my opinion, for he was a soldier before that time. AMERICAN REPORTS DIGEST.-Digest of Decisions in the Courts of Last | whether he located it under a military land warrant. The latter, however, is Resort of the Several States, contained in the American Reports, from Volume I. to XII, inclusive. By ISAAC GRANT THOMPSON. The "American Reports" consist of a series of leading and valuable cases, selected with care and discrimination from the current reports of the various states. We have several times had occasion to commend them as more useful to the practitioner than any series of reports he may purchase, except those of his own state and the Supreme Court of the United States. This is a compact, conveniently arranged and beautifully printed digest of the first twelve volumes; dividing the various matters into appropriate and apt titles and subtitles; giving abundant cross-references and black letter head-lines to facilitate search, having a table of doubted and overruled cases, as well as a general table of cases, and being in all respects a first class American digest. To those who have a set of the "American Reports" it will be exceedingly useful, if not indispensable. Correspondence. A SINGULAR CASE. I. If A. located the land on a land warrant, was it necessary, in order to complete his title, that he should have a patent from the state of Virginia, or did the land warrant alone divest the state of its title? What was the law of Virginia governing such cases at that time? II. What effect would the death of D., the trustee under the will, have on the realty, D. having died before executing the powers vested in him by said will? After D's. death, there never was a successor to D. appointed. No wcould a successor to D. be appointed at this time, to carry out the provisions of the will in that behalf. III. H. having attained his majority, 13 years after the death of B., his mother, to-wit, in the year 1862, when did H's. right of action accrue, and how long a time under the laws of West Virginia, where the land now is, has he in which to bring his action, after the disability of infancy is removed, if at all? B. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. A subscriber writes: "I have been perplexed by the following query. A., residing in Indiana, by a deed of general warranty, conveys to B. of the same state, land in Kentucky. B., learning A. had no title does not take possession, but brings suit in Indiana for breach of warranty. While this action is pending, B. brings suit in Kentucky against the terre tenant to recover the GALLATIN, Mo., June 24, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-It has just been decided by the supreme court of this state that the right to drink intoxicating liquors, and especially beer, is a valuable privilege, the surrender of which for eight months will be sufficient consideration to support a promise to pay at least fifty dol-land, and gives A. notice of the suit, and to protect the title; to which A. lars. Lindell v. Rokes, decided at the present term, at St. Joseph, was an action by the payee against the maker of the following instrument: "MARYVILLE, Mo., JULY 1, 1872. The defendant pleaded want of mutuality in the contract, and that it was without consideration. Plaintiff proved compliance with the conditions of the contract upon his part, and recovered judgment for the amount of the note. The defendant appealed. The supreme court, Wagner, J., delivering the opinion, affirmed the judgment of the court below, holding that the contract was not wanting in mutuality, that it was not against public policy, and that it was founded upon a sufficient consideration. M. A. L. Notes and Queries. SOME POINTS UNDER A WILL-DEVISE OF REALTY IN VIRGINIA. WARRENSBURG, MO., June 22nd, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL-GENTLEMEN:-Will you be so kind as to give the following queries a place in your columns, and ask some of your Virginia correspondents to answer the same? pays no attention, and judgment is rendered against B. on the specific finding by the court, that the deed of A. conveyed no title, by reason of a valid outstanding tax title. Is this record available, and conclusive on the parties, at the trial of the case in Indiana? K. PURCHASE AT EXECUTION SALE-AFTER-ACQUIRED PATENT. We have not had time to look into the following query, although we have held it over for some time in hopes of being able to do so. The questions are no doubt res judicata, and possibly some light may be derived from the following cases: Levi v. Thompson, 1 Morris, 235; Jackson v. Williams, 10 Ohio, 69, and Land v. Hopkins, 7 Ala. 115. We hope to hear from some of our readers with reference to it. VAN BUREN, ARK., June 1, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-"A." purchased a tract of land I. On the 11th day of Jan'y, 1799. the commonwealth of Virginia granted 1. Does the title acquired by this patent inure to the benefit of the purchaser under the execution or order of sale? 2. Does the purchaser at an execution sale take only such title as the execution debtor has at the time of such sale? 3. Can the purchaser, having purchased only an equitable title, and having taken no steps to perfect it, now hold the land against the holder of the patent? III. Afterwards C., the youngest heir married E., and B. the eldest marF. B. and her husband F., removed from Virginia in the year 1841, leaving C. and her husband E., in possession of the land mentioned in the will as vested in D., for the purpose aforesaid. E., by his wife C., had six children. C. died in