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of it, this would excuse the master from liability, but the opinion would have been much more satisfactory if the conclusions of the court had been stated with more distinctness.

A very important case of this character was decided in 2 Dillon, C. C. R. 259 (see I CENT. L. J. 39), where the rule mentioned above as obtaining in Kentucky and Ohio is adopted. The case was afterward affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. I CENT. L. J. 118; Ibid., 112, see also C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Dickson, 63 Ills. 151.

Liability of Common Carriers for Loss Occasioned by Vis Major-Who may Sue.-The Southern Express Company, in December, 1861, and January, 1862, undertook to carry money-packages from Holly Springs, Miss., to Bowling Green, Ky. The federal forces were known to be then investing Bowling Green, which was occupied by the confederates, and a battle was daily imminent. The packages were not delivered, but carried to Nashville, where they were seized by the federals on their occupancy of that place. The communication. by railroad, between Bowling Green and Holly Springs, was not interrupted until the 14th day of February, 1862. The court held, in effect, though not in terms, that the carriers were liable for the loss.

It was also decided, after a very extended examination of the authorities, that the consignor was the proper party to bring the suit. So. Ex. Co. v. Craft, p. 480.

Will-Renunciation under Foreign Will-Construction of Will. -A citizen of Louisiana died, leaving a will disposing of his estate in that state, but not disposing of certain lands in Mississippi. The widow applied for dower in the Mississippi lands, claiming that as to them the husband died intestate.

Held, that the will could not have been probated in Mississippi, because it disposed of no property in Mississippi; that the common rule, that the widow could not, by the act of the husband, be deprived of dower, and that she must elect, to take under the will, or renounce the will and retain her right of dower only when the devise was expressly declared in the will, to be in lieu of dower, is reversed in Mississippi, and every devise is construed as in lieu of dower unless otherwise expressed in the will, but gives her the privilege of renunciation and election; and that this statute does not apply to a foreign will, especially in this case, when the law of Louisiana gives the widow no privilege of election; that when the right to election does not exist, the statute which construes a devise to be in lieu of dower, ought not to apply; and, finally, that the effect of the Louisiana will was, as to the property in that state, to give the widow the whole estate; and there being in effect no will in Mississippi, the Mississippi property is subject to the ordinary rules of descent and distribution, which would entitle the widow to dower therein. Wilson v. Cox, p. 538.

Bankrupt Act-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-The state courts

performing the carriage, so as to incur liability, ought to have gone to the jury. M. & O. R. R. Co. v. Weiner, p. 725.

The long and bitter contest between the carriers and their patrons, on the question of liability, has given rise to so much litigation, that there is scarcely any firmly settled rule on any one of the various questions which constantly arise; and the courts seem to find it necessary, in each case, to go over and over again the same ground, reviewing and balancing the authorities, and seeking to find where the weight of authority really is, a matter of no little difficulty. Exemption-Waiver of-Law impairing Obligation of Contract, When the whole of a valuable plantation was levied on and offered for sale by sheriff, the owner gave the sheriff a notice to be read at the sale, stating that she claimed 240 acres thereof as exempt, and the sheriff read the same and recited it in his deed to the purchaser, it was held, that failure to proceed formally to have the premises claimed as exempt, designated and set apart, was not a waiver of the exemption. It was the duty of the sheriff to appoint freeholders to set apart the premises claimed as exempt.

The act of the legislature, increasing the amount of the exemption after the debt under which the sale was made was incurred, held, to be a law impairing the obligation of a contract. Lessley v. Phipps, p. 790. [See Cockran v. Darcy, I Cent. L. J. 179; Ibid., p. 249.]

Husband and Wife-What Constitutes Marriage-Constitutional Legalization of Cohabitation.-The complainants, brother and sister, claiming to be the children and heirs at law of one Dickerson, a white man, who died Feb. 2, 1871, leaving property, filed their bill setting forth that Mary Ann Dickerson, a negress, one of the respondents, is the mother of complainants; that their mother and father had never been married, because at the time when their intercourse commenced, marriage between them was prohibited by law, but that "their father loved their mother with all the ardor and devotion of a true lover, and while the laws of the state forbade the solemnization of the marriage rites between them, they were married in heart and by the laws of nature and of love; that their father and mother lived and cohabited together as husband and wife; that the complainants were the fruits of this union, and were always recognized by their father as his children, and they lived with him and their mother, and continued to honor and obey him as their father until his death; that the intercourse between the father and mother of complainants began in 1855 and continued until his death; that he never attempted to marry any woman of his own color; that he remained true to his love, and when the bonds of slavery were stricken from their mother, and the new constitution of the state legalized all such marriages of love by declaring that all persons who have not been married, but are now living together and cohabiting as husband and wife, shall be taken and held, for all purposes in law, as married, and their children, whether born before or after the ratification of this constitution, shall be legitimate, that their father and mother continued to live together as before, until the ratification of the con

