United States v. Shrewsbury, opinion by Swayne, J. 1. Where a contract for the transportation of army supplies, provided, that upon their arrival at their destination, a board of survey should be called to examine their quality and condition, and in case of loss, deficiency or damage, to investigate the facts, assess the amount of loss or injury, and state whether it was attributed to neglect or to the want of care on the part of the contractor, or to causes beyond his control, deficiencies to be charged to the contractor, the following was held to be a sufficient finding: "Packages all correct and in good order, with the exception of nine sacks of corn, deficient; weight agreeing with the B. L. (bill of lading) with the exception of four thousand two hundred and forty (4240) pounds of corn deficient." The board is presumed to have made the investigation necessary to enable them to report their conclusions. 2. Where the contractor raised no objections when the reports were made, and did not raise any until the time of payment, months afterward, when, though it would have been difficult or impossible for the government to reinvestigate the matter properly and obtain the necessary evidence to support its findings; he gave notice that he should claim readjustment and full payment, he was held to have waived any exception which he might have taken at the proper time, and to have been finally concluded when the payments were made. Construction of Guarantee - Cattle-Reversals of Judgment -First National Bank of Decatur v. Home Savings Bank of St. Louis, opinion by Davis, J. 1. Where a letter of credit guarantees drafts on shipments of cattle, there can be no recovery if the shipments are of anything else. The guarantee is to be technically construed. 2. The term "cattle comprises the different kinds of stock used for food, including hogs. See Rex v. Chappell, Russ. & Ry. Cr. Cas. 77; Rex v. Whitney, I Moody Cr. Cas. 3; Paty's Case. 2 W. Black, 721; Rex v. Mott, 2 East Pl. Cr. 1074-6. 3. To warrant the reversal of a judgment there must not only be error in the record, but such as may have wrought injury to the party complaining. Brobst v. Brock, 10 Wall. 519. The French Franc and the English Sovereign.-Collector Arthur v. Richard, opinion by Bradley, J. The French franc is worth nineteen cents and three mills of United States money. The mode of computing the value of foreign coin is fixed by an act of March 3, 1873 (17 Stat. at Large, P. 602), which also fixes the value of the English sovereign at four dollars, eightysix cents and six and a half mills. 244; Hall v. Wiles, 2 Id. 194. 2. An invention to be patentable must be new and of practical utility. Everything within the domain of the conception belongs to him who conceived it. The machine, process or product is but its material reflex and embodiment. A new idea. engrafted upon an old invention, but distinct from, and an improvement upon the conception which preceded it, is patentable. The prior patentee can not use it without the consent of the improver, and the latter can not use the original invention without the consent of the former. But a mere carrying forward, or new or more extended application of the original thought, a change only in form, proportions or degree, the substitution of equivalents doing substantially the same thing in the same way, by substantially the same means with better results, is not such invention as will sustain a patent. This is so also whether what preceded was covered by a patent, or rested only in public knowledge and use. In neither case can there be an invasion of such domain, and an appropriation of anything found there. In one case, everything belongs to the prior patentee; in the other, to the public at large. Briefs. [Members of the profession who send us briefs for notice will confer a great favor by giving their address, and by enclosing a brief statement of the points argued. This will save us much labor, avoid the danger of our making mistakes, and render it possible for us to notice briefs when we might not otherwise have time to do so. As it is sometimes convenient for us to cut extracts out of briefs, and as we desire to preserve all good briefs for binding, we should take it as a favor if those who send us briefs would enclose two copies.-Ed C. L. J.] [The following briefs, sent to us by their authors, have been condensed for our columns through the kindness of JAMES HAYWARD, Esq., of the Saint Louis bar. Printed copies of them, respectively, may be procured by addressing the persons named below.] Where the same Persons are Officers of Two Corporations, Notes Drawn by them against One not Valid to Pay Debts of the other.-Rahm v. King Iron Bridge Works of Topeka, Kansas Supreme Court of Kansas. Argument for defendant in error. Plaintiff in error alleges that the defendant made two notes, each endorsed to Coleman, Rahm & Co., and signed by one Mills as vice-president of the defendant, Eminent Domain.-Secombe v. Railway Company, opinion by Davis, Defendant argues that said notes are not the notes of defendant, and do not J. 1. There is no limitation upon the legislative power of exercising the right purport to be; and that extrinsic evidence is not competent to show the conof eminent domain, if the purpose is public and just compensation is paid or trary. It appears that said notes were made to pay debts of the King Bridge tendered to the owner for the property taken. Weir v. St. Paul, Stillwater and Company of Iola, and signed by said Mills as president Defendant claims, Taylor's Falls R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155; Langford v. Com'rs of Ramsey that, though Mills was an officer in each company, he can not without authorCounty, 16 Minn, 375. 