the year 1842 or 1843. E. then married a second time, about. the year 1847. The land had never been by any act of the trustee, D changed from the character with which it was impressed by the testator when he appointed said trustee, up to the time of the second marriage of E., neither was there up to that time a successor to D. appointed. Of course the assignee stands in no better attitude than his assignor, the assignment having been made with full knowledge, and for the purpose of G. W. Please cite authorities. Recent Reports. PENNSYLVANIA STATE REPORTS. VOL. 75. COMPRISING CASES AD- This volume is everything that could be desired in style and workmanship; indeed it could scarcely be less, coming from the house of Kay & Bro. IV. E., in 1848, conveyed by a warranty deed, all of said land to G. for The names of the judges of the Courts of Common Pleas, and other invalue, without B's, knowledge or consent as to her portion of the same. ferior courts are given in a table in the front part of the volume. The tables of cases are very full, and the index carefully prepared. The practice of entitling the cases in some instances by naming only the appellant, is confus V. At that time of the conveyance by E. to G, B. the eldest heir of A., was living and had children living also. In the year 1849, B. died, leaving her husband F. and her children. In 1862, F. the husband of B. died, leaving and awkward, and must prove inconvenient for purposes of citation and refing several children of his by B. The youngest of said children, H., attained his majority in 1862. erence. Thus we have "Wood's Appeal," which arose from a bill filed by appellant against Quay and others, and which should have been entitled accordI don't know whether the testator A. had a patent for the land or not, or ingly, to correspond with general usage and manifest convenience. There are no less than twenty other cases similarly entitled. Fortunately the name of the other party is generally given in the table of cases; thus, "Fessler's Appeal," is inversely tabled as May's Appeal." A more uniform aud convenient style would vastly improve the appearance and enhance the value of the work. Practice-Support of Paupers.-Danville and Mahoning Poor District v. Montour County, p. 35. Assumpsit will lie by one poor district against another, for maintenance of a pauper belonging to the latter district. Arbitration and Award.-Shisler v. Keavy, p. 79. After an agreement for submission has been executed, neither party can revoke it. A submission in writing can not be revoked except by writing given to the referees, or a majority of them. Street Railway -Negligence-Stopping for Passengers to Alight.-Crissey v. Hestonville, etc., Railway Co., p. 83. The question of negligence is for the jury, and no definite or inflexible rule as to what consti tutes it can be laid down. It is the duty of a railway company to cause its cars to come to a full stop for passengers to get off. Negotiable Paper-Discharge of Endorser.-Hagey v. Hill, p. 108. The holder of a note agreed in writing with the drawers, upon consideration to give them time, with the proviso, "that no delay of demand shall interfere with any claim upon the endorsers. Held, that the endorsers were not discharged. Any act by the holder which prejudices the right of the endorser to his action against the drawer, will discharge him. Husband and Wife-Relinquishment of Dower.-Burk's Appeal, p. 141. A. contracted to sell land. His wife refused to join in the deed, there being no collusion. Held, that the vendee could not compel specific performance by the husband alone and retain part of the purchase-money to cover the wife's contingent claim for dower. Negotiable Paper-Mutilation of Note-Removing Condition.— Zimmerman v. Rote, p. 188. A note payable to order "for value received without interest, waiving the right of appeal, and of all valuation, appraise ment, stay and exemption laws," had written on its margin, before signing, a condition reciting that it was given for a patent, and was not to be paid until a certain profit had been made thereon. This condition was afterwards cut off, and the note negotiated. Held, that the note was negotiable, and that the existence of the condition and failure of consideration were no defence to the note in the hands of a subsequent holder without notice. "Lawful Money "-Payment.-Eagle Beneficial Society's Appeal, p. 226. Land was purchased subject to a mortgage which recited that the mortgagor was bound by a bond of even date to the mortgagee, in the sum of $3,000, lawful money of the United States, conditioned for the payment of $1500 of like lawful money, "as in and by the said recited obligation, etc., will appear." The bond was in "$3,000 lawful silver money of the United States," conditioned for the payment of $1500, "if like lawful money." Held, that payment in lawful money of the United States, of any description, was good. Sale of Personal Property-Warranty.-Whitaker v. Eastwick, p. 229. A purchaser takes the risk of the quality of the article sold unless there be fraud or warranty. There is an implied warranty of title, but not of quality. Mere representation is not warranty. The relation of buyer and seller is not confidential. The plaintiffs purchased a cargo of coal, by the bill of lading and the representations of the defendants that it was good coal, well adapted for generating steam." Held, that evidence that the coal was full of dirt, and that it took an increased quantity to accomplish the purpose, was inadmissible. Sale of Personal Property-Insolvency of Purchaser-Knowl. edge of Insolvency.