have no jurisdiction to enquire into the sufficiency or validity of a judgment stitution; that their father joyfully embraced this opportunity of doing justice of the bankrupt court discharging a debtor. Their jurisdiction may extend to the enquiry whether a debt was or not affected by such discharge.

to her who had been so many years the partner of his bosom, and to the children of his loins; that after he had seen the provisions of the constitution, and knew the effect of a continuance of his intercourse with their mother, he

The syllabus to this cause is unfortunate in simply giving, as clauses 2 and 3. rejoiced that a public ceremony of marriage would be unnecessary; that he

the language of certain sections of the bankrupt act, without advising the reader what, if any, ruling or dicta were declared by the court thereon. Stevens v. Bowen, p. 597.

Confederate Money-Contract Payable in-Measure of Damages.-The note sued on was as follows: "$1140.00.

JACKSON, MISS., 2d June, 1862. On or before the first day of March, 1864, we promise to pay to Darcey & Wheeler, or order, $1140.00, for value received, same being for money loaned, with eight per cent, interest after maturity, until paid, payable in such money, currency or funds as will be generally received for debts in this country, at maturity of this note. (Signed)

"R. & B. SHOTWELL."

Held, that the proper measure of damages was the value of confederate money at the time the note was given-not at the date of its maturity, Darcey & Wheeler v. Shotwell, p. 631.

Carrier-Right to Limit Liability-Negligence.-So frequent are the cases on the liability of carriers becoming, that there must soon be, in each state, as elaborate laws for their government as are now of force on the subject of insurance. The wonder is, that more legislation, good, bad and indifferent, has not been had on this subject.

In this case, the carrier, a railroad company, sought exemption from liability for cotton burned while in transit, on the usual grounds that the loss was caused by inevitable accident, and that a clause in the contract of affrieghtment protected the carrier against loss by fire; and the court awarded a new trial on the ground that the question of fact, whether, notwithstanding the exemption of the carrier by notice or contract, there was not still negligence in

could thus, in a quiet and unobstrusive manner legalize his intercourse with their mother into matrimony; that they continued to live together and cohabit as husband and wife, until the new constitution was ratified; that a brother of their father and one Brown, have obtained possession of all the personal property of their father," etc., and praying relief.

Argued for the complainants: That no particular form is necessary to constitute marriage in Mississippi; that this principle is not changed by any statutory regulation prescribing such form; that no statutory regulations are essential to the validity of a marriage unless the statute proceeds to declare void all marriages not solemnized in accordance with its terms; that nothing, therefore, but the woman's legal incapacity prevented this from being a valid marriage in the first instance; that such incapacity was removed in the lifetime of Dickerson, (1.) by the 14th amendment to the constitution of the United States, which made her a citizen and protected her in her rights; and, (2.) by the act of the legislature of June 14th, 1870, repealing old laws relating to slaves, which forbade such marriages, and such incapacity being removed, subsequent cohabitation constituted a valid marriage; and that by the provisions of the new constitution of Mississippi, providing that " all persons who have not been married, but are now living together, cohabiting as husband and wife, shall be taken and held, for all purposes in law, as married, and their children, whether born before or after the ratification of this constitution, shall be legitimate, and the legislature may, by law, punish adultery and concubinage," [Art. 12, § 22.], the marriage between the father and mother of complainants became absolutely legalized, and complainants became the lawful children and heirs of Dickerson, and entitled to share in the distribution of his estate,