2. A regular judgment of condemnation of land un-ity charge one corporation with the debts of the other. [Address Alfred der the power of eminent domain, and by a court charged with a special statutory jurisdiction, supported by the facts, is no more subject to impeachment in a collateral proceeding than the judgment of any other court of exclusive jurisdiction. i Redf. Rys. 5th Ed. 271. 3. The unauthorized occupation of land by a railway company, is a trespass for which the company is liable to those who own the land at the time, but does not preclude them from taking subsequent legal measures to have the land condemned for their use. Ennis, Esq., Topeka, Kansas.] Alimony given by Divorce Court not Annulled by Subsequent Marriage.-C. P. Brenner, Appellant, v. Dorothea Brenner, et al., Respondent, in the Supreme Court of Indiana. Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1843, and in March, 1871, were divorced, $1800 alimony being decreed, to be paid in instalments. In May, 1871, they were again married; and in May, 1872, plaintiff brought action for divorce, and it was granted to his wife with $1400 as alimony. At the second divorce only $300 of the first alimony had been paid. In March, 1873, plaintiff moved for an injunction against any claim of the $1,500 still due, and his motion was overruled. Appellant claims that the first judgment for the alimony is null and void— 1st, because of the second divorce and decree; 2d, because of the full investigation into his ability to pay alimony in the second suit; 3rd, by reason of the second marriage; 4th, because of appellee's agreement to release the first judgment in consideration of the second marriage. Patent Law-Infringement -Charge of Profits to Party Guilty of Infringement.- Mason v. Graham, opinion by Strong, J. 1. A charge of infringement upon a patent will be sustained by proof that the object is the same and the means of effecting it substantially the same in both inventions. 2. Where one has infringed upon the rights of a patentee, by manufacturing and selling an improvement upon the article patented, allowance should be made in charging him with his profits, for the reduction in the cost of manufacture resulting from his improvement. The complainant is not entitled to the profits resulting from the defendant's own invention. 3. Where the profits from the sale of an infringing device are mingled with the profits of the sale of the invention to which it is attached, the measure of the profits result-way referring to the former; that the first alimony was in lieu of any interest ing from the device, can be better ascertained from sales of the device separately, than from an estimate of a rateable proportion of all the profits, obtained on the assumption that the cost of the whole machine is to the cost of the device, as the ascertained profits of the whole are to the profits upon the device alone. Infringements-What is Not Patentable.-Smith v. Nichols, opinion by Swayne, J. 1. One who sues for the infringement of his patent, may file his disclaimer to any specific part of the invention after the beginning of his suit as well as before, but the judge must see that the defendant is not injuriously surprised. The question of the delay will be open for consideration and the complainant can recover no costs. Tuck v. Bramhill, 6 Blatch. 104; Silsby v. Foote, 14 How. 220; Dolan v. Dolan, 3 Fisher, 197; Taylor v. Archer, 8 Blatch. 315; Myers v. Frame, Id. 446; Guyon v. Serril, 1 Blatch. The appellee argues that each judgment was distinct from the other, there being two seperate causes of action, followed by two decrees, the second in no the wife had in her husband's property at that time, and so of the second decree; that the first alimony became the personal property of the wife, and was due to her at the second divorce as such; and that there is nothing to show any agreement on the wite's part to cancel the first decree. [Address Chas. L. Wedding, Rockport, Indiana.] Sales under Decree of Court-Homestead to be either Urban or Rural.-G. F. Rogers et al., v. R. S. Ragland et al., in the Supreme Court of Texas. Special brief for Brownson, one of the appellants. It seems that Brownson, under a decree of the probate court, acquired certain lands, by a sale which the respondents now seek to set aside, because the sentence of the district court, in accordance with which the sale was ordered, had been reversed. Argument sustains the sale. Another point concerning homesteads declares that homesteads are either for town or country people, and should be either urban or rural, and not mixed. [Address Phillips, Lackey & Stayton, longer officiating as such, it appeared that the church had no connection with Victoria, Texas.] Effect of War on Partnerships Between Citizens of the Belligerent Countries.