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render legislation too difficult and uncertain, and lead to litigation. It will not do, therefore, to impale the legislation of the state upon the sharp point of criticism, but we must give each title, as it comes before us, a reasonable interpretation, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. If the title fairly gives notice of the subject of the act, so as reasonably to lead to an enquiry into the body of the bill, it is all that is necessary. It need not be an index to the contents, as has often been said. But on the other hand it should not mislead or tend to avert enquiry into the contents, as was held in the case of The Union Passenger Railway Co., decided at Philadelphia in 1873. In view of this current of decision we cannot say that this title is too vague or is misleading. It substantially, though without particularity, describes the subject of the act and its purpose."

Vendor and Vendee-Parol Agreement that Vendor shall Convey to a Third Person the Land in case he pays the Purchase

Money-Mortgage-Statute of Frauds.-Payne v. Patterson, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, October and November Terms, 1874. [5 Pittsb. L. J. (N. S.) 66.] McClane, the owner of land, and Patterson who was about to become the vendee and receive a deed therefor, agreed by parol with Payne, that if he (Payne) paid the amount of the purchase-money and interest, Patterson should convey to him. In an action by Payne to recover a portion of the money received by Patterson on a subsequent sale of the land by him to Payne, to which the Statute of Frauds was pleaded, Held, that Patterson held

the land neither as a trustee nor as a mortagee.

-SOME young lawyers and law students in New York city, have organized what is called "The Commonwealth," a society for improvement in legislative and forensic debate. It has two departments; the one judicial, the other, legislative. The former consists of a court with judges and other officers; the latter, of a legislature, with the proper officers. The editor of the Daily Register has been chiefly instrumental in its organization.

-BOTH Count Von Arnim and the Public Prosecutor are dissatisfied with the judgment of the court, and have appealed to the Kammergericht. Meantime, it having transpired that some enterprising newspaper man got hold of the twenty lithographed pages which embraced the judgment of the court before it was published, Herr Reich, president of the court, has been "disciplined." And yet some people say America is not a free country.

-HON. FULTON ANDERSON, of Mississippi, died in Baltimore during the

night of the 27th ult., of general paralysis, after a protracted illness of five years. Mr. Anderson ranked as a jurist with the Prentisses, the Yergers, the

Poindexters, the Sharkeys and the Gaines, who elevated the bar of Mississippi of the late Hon. George S. Yerger, known throughout the country as the to a high point of excellence. In early life he married the eldest daughter great and good layman." He was the son of the late William E. Anderson, a distinguished jurist of Tennessee. He died in the fifty-first year of hi age.-[New York Herald.]

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-IT will be remembered that the Court of Appeals of New York, decided in the Tilton-Beecher case that the granting or refusing of a bill of particulars, in an action for criminal conversation, is a matter of discretion with the trial court.

Whereupon Mr. Beecher's counsel renewed their application, and an order for a bill of particulars was granted by Judge McCue of the Brooklyn City Court, in which the suit is pending. This order has now been reversed by Judges Neilson and Reynolds, on the ground, as we understand it, that it was too particular. Meantime Tilton cannot understand what Beecher is driving at; for Tilton thinks Beecher is the man that knows all the particulars. The trial is now in progress.