Argued for the respondents, that the status of the father and mother was not at any time a legal one, but one criminal in its nature, and knowingly so, contrary to the law of the state and good morals-and that no legislation or constitutional provision can make that innocent which has once been criminal, so as to affect acts done; that these persons could not have been able by this kind of intercourse to constitute it a valid marriage even if there had been no statutory prohibition, without holding themselves out to the world as man and wife, which they never did; that it could not have been in contemplation by the makers of the new constitution to encourage such proceedings by the enactment of Art. 12, 22, or of the legislature to legalize such marriages by the act passed to legalize the existing de facto marriages which were found to obtain among the colored people; the contrary, the convention which framed the constitution, as is shown by the context, had in contemplation two classes of persons instead of one, and that the words "all persons," construed in connection with the last clause of the section, must be held to mean the class of persons in whose interest this particular clause was deemed necessary, viz: the blacks, who had been deprived by the condition of slavery of the benefits of marriage, and not such persons as had been long indulging in an open and wanton violation of a penal statute; and that these last, among whom are to be reckoned the father and mother of complainants, were directly affected by the last clause of section 22, providing that the legislature should have power "to punish adultery and concubinage."

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The court, after reviewing the authorities as to what constitutes a legal marriage, and declaring that with the adoption of the new constitution, former impediments to marriage between whites and blacks ceased, and that however much people might differ as to questions of policy or propriety, the court can only declare legal rules, and "matters of taste and propriety, like this, the people must determine for themselves," held, that the provisions of the new constitution were intended to apply to all classes, "without regard to race, color or previous condition of servitude," and when it said all persons," it did not mean its provisions to apply to less than all; that "such constitutional action was expedient and wise, it legitimated offspring and settled a rule which could scarcely be confided to legislation with the certainty of satisfactory solution;"' and concluded, that if these parties were "cohabiting as husband and wife," at the time of the adoption of the present constitution, and if with a knowledge of its provisions, they mutually assented to the relation, then their marriage was consummated and their children legitimated. The cause, which came up on error as to a decree sustaining demurrer, was remanded for answer. Dickerson v. Brown, p. 357.

2. That it was not an infraction of the section of the constitution of the state which provides for the establishment of a uniform system of public schools, equally open to all.

3. That it was not in conflict with section 2 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States, which declares that the citizens of one state shall enjoy the privileges of citizens in the several states.

4. That it was not in conflict with the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments of the constitution of the United States, nor any of the amendments of earlier date; nor with the act of Congress known as the "Civil Rights Bill."

Held, also, that the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments do not impose limitations upon the powers of the states to fix, secure and protect the rights, privileges and immunities of their citizens as such, of whatever race or color the sovereignty of the states are (1) to prevent slavery; (2) to prevent negroes or mulattoes being deprived of national rights; (3) to compel the states to recognize negroes or mulattoes as their citizens; (4) to compel the states to give to negroes or mulattoes the same rights which their white citizens enjoy.

they may be. That the only restrictions which said amendments impose upon

THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER (PHILADELPHIA, D. B. CANFIELD & Co.), FOR DECEMBER.

Studies in the Law of the Statute of Frauds, by Henry Reed. [13 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 721.] This article, which has been continued from a former number (p. 602) appears to exhibit much research. The following subjects are considered: III. Indemnities for becoming guarantor or bails

man.

IV. Whether an agreement which can be performed on one side within a year, but not on the other, is within that section of the statute which provides that" no action shall be brought upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof." V. As to what contracts, on the one hand, are for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandise for the price of, etc., and within the statute; as to what contracts, on the other, are for work and labor, and without the statute.

Exempting Manufacturing Establishments from Taxation— Brewer Brick Co. v. Inhabitants of Brewer, Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, opinion by Appleton, Ch. J. [12 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 735.] This case re

sembles the Iola Bridge Co, sup. case, 2 Dillon C. C. 353, and Allen v. Jay, 12 Am, L. Reg. (N. S.) 481. The following is the syllabus:

It is for the legislature to determine what property, real and personal, shall

Only the unique and unprecedented facts in this remarkable case could ex-be subject to and what shall be exempt from taxation.
cuse us for devoting so much space to it. We forbear comment, except to
note that it would seem as if the framers of the Mississippi constitution in
their earnest desire to establish equal rights for all," had, perhaps inadvert-
ently, enacted too much, and thus contributed to the perpetuation and legali-
zation of some of the most flagrant evils which characterized the institution
of slavery.

Exemption of property from taxation is the imposition of increased taxation upon the non-exempt property.

