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N. C. 636, where, however, there were special circumstances), defendant now seeks to recover against the person notified (Smith sheriffs were specially directed (Humphreys v. Pratt, 5 Bligh. N. v. Compton, 3 B. & Ad. 407; Sparkes v. Martindale, 8 East, 593; S. 154); a manufacturer employed to brand with a false trade- Scott v. Duffield, 3 T. R. 374). mark, goods made by him for the defendant (Dixon v. Fawcus, 9 W. R. 414); and a person in possession of goods, the right to which was in dispute, delivering them to one of the claimants (Dugdale v. Lovering, 23 W. R. 391, L. R. 10 C. P. 196).

Fourthly, if a person has incurred a liability in consequence of another's default, and the defaulting party requests him to defend an action arising out of that liability, the person so defending will be entitled to recover his costs of litigation, and is dispensed from the necessity of showing that his defence was reasonable. Howes v. Martin (1 Esp. 162), Williams v. Burnell (1 C. B. 402), Blyth v. Smith (5 M. & G. 405), of which last case it may be said that but for the way in which the point was raised, it is very doubt ful whether a request would have been inferred.

Fifthly, where, by the defendant's breach of duty, the plaintiff is hindered in the exercise of any rights of person or property, and is compelled to take legal proceedings for their recovery, he is entitled to recover the costs he has been thus necessarily put to; as in Henderson v. Squire (17 W. R. 579, L. R. 4 Q. B. 170), and Bramley v. Chesterton (2 C. B. N. S. 592), to recover possession of land let by the plaintiff to the defendant, and which was, at the expiration of the tenancy, in the occupation of a third person, who refused to deliver up possession; and in Foxall v. Barnett (2 E & B. 928), to regain possession of his liberty from imprisonment on a false charge made by the defendant. On the other hand the costs must be strictly necessary for the purpose, not merely identical to it (Holloway v. Turner, 6 Q. B. 926), and it seems doubtful whether, even to the limited extent to which costs, incurred by the landlord's inability to fulfill a contract to give possession to a third person, were allowed in Bramley v. Chesterton (2 C. B. N. S. 592), that case can be supported.

Sixthly, however, in cases where through the defendant's default in meeting an obligation which, as between himself and the plaintiff he ought to meet, the plaintiff is exposed to an action, but where, the case being one in which a defence ought not to be made, the plaintiff would not be entitled to the costs of defending, he is still entitled to recover those costs which he could not avoid, that is the costs of writ: Beech v. Jones (5 C. B. 696); Penley v. Watts (7 M. & W. 691); Pierce v. Williams (23 L. J. Ex. 322).

But on the other hand, in no case, except one falling under the fourth head, will the plaintiff be entitled to recover costs incurred in an unreasonable litigation. Nor can he recover costs incurred in litigation arising out of a distinct contract of his own, only be cause the contract was rendered necessary by the defendant's default, or because but for the defendant's default it would not have subjected him to liability, although it may have been in his own interests reasonable to carry on the litigation.

It remains to say a few words upon the question, how far the right of the plaintiff to recover costs is affected by notice of the litigation to the defendant. The effects of notice are of two kinds. First it may be used as a ground for the inference that the defendant in the second action has requested the defendant in the first action to carry on the litigation, or has assented to his doing so. Mere silence in reply to such a notice has been sometimes treated as equivalent to such a request, so as to entitle to the recovery of costs (Blyth v. Smith, 5 M. & G. 405; Rolph v. Crouch, 16 W. R. 252, L. R. 3 Ex. 44); but this is a very doubtful inference. But as a step in showing or inferring a request, it is of practical importance. Secondly, and this is its most direct function, notice to a person who would, without the notice, be liable over to the notifying party, will, especially if coupled with the offer of the defence to him, operate as a kind of estoppel on him against questioning the liability of the notifying party as defendant in the first action, or the reasonableness of the course pursued by him, or the amount of the costs incurred in the defence, and which that

There is no authority for saying that notice will create a liability to answer for costs incurred in a prior action, if, without notice, no such liability would have existed; and in point of reason there is nothing to show why it should.-[The Solicitor's Journal.

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TOLEDO, O., Sept. 1, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:--Can garnishee be issued against property or money in the hands of a receiver? If so, can you refer me to any STUDENT. authority or decisions on the subjuct?