-J. M. Booker, Plaintiff in Error, v. J. Kirkpatrick, Defendant in Error, Supreme Court of Virginia. Argument of defendant. The following are the facts: Plantiff and one Halsey formed a partnership to conduct business in Missouri, by the said Halsey, Booker to remain in Virginia. In March, 1861, the firm hired of defendant ten negros, for whose work they gave three notes. The work was performed by December, 1861, and the money became due. On suit brought for payment of the notes, Booker filed a special plea, to the effect that on April 17th, 1861, war broke out, Booker remaining on the confederate side, and the other parties in Missouri, and hence the partnership was dissolved, and the notes became invalid. The defendant admits that, had the partnership been commercial, the war would have dissolved it, but claims that the partnership was of such a nature as not to be affected by the war. Defendant discusses four propositions Ist, the partnership was not dissolved by the war; 2d, the liability of a partner on contracts of the partnership, is not discharged by its dissolution; 3rd, dissolution of a partnership does not constitute failure of consideration of a contract made by the partnership; 4th, Booker could not thus sever from his partner and defend alone. The principal points to sustain defendant's position are, that, as the business was to be conducted entirely in Missouri, and the Virginia partner had nothing to do therewith, the relation was not commercial within the meaning used in those decisions declaring commercial partnerships dissolved by war; that the partnership did not interfere with the allegiance of the partners, nor with their duties to their respective governments; and that, if the partnership was dissolved, the liability of either partner for the partnership debts was not discharged thereby. [Address Messrs. Mosby & Brown, Lynchburg, Va.] Notes and Queries. Will some of our readers be kind enough to respond to the following: 1. DEVISE-SALE BY HEIR-RIGHTS OF CREDITOR. WARRENSBURG, MO., May 4, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:- A. died seized in fee of cetain realty. He left seven heirs. He also, just before his demise, made a will, in which he directed his executor to sell all of his estate, both real and personal (deseribing it), and apply the proceeds of the sale of his personalty to various But the proceeds of the sale of his realty was to be distributed equally among his seven heirs. After A.'s death, but before the sale of the realty by the executor, B., one of the seven heirs, made a deed to C., in which he conveyed to C. the undivided one-seventh part of the realty mentioned in the will. Afterwards, the executor sold all the land described in the will. Now did the deed from B. to C. convey to C. B 's interest in the proceeds of the sale of the realty, as against B.'s creditors. Yours, uses. B. OLATHE, KANSAS, May 5, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-Will you be so kind as to give us an answer to the following questions, to-wit: A. sells a plow to B., upon the following conditions: B. gives A. his prommissory note (negotiable) with a condition attached thereto, in effect that the title to the plow shall not vest in B., until said note is fully discharged. The plow is delivered to B. Afterwards, B. sells the plow to C., and the plow is sold from C. by virtue of a writ of attachment to D., a bona fide purchaser, without notice of such condition existing between the original vendor, and vendee. No claim is made to the plow by virtue of such condition, until four months have elapsed since maturity of said note of B. to A., and then it comes in the person of E., who is indorsee of said note. A. indorsed said note to E. without recourse. What right has E. against D., the purchaser at sheriff's sale? Have not the payee and indorsee been guilty of such negligence as to estop them from any remedy as against D.? Does the indorsement of the note from A. to E. give E. the title to the plow, the same as A. possessed before the transfer, when the condition attached to said note says in so many words, that the absolute title shall remain in A. till the note is fully discharged. W. M. Q. Summary of Our Legal Exchanges. ADVANCE Sheets of 66 ILL. REPORTS.* Injunction Bill by Church Trustees to Restrain Pastor from Officiating.-Trustees of Independent Presbyterian Church, etc., v. Proctor. [66 Ill. 11.] Opinion by Lawrence, Ch. J.-Upon bill in chancery, by the trustees of an independent church organization, to restrain their pastor from *Courtesy of Hon. Norman L. Freeman, Reporter, Springfield, Ill. any religious denomination, but was governed by its own rules and customs. One of the customs of the church and society was to elect a pastor every year. In this way, the defendant was elected in 1868, 1869 and 1870, and again in 1871, and he accepted. After the last election, the church session and the church trustees decided not to retain him, but he declined to leave, the trustees claiming that they had the sole power to employ a pastor. They, however, failed to establish this claim. Held, that the facts and circumstances were not such as to justify the interference of a court of equity, it appearing that he remained in obedience to the vote of a majority of the society, whose wishes, according to the usages of the church, should control. Limitation-Color of Title-Payment of Taxes-Good FaithDisability.-Milliken v. Martin. [66 Ill. 13.] Opinion by Walker, J.-I. The law is settled in this state that the holder of color of title will not be presumed to know of a defect in a prior deed in the chain of title, so as to charge him with bad faith. Hence such holder will not be affected by the fact that the judgment under which the sale was made, through which he claims, was void. 2. It is the settled rule of law that the payment of taxes may be proved by parol testimony in ejectment, where the defence relied on is the limitation under the act of 1839, by payment of taxes for seven successive years upon vacant land under color of title. 