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C. A. C.

Summary of our Legal Exchanges. AMERICAN LAW TIMES REPOrts (New YorK, HURD & HOUGHTON), FOR FEBRUARY.

Constitutional Law-Effect of the XIIIth and XIVth Amendments upon the Sovereign Powers of the States-A State may Provide for the Education of White and Colored Children in

Separate Schools.-Cory v. Carter, Supreme Court of Indiana, November, 1874, opinion by Buskirk, J. [2 Am. L. T. R. (N. S.), 76.] The only case in this number of the American Law Times Reports, which we have not already noticed in other periodicals, is the celebrated Indiana colored school case, which has excited so much comment in the political journals. The following is the syllabus:

A state statute provided, in substance, that a school tax should be levied without regard to the race or color of the owner of the property taxed; that all children, without regard to race or color, should be included in the enumeration for school purposes, the colored children to be enumerated in separate lists, and separate school-houses, and teachers to be provided for them. In the event of there not being a sufficient number of colored children in any district to warrant the erection of a school-house and the employment of a teacher for their separate use, it was made the duty of the proper officers to consolidate adjoining districts, or otherwise provide for the education of such children, their full proportion of the school revenue to be expended for their benefit. Held: 1. That the act was not an infraction of the section of the constitution of the state which provides that the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which shall not equally belong to all citizens.

The legislature cannot constitutionally transfer to municipal corporations the power of determining upon what property, real or personal, taxes shall and upon what they shall not be imposed.

Where the constitution of the state requires taxes, voted by the legislature, to be assessed upon all taxable property in the town, or district, subject to the tax, ratably, or in proportion to the value of the estate or in any other similar manner, it is not competent for the legislature, with the assent of towns, where real estate is situated and liable to taxation, to provide, even by a general law applying to the whole state, that manufacturing establisments, going into operation after the date of the statute, and the consent of the town, together with the capital invested in such establishments, shall be exempt from taxation, while other similar establishments, already existing in such towns, remain subject to such Such exemption is, virtually, the levy of an increased tax upon all the taxable estate in the town, and to that extent, depriving the owner of its value without any equivalent benefit, either directly or indirectly.

tax.

It is essential to all just taxation that it be levied with equality and uniformity.

In a note to this case, Judge Redfield says: "The country have great cause for thankfulness when the courts oppose such firm aud just resistance to the attempts of interested parties to induce the legislature to usurp, for the benefit of such parties, those arbitrary modes of distributing unequal favors through the abuse of the power of taxation."

Power of Debtor to waive Benefit of Exemption Laws.-Maxley v. Ragnun, Kentucky Court of Appeals, opinion by Pryor, J. [12 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.). 743.] This case holds that a debtor cannot, by an executory contract, such as a stipulation in a promissory note, waive the benefit of the state exemption laws, so as to estop himself from subsequently claiming the exemption. The same ruling will be found in Knittler v. Newcomb, 31 Barbour, 170. A contrary view was taken by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in the case of Solomon, I CENT. L. J. 318. Compare Dow v. Cheney, 103 Mass. 181. Judge Redfield, in a note to the case we are noticing, commends the conclusion of the court as being sound and just,

Injunction Issued on Sunday.-Langaber v. Fairbury,,&c., R. R. Co., Supreme Court of Illinois, opinion by Breese, Ch. J. [12 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.). 747.] This is an old case, determined, we believe, about two years ago, and which has been resurrected, we presume, because of its exceptional interest. The syllabus is as follows:

Although Sunday is dies non juridicus at the common law, and although the statute of Illinois prohibits all secular employment on that day, yet in special cases where public policy, or the prevention of irremediable wrong requires it, the courts may sit on that day and issue process.

An injunction issued on Sunday to prevent a railroad company from taking possession of a public street in a town, without having made compensation to property-owners who would be injured thereby, sustained.

Appended to the case is a very learned and interesting note by a person signing himself J. P. B., on the maxim, dies dominicus non est juridicus, in which the writer dissents from the learned chief justice, on the ground, that in deciding as he did, he disregarded an established rule of the common law. We think that in deciding as he did, he displayed the good sense which has attended his judicial labors for a quarter of a century. He probably thought that if the Savior of men could perform a work of necessity on Saturday, the scriptural sabbath, he might venture to issue an injunction on Sunday to prevent a railroad corporation from overriding the rights of the people.