A garnishment can not be enforced against property in the hands of a receiver, it being a well understood principle of jurisdiction or rule of comity that one court will not interfere with the possession of another court. But "Student" should have gone to his professor with this question, and not to us, -[Ed. C. L. J.

POWER OF NATIONAL BANKS TO TAKE MORTGAGES OF LAND. OSAGE MISSION, KAN., September 14, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-Sec. 5137, Rev. Stat. U. S., p. 999 "1 as shall be mortprovides that national banks may hold such real estate gaged to it in good faith by way of security for debts previously contracted." Is it to be understood that national banks are prohibited from taking mortgages to secure loans made contemporaneously with the execution of the mortgage? If so would such a mortgage, i. e., a mortgage taken by a nat tional bank to secure the payment of a contemporaneous loan, be void as against a subsequent mortgage taken expressly subject to it? Can you refer me to any cases decided in State or Federal Courts, construing Sec. 5137, Rev. Stat. U. S.?

H.

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viz.:

after sold 150 bushels of wheat for $150, and the maker made demand for the amount of the note and interest, claiming that the note was due, by virtue of the endorsement on the back. Payment was refused, and the payee brought suit for the amount of the note. These facts suggests the following questions Does the endorsement on the back of the note qualify the face of the Can the maker maintain on action on the note until after the expiration of seven months? If the endorsement on the back qualifies the promise in the body of the note, can the maker maintain the action until all the wheat of the promisor is sold, or the seven months expire? If the endorsement on the back qualifies the terms of the promise in the body of the note, can the prom

note?

isor refuse to sell his wheat and thereby defer or defeat an action on the note after the expiration of the seven months? You will bear in mind that there was no additional consideration for the endorsement on the back of the note. Yours truly, HORTON & WAGGENER,

Briefs.*

Estoppel-Purchase of Property Subject to Chattel Mortgage. -In the Supreme Court of Iowa; Oswald, Appellee, v. Hayes, Appellant. Argument for appellant, pp. 13. One Thurston bought a hack of Hayes, the ap pellant, and gave a chattel mortgage for the price. Said Thurston sold to one Paine, who bought subject to the mortgage. Hayes knew of this sale. Paine sold to Oswald, the appellee, without informing him of the foregoing facts. Hays did not know of the latter sale until completed, when he took possession of the hack, which he now holds. The question arises, whether the lien of the mortgagor holds against a purchaser ignorant of the mortgage, though the latter's vendor has taken the property subject to the mortgage. It is claimed that the appellant is not estopped from asserting a right to the property, beause he did nothing to mislead or injure the appellee, or that could have done so. The points, though well made, are well known. [Address Mrs. J. Ellen Foster, Clinton, Iowa.]

Vacating Appointment of Receiver.-In the United States Circuit Court, District of Kentucky; Opdyke et al. v. St. L. and S. E. R. R. Co. (consolidated). Arguments of defendants, pp. II. The defendants are a company formed by the consolidation of two others, each of which issued bonds, but the consolidated company made a consolidated mortgage, of which plaintiffs are trustees. It is sought to vacate the appointment of a receiver, to which the defendants object, as the course already pursued was proper, and they wish to exclude cross-suits in other and state courts. The argument is confined too closely to facts peculiar to this particular case, to make an extended account desirable. [Address Walter Evans, Esq., Louisville, Ky.]

Admiralty-Petitory actions against the thing Seized. In the United States Circuit Court, District of Louisiana; Gastrel and Raymond, Libellants, v. a Cypress Raft. Brief for claimants, pp. 12. It appears that the claimants entered libellants' land in Mississippi, cut there certain logs, and joined them with others in a raft, which they took to New Orleans. Libellants bring action in admiralty to recover said logs. It is claimed that there is no maritime lien or right to libel in rem in this case, because: (a) the thing siezed is not a ship or vessel; (b) a possessory or a petitory action does not lie in admiralty against the thing siezed; (c) the alleged tort was a trespass upon land; (d) the allegation that certain logs were taken from the libellants and incorporated into the thing seized, can not establish a maritime lien, and confer jurisdiction in rem, against that thing. These points are well sustained. [Address Kennard, Howe, and Prentiss, New Orleans, La.]

