the time of its adoption was one of the people became a citizen. All children language, but in the discharge of my duty I am bound to use born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction, are themselves citizens. The naturalization laws are reviewed to show that women have always been con sidered citizens the same as men ; also the laws giving jurisdiction in federal cases. It is then said that the fourteenth amendment did not affect the citizenship of women any more than it did of men, and thus minors' rights do not depend upon it. She has always been a citizen from her birth, entitled to all the privileges, immunities, etc., of citizenship. The amendment prohibited the state in which she lives from abridging any of those rights. The right of suffrage is not made in terms one of the privileges of the citizen. The United States has no voters, and no one can vote for federal, without being competent to vote for state officers. The elective officers of the United States are chosen directly or indirectly by the voters of the states The amendment did not add to the privileges or immunities of the citizen; it simply furnished an addititional guarantee for the protection of such as he already had. Nor is the right of suffrage co-extensive with the citizenship of the states. when the federal constitution was adopted all the states but Rhode Island had constitutions of their own, in not one of which were all citizens recognized as entitled to this right. And under all these circumstances it can not be for a moment doubted that if it had been intended to make citizens of the United States voters, the framers of the constitution would have so expressed that intention, and not have left so important a change in the condition of citizenship, as it then existed, to implication. it." Subsequently he ordered the prisoners to be removed in custody. The second case was that of a man who was tried and acquitted at Brighton Assizes, the Lord Chief Justice (Cock surn) being the presiding judge. His lordship immediately directed another jury to be sworn, and, addressing the prisoner, said: "You are very fortunate, for I do not believe twelve human beings could have been found except the jurors in the box, who would have returned such a verdict on the evidence." He would ask the right honorable gentleman whether it was his intention to introduce any measure which would have for its object the better maintenance of the rights of jurymen to deliver verdicts according to their consciences and to the best of their ability, without censure from the bench. The Law Times, referring to this subject, uses the following language: The issue raised by Dr. Kenealy's promised motion concerning the censure of juries by judges is, perhaps, wider than he contemplates. The verdicts of But if further evidence is needed it is to be found in the provisions of the juries have in many recent instances been the cause of much surprise on the constitution. If suffrage is necessarily a part of citizenship, then the provis-part both of the public and the profession. Juries have been known to act ion of the constitution which gives citizens of each state all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, would entitle the citizens of each state to the right to vote in the several states precisely as the citizens of those states are. Other provisions, among them that relating to the appointment | of representatives, were cited to the same point. But still again, after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment it was found necessary to use in the fifteenth amendment the following language: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any state, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude" The fourteenth amendment had provided against any abridgment of privileges or immunities of citizens, and it the right of suffrage is one of them why amend the constitution further to prevent its being denied on account of race, color, etc.? The duty of the United States to guarantee to the state a republican form of government is discharged in protecting those governments which were recognized as being republican in form by the constitution when adopted. The governments of the states being then accepted, it must be assumed that they are such as are to be guaranteed. The admission of new states is then considered, and it is found that there is nothing to favor the idea that suffrage is a right of citizenship, but everything to repel it; also, the restoration of the states to the Union after the war, none of them having provided for female suffrage. Besides, a person who has simply declared his intentions to become a citizen of the United States may vote under certain circumstances, in Missouri and other states, and this could not be if suffrage depended upon the right of citizenship The court are unanimous in the opinion that the constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions of the several states which commit the trust to men alone are not necessarily void. Affirmed. Judicial Interference with Juries. Dr. Kenealy has taken a step in the British House of Commons which is calculated to increase his popularity among the masses, but which will probably diminish still further the respect which is felt for him by his former brethern of the bar. He recently gave notice of an intention to ask the first lord of the treasury, whether his attention had been called to the two following cases of the interference of judges with the independence of juries at recent assizes. The first case he extracted from the Dublin Daily Express, where it was reported to have been tried at Limerick Assizes, before Justices Lawson and Keogh. Two men, having been charged with homicide, were acquitted; whereupon the judge (Lawson) was reported to have said: "Is it possible that after hearing such evidence, you can have arrived