A Criticism.—We notice that the American Law Register does not give the date at which the decisions which it publishes were pronounced. This, we cannot avoid thinking is a practice which ought to be reformed, for reasons which will suggest themselves to every one. If opinions reach the editor of the Register in the state in which they reach us, he is obliged, in each instance, to scratch out the designation of the term of the court at which they were rendered, in order to present them as he does. The omission cannot, hence, be attributed to negligence; but it looks rather like a weak commercial device for palming off old decisions upon its readers as new ones.

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, FOR JANUARY. Good-Will.-The January number of the American Law Register contains the commencement of what appears to be a valuable paper on the subject of the "good-will" of business establishments. On the question what is the correct definition of good-will, and in what it may consist, the writer cites Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. 335; Churton v. Douglas, John. Ch. 174; Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meri. 452; Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 2 Beav. 84; Chissum v. Dewes, 5 Russ. 29; Dougherty v. Van Nostrand, I Hoff. 68; Williams v. Wilson, 4 Sandf. Ch. 379; Elliott's Appeal, 10 P. F. Smith, 161; Gibblett v. Read, 9 Mod. 460; Bradbury v. Dickens, 27 Beav. 53; Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Vesey, 215; Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige, Ch. 75; Holden v. McMakin, I Pars. Eq. 270; Rodgers v. Nowill, 3 DeG., M. & G. 614; S. C. 6 Hare, 325; Farina v. Silverlock, 3 DeG., M. & G. 214: Partridge v. Mench, 2 Barb. Ch. 101; Austin v. Boys, 2 DeG. & J. 626; Farr v. Pearce, 3 Mad. 74; Howe v. Saring, 19 How. Pr. 14; Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Sim. 421; Banks v. Gibson, II Jurist, Part 1, 680.

The writes also cites, on the general proposition that the good-will of a firm is one of the partnership assets and valuable, Macdonald v. Richardson and Richardson v. Marten, I Gif. 81; Banks v. Gibson, 11 Jur., Pt. 1, 680; Johnson v. Helleley, 34 Beav. 63; Williams v. Wilson, 4 Sand. Ch. 379 ; Mellersh v. Keen, 28 Beav. 453; Bradbury v. Dickens, 27 Beav. 53; Austin v. Boys, 2 DeGex & Jones, 626; Turner v. Major, 3 Gif. 442; Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 22 Beav. 84; Willett v. Blandford, 1 Hare, 271; Holden v. McMakin, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. 270; McFarlan v. Stewart, 2 Watts, III; Musselman's App., 6 P. F. Smith, 81; Dougherty v. Van Nostrand, 1 Hoff. 68; Case v. Abeel, 1 Paige, 401; and Marten v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige, 479.

Statute of Limitations-Verbal Promise to Pay barred Debt"Promissory Note not Negotiable."-Currier v. Lockwood, Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, opinion by Seymour, Ch. J., and by Foster J. [14 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.), 12.] A writing in these words, " Due C. & B. seventeen dollars, value received, F. L.," does not import an express promise to pay, but is merely an acknowledgment of indebtedness, from which the law implies a promise to pay. It is not, therefore, a "promissory note not negotable," within the statute which fixes the limitation to actions upon obligations of that description. [Two judges dissenting ]

promise, it was held that the court committed no error of law in so deciding. Judge Redfield, in an interesting note to the above named case, dissents from the conclusion of the court as to the instrument in suit being a promissory note. From the cases he cites, it appears that the following instruments have been held good promissory notes:

"Borrowed of J. S., 50%., which I promise never to pay." Simpson v. Vaughn, 2 Atkins, 32.

For value received of C. & M., or order, thirty dollars and eighty-three cents on demand and interest annually." Cummings v. Gassett, 19 Vt. 308. "Due John Allen, $94.91, on demand." Smith v. Allen. 5 Day, 337. "Due S., or bearer, $340 for value received with interest." Sackett v. Spencer, 29 Barb. 180.

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Due A. B., or order, $20, on demand." Carver v. Haynes, 47 Me. 257. "Due G. S. W., five hundred and twenty-five dollars." Jacquin v. Warren, 40 Ill. 459.

"Good to bearer." Hussey v. Winslow, 59 Me. 170.