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Breach of Promise to Marry.-In the Supreme Court of Texas; Glasscock, Appellant, v. Shell, prochien ami of Virginia C. Shell, Appellee Brief for appellant, pp. 32. This is the first case of the kind ever known in Texas. The discussion is confined to declared irregularities in the rulings of the lower court, and touches but slightly upon the question at issue. [Address Peeler, Montgomery, and Fisher, Austin, Texas.]

Collection of Taxes Enjoined.-In the Supreme Court of Indiana; City of Mt. Vernon et al. Appellants, v. A. P. Hovey, Appellee. Argument for appellee, pp. 19. It appears that the city of Mt. Vernon, rightfully voted a certain sum in its own bonds to a certain railroad, which bonds were never issued, and which road was never begun. Afterwards said road was consoli. dated with another. Sometime later, the common council of said city issued bonds to the consolidated road, and proposed to levy a tax for the payment thereof. This the appellee resists, claiming that in the premises the issue of bonds to the consolidated company by the common council is unlawful and unauthorized. The law bearing on the question is drawn mainly from the statutes, but well merits study. [Address Hovey & Menzies, Evansville, Ind.]

Tax Unlawfully Imposed.-In the Supreme Court of South Carolina; Mathewsen v. Gulick et al. Bill of complaint, pp. 22. The complainant prays for an injunction to restrain certain state officers from collecting a tax on certain stock of his, which tax is levied under, and by virtue of a certain act said to have been passed by the general assembly of the state. The request is based on the ground that said act never became a law, having been vetoed, and the veto never having been voted down. [Address A. G. Magrath, Esq., Charleston, South Carolina.]

A Correction. In our notice of the brief for the complainants in the important case of Craig v. Smiht and Hale (ante, p. 576) our reviewer inadvertently omitted from the address the name of Geo. S. Brown, Esq., of Topeka, Kansas. The style of the firm of attorneys who had that case in charge is Guthrie & Brown, and Mr. Brown, the junior member of the firm, was actively engaged in the case, and largely entitled to the credit of the successful result.

*These abstracts of briefs, were prepared by James Hayward, Esq.

Summary of Our Legal Exchanges.

WEEKLY NOTES OF CASES, SEPT., 16.* Telegraph-Reasonableness of Stipulation in Telegraph Blank -Unrepeated Message-Liability of Telegraph Company for.— Passmore v. The Western Union Telegraph Co., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (no written opinion). The plaintiff gave the following message at Parkersburg, W. Va., to the telegraph operator of the defendant company, to be transmitted to E., at Philadelphia: I hold the Tibbs tract for you,' etc. The message as received by E. read, "I sold," etc. The printed blanks of defendant, with which the plaintiff was familiar (though there was no evi dence that he had used one for the above message), stipulated that the company should not be responsible for any error in the transmission of any unrepeated message, and provided an extra charge for such repetition. In an action for damages for the loss of a contract occasioned by the above mistake, the court entered judgment for the defendant, holding that the above regulation was not so far contrary to the public good, as to justify a court in pronouncing it invalid. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that in this there was no error.

*

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Will-Legacy-Contract.-Reck's Appeal. Supreme Court of Pennsylvani, opinion by Sharswood, J. A husband bequeathed to his wife "the interest of one thousand dollars, and should the interest of the same be insufficient to provide for her, then as much of the principal as may be required." He further provided that after her death the balance of the one thousand dollars should go to the residuary legatees. The widow resided with her son-in-law until the time of her death. Subsequently the son-in-law recovered judgment against the estate of the widow for her maintenance and funeral expenses, and, upon the filing of the account of the administrator, he sought to surcharge the latter with so much of the one thousand dollars as were requisite to satisfy his judgment. Held (reversing the decree of the court below), that the whole sum, excepting "the balance undisposed of," vested absolutely in the widow, and that, although the amount of that balance was not ascertainable until the widow's death, it nevertheless vested an interest at the testator's death. Held, further, that the fact that the widow had made no demand for any part of the principal was immaterial, and that the judgment-creditor had an equitable claim thereon for payment in the absence of fraud or collusion.

Taking Land for Railroads-Measure of Damages-Evidence. -The East Brandywine and Waynesburg Railroad Company v. Ranck. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, opinion by Paxson, J. In an action for damages for the appropriation of certain farm lands by defendant railroad, the court below refused to admit the defendant's offer of the plaintiff's declarations as to the value of the land, and the price for which certain portions of it had previously been sold. Held (reversing the judgment of the court below), that the evidence should have been admitted.