Upon the question whether the transaction made Patterson a mortagee, the court said: It will be observed that there was no agreement to re-convey to McClane. It was that if Payne paid the amount of the purchase-money and interest, Patterson should convey to him. It was not conditional between the grantor and grantee. Under no circumstance was it to revert to the grantor. It was not conditional with the only person who had any interest to convey. It was not a mortagage as to McClane, and could not be as to Payne, to whom no return could be made. A mortgage is a defeasible deed. The defeasance is essential to the creation of every mortgage, whether it be evidenced by writing in, or separate from, the mortgage, or whether it be es- -SOME two years ago Carl Vogt, a subject of the King of Prussia, comtablished by parol, it must nevertheless exist. The conditional right of res- mitted a heinous murder in Belgium, and fled to the United States. At that toration in the mortgagor must have been created. Without a valid agreetime there was no extradition treaty between our government and Belgium, but ment which binds the grantee to reconvey or yield up to the grantor when his surrender was demanded by the government of Prussia, on the ground that the conditions shall have been performed, it lacks the elements essentially it had the right to bring back to its own territory one of its subjects who was necessary to make it a mortgage. This is fatal to the plaintiff's case. Penn- charged with having committed a crime in any part of the world. To this sylvania Life Insurance Company v. Austin, 6 Wright, 257. The case of demand our government refused to accede. Since that time a treaty of exMaffitt's Adm'rs.v. Rynd et al, 19 P. F. Smith, 380, is not in conflict with this tradition has been established between the United States and Belgium, and view. The foundation of the right of action in that case rested on a written now Vogt is again arrested and his extradition demanded under this treaty. agreement by which the money was raised for the purchase of the land in Out of this demand grows the important question, which may have to be dequestion for the use of Lamb. It expressly provided that on the payment termined by our Department of State, or possibly, by some of our State or of the advances and the other indebtedness from Lamb to them, they would Federal judges under a writ of hapeas corpus, whether treaties of the United convey to Lamb's wife. Maffitt & Old took a conveyance of the land States are " laws" within the meaning of the prohibition of the constitution of with full knowledge of this agreement, and under a promise to carry it out the United States against the passage of ex post facto laws. If so, a treaty in good faith." of extradition with a foreign power, is, so far as it operates retrospectively upon crimes already committed, null and void. The question is one of great interest, and the profession would, doubtless, much rather see it determined by an able federal judge than by the secretary of state under the advice of the present attorney-general.

Legal News and Notes.

-WE learn from an authentic source that the new rules in bankruptcy will be promulgated by the judges of the supreme court on Monday next.

-HON. CHAS. W. TANKERSLEY, formerly speaker of the house at Little Rock, Ark., has removed to Denver, Col., and engaged in the practice of law n that city. We wish him much success in his new field of operations.

-KING KALAKAUA does something smack. He has a kind of taste On his first theatrical night in New York city, it was arranged that he should attend Booth's theater, but he betook himself to the Black Crook.

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SOME time since we acquainted our readers with the fact, that Dr. Kenealy had been disbenched" by his brethren of Gray's Inn, and deprived of his dinner. We omitted to state, however, while it was a matter of news, that he

had been disbarred.

—GEN. LESLIE COMBS, of Kentucky, was recently summoned to recognize the handwriting of a Mr. Sudduth, who was a surveyor of sixty years ago. He knew the man and knew the handwriting. The case will probably be decided by his testimony. The case involves some 3,500 acres of land adjacent to the Blue Grass region.

-IT IS time for some enterprising legal author to write a book on the law of mother-in-laws. Here is a fresh item: An Indianapolis mother-in-law pursuaded her daughter to quit her husband and get a divorce from him. The husband brought suit against the mother-in-law for forty thousand dollars damages, and a jury have awarded him five hundred. If the mother-in-law had been young and good looking he wouldn't have got anything. But the verdict affected the divorced wife more than the mother-in-law. The latter hearing of it, became insane.

-IN the American reports there are a number of criminal cases which discuss the order in which counsel shall address the jury, and the right of final reply. In the German court which has just tried Count Von Arnim, they have this curious custom : The public prosecutor makes immediate reply to each of the separate speeches for the defence. Such an officer must needs be a ready orator to encounter in detail the powerful talent which a rich and discounsel was Herr Von Holtzendorff, the famous professor of law at Munich, tinguished prisoner could summon to his aid. Thus, among Von Arnim's horn, whose rare talents had led to his being brought all the way from Posen who spoke for two hours with great vigor and acumen; and also Herr Dockto take part in this great trial. Herr Dockhorn must have been a hard man to grapple with in off-hand debate; for, in describing the commencement of his speech, it is said that he "got into the saddle like a Cossack breaking forth in the rear of heavy professional artillery." When Hannibal bivouaced with his army under the walls of Rome, the senate sent a messenger to inform him that the ground on which he had pitched his tent, had been that day sold at auction. With the same sublime assurance, Herr Dockhorn commenced his speech, as follows: "The professor having dug the trenches with wonderful effect, I am going to burn some of the outlying forts of the public prosecutor. The moment those forts are down, we shall perceive that the main points of the charge, which I may compare to the citadel, are nothing but painted sidescenes, and have no reality at all." Herr Tessendorff, the public prosecutor, seems to have done himself great credit by the self-possession and disciplined logic with which he met those great antagonists.

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SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON,

Editor.

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ST. LOUIS, FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1875.