-Rodman v. Thalheimer, p. 232. Insolvency of a vendee of goods, and his knowledge of it, are not alone such fraud as will set aside a sale and enable the vendor to rescind and replevy the goods from the actual possession of the vendee; but such insolvency and knowledge are evidence for the jury, with other facts of intended fraud. Express Company-Liability for Contents of Trunk sold for Charges.--Adams Express Co. v. Schlessinger, p. 246. A number of trunks were sold for charges, under an order of court, by the Adams Express Company, among them, that of the defendant in error, which was sold locked, and without exposing its contents. Held, that the order of court did not protect the company. Evidence that the owner of the trunk was a lady of wealth, and the goods described by her as contained in the trunk, w re worth $20,000, and were such as are possessed by persons in similar circumstances, was held admissible. See 1 CENT. L. J. 360. Ante Nuptial-Reconveyance to Widow after Death of Husband.-Russell's Appeal, p. 269. In contemplation of marriage, and with the consent of her intended husband, a woman executed a deed of settle ment of all her estate to trustees to pay her the income during her life, and after her death to convey the estate to her children according to testamentory appointment, etc. There was no power of revocation, and the wife always believed that if she survived her husband, she could dispose of the estate as she pleased. The wife survived her husband, who died leaving no issue. In a suit by the wife against the residuary beneficiaries under the settlement for a reconveyance, by the trustee, to her of the estate: Held, that the absence of the power of revocation being a mistake, and the beneficiaries, in absence of issue of the marriage, being volunteers, and there being no consideration for the settlement on them, the widow was entitled to a recon veyance. Tucker's Appeal, p. 354. Where the husband and wife had conveyed her property in trust, to be free from the liabilities of her present and any future husband, and after her death for such persons and uses as she might appoint, etc., the husband having died first: Held, that the widow was entitled to a reconveyance from the trustee. Equitable Assignment of Fund.-Jermyn v. Moffitt, p. 399. Where an order is drawn for the whole of a fund, it is an equitable assignment of it, and binds the fund in the hands of the drawee after notice. An order drawn for part of a fund, is not an assignment unless the drawer accepts, or an acceptance, or obligation to accept may be implied from custom. An assignment professing to transfer a debt for wages not yet earned, against any person who may thereafter employ the assignor, although there may be notice of the assignment to the employer, is insufficient without his acceptance. Foreign Attachment.-Coleman's Appeal, p. 441. Without a voluntary submission by a defendant in foreign attachment to the jurisdiction of the court, judgment in the case can be enforced only against the property attached. Such judgment has no extra-territorial operation. Foreign attachments will not lie upon a demand for tort. Trade Mark.-Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler, p. 467. Plaintiffs adopted the trade-mark" Glendon" on their iron; the place where their furnaces were, was afterwards made a borough by the name of Glendon. Another company afterwards used the same mark. Held, that there was nothing to prevent the second company from so doing. As a rule, the name of a town, etc., can not be exclusively appropriated as a trade-mark. A lawful act is not actionable, C. A. C. though it proceed from malicious motive. Abstracts of Opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. [Prepared expressly for this journal, by HENRY A. CHANEY, Esq., of Detroit, Mich.] Mercantile Law-Negotiable Promissory Notes-Indorsement and Suretyship-Construction of Statutes which alter the Common Law-Suspension of Commercial Intercourse by War, and of Statutes of Limitations by the Rebellion.-Ross, Adm'r, v. Jones et al. Opinion by Clifford, J. 1. Mercantile law is a system of jurisprudence recognized by all commercial nations, and demands, as far as practicable, uniformity of decision throughout the world. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 364. 2. Nogotiable promissory notes, like bills of exchange, are commercial paper in the strictest sense, and as such, are favored instruments, as well on account of their negotiable quality as for their universal convenience in mercantile transactions. Hence the law encourages their use as a safe and convenient medium for the settlement of balances among mercantile men, and any course of judicial decision calculated to restrain or impede their unembarassed circulation would be contrary to the soundest principles of public policy. 3. The maker of a note is, in general, the principal debtor, and all the other parties are in a special sense, sureties for him; if indorsers, they are liable only in case of his default, unless they have waived demand and notice. Though all the other parties are sureties in respect to the maker, still they are not co-sureties, but each prior party is a principal in respect to each subsequent party. 