Ejectment-Evidence-Proof of Appointment of Assignee in Bankruptcy.-Alexander v. McCullough, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Opinion per curiam. In ejectment plaintiff gave in evidence a certified copy of a petition in bankruptcy, a certificate of the bankrupt's discharge, and a deed from the bankrupt's alleged assignee. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that as there was no evidence of the appointment of the assignee, the plaintiff could not recover.

Partnership-Dissolution-Power of liquidating Partner to execute Note so as to bind Firm.-Lloyd v. Thomas, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Opinion by Paxson, J., Williams, J., absent. On May 15, 1871, notice was given of the dissolution of a partnership, and that the accounts of the firm would be settled by A., one of the partners, "alone authorized to use the name of the firm in the settlement of the business." In August, A. made notes to the order of the firm, antedated as of the day of dissolution, and endorsed with the firm name, without the knowledge of the other partners, the defendants; the notes were given by him to the firm in payment for stock taken by him at the dissolution. A.'s letters to the plaintiffs spoke of these notes as made to facilitate the liquidation of the firm, but on examination he could not tell whether or not he used the proceeds to pay off the firm debts. Held (reversing the judgment of the court below), that the above facts were not sufficient to exempt the other members of the firm, and that if the notes were never issued, and the proceeds were applied to aid the firm's liquidation, the other partners were liable.

OHIO STATE REPORTS, ADVANCE SHEETS OF VOL. 25. † Indictment-Leasing House for Purposes of Prostitution-Failure to Enter and Take Possession. --Crofton v. The State, Supreme Court of Ohio. Opinion by McIlvaine, Ch. J. [25 Ohio St. 249.] 1. An indictment *Phila. Kay & Bro.

Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co.

under section of the act 1 of April 11, 1856 (S. & C. 879), which contains an averment that the accused, who was the owner of a certain house, knowingly permitted one M. to use and occupy the same for the purpose of prostitution, is sufficient without an averment in so many words, that the house was in fact so used and occupied by M. 2. A conviction under such indictment, should have been set aside where the only facts proved were, that the defendant who had innocently and in good faith leased the premises for a term, afterwards refused, during the term, to avoid the lease, and to re-enter and take possession, upon being informed that the lessee was using the property for such illegal purpose. 3. Section 2 of said act confers upon the lessor the power to avoid the lease for the cause therein stated; but the omission on his part to exercise the power is not an offence under the statute.

Constitutional Exemption from Taxation-"Institution of purely

tried by Judge Lafayette Foster of the Superior Court at Bridgeport, and was sentenced to twenty years in the penitentiary.

-A CURIOUS CUSTOM, a relic of old feudal times, has been brought to notice in connection with the recent execution of a criminal in the Island of

Jersey. In the three parishes of Grouville, St. Clement, and St. Saviour's are certain lands, the property of the crown. About 150 persons in these three parishes owe a small rent for the privilege of pasturing, etc., on the crown lands. This rent is commuted for the attendance of the renters as a guard at public executions. In former years they were employed to convey prisoners for trial to and from the court. They are now merely called upon in cases of Each man (in private clothes) was armed with a halberd of the

executions.

old fashioned type and a number of them were posted around the gaol wall in front of the scaffold to preserve order among the crowd. Another portion were stationed in the gaol yard, and formed a double line, along which the

Public Charity"-Taxation of Catholic Schools.-John Gerke, culprit passed to the scaffold, on which also several of them were posted.

County Treasurer, and Walker M. Yeatman, County Auditor, of Hamilton County v. John B. Purcell. Supreme Court of Ohio. Opinion by White, J. 1. The act of April 10, 1856, which authorizes the enjoining of the illegal assessment of taxes, and the collection of taxes illegally ass ssed, applies as well to taxes assessed on land, as upon personal property; and the jurisdiction con

-NUISANCE-COCK CROWING.-A case which came before Serjt. Wheeler at the Brompton County Court a fews days ago, will be a lesson to many house-holders in the law of nuisances. The plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for a nuisance caused by the crowing of a cock on the defendant's premises. It appears that the plaintiff and defendant occupy adjoining houses in

ferred by said act is, by section 20 of the act to establish the Superior Court of Kensington. The defendant had a fowl-house in his garden where he kept a