3. Where a party having color of title to vacant land pays taxes on the same for the statutory period under the act of 1839, and then goes into possession, the law will presume good faith, and it is for the party resisting the bar of the statute to show bad faith. 4. Under the limitation law of 1839, there are two states of fact under which a minor feme covert, lunatic, etc., may avoid the bar, after disability ceases. Where the land is occupied it may be avoided by bringing suit within three years after the removal of the disability. Evidence-Questions of Alteration of Written Instrument Law and Fact.-Milliken v. Martin. [66 Ill. 13.] Opinion by Walker, J.-1. Where an instrument offered in evidence has the appearance of having been altered, as when a portion of it is in a different ink and handwriting from the body of it, the law raises no presumption as to when the change was made, or by whom, but these are questions of fact to be found by the jury. 2. In such a case the jury, in determining the question, will look at the instrument itself for an explanation, as well as to all the circumstances in evidence; and if an alteration is apparent, it is for the jury to determine whether it was made before or after its execution, and with or without the consent of the maker. 3. Whether an alteration of an instrument is material, is a question of law for the court, and should not be submitted to the jury. Sale of Fixtures and Assignment of Lease-When Title Passes -Measure of Damages.-Roddin v. Shurley. [66 Ill. 23.] Opinion by Breese, J.-I. Where a contract was made for the sale of personal property and the assignment of a lease for the building in which the fixtures were, and the delivery of possession of the leased property and fixtures, and the payment of the balance of the consideration, were made concurrent acts: Held, that the title to no portion of the property would pass until these acts were performed. 2. Where the plaintiff bargained for the assignment of a certain lease interest, and the purchase of the personal property connected with the leasehold premises, and paid $2,000, and the defendants neglected to deliver possession at the time they had agreed to, and it appeared that the personal property was only of the value of $1,500: Held, that the plaintiffs, in a suit to recover damages for breach of the contract, were not limited to the differences between the value of the personal property and the money paid, as the contract for the lease and the fixtures was entire. 3. Where the damages recovered by the plaintiffs for the non-delivery of personal property purchased and neglect to transfer a lease according to contract, was only the sum paid by them on the contract, with legal interest thereon: Held, that the damages were not excessive. Setting Aside Deed on Ground of Undue Influence-Quantum of Proof-Mental Capacity.-Wiley v. Ewalt. [66 Ill. 26]. Opinion by Breese, J.-I. On bill to set aside a deed made by an aged person, in the nature of a testamentary disposition, on the ground of undue influence and want of sufficient mental capacity, the proof failed to show that any one made any suggestions to the grantor as to what disposition should be made of the property, or that he did not, of his own volition, select the persons who should be the recipients of his bounty, and the several persons charged with having influenced his action denied, under oath, that they ever advised him to make such disposition of his property, and this was not overcome by any evidence in the record: Held, that the charge of undue influence was not sustained by the proof. 2. Where a deed, made by a party in the nature of a testamentary disposition, giving the bulk of his remaining property to his four daughters after his death, was sought to be set aside by a portion of his heirs, on the ground that his mind had become impaired by reason of his advanced age and by the use of intoxicating liquors, it appeared, from the evidence that the deed was made at the age of seventy-six years, just on the eve of his second marriage, and that at that time his memory only was somewhat impaired, but that he still possessed a sound, practical judgment in business matters; and it further appeared that he had exhibited judgment in making the disposition of his property, by reserving to himself the absolute control of the same during his life, and that he had previously given his other children property, while the four daughters had got but little, so that the disposition was not very unequal; and it further appeared that he was then a vigorous man for his age, and that the disposition was not made from any sudden impulse, but in pursuance of a purpose formed to that effect many years before : Held, that the facts would not justify a decree, setting aside the deed. 3. In order to justify the setting aside of a deed where no undue influence is shown, on the ground of mental incapacity from age, it must be shown that the grantor was affected with such a degree of mental weakness, as to render him incabable of understanding and protecting his own interests. The circumstance that his mental powers had been somewhat impaired by age, is not sufficient, if he still retained a full comprehension of the meaning, design and effect of his acts. Mistake in Sheriff's Return.