4. The holder of a dishonored note has his choice to sue any one of the parties to the note who is in default, or all of them, and is not bound, even at the indorser's request, to use diligence in seeking his re-imbursement, and if the indorser desires to secure the amount, his remedy is to pay the note himself and then bring suit against the maker or any other party liable over to him. Story on Notes, 5th ed, 115. a; Ib. 419; Beebe v. Bank, 7 Watts & Serj. 375. Having this right and the right of being subrogated to all the holder's rights as against the maker, an endorser whose liability is fixed by due notice of the maker's default, is not entitled to the aid of a court of equity as a surety. Lenox v. Prout, 3 Wheat. 525; Trimble v. Thorne, 16 John. 153; Warner v. Beardsley, 8 Wend. 199; also 6 Wend. 610; Frye v. Barker, 4 Pick. 382; Hunt v. Bribham, 2 Pick. 581. 5. An indorser of a promissory note, though in the nature of a surety, is not for all purposes entitled to the privileges of that character, as he is answerable upon an independent contract, and it is his duty to take up the note when it is dishonored. Ellsworth v. Brewer, II Pick. 320. He does not lose his character of indorser, nor can he be made liable on the note without proof of due demand and notice (Bradford v. Conrey, 5 Barb, 462), which proof, if the demand and notice are seasonable and in due form, removes every condition from his liability except that the holder will do no act to suspend, impair or destroy his right to indemnity from such other parties to the instrument as are bound to save him harmless. Woodman v. Eastman, 10 N. H. 350; Warner v. Beardsley, 8 Wend. 2nd ed. 195, and note. 6. Statutes passed in derogation of the common law should be construed strictly, especially where it is attemped to change the rules of commercial law applicable to bills of exchange and promissory notes. Statutory remedies, where the right to be enforced was unknown at the common law, are to be strictly followed, both as to the methods to be pursued, and the cases to which they areto be applied Lease v. Vance, 20 Iowa, 509. The meaning of statutes that alter the common law shall not be strained beyond the meaning of the words, except in cases of public utility, e. g., when the end in view seems more comprehensive than the enacting words. Potter's Dwarris, 186. that when his liability is fixed by those acts of the holder, he becomes a principal debtor himself, subject only to the condition that the holder shall do no act to suspend, impair or destroy his remedy over against prior parties to whom he has a right to resort for a remedy. McLemore v. Powell, 12 Wheat. 556; 2 Pars. Notes and Bills, 243-5; 3 Kent's Com., 12th Ed., 105. The endorser is not a surety in the general sense, as he stands in the attitude of the drawer of a new bill, and is not primarily liable to make the payment, but only in case of the default of the maker and proof of due presentment, protest and notice of dishonor, and even then he can not be joined with the maker as the surety proper may be, because the maker and endorser are liable on different contracts. 2 Pars. Bills and Notes, 25. 10. The endorser of a note contracts with the endorsee and every subsequent holder to whom the note is transferred, as follows: (a.) That the instrument and antecedent signatures are genuine; (b.) that he, the endorser, has a good title to the instrument; (c.) that he is competent to bind himself in such a contract; (d.) that the maker is competent to bind himself to the payment, and that he will, upon due presentment of the note, pay it at matuWhere the ex-rity; (e) that if, when duly presented, it is not paid by the maker, he, the endorser, will, upon due and reasonable notice being given him of the dishonor, pay the same to the endorsee or other holder. Story on Notes, 5th Ed., 135; Story on Bills, 108; 2 Pars. Bills and Notes, p. 23; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 341; 3 Kent's Com., 12th Ed., 88; Bateman, Commer. Law, 319. 11. War, when duly declared or recognized by the war-making power, peremptorily suspends all commercial intercourse or correspondence with persons domiciled in the enemy's country, and the enforcement of remedies for unfulfilled commercial obligations. Peace restores the rights and remedies. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall, 539. 12. For the suspension of statutes of limitations, the war of the rebellion must be held to have lasted from the proclamation of the blockade, April 27, 1861, to the proclamation that the war was closed, April 2, 1866. Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall. 177. See Batesville Inst. v. Kauffman, 18 Wall. 155. Summary of Our Legal Exchanges. ADVANCE SHEETS OF 55 N. H. REPORTS * " Mortgage of Lease holds-Fixtures-Dills of Sale Act-17 and 18 18 Vict. c. 36, s. 7.-Meux v. Jacobs, House of Lords. Opinion by Chelms ford, Hatherly and Selborne. [23 W. R. 526.] The rule quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit" applies to premises which are leasehold as well as to freeholds, and, therefore, under an equitable mortgage of leaseholds by de of the deposit, pass to the mortgagee, without being expressly included in the security. The Bills of Sale Act, by its interpretation clauses, extends the term "personal chattels " to fixtures for the protection of certain classes of creditors, but does not alter the general law as to fixtures so as to make fixtures personal chattels for all purposes. pression is in general terms, statutes are to be construed as may be agreeable to the rules of the common law in cases of that nature, for statutes are not presumed to make any alteration in the common law beyond what they express. 9 Bouvier's Bac. Abt, 245; Sedgw. on Stats. 2nd ed. 267; 1 Kent. Com. 12th ed. 464; Broom's Max. 4th ed. 552; Smith's Com. 676. 