumstantial evidence having such a tendency. An instruction given at the re-writing in pencil. But we think writing on slate presents even more serious quest of the prosecution, contained the following propositions: objections. While it is true that this material is prepared and used for writ"A sane man is conclusively presumed to contemplate the is neither intended for nor adapted to, writing of a permanent character. It ing, it is true only in a limited sense. It is especially designed for figures, and natural and probable consequences of his own acts; and would hardly be thought of in this connection; and the reports here and elsetherefore the intent to murder is conclusively inferred by the where, show not a single instance in which it has been so used. Impressions deliberate use of a deadly weapon, unless proved to have upon it are easily removed, and replaced, without leaving any trace of the been done in self-defence or accidentally." "This," said change. Writing upon such material does not in our judgment even reasonably accomplish the purpose had in view by the legislature, was not contemRhodes, J., in delivering the opinion of the court (with plated, and is not embraced in the statute. Judgment must, therefore, be enwhom Crockett, McKinstry and Niles, JJ., concurred) "istered for the defendant on the point reserved, notwithstanding the verdict. |