-Higgins v. Bullock. [66 Ill. 37.] 1. Where a summons was directed to the sheriff of Wabash county, and the officer's return of service commenced "State of Illinois, Nash county:" Held, that the word Nash" was an evident misprision, and that the name of the county in the venue of the return was without any effect upon the return. 2. Where a summons was directed to the sheriff of Wabash county, and the officer serving signed his name as "sheriff," without stating of what county: Held, that the return should be taken in connection with the direction and command in the writ, and should receive a construction in support of it; and that it would be intended he was sheriff of Wabash county. Forcible Detainer-When an Additional Bond may be Required on Appeal.-Ryder v. Meyer. [66 Ill. 41.] Opinion per curiam. The statute authorizing the circuit court to require a new bond in the case of an appeal by the defendant, in an action of forcible detainer, from the judgment of a justice of the peace, does not authorize the exercise of that power previous to the commencement of the term to which the appeal is taken. Chancery-Relief Against Judgment at Law-Judgment on Gaming Contracts-Enforcement of Contract Extending Time of Redemption.—Lucas v. Nicholas. [66 Ill. 41.] Opinion by Lawrence, Ch. J.-I. Where the maker of a promissory note given for money bet on the result of an election, neglected to make his defence at law when sued: Held, that a court of equity would not relieve against the judgment. 2. But, owing to the statute prohibiting gambling at cards or other games, a court of equity will set aside a judgment upon a note given for money won in gaming, notwithstanding the maker had a complete defence at law. 3. It seems that, if a purchaser of land under an execution prevents the judgment-debtor from redeeming within the twelve months, by promising to extend the time, and then refuses to permit the redemption, a court of equity would grant relief, even though the contract rested merely in parol, on the theory of presumptive fraud. 4. But an agreement to give further time to redeem from sheriff's sale of land, made after the expiration of twelve months from the day of sale, would not be obligatory, if made without consideration, or if resting in parol, when the statute of frauds is set up. Such a promise could not operate as a fraud upon the debtor by inducing him to sleep upon his right of redemption, as such right would not then exist. I Price v. False Imprisonment - Mock Judical Proceeding. Bailey. [66 Ill. 49.] Opinion by Breese, J. Where A. procured B. to assume the office of constable and arrest a boy on a charge of breaking a glass in his show case, and the boy was carried before C., who falsely assumed to act as justice of the peace, when the form of a trial was gone through, the boy being refused the privilege of seeing an attorney, and judgment was rendered against him for three dollars, and the parties then threatened him with imprisonment in the county jail, unless he could get two good men to become surety for him, which he finally procured, and was then released, after having been detained about two hours: Held, that the facts fully warranted the jury in finding the defendants guilty, in an action by the boy for trespass and false imprisonment, and assessing the damages at $125. set up Legal News and Notes. -A FRENCH paper makes merry at some of the disquisitions of English magistrates on the administration of corporal punishment. "Fortunately such old-fashioned notions of school discipline are no longer to be found in France." -BEFORE Mr. Serjeant Ballantine left Bombay, he was presented with an address by 1800 natives, who thanked him for his efforts to secure justice to the Guicowar. They also gave him a shawl as a token of gratitude. A Sanscrit ode was sent to him by "the Rajkote Association for the Promotion of Arya Samaja," in which he was told that " the word Ballantine," according to Sanscrit, signifies "a person possessing mighty strength." -LAWYERS V. RAILWAY ACCIDENTS.—A case came before the Court of Exchequer on Saturday, in which Mr. Bulwer, Q. C., moved for a rule nisi for a new trial, on the grounds of excessive damages and misreception of evidence. This, said the learned counsel, was an action arising out of the Thorpe accident. Baron Bramwell remarked that all the motions before the court that day had arisen out of railway accidents. What, asked no railway accidents, would the Lord Chief Baron, if there were the lawyers do? Mr. Bulwer feared they would fare very badly; it was an ill wind that blew nobody good. In the result the court granted a rule nisi.-[The Law Times. —ACCORDING to the telegraph, Judge Mort ill of the United States District Court, for the Eastern District of Texas, in his charge to the grand jury on the 4th instant, reviewed the civil rights law, and expressed the opinion that all persons have legal right to have board and lodgings at inns, transportation on steamers and railroads, or stages, and entrance in theaters, while they do not thereby acquire any social right. To hold that a conductor of a railroad train can not assign a special car to ladies and children and their attendants to the exclusion of all others, provided the other passengers are furnished with other cars, with all the necessary facilities for traveling, would, he says, be to stab social rights, privileges and immunities. Therefore, my view of the act is, that it was not intended to affect social rights through civil and legal rights. In conclusion, the judge said that if it should be made to appear that any innkeepers, managers of theaters or transportation agents, had refused proper facilities to any one on account of race, color or previous condition of servi tude, the grand jury would have authority to find a true bill against such persons. -THE SUIT AGAINST Tweed.