7. A statute providing that a surety in any bond, bill or note, may give the holder notice to sue the principal in writing; and that if the holder fails to do so, the surety shall be discharged [Gould (Ark.) Dig. Stats. 1015], is in derogation of the common law, even if restricted to sureties in the general sense, but would be more so, if it could be extended to include endorsers upon bills of exchange, and negotiable promissory notes. It contemplates that the cause of action will accrue against the principal and surety at the same time, which is never the case with the endorser and maker. Such a notice may certainly be given by a surety proper, whether his contract is expressed by a bill, bond or note, as soon as the instrument falls due, but it would be unreasonable to suppose that an endorser would give such a notice before his liability had become fixed, as it may be that such a demand to sue would operate as a waiver of the right to notice of the dishonor of the note "Persons bound as security for another," are the words of the statute, which undoubtedly includes sureties proper in a bond, bill or note, but they cannot reasonably include an endorser whose liability is fixed by the required notice of the dishonor of the bill or note. Sureties in a note who became joint posits of title deeds, trade fixtures, whether affixed before or after the date promissors with the maker, stand in the same relation to the principal as in a bond given for the payment of money on the delivery of property. Authority to give the notice provided in the statute, arises immediately after the bond, bill, or note falls due, which evidently refers to the lapse of time specified in the contract, but the absolute obligation to pay, does not arise in the case of an endorser before notice of dishonor, which can never be given to the endorser till after the note is presented to the maker, and he has refused or neglected to fulfill his promise to pay, so that the notice in writing, requiring the holder to sue the endorser with the maker, seems to be inapplicable before the endorser's liability is fixed by the demand of payment of the maker, and his refusal to comply, and notice given to the endorser of the dishonor of the note. 8. If any act of the holder of a negotiable promissory note suspends, im pairs or destroys the right of the prior parties to indemnity from those otherwise liable over to them, he can not resort to the parties affected by his conduct to make good the default of the maker of the instrument. Bank v. Hatch, 6 Pet. 258; McLemore v. Powell, 12 Wheat. 556; Wood v Bank, 9 Cow. 194; Bank v. Harrick, 2 Story, 416; Newcomb v. Rayner, 21 Wend. 108; Byles on Bills, 11th Ed., 247, n. 1; 3 Story on Notes, 5th Ed., 413. Mere delay to enforce payment, without a binding contract to give time, will not have that effect even in the case of a surety. Philpot v. Blunt, 4 Bing. 721; Story, Prom. Notes, 5th Ed., 2 415. 9. The contract of the endorser differs from that of the surety who is a joint promissor with the principal; the holder of an endorsed note is under no obligation to use diligence to enforce payment against the maker in order to hold the indorser. Bank v. Myers, 1 Bailey, 418; Powell v. Waters, 17 John. 179; Stafford v. Yates, 18 John., 329, Bank v. Rollins, 13 Me. 205; Page v. Webster, 15 Me. 256; Bank v. Ives, 17 Wend. 502; Sterling v. M. & C. Co., II S. & R. 182; Kennard v. Knott, 4 Man. & Gran., 474. Even where the holder of a promissory note already fallen due, was called on by the endorser to prosecute the maker, of whom the amount might then have been collected, but who afterwards become insolvent, and the holder neg. lected to do as requested, such neglect did not discharge the endorser. Trimble v. Thorne, 16 John., 159; Beebe v. Bank, 7 Watts & Serj. 375. It seems that the endorser is not to be regarded as a surety after his liability is fixed by due presentment, demand and notice of the dishonor of the note, and Copyright in a Name - Agency - Injunction. Ward v. Beeton, Vice Chancellor Malin's Court. [23 W. R. 533.] The plaintiffs purchased the copyright of the defendant Beeton's publication, called "Beeton's Christmas Annual," and the defendant agreed, in consideration of a salary, to permit the plaintiffs to use his name, and bound himself to give his services to them, and not to engage in other business or enterprise. Held, that defendant must be restrained from allowing his name to be advertised in connection with a rival publication. Covenant for Construction of Station-Trains to stop there for Passengers and Luggage-Railway Leased to another Company-Specific Performance Parties-Injunction.-Churchill v. Salisbury and Dorset Railway Company. Vice Chancellor Bacon's Court. [23 W. R. 534] The S. Railway Company purchased lands from C., and agreed to er ct a station at A., and that the trains should stop there for passengers and luggage. They entered into possession of the lands but did not erect a station, and C. served a writ of ejectment on them. The S. Company then filed their bill praying for the specific performance of the contract. A decree was made ordering specific performance, and that C. should execute a proper conveyance of the lands, and that such conveyance should contain a covenant by the S. Company to erect the station, and that trains should stop there for passengers and luggage. This conveyance was duly executed. Under acts of Parliament of 1867 and 1873. confirming agreements between the S. Company and the L. S. W. Company, the latter company were empowered to take a lease for 1,000 years of the S. Railway, and