PUBLICATION OF LEGAL NOTICES.-The Albany Law Journal does not seem quite satisfied with the propriety of the measure recently approved by Governor Dix, which requires all legal advertisements to be inserted in a law journal to be designated by the judges. If Governor Dix's course, in approving the bill, needs any vindication, it will be found in his own language in a private letter written in regard to the matter on the 5th of December. He uses the following language, the Italics being ours:

I am aware that the judges are unanimous, and the bar nearly so, in favor of the bill, and that the publication of legal notices provided for by this bill is very desirable. Wherever more than one notice or advertisement in any legal proceeding is required, one would be published in the daily law journal which the judges named in the bill should designate. If only one notice or advertisement is required, it would be published in the designated journal. There is no doubt that such a publication would put an end to the gross frauds which are not unfrequently perpetrated by giving legal notices and advertisements to obscure papers for the purpose of concealing them from the parties interested. By having one journal in which every such notice or advertisement would appear, parties to legal proceedings would always know where to look for it. The cases are numerous in which such publication is required to be made in three or four newspapers, and it is right that one notice or advertisement should be made where it can always with certainty be found.

DEPOSITIONS BEFORE NOTARIES-WITNESS REFUSING TO TESTIFY ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO "SUIT PENDING."-We publish elsewhere an interesting opinion of Mr. Justice Lewis, of the Supreme Court of Missouri, in ex parte Munford, expounding the statute of Missouri, which provides for the taking of depositions to be used conditionally in "suits pending." As the statutes of several other states have provisions similar to that of Missouri, the case has more than a local interest. The petitioner, being summoned before a notary public, before whom a deposition in a certain suit was being taken, refused to testify, on the ground that there was no suit pending, and was by the notary committed to jail. It appeared that a demurrer had been interposed to the petition in the suit and sustained; that the plaintiff had been allowed thirty days in which to amend, and that at the time the witness was summoned before the notary, the amended petition had not been filed; and it was hence urged that as there was no valid petition in court, there was no suit "pending," within the meaning of the statute, which provides that "any party to a suit pending in any court in this state, may obtain the deposition of any witness to be used in such suit conditionally." Wagn. Stat. 522, § 1. But the learned judge ruled otherwise, and the witness was remanded to jail. He quotes in support of this view, Brown v. Foss, 16 Maine, 257, in which a similar statute received a similar exposition in a still stronger case.

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done this, the company filed a libel for salvage against a part of the cargo of the Colima. The bills of lading contained a provision that the vessel should not be liable "for accidents, loss and damage from machinery, boilers and steam, or from accidents or perils of the seas, or of land and rivers, or of sail or steam navigation, of whatever kind or nature soever." It was held on the authority of the Miranda, 3 L. R. Adm. 561, 1. That, although these stipulations would not avail to exonerate the carrier from liability for damages caused by his actual negligence; yet they must exempt him from liability for the consequences of a secret defect which no diligence could discover or guard against, and where the previous history of the vessel afforded the strongest grounds for the belief that such defects could not exist.

2. That the libellants being thus found not to be liable as carriers for the consequences of the accidents to the machinery they are entitled to claim as salvors a reasonable compensation for their service to the cargo.

We cannot perceive upon what sound principles this case can be supported. It cannot be possible that a carrier is entitled to additional compensation for doing no more than what it was his duty under his contract to do. To say that because he would not have been liable for any losses happening from the breaking of the propeller, through a latent defect, he is therefore entitled to salvage for saving the goods, is a non sequitur; because it omits to take into consideration the fact that after the accident occurred, the carrier was still under obligations to save the goods if he could, without incurring extraordinary risk in order to do so. According to the facts, as detailed by Mr. District Judge Hoffman, the ship performing the salvage incurred thereby no extraordinary peril. The Pacific Mail Steamship Company, therefore, did no more than their duty under their contract, and hence were not entitled to compensation. The proposition of the learned judge might be reversed, and it might well be said that if the agents and servants of the company had negligently suf fered the Colima to become a wreck after the breaking of her propeller, her owners would have been liable as carriers; and since they would have been liable as carriers, they are not entitled to salvage. Independently of these considerations, strong reasons of public policy appear to point to the conclusion that a carrier ought not to be entitled to salvage in any case for saving goods imperiled in one of his own vessels.

Judge Benedict's Case.