at such a conclusion? I must observe that in the whole course of my experience I never witnessed a more distinct violation of the jurors' oath than has taken place in this case. This may be strong from many motives other than the single motive of giving a verdict according to the evidence, and it is difficult for a judicial mind contemplating such a miscarriage of justice to refrain from giving expression to a certain amount of indignation. Whilst, therefore, it may be highly desirable that juries, so long as they exist, should have all possible freedom conceded to them, their constant abuse of that freedom may well suggest a doubt whether they should continue to be a part of the legal machinery in this country. In criminal cases, no doubt, danger might attend their abolition, but in civil cases unlimted liberty of obtaining new trials scarcely compensates for the loss inflicted by no verdicts at all, or verdicts palpably in conflict with the evidence. When juries are censured by the bench it is absolutely certain that they are wrong. Censure of one jury must have a good effect upon other juries, who will be more careful in considering the evidence. Judges are not to be gagged, and if Parliament is to be appealed to upon every trifling exhibition of judicial temper, the life of a judge will become intolerable. In this country, at least in most of the Western and Southern states, such a question would not admit of much discussion. Juries being regarded among us, as the exclusive triers of the facts, subject to the right of the judge to set aside their verdicts, and grant new trials where they have manifestly found against the law or the evidence, any attempt on the part of the judges to browbeat them, or to destroy their independence by treating their verdicts with contempt, would meet with general popular condemnation, and would, we doubt not, provoke an opposition from the bar wnich the judge could not withstand. We believe that in the great mass of civil causes, jury trial, in its present form at least, might be dispensed with to the great advantage of the administ ation of justice, and without involving our liberties in sudden annihilation. If it were proposed to pass a law authorizing coroners to summon committees composed of blacksmiths, carpenters and lawyers to analyze the contents of the stomach of a deceased person suspected of having been poisoned, every one would at once say that there is no sense in such a measure, and that the person introducing such a measure is a fool. Equally absurd is it to summon twelve men from the ordinary walks of life to sit as examiners of conflicting and variant testimony, and to decide complicated questions of fact, mixed up with intricate principles of law which none of them understand. Such questions can be much better tried by trained professional experts, and with less expense to the public. But whilst this may be apparent to lawyers, the people take a different view of it. They remain distrustful of states, and one party has the same interest in reproving the outrages as the time, as the life of a free state transcends in value the salaries of a few offices. surrendering the entire administration of justice into the hands of a particular profession. They prefer that the public at large should participate in those duties, and believe that confidence in the unbribed and impartial administration of justice, and the repose of society, require that juries should be the triers of the facts in a large class of cases; and hence they have incorporated into their state constitutions stringent declarations intended to protect the institution of trial by jury against judicial or legislative encroachment. This being the case, and the judge being sworn to support the constitution which contains these provisions, he can not, without a violation of his judicial oath, usurp the functions of the jury, any more than he can usurp those of the legislature; and any attempt on the part of a judge unduly to influence juries, or by violent censure to break down their indepen-in dismay, with the alternative presented to him of probable impeachment dence, deserves nothing less than impeachment. Louisiana case and removal by a republican Congress, if he should fail to resign. No man, therefore, can be accused of partisanship who unites his voice in the general condemnation, or who, for the sake of the perpetuity of free institutions threatened by such measures, and certain to be destroyed by their repetition, enters his protest as an American citizen against them. It would be impossible, in a short sketch, to make any summary of this admirable paper which would not greatly impair its force and inadequately represent its real character. Its main conclusions, however, may be stated as follows: The Legal Aspects of the Louisiana Case. Mr. Justice Cooley has contributed to the April number of the Southern Law Review an able paper under the above caption, in which he considers, from a judicial standpoint, the recent troubles in Louisiana. This exposition of "the is believed to be the clearest that has yet been put forth by any writer or speaker on the subject. Begin1. That the order of Hon. E. H. Durell, United States ning with the period when an unsuccessful candidate for gov- District Judge, by which he enjoined a governor-elect from ernor was seated in that office by an injunction issued at mid-acting, and by which he directed his marshal to take possesnight by a federal district judge, he traces, step by step, the usurpation, and tells a plain, unvarnished tale of a state govern ment overthrown and subverted by the most astounding fraud and perjury, supported at every step by the military arm of the federal government. governor of sion of the state-house and to determine who should and who should not enter, was extra-judicial and void; and that the government established in