to work it, and were, during such lease, to be liable to all duties and obligations to which the S. Company, if the acts had not been passed, would be subject and liable. No station was erected. Held, on a bill filed by C. against both companies, that C. was entitled to a decree against the S. Company or the erection of a station within three months, and to an injunction against both companies restraining them from allowing the line to remain without a station for the reception, etc., of passengers and luggage according to the terms of the covenant. The injunction to be suspended for three months. Mutual Insurance Contracts-Collection of Premium Notes. Practice," the aforesaid "Cockcroft & Co.," have become virtuously indignant, 46 -VIGOROUS efforts are being made by the English bar to foster the law as a monopoly. A bill has been framed by the parliamentary commitee of the Legal Practitioners Society, and introduced in the House of Commons, imposing a penalty of ten pounds, with full costs of suit, upon " any person who, not being a qualified practitioner, either directly or indirectly, for or in expectation of any fee, gain, or reward, draws or prepares any instrument under seal, or who shall receive any fee, gain, or reward for drawing or prepar Nashua Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore. [55 N. H. 48.] Opinion by Smith, J.-The charter of a mutual fire insurance company provided that every person becoming insured therein should pay, upon the execution of his policy, the premium thereon, and in addition thereto deposit his written agreement to hold himself liable for an equal amount in the capital stock of the company, to be assessed and collected by the directors in such sums, and at such times as they should deem expedient; that all premiums and deposits thus made should be considered the absolute funds of the company, and be applied, first, to the payment of the expenses of the company; secondly, of money borrowed; and, thirdly, of losses and notes given in payment of losses;-and in case losses should happen so as to consume the absolute funds of the company, each member should be held to pay, at the discretion of the direc-ing any such instrument." It is explained that "in any action against a pertors, during the term of his policy, a sum not exceeding two dollars for each dollar of premium and deposit. On a bill filed by C. against both oompanies: Held, that such a deposit note was subject to collection at any time, at the discretion of the directors, for the purpose of discharging expenses, debts and losses of the company; that it was not necessary to enforce payment of such notes by a general assessment; and that such note might be collected to pay losses and expenses which accrued before the maker became a member of the corporation. *Courtesy of John M. Shirley, Esq., Andover, N. H., Reporter. ADVANCE SHEETS OF 66 ILLINOIS REPORTS.* Descent-Illegitimate Child may take as next of Kin to his Mother. - Miller v. Williams, [66 Ill. 91.] 1. Under the statutes of this state, an illegitimate person is recognized as the child of his mother, as regards the descent of property, and made capable of inheriting her property to the exclusion of all other persons, where she was unmarried, and he is enabled to transmit by descent his own property to her and her children. 2. Where an illegitimate person died seized of real estate, and his mother had died before him, leaving another illegitimate son, she never having been married, it was held that the surviving illegitimate son took the property by descent, one-half from his deceased brother, and, as the next of kin to the mother, the half that would have descended to her had she been living. Judicial Sales of Land-When may be made En Masse.-Van Valkenburg v. Trustees of Schools, etc., opinion by Scott, J. [66 Ill. 103.] When an officer charged with the sale of land under a decree of court, offers the premises in separate parcels and receives no bids, it is not error then to proceed to sell the same en masse. [Acc. Phelps v. Conover, 25 Ill. 309.] *Courtesy of Hon. Norman L. Freeman, of Springfield, Ill., Reporter. Legal News and Notes. -HON. NORMAN L. FREEMAN has been re-elected by the Judges of the Supreme Court of Illinois, reporter of that court, for the period of six years. -THE CHEAPEST YET.-The Daily Register says that the fifty-seventh volume of New York Court of Appeals reports has been issued by Banks & Brothers, the official publishers of these reports. The price is reduced to one dollar and ten cents per bound volume, which is uniform in size with previus volumes. son accused of violating the law in this matter, it will be necessary to prove only that he has received a fee, gain, or reward for the business or transaction in respect of, or in regard to which he has, directly or indirectly, drawn or prepared such instrument.' It is claimed by the Law Times, and by those who advocate this bill, that it is not meant for the protection of the legal profession, but of the public, and that it will operate to reduce litigation, and hence professional emoluments. This claim is really too thin, and we are surprised that a sensible journal should urge it. Lawyers are but men; and when did any set of men ever become so deeply imbued with a spirit of disinterested philanthropy as to propose a measure that would deplete their own pockets, for the sake of benefiting an indifferent public? -THE Saint Louis Republican, referring to our libel suit says: When it came to be law that a writ in a civil action issued by a New York city court, could