"Many similar cases," adds Judge Redfield, " may be found both in this country and in England, and there are few looking in any degree in the opposite direction. The decisions in England seem to treat I. O. U.'s, when no time of payment is named, as not amounting to promissory notes. But these cases may be regarded as resting upon peculiar grounds. It is well understood there to be a form of contract or symbol passing among gentlemen as evidence of merely honorary debts, and to require them to be stamped, would be inconsistent with their character."

Criminal Procedure-Quantum of Proof to Establish Defence of Insanity.-The State v. Crawford, Supreme Court of Kansas, opinion by Valentine, J. [14 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 23.] In a criminal action, where the defence of insanity is set up, it does not devolve upon the defendant to prove that he is insane, by a preponderance of the evidence; but if, upon the whole of the evidence introduced on the trial, together with all the legal presumptions applicable to the case under the evidence, there should be a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is sane or insane, he must be acquitted. The case of The State of Kansas v. Boyle, 10 Kansas, with regard to the effect of repeals of statutes, in criminal cases, referred to and followed. To this case an exceptionally good note is appended by a writer signing himself R. S. H. We wish this writer had signed his full name. He gives in this note such clear proofs of a fine legal mind that the profession will, we are sure, wish to make his acquaintance. 1. From this note it may be concluded that in England the established doctrine is, that the prisoner must make out the defence of insanity to the satisfaction of the jury. McNaughton's Case, 2 Cl. & F. 200; Regina v. Stokes, 3 C. & K. 188; Regina v. Taylor, 3 Cox C. C. 155; Regina v. Laeron, 4 Cox C. C. 149.

2. That in America, the following cases hold that the defence of insanity must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Spencer, 1 Zab. 796 ; State v. Huting, 21 Miss. 477; Bonfante v. State, 2 Minn. 123; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 495.

3. That the following cases support the doctrine that the prisoner must show a preponderance of evidence in favor of his insanity: Com. v. Eddy, 7 Gray, 584; Com. v. York, 9 Metcf. Mass, 93 (leading case); State v. Starling, 6 Jones, N. C. 366; State v. Brandon, 8 Jones, N. C. 465; People v. Myers, 518; Com. v. Heath, 11 Gray, 303 (idiocy). To these we may add a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, opinion by Agnew, Ch. J., which we expect to publish next week.

4. The following cases support the doctrine of the Kansas court, and hold that it is sufficient for the prisoner to raise in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to his sanity: State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224; Polk v. State, 19 Ind. 170; Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385; Ogletree v. The State, 28 Ala. 701; United States v. McClare, 7 Law Rep. (N. S.) 439; State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43; State v. Bringyea, 5 Ala. 241. The Kansas court also cite, in support of their doctrine, Chase v. People, 40 Ill. 224, 228; Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485; People v. Gorbut, 17 Mich. 21, 23; People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58, 64; Smith v. Commonwealth, 1 Duvall (Ky.), 224, 228; Ogletree v. State, 28 Ala. 693.

To our mind the conclusion of the Kansas court seems most consonant with reason; and the tendency of the courts seems to be in favor of this rule. It is a flat contradiction for the law to say in one breath that a prisoner is en

Where the debtor, after the debt was barred by the statute, said to the cred-titled to an acquittal, if there be a reasonable doubt of his guilt, and in the itor, "I will give you a ton of coal for the note," which offer was not accepted, it was held that it was a mere offer of compromise, and not such an acknowledgment as would take the case out of the statute of limitations.

Where the debtor, at another time, said to the creditor, "Have you that note? I wish to settle it," the creditor replying, "It is in the hands of S. and you can settle with him," to which the debtor rejoined, The note is outlawed and good for nothing, and you can go ahead if you want to;" which declarations the court below held not to be sufficient evidence of a new

next breath, that if the defence is, that the prisoner was insane at the time he did the act, he must establish this by a preponderance of evidence, or, what is worse, beyond a reasonable doubt. If he is entitled to acquittal upon a reasonable doubt of his guilt, why should he not be permitted to raise that doubt by evidence tending to show insanity, as well as by evidence tending to establish any other defence? And how can the judge, without invading the province of the jury, instruct them what quantum of proof shall be sufficient to raise that doubt?