Cincinnati, made applicable to that court. 2. In section 2, article 12, of the constitution, which authorizes the general assembly to exempt from taxation the classes of property therein described, the word "public" is used, in some

number of fowls, and among them a bantam cock, which by its crowing at four or five o'clock in the morning, disturbed the plaintiff's wife, who was ill harmless enough, certainly; but, as the judge pointed out, legal rights may, to such an extent that it hindered her recovery. To keep fowls is in itself under certain circumstances, be pushed to excess, and such is the case when they interfere with another's enjoyment of his or her rights. The principle is perfectly clear, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas."-[The Law Times -THE Chicago Legal News says that the following is a verbatim copy of a return of a Wisconsin sheriff, indorsed on the summons of a justice of the

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MONROE COUNTY, SS.

'I, Geo. B. Robinson, deputy sheriff of said county, do certify that I have been to the defendant's usual place of abode, and find he is dead, and so I left a copy at his last and final abode in my county, to-wit: on his grave, in the town of Ridgeville, he not leaving any family or funds behind. He leaves this world without a cent, and has gone where the plaintiff can't sell him whisky. Alas! Tuteur is out, and Weigand is dead!

"C. W. MCMILLAN, Sherift.

instances, to describe the ownership of the property, in others as merely de-
scriptive of the use to which the property is applied. As applied to school-
houses, it is used in the former sense; and by "public school-houses" is
meant such as belong to the public and are designed for schools established
and conducted under public authority. 3. The fact that the use of property
is free, is not a necessary element in determining whether the use is public or
not. If the use is of such a nature as concerns the public, and the right to its
enjoyment is open to the public upon equal terms, the use will be public, peace, in the case of Isaac Tuteur v. Weigand :
whether compensation be exacted or not. Whether the use is free or not, be-
comes material only where some other element is involved than that of its pub-
lic character, as for instance, whether the use is charitable as well as public.
4. A charity, in a legal sense, includes not only gifts for the benefit of the
poor, but endowments for the advancement of learning, or institutions for the
encouragement of science and art, without any particular reference to the
poor. 5. Schools established by private donations, and which are carried on
for the benefit of the public, and not with a view to profit, are "institutions
of purely public charity" within the meaning of the provision of the con
stitution, which authorizes such institutions to be exempt from taxation
6. The constitution in directing the levying of taxes and in authorizing ex-
emptions from taxation, has reference to property, and the uses to which it
applied; and where property is appropriated to the support of a charity which
s purely public, the legislature may exempt it from taxation, without refer-
ence to the manner in which the title is held, and without regard to the form
or character of the organization adopted to administer the charity. 7. The
statute in exempting property from taxation, classifies it according to legisla-
tive discretion; and if the property which the statute undertakes to exempt-
comes within the exemption authorized by the constitution, it is immaterial
how the property is classified or discribed. 8. In the description of the prop-
erty exempted from taxation in section 3 of the tax law, as amended March 21,
1864, the word public, as therein applied to school-houses, colleges, acade-
mies, and other institutions of learning, is descriptive of the uses to which the
property is devoted. The schools and instruction which the property is used
to support must be for the benefit of the public; and when private property
is thus appropriated without any view to profit, it constitutes a "purely public
charity" within the meaning of the constitutional provision. 9. The express
authority given in the constitution to exempt from taxation "houses used ex-
clusively for public worship," carries with it, impliedly, authority to exempt
such grounds as may be reasonably necessary for their use; but such grounds
must subserve the same exclusive use to which the buildings are required to
be devoted. 10. A parsonage, although built on ground which might other-
wise be exempt as attached to the church edifice, does not come within the
exemption. The ground in such case is appropriated to a new and different
Instead of being used exclusively for public worship, it becomes a place
of private residence. The exemption is not of such houses as may be used
for the support of public worship, but of houses used exclusively as places of
public worship.

"By GEO. B. ROBINSON, Deputy.”
-THE force of ancient custom is still curiously illustrated by the enacting
clause of a British statute raising revenue. Would any American believe that
in a country whose sovereign is a mere tinse lled figure-head to the state, who
has not dared to exercise the veto power for nearly two centuries, and whose
ministry is little better than a bureau of clerks to the popular branch of the
legislature, this branch of in that body granting a bill for supplies, should
couch it in language of the mosta bject and humiliating character. Imagine
the master addressing the servant in the following language, which constitutes
the enacting clause of 38 and 39 Vict., chap 23:
Most Gracious Sovereign,

use.