We have heretofore (1 CENT. L. J 591) apprised our readers of the nature of a suit which had been brought by Edward Lange, against Mr. District Judge Benedict, of the Eastern District of New York, for false imprisonment. It will not, therefore, again be necessary for us to repeat the facts of the

SALVAGE TO THE Owner of a Distressed Vessel.-In the Pacific Mail Steamship Company v. Ten Bales of Gunny Bags, United States District Court, District of California, Hoffman, J. [8 Pac. L. R., 155.], the Pacific Mail Steam-case; but we recur to it, at this time, for the purpose of noting ship Company's steamship Colima, broke her propeller at sea, by reason of a latent defect which could not have been detected by any tests known to mechanics, and was towed into port by another vessel belonging to the same company. Having

the fact that Judge Van Brunt of the state court, has overruled the demurrer to the petition, thus holding that an action will lie in one of the state courts against a judge of a federal court, for sentencing a person to imprisonment with

out jurisdiction. In overruling the demurrer, Judge Van quiesced in. For decisions upholding the summary proceedBrunt delivered a written opinion, in which, according to a ings which have been instituted for the collection of the New York paper, he says, in answer to the contention, that public revenue, see the following: McCarroll v. Weaks, 2 the second sentence was lawful, he deems it indecorous to Tenn. 215; State v. Allen, 2 McCord, 56; Harris v. Wood, attempt to review a decision of the highest judicial tribunal | 6 Monr. 643; Doe v. Deavors, 11 Ga. 79; Morton v. Reeds, in the land (ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163), and thereupon- 6 Mo. 64; Bergen v. Clarkson, 1 Halst. 352; Livingston v. assuming the second sentence to be without authority-he discusses the other questions raised on the demurrer. "There is no principle," he says, "which is better settled than that no judge of a court of record is liable to action for a judicial act, although in many of the cases distinctions are made between the liabilities of judges holding courts of limited jurisdiction and superior or general jurisdiction." For the purpose of this demurrer he does not consider it necessary, however, to determine whether the United States Court was of a limited or general jurisdiction. After citing various opinions, he concludes that in this case the plaintiff having been convicted and suffered one of the alternate punishments to which alone the law subjects him, his sentence to be imprisoned for an offence which he had already expiated, was without authority and a violation of the common law and the constitution.

Furthermore, after a careful examination of the authorities, he is of opinion that a judge of a court of general jurisdiction, who attempts to enforce a judgment which he knows to have been satisfied, makes himself liable in an action. The demurrer is therefore overruled, with leave to the defendant to answer on payment of costs.

Moore, 7 Pet. 469; In Re New York Schools, 31 N. Y. 574; Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 437; Willard v. Weatherbee, 4 N. H. 118. "If," said the Supreme Court of Tennessee in McCarroll v. Weaks,supra, “the government were necessitated to take the cautious and tedious steps of the common law, in giving personal notice, making up regular pleadings, and having a trial by jury, judgment and execution, it would cease to exist for want of money to carry on its operations; loss of credit and a total extinction of national faith, the basis of all regular governments, must be the inevitable result."

Whether Mr. Justice Simrall is correct in classifying proceedings to sell land for taxes, as proceedings in personam, may, perhaps, admit of question; but as it is a question which concerns merely the propriety of a definition, we shall not discuss it. Whilst we are not entirely satisfied with the reasoning of the learned justice, we presume that the result which the court arrive at will meet with general satisfaction. As we understand the case, it amounts simply to an affirmance of the principle that it is beyond the power of the legislature to authorize a proceeding whereby a man's land is sold for taxes without notice. For such a notice as that authorized by the statute in question-an advertisement published in a news

"Due Process of Law"-When Denial of Personal paper at the seat of government of the state, and not in a

Notice in Civil Actions is Unconstitutional.

We publish in another place a very interesting opinion of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, by Mr. Justice Simrall, which holds that a statute which authorized the sale of lands in certain counties, for taxes to build levees, without personal notice to the owners of the land, but which provided for the publication of notice in a newspaper published at Jackson, and which further provided that "neither the state nor any party, person or corporation interested therein, be made defendant by name, designation or description," is unconstitutional, being in conflict with those clauses of the Mississippi bill of rights which prohibit the deprivation of property without "due process of law" or contrary to "due course of law." In other words, it holds, as we understand it, that it is incompetent for the legislature to provide, in a statute prescribing a judicial proceeding for the sale of land for taxes, that resident land-holders, whose names and places of residence are known, shall be proceeded against by the publication of a general notice, directed to a certain class of individuals, and not designating the separate land-holders by name. We take it that the court does not intend to hold that it would be incompetent for the legislature to authorize a proceeding by constructive notice, even against residents of the county in which the land lies, where the advertisement separately sets out and adequately describes each tract or parcel of land proceeded against, and designates the owner by name. Such a conclusion would impugn the universal course of proceeding in enforcing the payment of taxes in this country, and would be without support in any decision of which we have knowledge. We believe that the contrary principle has been established wherever it has been contested, and is now universally ac