pursuance of it, and supported by the troops of the United States, was a usurpation. Judge Cooley does not hesitate to declare that a parallel to this proceeding "will be sought in vain in the history of the Anglo-Saxon race since parliamentary government was estab board of election canvassers, which made that board the 2. That the provisions of the act establishing the state judge of the election of members of the state legislature, and which provided further, that the persons declared elected by that board," and none other," should be competent to organize the two houses respectively, was in direct violation of the provision of the constitution of Louisiana that each house shall be the judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its own members (Tit. 2, art. 34), and that “returns of all elections for members of the general assembly shall be made to the secretary of state [not to a canvassing board]. Tit. 3, art. 46. It further appears that the draftsman of this extraordinary bill knew that it was unconstitutional; for he inserted in it a provision that "nothing in this act shall be construed to conflict with article 34 of the con We have hitherto endeavored to avoid, in these columns, the discussion of any subject which might draw us into the domain of party politics. We fully recognize the impro-lished." priety of a legal journal engaging in such discussions. But we can not bring ourselves to believe that this is in any proper sense a party question. Whether a federal district judge had jurisdiction to enjoin a person who claims to be state, from acting as such; whether the creation of a certain board of election canvassers with certain extraordinary powers was or was not in contravention of the constitution of the state in which such board was created; whether it was competent for the legislature of a state to pass an act taking away from future legislatures the right to judge of the election of their own members; whether the house of representatives of a state was, on a certain day, as an historical fact and legal conclusion, duly and properly organized, according to the constitution of the state, and according to parliamentary law and usage; these are questions which, although they may be accidentally associated with party poli-stitution of this state." tics, are legal and not party questions. And we are equally clear that the usurpation of Kellogg and his co-conspirators, has been a continued attack upon republican institutions, and a continuing crime against all who dwell upon our shores, republicans or democrats, native or foreign, white or black. Mr. Justice Cooley protests against this being considered a party question in the following language: We have endeavored to consider this case from a purely legal and constitutional standpoint. It is unfortunate that it has been obscured, somewhat, by its supposed necessary connection with party politics. It has no such connection. It concerns the rights and liberties of all the people and all the 3. That the privilege guaranteed, as above shown, by article 34 of title 3, of the Louisiana constitution, is simply the affirmance of a right which every legislative body possesses, independently of any constitutional provision, of judging of the election of its own members. 4. That this board proceeded without evidence and without a shadow of justification to set aside the returns of the local boards, and to seat members who were shown not to have been elected. 5. That, notwithstanding the utmost resources of this board of canvassers, sitting much of the time in secret session, and fertile in every resource of fraud, forgery and perjury, their labors left a conservative majority of five in the house of representatives, who were legally entitled to participate in its organization; since the five members whose cases were returned by the board too doubtful to act upon, having been returned elected by the local boards, were prima facie entled to their seats and to participate in the organization of the house. 6. That the house of representatives was, in the election of Speaker Wiltz and the other officers elected with him, on the 4th of January, duly and legally organized. not in what sea of bloodshed, or after what reign of anarchy. Lord Stafford once advocated a like policy of thorough, and a long and bloody civil war, eventuating in revolution, was the result. On a review of the whole proceedings we are at a loss to discover more than one ground on which they can be defended. That is, that the state, having been conquered in the field, its government has fallen to the camp followers as the booty of war. On this ground, and this alone, Durell and De Trobriand may both be justified! These sentiments would have been worthy of Lord Coke himself. They are the earnest words of a great constitutional lawyer, uttered with a sincere concern for the safety of our institutions, without partisan malice, but not without a just indignation at the wrongs he recapitulates. The Chicago Contempt Case. 7. That when Gen. De Trobriand's soldiers entered the house with muskets and bayonets and forced these five members therefrom, "they were guilty of as high handed an out- The Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, has recently rage upon free institutions, and as glaring an invasion of re- had before it a very important proceeding for contempt, in presentative privileges as was Charles I., when, with like the case of The People v. Wilbur F. Story, editor of the force, he attempted the arrest of the five members of the parliament whose course displeased him." This brings us to the culminating points of Judge Cooley's article, and we shall let him give his view of the nature and magnitude of the outrage in his own language: Chicago Times, a widely-circulated but disreputable daily newspaper. The grand jury of that court having returned four indictments