Liability of Express Company for Loss of Goods caused by Fire in Railroad Accident.-Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Ex. Co. This case was published in our issue for September 3 of last year (1 CENT. L. J. 436), and we recur to it now for the purpose of saying that the American Law Register, in publishing it, adds to it a valuable note by Judge Redfield, in which he dissents from the views of Judge Ballard on the second proposition involved in the case, namely, that an express company which receives goods to carry, is not responsible for damages caused by accidents originating in the negligence of the servants of the railroad company over whose road such express company conveys the goods entrusted to it.

Legal News and Notes.

-THE Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has granted four hundred and eighty-seven divorces during the present year.

-AMONG the cases disposed of by the Supreme Court of Missouri, at its recent session at Jefferson City, was that of the state against Harper, under indictment for selling liquor without state and county license in the city of Carthage. The plea of the defendant was that he had a license from the authorities of Carthage which superseded the necessity of obtaining a state and county license, and was a bar to any prosecution. The court is said to have decided that a legislative act authorizing the state and county to levy a tax is of higher authority than a city ordinance, and that the charter of the city of Carthage, although granted subsequent to the dram-shop act, in its provisions regulating dram-shops, does not repeal the operation of the dramshop law in the city of Carthage; that the two acts, the charter and the dramshop act, not being incompatible with each other, both of them have a right to regulate dram-shops. A number of cases in the southwest depend upon the decision in this case.

-LEGAL PUNISHMENT FOR NEGLIGENCE has been inflicted by a New -THE Supreme Court of Missouri adjourned its term at Jefferson City trains on the branch of the Pennsylvania Railroad which leads to Harsimus Jersey court. Some months since a collision took place between two freight

on the first instant, and will sit at Saint Joseph, on the third Monday of this month.

-THE three new republican United States senators from the west-Christiancy, of Michigan, Paddock, of Nebraska, and Cameron of Wisconsin, are all natives of the state of New York.

Cove freight docks in Jersey City, and a man was killed. The accident was caused by the neglect of the telegraph operator at the junction with the main line, who should have held one of the trains there until the other had passed, but who failed to do so. This operator, John S. McClelland, was subsequently indicted for manslaughter by the grand jury, and was last week tried in the Hudson county court and found guilty. On the 15th ult. the judge sentenced

-GENERAL CHESTER HARDING, who for more than a quarter of a century, has practiced law at the St. Louis bar, died at the residence of his brother-him to pay a fine of $250. A somewhat similar case was tried in New Jersey in-law, Judge John M. Krum, on Washington avenue, in this city, on Wednesday last. His health has been delicate for a year or more.

-THE London Paper Trade Journal, proposes a compromise on the international copyright question, substantially to the effect that any publisher in the United States, shall have the liberty to reprint, but requiring him to give the author a royalty of 10 per cent., which is copyright without the exclusive right.

-IN Udderzook v. Com., opinion by C. J. Agnew, we noted the uses of the art of photography for the purposes of identification. In the case of Tryon and Dull v. Gamble et al., a brief note of which we have given elsewhere, the art was put to another use. The defendant's scire facias, which was issued on the Wollstonecraft mortgage, March 23, 1829, and which had become to be a much worn document was photographed by G. M. Bretz, popular photographer of Pottsville. Copies were printed very distinctly from the negative, and used with the paper-books at the argument of the case in the supreme court.-[Legal Chronicle.

~W. M. B. HARTLEY, one of the most prominent lawyers of Canada, died suddenly at his residence in Montreal on the 1st inst. He was a graduate of Yale Law School, and resided for some years on this side of the border at Hartford, where he filled the position of secretary to the Colt Arms Manufacturing Company. He was of an adventurous spirit, and at one time became a follower of Garibaldi, having been in the trenches with him before Palermo in 1855. He had also been a successful stock operator on Wall street, and was at one time American vice-consul at Liverpool.

-IN the case of the state against Lack, for murder in Franklin county, tried at the recent term of the Supreme Court of Missouri at Jefferson City, the judgment has been reversed and the case remanded on the ground of the refusal of the circuit court to grant defendant a change of venue. The present law requires the affidavit for a change of venue to be supported by the affida vits of other competent witnesses. In this case the application for Lack was supported by two witnesses, attorneys of Washington, Franklin county. The circuit court held that attorneys at law were not competent witnesses in such The supreme court overrule this doctrine, and declare that attorneys are equally competent with other witnesses, and that this was not proper ground upon which to refuse a change of venue.