paper published in any of the counties in which were situated the lands upon which the tax had been levied; a notice. directed merely to a class of persons, which neither mentioned by name any land-owner charged with being indebted for taxes nor described any tract of land as to which there was an alleged delinquency ;-was manifestly equivalent to no notice at all, and manifestly could not be the foundation of any proceeding judicial in its nature, in which notice, actual or constructive, is required. That it is beyond the power of the legislature to authorize a proceeding by which land is sold for taxes without any notice at all, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri in a very satisfactory opinion by Judge Holmes in Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162, 169. The same view was enforced by the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi in 1860, in an opinion of great vigor delivered by Judge Harris, in the case of Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 424, 433, against views of Handy, J., who dissented. The act of the legislature, which was overthrown in this last case, went so far as to provide for the forfeiture to the state of land for taxes simply on the return, under oath, of a delinquent list by the tax collector, without any judicial proceeding whatever. In the opinion of the court, Harris, J., eloquently observed: "It is for those who claim to derive a right under a power so extraordinary, to inform us whence it is derived and where it may be found; or in what moment of folly or infatuation, an intelligent people, desiring rational liberty, cautious of restraint and jealous of power, have thus abandoned one of the cardinal rights for the protection of which free governments are instituted."

-LACEY'S Railway Digest, a most complete compendium of railway law, will be out in a few days.

To Correspondents.

should never take up his pen to write upon legal subjects. He lacks even the most essential quality of a good digester.

have decided, than what any private individual may think. An unusual pressure of work during the past month has Still we hold it to be not only the privilege, but also the obliged us to defer attending to a number of queries, and duty, of law-writers to criticise, without hesitation, judicial lack of space has obliged us to hold over several valuable com- decisions; and he who has not the ability to conduct a jumunications. If correspondents do not get letters explaining | dicious discussion of this kind, from an original point of view, the causes of such inattention and delay, we beg them to consider the circumstances under which an editor labors, the multitude of things which press upon his attention, and the great number of private letters he is obliged to write each day in addition to his other labors. It has sometimes happened that we have omitted to acknowlege the reception of contributions. Should this again occur, correspondents will please understand that their contributions are accepted and will be published whenever our space will permit. We will always return contributions which we are unable to use, if the writer so requests. It is unnecessary to state that we shall adhere to a rule which journalists have found necessary for their own protection-not to notice anonymous communications.

Some Recent Decisions in Bankruptcy. SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURT UNDER SECTION 2.

Stickney, Assignee, v. Wilt (U. S. Supreme Court, 11 N. B. R. 97), affirms the cases of Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wall. 72; Smith v. Mason, Ibid. 419; Marshall v. Knox, 16 Ibid. 556, and Coit v. Robinson, 19 Ibid. 274, as to construction of second section of bankrupt act of 1867. The assignee obtained a decree of the district court declaring certain liens claimed by Wilt upon the lands of the bankrupt, inoperative as security. Wilt filed his petition for review under the first clause of section 2d of the bankrupt act, in the circuit court, and the assignee filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The circuit court overruled the plea to the jurisdiction, and reversed the decree of the district court, whereupon the assignee appealed to the supreme court. The supreme court held that this case did not fall within the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the circuit court by the first clause of said section 2d, and hence that the circuit court acted without jurisdiction in the premises. But the supreme court, following the decisions mentioned above, further held that there was no appeal from the decree of the circuit court, rendered in a petition of review in such cases, and hence that the supreme court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits of the case.