claim and have effect on the person of a defendant a thousand miles beyond the jurisdiction of the court, we are at a loss to conjccture. A" Philadelphia lawyer" was ever supposed to know everything worth knowing, and of late years a New York lawyer has become more wonderful in wisdom than his Philadelphia brother; but the lawyers of both cities together would have some difficulty in demonstrating the marvellous virtue here claimed for the New York court's writ. Why the New York court presumed to issue it when it shows on its face that it was intended to opperate upon the persons of defendants beyond its jurisdiction, is a little curious. Does not the Supreme Court of New York city know where its jurisdiction ends? As the mountain will not go to Mahomet, we suggest that Mahomet come to the mountain; in other words, let the New York City Court hold an occasional term in Missouri for the trial of Saint Louis offenders." The Republican is mistaken. The court is a very respectable court, and does not want to extend its jurisdiction unduly, but the plaintiff's lawyer wants it to. No judge or clerk has yet awarded any process against us; but under the peculiar practice in that state lawyers issue writs of summons, and cases are prepared for trial outside the court. That's how it is. -OUR old friend the Forum, with whom we last year had a controversy about appropriating matter from this journal without giving due credit, is now at loggerheads with the Albany Law Journal. Our Albany neighbor criticised the Forum rather severely, but we feel obliged to say we think not unjustly, and the editor of the Forum was so indiscreet as to object thereto n an anonymous letter, upon which the Journal made some further disparaging remarks. And now the editor of the Forum publishes a card in the New York Daily Register, in his own vindication, which we think he had -OUR friends of the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL have been sued for libel by better not done. In the course of this card the editor of the the publishing house of James Cockcroft & Co., on account of a criticism Forum refers to a book called "De Laudicus," and also to "St. that recently appeared in their columns, on The History of Lawyers, AnGerman's Doctor and Student," and then, cient and Modern," published by that firm. They have our sympathy.-learning to misquote," ends by enquiring, 'with just enough of "Will the dull ass mend [The Legal Gazette. -THE members of the legal profession in Connecticut have formed a bar association, with the following officers: President, Origen S. Seymour, of Litchfield; vice-presidents, Charles R. Ingersoll, of New Haven; Richard D. Hubbard, of Hartford; treasurer, William Hamersley, of Hartford; secretary, John R. Buck, of Hartford; exécutive committee, John T. Wait, of Norwich, John S. Beach, of New Haven, Roger Averill, of Danbury, Henry Robinson, of Hartford, William T. Elmer, of Middletown. THE CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL has the good fortune of a libel suit. Having recently commented in pointed but just terms on the attempt of "James Cockcroft & Co." to palm off an edition of Sir William Forsyth's "Hortensius," under an other, and to borrow the popularity of Samuel Warren, to help along an edition of Stephen's" Adventures of an Attorney in Search of his pace by beatng?" and signs the card "Shakspeare." We are afraid the dull ass will not mend his pace by beating. We have done all we could to induce him to do so, but to no purpose. When a man's intel lect is so upset that he thinks he is Shakspeare, he must be put aside as incorrigible. We would advise him to quit journalism and go to fighting grasshoppers in Minnesota, if we thought it would be of any use; but we know it will not. When the New Zealander, seated upon the pinnacle of Dr. McLean's new building in Saint Louis, shall behold the ruins of the great bridge protruding from a marsh, while the Mississippi, shrivelled to a little stream, creaps along the American bluff, and the coyote chases the jackass rabbit over the ruins of the new custom house, the Forum will still be published, albeit in a dead language and a month behind time (for the purpose of geting in the latest cases), and without any visible improvement. SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, Editor. ST. LOUIS, FRIDAY, JULY 9, 1875. REPUBLICATION OF FOREIGN BOOKS.-The Boston Daily Advertiser, referring to the libel suit brought against the publishers of this journal by James Cockcroft & Co. of New York, says: "Whether they exceeded the legitimate limits of literary criticism or not is for the courts to decide. But the practice of republishing books not widely known on this side of the Atlantic, with nothing about them to indicate their true age and paternity, is a deception deserving of nothing but censure. It is to be hoped, in the interest of honest trade, that the suit will be brought to trial, in order that the rights of publishers, as well as the rights of critics, may be judicially settled." CHANGE OF VENUE IN MISSOURI.-We learn from a correspondent that the Supreme Court of Missouri has recently decided, in the case of Darly v. Stark, an interesting point with reference to changes of venue: An application was filed by plaintiff, praying a change of venue. The court adjourned without passing on the application and the cause was continued. At the next term, the application was presented and overruled, because it was filed at a previous term and not passed on at that term. The court, per Wagner, Judge, decide: 1. That when the cause was continued, the application for change of venue was continued with it. 2. That the fact that the application was filed at a previous term, was no sufficient ground for overruling it, and to overrule it was error. 