-Active preliminary skirmishing in the matter of the new suit commenced against William M. Tweed to recover the $6,000,000 and over, which, it is claimed, he fraudulently obtained from the city treasury, in connection with the building of the new court house, has evidently begun in earnest in the courts. Mr. William H. Peckham appeared before Judge Barrett, in supreme court chambers, yesterday, and remonstrated against the twenty days' extension of time granted to Tweed to put in his answer, and asked that the same be reduced. To give the matter a tangible form, he put his application in the shape of an affidavit, such affidavit simply stating that no bill of particulars would be furnished by the prosecution. After taking the subject into consideration, Judge Barrett gave a compromise decision and reduced the time to ten days. This sort of skirmishing is likely to last for some time, and the probability is that there will not be a general engagement before the fall campaign. Meantime, as a basis to insure the recovery of the $6,000,000 sought to be recovered from Mr. Tweed in the ahove Trespass de Bomis Asportatis against Tax Collector by Lein- suit, some 5,000 lots, lying within the corporation limits, were recently atHolder.-1. In order to maintain trespass for taking and carrying away per- tached. Some of the owners of these lots, who purchased the same from sonal property, the plaintiff must be the owner of the property, or in poses- Tweed, are now seeking to establish the validity of their titles. Yesterday sion, at the time of the alleged trespass. The mere fact that he had a lien Judge Barrett released from the lis pendens a lot owned by Matthew Bird, on upon the property as landlord, for rent due, will not enable him to maintain Eighth avenue, near Seventy-first street, it being shown that he bought the the action; neither will the levy of a distress warrant by him upon the prop- same in good faith and paid its full value, and the attorney-general also conerty, where no sale is shown, and it does not appear to have been in his actual senting to its release. This is the second application of this kind that has alpossesion. 2. Where the plaintiff sued the tax collector in trespass, for levy-ready been granted, and the likelihood is that plenty more of the same sort ing upon personal property for the taxes of a third person, and the plaintiff will speedily follow.-[New York Herald. SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, Editor. } ST. LOUIS, FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1875. Hon. JOHN F. DILLON, Contributing Editor. sessions and fined $25 for cruelly treating his dog while working him on a treadmill. This conviction the supreme court has unanimously affirmed. court has unanimously affirmed. Davis, J., who delivered the opinion is reported to have said: JUDGE DILLON will sail for Europe on the 26th instant, and relator, Walker, was convicted in the court of general will probably be absent during the summer months. This step has been determined upon with the view of recruiting his health, which has been considerably impaired by overwork. Mr. Justice Miller will remain in the circuit during Judge Dillon's absence. THE BRIGHAM YOUNG DIVORCE SUIT.-Judge Lowe, the new Chief Justice of Utah territory, has just rendered a decision in this celebrated case, denying an attachment against the defendant to compel payment of $500 per month alimony, pendente lite, as awarded by ex-Chief Justice McKean The decision proceeds on the ground that, in cases of divorce, alimony can not be allowed unless a valid marriage is either first admitted or proved. The defendant had alleged in his answer that the marriage in question was a polygamous one, and the allegations, not being denied, must be taken as true. The Chief Justice is reported to have said, it would be strange, if, under these circumstances, it could be imposed upon a court of equity to direct or enforce payment of alimony, and thus bestow apparent, if not, indeed, real, sanction of the law upon a practice which is hostile to the civilization of the age, and which the penal statutes of the land visit with punishment. This is sound law and good sense. Nashville Bar ASSOCIATION.