In sending us opinions of courts for publication, correspondents should remember that we shall endeavor, during the coming year, to publish in full only such decisions as are novel, important and of general interest. By analyzing the meaning of the words which we have italicised, it will be seen that a decision may be novel, and yet neither important nor of general interest. Again, it may be both novel and important, and yet of very little interest outside of the state in which it it is rendered. We need not remind correspondents that our space will not permit us to publish decisions which relate merely to questions of local practice, or which involve only an exposition of local statutes which do not exist in other states. It must not be thought, however, that because a decision relates to a question purely statutory, it may not be of general interest. The number of cases in the reports of the various American courts which relate to questions govInstead, however, of dismissing the appeal from the circuit erned by statute, now greatly exceeds those which relate to court, which would have left in full force a decree of the cirwhat is inaptly termed the unwritten law. Besides, there is cuit court rendered without jurisdiction, reversing the decree such a kinship between the leading statutes of the different of the district court which had jurisdiction, the supreme states that discussions upon the statutes of one state are con- court, admitting its own want of jurisdiction, .reversed the stantly quoted as pursuasive authority in expounding similar decree of the circuit court, and remanded the cause, with statutes in other states. Thus, discussions relating to me- direction to dismiss the petition for review for want of jurischanics' liens, homestead and exemption laws, the discharge diction. The result is, to leave Wilt where the decree of the of sureties by creditors delay after notice, the degrees of district court left him, except that he has obtained by some homicide, taking land for the construction of works of pub-years of litigation the following consolatory paragraph in the

lic utility, the police of railways, taxation and tax titles, and many other subjects that might be named, which rest entirely upon statutory enactments, may possess a very general interest, by reason of the fact that most, if not all the states, have statutes on those subjects.

Correspondents who favor us with original articles, should remember that the aim of a weekly law journal is practical usefulness; and whilst we desire to make the JOURNAL, to some extent, an organ of enlightened opinion; yet, as a general rule, long discussions of questions not practical in their character, are not suited to our columns. In discussing questions which have been passed upon by the courts, an intelligent presentation and judicious criticism of adjudicated cases, will be, we believe, most acceptable to our readers. We presume that correspondents will not take offence if we give them the advice which several of our readers have not hesitated to give us, that lawyers are much more concerned to know what the courts

opinion pronounced by Mr. Justice Clifford :

Unable to refer the appellee to any legal remedy, as matter of right under the present pleadings, it seems to be proper, in the judgment of the whole court, to suggest that it may be that the district court will grant a review of the decree rendered in that court, if a proper application is presented for that purpose, which would lay the foundation, if it be granted, in case of an adverse decision upon the merits of the case, for a regular appeal to the circuit court.

With such a suggestion from the supreme court, it is hardly probable that the district court will refuse a rehearing of the cause, and quite as improbable that either party will submit to the decision of the district court upon the re-hearing. We may expect, some years hence, again to find this case in the reports of the supreme court. Meanwhile, creditors of the bankrupt await their dividends, or, it may be, contribute funds towards the prosecution of this litigation.

The uncertainty of section 2d of the bankrupt act has resulted in many delays, and much expense in the administra

tion of bankrupt estates. It would seem, however, that there would now be no reasonable excuse, in the light of the foregoing decisions, for counsel mistaking their remedy. Had Wilt appealed from the decree of the district court, instead of seeking his redress by writ of review, his law-suit would now be at an end.

COMPOSITIONS.

In re Gilday, 11 N. B. R. 108. In this case Judge Blatchford construes the composition clause of the act of June 22, 1874, so as to exclude creditors, whose debts do not exceed fifty dollars each, from the whole number of creditors, in determining whether two-thirds in number of the creditors have signed the composition. The same point was ruled by Krekel, J., in the case of Wald & Aehle, 1 CENT. LAW JOUR. 531.

upon all the lands in those counties until 1879, for that purpose, which was a lien upon the land. To enforce collection, the collector was authorized, on the second Monday in April, to sell the lands of delinquents for cash, and on the failure of other persons

to bid the amount due, then the lands should be struck off to the treasurer of the board. From year to year a large number of sales were made to the treasurer, many of which lands are still held as the property of the board.

EXAMINATION OF BANKRUPT―RIGHT OF BANKRUPT TO BE FUR- founded upon the petitions and exhibits and notice, are invalid,

THER EXAMINED IN HIS OWN BEHALF.