3. That the judgment which was rendered after overruling such application, should be reversed and the cause remanded. JUDGE ADAMS.—When we learned that Judge Adams, who represents Boone County in the Missouri Constitutional Convention, had prepared and submitted to the convention a complete draft of a constitution, we recommended that the convention adopt it and go home. That recommendation was perhaps rash; but we learn that Judge Adams' draft of a constitution has been of great value to all of the committees of the convention, and has materially affected the work so far accomplished. Judge Adams is an able, cool-headed and persistent worker, and the influence exerted by him in a body comprising so many able men should be a source of just pride to him and his friends. We yield this recognition of his services in the convention the more cheerfully, since in a previous number, by quoting and commenting upon an amendment to the bill of rights introduced by him, which had been imperfectly printed in the reports of the daily press, we inadvertently did him great injustice. PHYSICIAN'S CHARGES-SERVICES OF A BROTHER.-A curious case will be found in 32 Legal Intelligencer, 218, in case of Moffet's Estate, Orphan's Court, Philadelphia, which was a controversy about the allowances of fees to a physician who had attended on his brother during his last illness. The facts and conclusions appear from the following extract from the opinion by Hanna, J.: That the claimant attended the decedent as one of his physicians, sufficiently appears from the testimony. This attendance continued during six or seven days prior to the death of decedent, and the claim is made for uninterrupted medical attendance and services during the entire time, both day and night, While the fact that the claimant was a brother of decedent would be immaterial in determining his compensation for purely professional services, yet, in connection with other testimony upon the subject, it has an important bearing. The testimony shows that the claimant, while he attended his brother, the decedent, did not devote all his time and attention to his patient, but that he acted as a member of the family, sleeping and taking his meals in the house, going out and returning at his pleasure; and though, no doubt, he rendered many kind, thoughtful and affectionate atttentions to his suffer. ing brother, yet they formed no part of his duty as a physician, and cannot, after the death of that brother, be made the basis of pecuniary compensation. made, and the number of operations performed by him, at the usual rates of The most the claimant is entitled to is, to be paid for the professional visits practicing physicians. This we are unable to determine from the testimony, as the number of visits, etc., are not stated. The remainder of his claim should not be allowed. So far, this exception is sustained, and as the report must be recommitted to the auditor, he is instructed to modify the award accordingly. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-"DUTIES OF TONNAGE."-An ordinance of the City of St. Paul, Minnesota, ordains "that every steamboat or other vessel which may land or anchor at or in front of any landing, wharf or pier within the limits of the city of St. Paul, shall for each and every trip be charged and shall pay the city of St. Paul the sum of four and a half cents per ton for each and every ton such steamboat or other vessel may register or measure: Provided, that no boat shall pay more than twenty dollars for each trip, and all boats may remain at the wharf, landing or pier three days from the date of her arrival without extra charge: Provided, said boat or other vessel does not interfere with the landing or departure of any other vessel." In the case of the Northwestern Union Packet Co. v. Saint Paul, recently determined by Mr. District Judge Nelson of the Federal District of Minnesota, Justice Miller concurring, though not sitting, it was held that, as this was a tax upon the privilege of the city's wharves, and as it was admeasured according to of arriving and departing from the port, and not for the use the registered tonnage of each vessel, it was a "duty of tonthe registered tonnage of each vessel, it was a "duty of tonnage" within the prohibition of the federal constitution, and hence void. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cannon v. New Orleans (20 Wall. 577), and the previous decisions of the same court on this question, there can be no doubt of the correctness of this the courtesy of a correspondent, but as it has appeared in decision. The above named case was received by us through the Chicago Legal News for July 3, we shall not print it, but we refer our readers to that journal for the opinion in full. Suicide and Life Insurance. The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently passed upon this question in the case of the Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Peters, appealed by the company from a lower court. The company resisted payment of the loss under the clause in the policy which makes it void "if the assured shall die by his own hand or act." The court says it is now too well settled to admit of question, that the clause is not to be construed as comprehending every possible case in which life is taken by the party's own act; for instance, all the author |