-The leading members of the Nashville bar have formed a bar association, with Chancellor Cooper as president; Thomas H. Malone and D. W. Peabody, vice-presidents; J. A. Cartwright, secretary and treasurer; G. P. Thurston, John Ruhm and Robert L. Morris, executive committee; and Morton B. Howell, N. D. Malone and Thomas M. Steger, committee on admissions. It is proposed to establish a bar library. We should suppose it would be more judicious to enter into some arrangement with the state, by which the strength of the association could be exerted in completing the law department of the state library at Nashville. The establishment and maintenance of a law library is no easy task to be entered upon by the bar of a city no larger than Nashville. To illustrate this we may state that the Saint Louis Law Library Association has about 350 members; and yet the support of their library requires an initiation fee of twenty dollars, and an annual fee of ten dollars; and then, after an existence of about thirty years, it can not be said to have reached an independent basis. Its library room is still furnished, and its gas bills paid, by Saint Louis county. "On the merits of this case there appears to be no reason for interfering with the judgment. Although a dog is net a beast of burden,' yet it is not cruelty to train and subject him to any useful purpose. His use upon a' treadmill' or an inclined plane,' or in any mode by which his strength or docility may be made serviceable to man is commendable and not criminal, but his abuse while so employed, whenever it amounts to cruelty, is a crime, and punishable precisely under the same circumstances as the cruel usage of the higher animals. Evidence enough was given on the part of the prosecution, to show harsh and unreasonable treatment by the relator of his dog, producing unnecessary pain and suffering, and it was for the court below to determine from the conflicting evidence, whether the alleged cruelty was established. We think the suit should be dismissed, and the proceedings of the special sessions affirmed." DEATH OF BARON PIGOTT.-Sir Gillery Pigott, a baron of from the effects of injuries received by being thrown from a the English Court of Exchequer, died on the 28th of April, horse some time before. Baron Pigott was the fourth of the of Archer Lodge, Sherfield, Hampshire, by Lucy, second seven sons of the late Paynton Pigott Stainsby-Conant, Esq., daughter of the late Richard Drope Gough, Esq., of Souldern, daughter of the late Richard Drope Gough, Esq., of Souldern, Oxon, and was born in the year 1813. The learned judge, who was therefore sixty-two years of age, received his education at a private school at Putney, under the Rev. W. Carmalt, and was called to the bar by the honorable society of the Middle Temple, in Easter Term, 1839. He joined the Oxford Circuit, and also attended the Gloucester Sessions. In 1856 he was made a Serjeant-at-Law, receiving a patent of precedence, and in 1859 he was appointed Recorder of Hereford. He entered parliament in October, 1860, in the Liberal interest, as one of the members for Reading, in the place of his brother, Mr. Francis Pigott, who had been nominated to the post of Governor of the Isle of Man; his parliamentary career, however, was but of short duration, for in 1863 he was appointed by the late Lord Westbury to a judgeship in the Court of Exchequer, in succession to the present Lord Penzance, who had taken Sir Cresswell Cresswell's place in the Divorce Court, and at the same time received the customary honor of knighthood. A few weeks ago, when the Lord Chief Baron was suffering from illness, Mr. Baron Pigott relieved him on the Western Circuit, and he was to have tried the Norwich election petition next week. The announcement of his death, which was made by the Lord Chief Baron, in the Court of Exchequer, came upon the bar, as well as upon the public, with surprise. of the Law of Nations. THE DOG TREadmill Case.-"Confine your remarks to the dog-fight,” was the peremptory admonition of a country The Association for the Reform and Codification justice to a newly fledged lawyer who was making a spreadeagle speech. This reminds us that a case has just been This association resolved at its last meeting to direct determined in the Supreme Court of New York (People ex attention to the following objects: 1. Bills of Exchange. 2. rel. Walker v. The Court of General Sessions), involving Foreign Judgments. 3. Copyright. 4. Patent Law. 5. the question of the right of a man to treat his dog according Trade Marks. These subjects will be dealt with one by one. to the dictates of his own (not the dog's) conscience. The The following questions have been submitted to chambers of commerce, bankers, bill brokers, jurists, and mercantile houses in different countries, in order to elicit their opinions as to the desirability of adopting one uniform system in the laws, usages, and forms as to the bills of exchange: 1. Do you find such diversity in the laws, customs and regulations affecting bills of exchange in various countries with which you have intercourse, as to cause complications in commercial business, and create questions of legal difficulty in establishing and enforcing your rights and remedies? 2. Do you consider it desirable to adopt one universal form of bill of exchange, and one uniform system of laws regulating the rights and liabilities of parties to a bill of exchange? 3. What difficulties do you find in the present fiscal regulations respecting stamps on foreign bills, and in the laws relating thereto; and what sugges tions do you make for the removal of such difficulties? 4. Do you consider it desirable to establish one uniform form and system of endorsement, which shall only be limited in case of express directions by an endorser? 5. Do you deem it desirable that the usances now varying in different places and countries should be altogether abolished, and that the adoption of one uniform period of time would be preferable? 