The prayer of the bill is, that the court will decree a sale of the lands, or such parts and parcels thereof as may be necessary to pay the amount of taxes stated to be due thereon, etc., under the act of April, 1872. No notice of the suit to sell the delinquent lands was required, except a general publication in a newspaper, published at Jackson, Mississippi. The act further provided that neither " "the state or any party, person or corporation interested therein, be made defendants by name, designation or description.” It is insisted by the plaintiff in error, that the decrees of sale because it is an effort to deprive them of property without due process of law." And that the remedy pursued is not according to "due course of law." Sec. 2, Art. 1 Const. of Miss, and Sec. 28. The original of the grand principle embodied in the second section 1st Art. of the Constitution, is in the Magna Charta, and was designed primarily to shield persons and their property from the invasions of the prerogative and arbitrary power of the King. The great charter, and subsequently the American constitutions, declare the fundamental principle of the absolute involability of life, liberty and property against the encroachments of arbitrary power, and forbid a deprivation of either, by any form of power or authority, except it be as in Magna Charta," per legale judiConstitutional Right of Personal Notice in Civil | cium parium snorum, vel per legem terrae," or, as written in some of the constitutions, "by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers ;" and in others due process of law," and "due course of N. G. D. BROWN v. BOARD OF LEVEE COMMISSIONERS. law," and "according to the law of the land."

In re Noyes, Ibid. 112. Judge Lowell overrules Scofield v. Morehead, 2 N. B. R. 1, and Re Mealy, Ibid, 128; and holds that a bankrupt, under examination, has the right to be crossexamined, or further examined in his own behalf, so far as may be necessary to explain or qualify any matters brought out in the direct examination, which may seem to bear unfavorably upon his conduct or dealings, or which are obscure; and that the costs of such cross-examinations are not taxable against the bankrupt. E. T. A.

Actions.

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Mr. Webster gave an exposition of the meaning of the words law of the land," and "due process of law," in his argument in the Dartmouth College case, reported in 4th Wheaton, which has secured the sanction of the courts. 'By the law of the land, is most clearly intended the general law, which hears before it condems-which proceeds upon enquiry and renders judgment only

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1. Jurisdiction. It is essential to the validity of a judgment, or decree, that the after trial. It means that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property under the protection of general rules which gov

court should have jurisdiction.

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2. Judgment Suits in Rem.-The "thing" must be subject to the cognizance of ern society." Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 140; Griffin v.

the court, and amenable to its decree.

3. Judgment Suits in Personam.-The right to adjudicate, so as to conclude the defendant, is conferred by notice actual or constructive, according to a prescribed formula.

4. Power of Legislature over Process.—The provision of the bill of rights," that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law," inhibits the legislature from dispensing with personal service, where it is practicable, and has been usual under the general law. It does not take from the legislature power to amend the law and change the formula of remedies-provided the fundamental right of personal notice, actual or constructive, in personal suits, is not taken away.

5 Case in Judgment. The statute authorizing the suit, prescribing the mode of procedure, and the decree of sale, are condemned as unconstitutional, because it dispenses with personal notice, when the defendants, or many of them, were residents of the county and state, and amenable to such process; because the legislature attempted to change a suit, which according to the "law of the land," was personal into a proceeding in rem, so as to dispense with personal notice; because the defendants had, or may have had, diverse and independent interests in the land, conflicting with each other and the complainants, and were so numerous that it would be impracticable to unite them in one suit, and adjudicate the numerous collateral controversies that might arise; because the statute and suit under it are unusual, extraordinary, and without precedent, legislative or judicial, in the history of the state.

Mr. Justice SIMRALL delivered the opinion of the court. This was a suit in chancery, brought by the Board of Levee Commissioners, under the provisions of an act of the legislature, passed in April, 1872. In 1865 the complainant was created a body corporate, "for the purpose of rebuilding, strengthening, or elevating the old levees in the counties of Bolivar, Washington and Issaquena," and by the terms of the act, an annual tax was imposed

Dogan & Martin, 48 Miss. 21.

These terms," law of the land," "due course of law," " due process of law," "do not mean the general body of laws, common and statute," as it was at the time the constitution took effect. For that would seem to deny to the legislature the power to alter, change or amend the law.

Yet we know it is every day's practice for the law-making department of the government, to repeal old laws, enact new and change remedies. The principle does not demand that the laws existing at any point of time shall be irrepearable, or that any forms of remedies shall necessarily continue. It refers to certain fundamental rights, which that system of jurisprudence, of which ours is a derivation, has always recognized. If any of these are disregarded, in the proceedings by which a person is condemned to the loss of life, liberty, or property, then the deprivation has not been by due course of law."

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Some subjects are cognizable in one court, and others in another. What would be due process of law in che proceeding, might not be in another.

The nature of the suit, and how the judgment will operate, and upon what, must be looked at in determining, whether the proceeding has been conducted according to due process of law. In our system there have existed remedies which affect the person— suits inter partes-remedies which are of a mixed nature, touching

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