against Mr. Story, three for libel and one for publishing an indecent newspaper, he began through his journal a series of calumnious attacks upon the members of An act, like that of Gen. De Trobriand, wounds our institutions in their that body, of which the following are specimens: most vital and sensitive parts. I. It invades the immemorial privileges of the legislative body, and is in direct violation of its constitutional right to judge of the election and return of its members. Nothing need be added here to what has already been said on that score. This action on the part of the grand jury and the state's attorney, [referring to the indictments] is not in the interest of justice or decency, but wholly in the interest of the rascally elements that control the city and county. Every indictment returned by the grand jury last week against the editor of the Times, was a mean, pitiful attempt at revenge, for his effort to invite attention to the true character of men into whose hands has fallen the control of local affairs. The Times accepts these indictments as such mean and pitiful attempt to secure revenge for the expose of official iniquity. It accepts them as such, and herewith gives notice to the state's attorney, and all others whose interest this attempt at private vengence is directed, that it proposes to carry the battle to the end. And again on a subsequent day: 2. It violates the rights of the state by encroaching upon its authority, and overthrowing that department which most immediately represents the sovereignty of its people. It is of no consequence that the governor invited it. The governor, in acting outside his constitutional power was no more to be regarded than any other individual, and all parties to whom he appealed were bound to know that he was inviting aid in support of usurpation. It is precisely at this point that our institutions are most vulnerable. The proper boundary between national and state powers was agreed upon after long discussion, with much difficulty, as the result of a compromise, and it has been The result of the trial of this man proves what the Times has asserted, tofound so satisfactory that we have willingly endured a most destructive war wit: That no man having money has been sent to Joliet, from the Criminal in its defence. The cost of that war has been expended in vain if at its con- Court of Cook County. Just so soon as a grand jury of honorable men can clusion we propose to treat that boundary as a shadowy line which none need be gotten together, and can be allowed to investigate the abuses under the regard. The only safety to our institutions consists in standing by their fund-guidance of some lawyer, appointed temporarily by some judge whose inteamental principles, of which the just division of local and general powers is, grity-of judge and lawyer- are above suspicion, then will the Times, in the by the constitution, made first and most prominent. name of an outraged community, demand an investigation of this latest development of the peculiar practices of our criminal court. 3. But nothing can exceed in immediate danger the employment of the military to coerce the civil authority. Upon this subject Anglo-Saxon people have always been justly sensitive. They showed it by the petition of right, in which Charles I. was compelled to assent that soldiers should not be quartered upon the subject, and that commissions for proceeding by martial law should be revoked. They showed it in the declaration against a standing army in the bill of rights, upon the basis of which was settled the revolution of 1688. The people of Boston showed it when, in 1770, they drove the royal soldiers out of the town. The federal constitution and the constitution of every state in the Union contain provisions referable to the same wellfounded jealousy. The Parliament of Great Britian will make provision for the government of the army only from year to year, in order that at all times it may be subject to parliamentary control, and that no ambitious executive may be enabled to employ it against the constitution. British statutes make careful provision against the interference of soldiers in elections, and these have their origin in a belief that military ideas are, to a large extent, antagon istic to those upon which civil government must be administered. Is this behief an idle prejudice? Let the case of Louisiana answer. In that state an eminent military commander, upon the heels of the late military settlement of contested seats in the legislature, and while the people were justly excited and indignant, gravely and seriously proposed that by act of Congress or proclamation of the President, they should be turned over to him for trial as outlaws by military commission! Was this the proposal of one who revered the constitution and proposed to obey it? And what shall we say of the military secretary of war, who could immediately telegraph his thorough appro And again on a subsequent day: The men Especially strong in the belief of the public in the virtue, the integrity, the purity of the men composing the grand jury, which has just returned an inwho have done this are themselves immaculate. Their social relations are of dictment against a city newspaper for publishing 'obscene' matter. the highest, and their private lives are of the purest. It is only necessary to mention a few names in order to demonstrate their standing. They are "Fred." Erby," Ab." Price, B. R. Chambers, W. H. Watchtel, William Man mer. chester, Frank Sherman, "Jim" Brown, Walter Williams and James Fitzgerald. The state's attorney is determined to tolerate the exposure of no crime, if he has to put every male strumpet in Chicago on a grand jury to secure the punishment of the offender. And still another : It is a fact scarcely worthy of note that a dozen or more members of the val of this officer's