Legal News and Notes.

-IN the land of steady habits they do not do things by halves. Recently a desperate fellow named John Lee Powell, who had been put off a railway train for refusing to pay his fare, piled obstructions on the track, which were discovered and removed barely in time to save a passenger train from wreck. He was

"

WE, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled, towards raising the necessary supplies to defray Your Majesty's public expenses, and making an addition to the public revenue, have freely and voluntarily resolved to give and grant unto Your Majesty the several duties hereinafter mentioned, and do therefore most humbly beseech Your Majesty that it may be enacted; and be it enacted, etc."

-THE FRENCH LAW OF BETTING has received a very practical illustration in the recent prosecution of a number of English bookmakers before the Tribunal Correctionnel of Paris. This case may be compared with another, a decision of the Court of Common Pleas, referred to in another column. The charge against the accused was that they had violated the rules of fair betting. The civil code tolerates betting unless it is unfair, though it prohibits games of chance. The unfair practices to which the French betting public have been subjected appear to have been, in many instances, as fraudulent as courts take cognizance. For instance, any of those of which our own some bookmakers run horses under assumed names; the subsequent modus

operandi being simple in the extreme. Having induced people to bet by laying heavy odds against those horses, they "scratch" them, and thereby pockethe money laid upon them. Another ingenious plan was to keep false lists of horses in the betting offices. All the accused were found guilty of unfair practices, and condemned to pay various fines, a term of imprisonment being imt posed in some instances. It seems curious that some of the means employed by the bookmakers to deceive should be possible, and the fact can be accounted for only by the very different conditions of betting in France and England. [The Law Times.

SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON,

Editor.

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ST. LOUIS, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1875.

THE NEW YORK HERALD of Sept. 22, gravely informs its readers in an editorial that "the Supreme Court of the United States delivered its decision yesterday in the cases which came up on appeal from the circuit court relating to the right of a state to tax railway lands granted as a subsidy toward building railroads. The case originated in Nebraska, and it has been decided partly in favor of the state. The Union Pacific Railroad owns, by grant of Congress, alternate sections of land for a distance of twenty miles on each side of its track." The case referred to is that of McShane v. The Union Pacific Railroad, decided last winter and published by us at the time (ante, p. 104). Synopses of these old decisions are still being telegraphed to the New York dailies as though they had just been decided. It is a disgrace to journalism and an imposition upon the public.

HON. WILLIAM BEACH LAWRENCE, we learn from the Legal Gazette, has been during the past summer engaged on his Commentaires, the publication of which had been discontinued. The Gazette relates the following concerning a large fee taken by Mr. Lawrence:

"It was a natural effect of Mr. Lawrence's reputation abroad, that though he had not practiced law for forty years, the owners of the Circassian, when they were endeavoring to reverse, in 1873, before the Joint High Commissioners, the decree of the Supreme Court of the United States, which had condemned her for violation of our blockade, sougl.t his aid as their counsel. A conviction previously, publicly expressed by him, that the condemna ion was in violation of the law of nations, and a proffered fee of $40,000 in gold, induced him to argue the case. He argued it and gained it and got his fee, his $40,000 in gold!—not a bad fee for the season of the panic!"

LIFE INSURANCE LEGISLATION.-Referring to the subjects discussed in the convention of life insurance commissioners which recently met in New York, the Indianapolis Sentinel makes the following suggestions, which we reproduce, as showing the tendency of public sentiment on the question. We expressed our views on it two weeks ago:

In the matter of life insurance there is a great necessity for general legislation on one point, and that is on the lapsing of policies by reason of failure to pay the annual premium on the policy. Whenever a single premium a certain amount of money at death. No matter whether another premium is paid or not, he has a right to a proportional amount of the original pledge of the company. If this proposition is not true, there is no way in justice of denying the right of the policy-holder to demand the refunding of his premium money, since the company has received something absolutely for nothing. Legislation should therefore provide that every company should immediately upon the failure of a policy-holder to pay his annual premium, issue to the holder a paid-up policy for an amount proportional to the expectation of life, which regulated the amount of the premium paid. In some of the states where companies are chartered this is required, and should be demanded by every state of all foreign companies doing business in their lines. The matter of misrepresentation by agents is a grievous evil, but it is doubtful whether special legislation could reach this particular business, any more than it could

on a policy is paid, there is invested in the policy holder, in theory, a right to

reach a disposition to lie discovered in other business occupations.

THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS of the different states have recently been in covention in New York. The main

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feature of the meeting was the speech of Mr. Finch, of Indiana. His utterances were of a decided character, such as might be inferred from a synopsis of his views published by us two weeks ago (ante, p. 602). His positions have been variously criticised, the New York World being very severe toward them, while the New York Tribune and Saint Louis Republican speak in tones of moderate approbation. The Indianapolis Sentinel wisely says:

The insurance business has become one of the great interests of the country. A vast amount of money is invested in it, and all wise business men secure its ten secured or impaired by taking of advantage or neglecting this safeguard protection. It has become a necessity, inasmuch as the credit of a firm is ofagainst the accidental loss to which all are more or less exposed, and therefore, it will not do to disparage insurance as a legitimate and useful occupation, or denounce those engaged in it as extortioners and unworthy of con

fidence.

The truth is, that public sentiment is running into a spasm. of insanity on this question, as it does on some others, and this is more particularly true of life insurance. looking upon life insurance corporations as trustees of funds which should be sacredly preserved and guarded for the benefit of the widows and children for whose security it is being treasured up, it is regarded as so much money in the hands of a heartless set of adventurers, which is to be plundered whenever opportunity offers. The average juror, whose mind is incapable of any extensive process of ratiocination, reasons the question about this way: "An insurance company is a corporation; it is therefore 'bloated'; it is a vampire which sucks the blood of the honest sons of toil; it is a gigantic monopoly, holding in its coffers all the money in the country, and grinding the people in the dust." With such feelings, he may easily satisfy his conscience in awarding a verdict against an insurance company on a policy, no matter how base the fraud by which it may have been obtained. The fact is, whether the manner in which the business of life insurance is conducted be honest or dishonest, the assets of such a company do not, except in a limited sense, belong to the officers and agents of it, but belong to the beneficiaries in their policies, for whom it is held in trust by the corporation; and every suit on a policy of life insurance should be regarded rather as a contest between the beneficiaries in one policy, and the beneficiaries in all the other policies of the company; just as a suit between an assignee in bankruptcy and a creditor, is a suit between that creditor and all the other creditors, represented by the assignee.

MOB LAW.-On Saturday last at Bellefontaine, Ohio, a man named Shell was lynched by a body of excited citizens, who supposed him guilty of ravishing and then murdering a girl named Alice Laughlin. The verdict of the citizens was formed almost entirely on the testimony of the wife of Shell, given at the coroner's inquest after the husband had been arrested and imprisoned. The story told by Mrs. Shell is extremely improbable, and points to the conclusion that she herself had committed the murder through jealousy, and then, to save herself, had accused her husband. However this may be, the occasion is a fit one for enquiring the remedy for the frequent

occurrences of this kind that are taking place in different parts of the country. Beyond doubt the seat of the disease is a general distrust in the administration of criminal justice. In this case there was good ground for such distrust. A questionable rule of the common law makes a husband and wife one person, and prohibits the one from testifying against the .other. Therefore, unless this rule has been abrogated in Ohio (and we suppose it has not), the testimony of Mrs. Shell would not have been available on the trial of the cause. This consideration, no doubt, had its weight in moving the citizens with the impulse that justice should have her dues speedily and surely.

The circumstances which lead to the supposition that Mrs. Shell, and not her husband, was guilty of the murder, consist in the fact, as stated in one of the newspaper accounts of the affair, that in the hand of the dead girl, tightly clenched, has been found some threads of hair. In her death struggle with the enemy she had torn these from the roots, and held them like a vise. The hair was fine, dark and straight. They were supposed at first to be from Shell's head, but on examination under the microscope they appeared darker and coarser for his own hair was uncommonly fine, and what settled the matter as to Shell, the hair ranged from ten to fourteen inches in length, and no hair in his head measured half that. Besides the hair of the deceased was of a dark auburn and fine in texture, while this hair was the exact counterpart of the

hair of Mrs. Shell.