6. Having regard to the great diversity of custom, at present leading to great complications, do you consider that days of grace should be abolished entirely, or if not, that a uniform term should be established, and if so, what term? 7. Have you experienced difficulties from diversity in the practice, laws and customs of various countries, as to presentation for acceptance, and the consequences arising on non-acceptance, refusal or undue delay ? Do you consider it desirable that there should be a uniformity of practice, custom and law in regard thereto ? 8. Do you find difficulties in the present system of notice either as to form or law, or as to the parties upon whom it should be served; and can you suggest any simplification or alteration in regard thereto, or in the proof of due notice? 9. Is noting and protest as to foreign bills of exchange compulsory under your law? Have you in your country any regulated scale of charges on noting and protest? If so, please give full details thereof, both as regards inland and foreign bills? Do you find that the expenses of noting and protest, and incidental charges on foreign bills returned dishonored, are variable and burdensome, and what changes (if any) in the present system and rate of charges do you deem desirable? 10. What rights and remedies are, under your laws, secured to a holder of a foreign bill of exchange by due notice and protest? Is there any limitation as to the election of parties, or the time for inception of legal proceedings ? Have you any suggestions to make for the better securing the rights and remedies in other countries of holders of foreign bills? II. What is the limit of time in your country in which a suit must be brought, and do you consider it desirable to fix a uniform period? 12. Is the law or custom of Aval in force in your country? Do you find difficult questions arising in countries where no such law or custom exists, and do you consider it desirable generally adopt a system recognizing the validity of Aval. 134. Does the law in your country sustain the right of a bona fide holder for value of bills of exchange, lost or forged? Is this right upheld even in those cases in which loss is caused by gross neglect, such as a want of due care and caution on the part of a person losing a bill or from whose posses sion a bill has been abstracted? Answers to these questions may be addressed to the Honorary International Secretaries, H. D. Jencken, Goldsmith Building, Temple, London; and J. Rand Bailey, 8 Tokenhouse Yard, London. The next annual meeting of the Association will take place at the Hague, on the first week in September next. The Missouri Constitutional Convention. A careful perusal of the second week's work of this body. has left upon our minds an impression which we can only convey to our readers by asking them to suppose that a steamer named the Constitution should, after ten years' service, be pulled out of the Missouri river at Jefferson City for repairs; that sixty-eight men, from different parts of the state, some of them carpenters, some blacksmiths, some shoemakers and some politicians, should be chosen to perform the task; that these sixty-eight men should, without a foreman, each one assuming as far as possible to boss the job, and no two agreeing as to the nature of the repairs which ought to be made, attack the old carcass simultaneously, and proceed, with an incessant din of hammer and adze, to the work of demolition and rehabilitation. Suppose, further, that each of these workmen should bring to the yard a different kind of wood-some oak, some hickory, some pine, some basswood, and that none would agree to consider the repairs complete unless he should succeed in getting into the diseased frame at least one plank or piece of his own kind of timber and joined and patched to his own notion. Not dissimilar to this are the repairs which are now going on upon the constitution of Missouri. That instrument is simultaneously attacked by a body of lawyers, politicians, farmers and merchants, not a dozen of whom appear to have any adequate idea of the nature of the repairs needed; and yet each one is apparently determined not to look his admiring constituents in the face without being able to say that some one, at least, of the provisions of the new instrument was of his own concocting. One of the members, Judge Adams, formerly of the Supreme Court of Missouri, had the hardihood to submit to the convention a complete draft of a constitution, the framing of which had, no doubt, cost him much time and labor. We have not had the pleasure of seeing this document, but we venture the opinion that if the convention had, as a matter of hit or miss, adopted it and adjourned, they would have presented to the people an instrument as satisfactory as they will if they labor from now until Christmas. It would consume the entire space of this issue of the JOURNAL were we to enumerate the thousand and one propositions, some of them wise and some of them foolish, which have been made by the various members. Still, there are in the convention a number of able and experienced lawyers, and if the wisdom of these shall succeed in checking the vanity of the little men who are associated with them, its deliberations may result in much good. At all events it would be highly unwise and unjust to prejudge its action. The only substantial work reported from committee down to the time of this writing was the report by Mr. Gantt of Saint Louis, of a preamble and bill of rights, from the committee to which that subject had been referred. We do not see much in it that we would wish to see changed. It opens |