course? Such a policy would be thorough indeed, begin-present grand jury, who are not bummers and notorious male strumpets, ning with the thorough destruction of the constitution, and ending, we know I are personal friends and "cronies" of the managing editor of The Tribune who is also wonderfully noted as not being a bummer and a male strumpet. the English Common Pleas, recently sentenced an offender Is this grand jury a Tribune grand jury? It looks like it. And another : But that was before office-holding knavery found out that the grand jury could be converted from an agency for the punishment of offenders into an agency for shielding them against exposure. And yet another: How to make a free press a terror to evil doers. Get a grand jury to indict the editor that exposes them. That these outrageous attacks upon the character of individual members of the grand jury, were in the highest degree calculated to obstruct the administration of justice, seems to us beyond question. No grand jury could be impaneled that would indict persons connected with the press, if to do so would expose them to such scurrilous libels. The result would be that the courts of justice would find themselves completely bullied by a corrupt, scurrilous and indecent press, which might proceed with impunity, so far as the fear of criminal punishment is concerned, to blacken and besmear the reputation of the most virtuous citizens, or to corrupt the public morals with a limitless flood of obscene literature. His honor, Judge Williams, who presided in the court in question, was of this opinion. After a full and patient hear ing, he delivered a written judgment, in which he reviews the authorities on the subject at great length, and concludes that this is an actual and not a constructive contempt, because its immediate and necessary effect is to obstruct the administration of public justice. For the opinion itself we refer our readers to the Chicago Legal News, for April 3, where it is published in full. The following is a brief summary of the points ruled: from statute. The power to punish for contempt, is inherent in every court, and not derived It is the power of self-defence, and without it courts could not resist aggression. It includes all acts tending to impede, embarrass or obstruct courts in the due administration of justice. All such acts are regarded in law as done in the presence of the judge, and are actual contempts. The position that courts can only punish as contempts, acts done in the court-room, is supported by no authority, English or American. What is a contempt is to be determined with reference to the tendency of the act to obstruct the due administration of justice, and not by reference to the place in which it is done. Constructive attempts are not all those committed out of the view of the judge. An act which has no tendency to obstruct justice, but only to wound the feelings or offend the personal dignity of the judge is, at most, only a constructive contempt. A grand jury is a part of a criminal court, and while in session, engaged in the discharge of its official duties, is entitled to its protection. An editor of a widely-circulated daily paper, making in it vindictive and virulent attacks upon the personal character of grand jurors, for their action in indicting him, which attacks he knows will be read by them, while the grand jury is still in session, is guilty of conduct tending to obstruct justice. Such acts tend not only to obstruct justice by improperly influencing the conduct of the existing grand jury, but of the petit jurors then sitting in court, and who might be called upon to try the indictments pending against such editor. Such contempts are actual, not constructive. Editors have the same, and no greater rights, and are subject to the same responsibilities, as other citizens. The learned Judge concluded by sentencing Mr. Story to ten days' imprisonment in the county jail. This sentence would have been executed, but for the fact that Judge McAllister of the supreme court granted a supersedeas, which postpones the final decision until the September term of that tribunal. This sentence seems to us extremely lenient, considering the nature of the offence committed. Unless there is a statutory limit to the punishment which a court may award in such cases, it would seem that it ought not to be less than three months in such a case as this. Mr. Justice Denman, of to a year's imprisonment, in a much less aggravated case. The more reputable journals of Chicago have, singularly enough, taken up the cudgel for Story. All the morning papers of that city joined in denouncing the decision of Judge Williams as a judicial outrage. The Tribune said: Judge Williams forgets that recently in New York, three judges were per sistently attacked and pursued to impeachment by journals of that city, and that one of them died of shame and remorse. In the case of Story, however, it does not appear that the administration of justice has been impeded one iota. This language contains a covert and malignant threat, and of itself foreshadows the dangers which may overtake an independent judiciary, through the influence of our unbridled libellous and bullying press. The Tribune forgets that the three New York Judges were corrupt judges, who had fattened on great and corrupt railroad rings; whereas neither the honesty nor ability of Judge Williams is questioned. It is stated that the Illinois Legislature has, since this decision, been appealed to pass a law limiting the power of judges to punish for contempts, to those committed in the presence of the court while in session, and those which forcibly obstruct its process. There is no sense whatever in such a distinction between what are called actual and what are constructive contempts. The true distinction is, is or Is not the act one which necessarily obstructs the administration