Such law as that administered in this case is but one step better than no law at all, and finds its only justification in communities such as mining camps remote from civilization, where no other law can be invoked. And law administered by twelve unskilled men, played upon by cunning advocates, is but one step better.

The Defence of Insanity.

Berges was not considered out of his mind, but that he was
very passionate. Some, however, gave evidence that Berges
had complained of violent headaches, and that he declared
Naudy had sent evil spirits to torment him. Others testi-
fied that Berges shook hands with them in a strange way, and
afterwards asked them what sensations they had felt.
doctors accustomed to deal with lunatics declarged Berges to
be out of his mind, and recommended his instant removal to
an asylum. A sixth, who had examined him, sent an affida-
vit stating that if Berges was not mad he had, at least, com-
mitted the crimes of which he was accused while in a state of
high fever. The jury, as we have said, refused to be influ-
enced by this evidence, and Berges was condemned to death."
If American juries would only administer the law in clear
cases, there would be a rapid decrease in insanity in this

country.

An International Tribunal.

Dr. James B. Miles read before the recent meeting of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations a second paper on this subject, his first paper having been read before the meeting which took place last year at Geneva. This second paper is devoted to an attempt to show the grounds for confidence in the effectiveness of the decisions of the proposed tribunal. The present paper does not acquaint us with the most important premiss in such a discussion, but it argues that the exalted character of the court itself and considerations of honor and of patriotism, would lead to an acquiescence in its decrees.

Much as we should like to see a trial of the experiment of a tribunal of this character for the settlement of disputes between nations, and strongly as we sympathise with the general purposes of the Association which has honored Dr. Miles by making him its general secretary, yet we feel obliged to say that we are not favorably impressed with the arguments he puts forth in favor of this measure. On the other hand 'They do things better in France," or worse, according they impress us with the notion of an enthusiast who has an to the varying notions of what is better and what is worse. A idea in which his affections are so concentrated that he is inFrench jury recently found a prisoner guilty of murder with-capable of seeing any of the obstacles in the way of its atout mitigating circumstances, who certainly would have been tainment. A paper which, in discussing a question of such acquitted by an American jury, and then perhaps banqueted gravity and difficulty, takes such roseate views of human proby the public. "The prisoner in question," says an exchange, gress as this does, and which presents its arguments dressed “who was named Berges, a workman at Toulouse, shot and in the florid garb of a school girl's composition, will only killed three men in open daylight on the 24th of October last, move laughter on the part of statesmen and diplomatists, and severely injured a fourth, finishing with a desperate attempt and can not but have a tendency to bring the whole subject at suicide. The evidence given at the trial is interesting, both into ridicule. Imagine, for instance, the effect of such an from the point of view of English experience, and also as show- argument as the following upon the mind of Prince Bising that French juries do not on every occasion grasp at the mark or Gortschakoff: shadow of an extenuating circumstance. Berges' own account in court was that he was induced to kill Naudy because he sent evil spirits to annoy him. He killed Lasbax because he found him talking with Naudy. Caussinius had once accused him of indecent behavior towards a neighbor's daughter; and Vergnes had interfered with his poaching proclivities. He describes his having been spell-bound by a beautiful woman, radiant as a princess, and said the night before he committed the murders he heard noises around the house, and heard the voice of Naudy as he dug with a pickaxe outside. He had, to cure himself of his malady, shaken hands with all his friends, in order, he said, to get rid of the venom. Forty-those of the battlefield. By marvelous discoveries in astronomy, in geology, eight witnesses were examined, most of whom stated that in philology, in all departments of science and knowledge, what immense

It is a question of profound interest-Are the foremost nations to-day sufficiently enlightened, are they far enough advanced in the development of reason, conscience and the high moral sentiments, in the sense of the good, the beautiful, the just and the true? Is there among them intelligence, wisdom, virtue, magnanimity, statesmanship enough to capacitate them for the lofty undertaking of the constitution of an International Tribunal ? We may be too sanguine, we may think of them more highly than we ought to think, and yet we can but answer, yes. We ask attention to the wonderful progress made by these nations in all that constitutes a true civilization during the last half century. It has been a period of unprecedented mental activity. The nations have been snapping the fetters and casting off the shackles of ignorance and barbarism. By their conquest of the elements and forces of nature, and by making them

the servants of man, they have been winning victories more brilliant than

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