of justice? Thus a lawyer may insult a judge on the bench and grealty wound his feelings, and thereby render himself unqestionably amenable to punishment for contempt; and yet he commits an act far less injurious to the fearless and impartial administration of justice than that of the editor of a widely-circulated journal, who systematically libels and vilifies the members of a grand jury. If any legislation on this subject is necessary, it should regulate the proceeding so as to secure due fairness and deliberation; it should provide for a review of the proceeding in the proper appellate tribunal; and, above all, where the contempt consists in an insult to the judge himself, it should provide for a trial of the matter before another judge—since it is scandalous that a judge should be compelled to sit in his own case. On questions of this kind the Nation generally has views that are worth listening to, and we commend to the attention of our readers the following observations, which we take from an editorial in that journal referring to this case : Several of the states, and the United States itself, have passed statutes to limit the power, which, in its original and common-law form, is not only summary but absolutely without limits; that is to say, a judge might imprison, fine, and, for all we know, torture a person guilty of contempt, he being at the same time the sole judge of what contempt was. In other words it was a relic, one of the last, of the purely arbitrary power lodged in the courts as representatives of the sovereign. Now, in modern times it has been generally felt that this jurisdiction was too babarous and comprehensive for civilized court-i.e., acts or words tending to impede, hinder, or embarrass the adminlife, and an attempt has been made to distinguish between actual contempt of istration of justice - and constructive contempt -i.e., acts or words tending not to impede the administration of justice, but such as are by a mere fiction construed by the courts into contempt. To this distinction there can be no sort of objection, provided it is carried out logically and rationally. But it is not carried out in that way. In most of the statutes which have been passed on the subject, the reformers have proceeded on a clumsy theory, that the nature of the offence depends on the place where it is committed; and in the proposed Illinois statute, as given by the papers, we accordingly find that the power is to be confined to matters occurring in the presence of the court. This distinction is, however, almost utterly baseless, To take a very common case it is essentially the same kind of offence for a witness to refuse to answer a question put to him on the stand, as to run away on hearing that an officer has come to summon him. In fact, so far as refusals to obey a process of court go, the only question can be whether the refusal was made,not in the presence, but within the jurisdiction of the court. With regard to another common class of offences, those which consist of scurility and abuse, or defiance of the judges. jurors, or other officers, the question is one of degree, but has little to do with locality. If a party to a cause in court threatens a witness with words or gestures, it is a clear case of contempt; but is it any less so if a newspaper, day after day, threatens, intimidates, maligns, and accuses out of court? Yet, if the distinction between what is done in the presence of the court and out of its presence were correct, one would be contempt, and the other merely contempt by construction of law. It should be borne in mind, also, that it is only by a very loose usage that the power of a court to compel obedience to its process, can be brought under the right to punish for contempt at all. The power to compel a witness to attend and answer questions is nothing more than the natural exercise of the normal jurisdiction of a court, and it would be almost as logical to speak of a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or an injunction, as coming under the right to punish for contempt, as it is in the case we are considering. Every court must have power to make its authority felt; but this is very different from cases in which an attempt is made to impede the administration of justice in indirect ways. One of these indirect attempts was made not long ago in this city by Tweed's lawyers, who did not by any means attempt to impede the process of court, but did try to bring the impartiality of the presiding judge into question in an irregular way. Now, if this had been done, not in court, but by publication in a newspaper, or two or three newspapers, would the offence have been less or greater? Unquestionably greater. Yet, if we adopt the distinction of locality, the latter would merely have been a constructive" contempt. The true distinction between actual contempt and constructive contempt we should take to be rather indicated by the nature of the acts or words, their intent, and their probable effect, than by the place were they are committed or spoken. To hold a newspaper in contempt, for instance, for publishing articles complaining of actual delay in the business of the courts, or criticising in a temperate or even indignant manner real abuses in the administration of justice, would clearly be an attempt at introducing "construction," not because the newspaper was published out of the actual presence of the court, but because such criticism has not the object or the result of impeding justice, but rather of advancing it. Besides this distinction, another thing that should be taken into consideration is that the feeling excited in the press by contempt proceedings is chiefly due to their summary character, and, above all, to the fact that the judge is "judge in his own cause." There may be cases in which this is unavoidable, but the difficulty could be frequently obviated by a provision that cases may be sent to another court for trial-which is actually, we believe, the practice in France in the case of insults to judges. As a matter of fact, this end seems to be reached in Illinois in a roundabout way through a supersedeas. versy sold, and became the purchasers, and received a sheriff's deed to the same jointly in 1822; that in 1825 by a deed purporting to convey the whole interest, W. B. conveyed the premises in controversy to R. M. & G., under whom P. claims; that they immediately took possession under the deed, and that they and those claiming under them, including P., have been in the quiet and undisturbed possession of the same ever since claiming the same by a hostile title against the world. A. B. was married to S. B. in 1822, and he died in November, 1853. And this suit was brought in 1872. By an act of the legislature which took effect in May, 1853, dower was abolished. By the same act the interest of a widow in the lands of her husband was enlarged to that of a fee. Held, 1. That the adverse possession of P and those under whom he claimed, 2. That P. thereby became ripened into a perfect title at the end of twenty years. seized of an indefeasible estate in fee in the premises, as much entitled to protection, and as free from legislative interference as if the premises had been conveyed to him by deed. 3. That as the husband was not seized of the premises at his death, the widow did not take as heir, and therefore the statute of limitations did not begin to run against her till the death of the husband (eiting several cases). 4. But that it is firmly settled in Indiana under the law of descents, that where the husband parted with his title to the land before the passage of the law of descents in 1853, and died afterwards, the widow takes nothing (1.) Because dower is abolished by the act (a.) Because so much of the act as enlarges the interest of the wife after the interests of the third parties have accrued, is, as to such third parties, unconstitutional and void (citing many authorities and criticising but following them). 5. That there was no error in the ruling of the circuit court in refusing to let the deed of W. B. to M. R. and G., be read in evidence to avoid the bar of the statute by showing tendency in common, as the deed tended to show the reverse. A. P. Hovey, G. V. Menzes, W. F. Parrett and Luke Wood, for appellants; Asa Iglehart & John E. Iglehart, for the appellees. BUSKIRK, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court. This was an action by the appellant against the appellees to recover the possession of one-sixth of blocks seventeen, nineteen and twenty, in the city of Evansville. The defendants answered by the general denial. There was a trial by jury resulting in a verdict for the defendants. The causes assigned for new trial are: 1. The verdict is contrary to the evidence. 2. The verdict is contrary to law. 3. The court erred in giving instructions for the defendants numbered 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9 and 12. 4 For refusing to give instructions asked for by the plaintiff, marked C., F, G. and H. 5. Refusing to permit the plaintiff to read in evidence the copy of the deed from William R Bowen and wife to Stewart Mollin, John Rankin and Alexander Gallop. The error assigned is based upon the action of the court in overruling the motion for a new trial. The third, fourth and fifth reasons for a new trial are relied upon, in argument, to reverse the judgment. A brief statement of the case will aid in understanding the instructions given and those refused. On the 6th day of April, 1816, the government issued to Hugh The New York Herald sums up our sentiments on this McGary a patent for fractional section 30, township 6, range 10 question, when it says: west. In June, 1821, John Harrison, for the use of William R. and Samuel S. Bowen, recovered, in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court, a judgment against the said Hugh McGary for the sum of seventy-seven dollars and eighty-six cents. At the same term of court, William R. and Samuel S. Bowen obtained in said court a We cling to this wholesome rule-that an editor who libels a citizen should be punished; that when he outrages the law he should be subject to its penalties, and that there is no cant more pernicious and absurd than what we constantly hear about the "liberty of the press." The press does not want "liberty," but justice, and editors who ask for any special privileges or immu-judgment against the said McGary for the sum of six hundred nities are simply beggars, who claim what they do not deserve. and forty-seven dollars and nine and one-half cents. At the same term of said court the said Bowens recovered another judg Ejectment-Limitation-Marital Rights of Wife in ment against the said McGary for the sum of fifty-eight dollars Indiana. and twenty-one cents. On the 28th day of June, 1821, executions were issued upon all of the above-named judgments, for the prin AMANDA W. BOWEN v. CYPRIAN PRESTON AND MARY cipal, interest and costs thereof, and were placed in the hands of the sheriff, who levied upon the lands in dispute, and, by inquisition of twelve men, ascertained the value thereof and reported his doings thereon. On the 8th day of August, 1821, venditioni exponas were issued on said judgments to the said sheriff, who by virtue thereof, on the 3d day of December, 1821, sold said lands to the said William R. and Samuel S. Bowen for one half the appraised value, and on said day executed to the said Bowens a deed therefor. The appellant was married to Samuel S. Bowen on the 6th day of September, 1821, and lived with him as his wife until his death, which occurred on the 2d day of November, 1853. On the 3d day of March, 1821, the said Hugh McGary executed a deed to Jonathan Anthony for the land in controversy; but |