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several years ago, when a switch-tender, through whose neglect to close a switch, a train was thrown from the track and a man killed in Newark, was tried for manslaughter, found guilty and sent to the state prison. So it seems that in New Jersey at least some punishment can be inflicted on careless railroad employes, at any rate when human life is lost through their neglect.— [Railroad Gazette.

-DR. KENEALY.-The case of Dr. Kenealy, who has been disbarred and removed from the office of Queen's Counsel, because of his action in the Tichborne case, is, as we learn from the English papers, exciting much sympathy. One newspaper says "that there is a strong feeling among members of the bar that the special offence for which he has been cut off from the exercise of his profession" has been too severely punished, and that his offences, "however odious and reprehensible," do not come within the jurisdiction of the benchers who have disbarred him. Some friends of the Doctor announce that in the event of this decision being confirmed, he will leave London and take up his residence in America. The special offence of the Doctor was the writing of articles in the newspapers abusing the judges before whom he prac tised. It was held that, being an officer of the law, charged with the administration of justice, his attacks upon the bench were calculated to bring justice into contempt, and were really a serious form of blackmailing. The question whether a lawyer can honorably pursue such practices is one deeply important, not only to the bar in England, but in America. We shall await the decision of the judges with interest. If they restore Dr. Kenealy to his position as Queen's Counsel and member of the, bar it will be a declaration that the independence of the lawyer is of higher consideration than the etiquette of the profession. Whatever the legal result of this trial may be, Dr. Kenealy has been so severely condemned, morally, that he can scarcely live in England as an efficient member of the bar.-[New York Herald.

-IN the case of Arthur, collector of New York v. Richard & Iselin, which involved the value of the franc in invoices of foreign goods, Justice Bradley has delivered the opinion of the supreme court to the effect that the statute of March 3, 1873 governs the case, and that the terms of that statute are quite clear and its meaning unmistakable. They are, that the value of foreign coin, as expressed in the money of account of the United States, shall be that of the pure metal of such coin of the standard value. This basis of comparison excludes debased or abraded coin of diminished value, and makes the coin of full standard value, and the amount of pure metal therein the basis for ascertaining the value of foreign money. The gold coins of different countries are properly used for this purpose where they exist, because gold has become the principal medium of international exchange. Accord

-COUNSEL for defendants in error, in Sexson v. Kelley, 3 Neb. 104, arguing upon the insufficiency of a liquor-sellor's bond to cover "all damages accruing to the obligees, and seeking to establish the principle that a partying to this rule, the French franc, compared with United States coin, is worth suing on such bond must, if he recover at all, recover according to its terms, strictly, quotes as his only authority, the following from the Merchant of

Venice:

"Tarry a little ;-there is something else. This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood; The words expressly are a pound of flesh.

Shed thou no blood; nor cut thou less nor more; But just a pound of flesh."

nineteen cents three mills, as ascertained by the superintendent of the mint, and published by the secretary of the treasury. This is the value contended for by the government. The statute was evidently intended to be general and mandatory, and is inconsistent with previous statutes fixing different values. The second section of the act, in fixing the value of the pouud sterling, adopts precisely this principle of comparing the amount of pure metal in standard coins of the two countries, and declaring that such valuation shall be used in the custom-houses, as well as the valuation of contracts. This corroborates the view that the first section is to have the same interpretation,

SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON,

Editor.

ST. LOUIS, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1875.

} WE publish this week the interesting case of St. Louis Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Grigbsy, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, with a judicious note by our valued contributor, Judge Pierce, of Memphis. For the opinion we are indebted to the courtesy of Samuel B. Richardson, Esq., of Louisville, Kentucky.

FOREIGN MARRIAGES.-A curious decision on the law of foreign marriages has lately been rendered by Vice Chancellor Malins in Re Alison's Trusts, 31 Law Times (English) Re

ports, N. S. 638. O., an English Protestant, went through

a form of marriage with V., an Armenian Protestant Christian, at Teheran, she being pregnant at the time. By the Persian law Christian marriages are recognzied, if valid according to the religious denomination of the parties. By the Armenian Church law a woman cannot marry while in a state of pregnancy. The Armenian priests having refused to marry the parties, a Roman Catholic priest performed the ceremony according to the rites of the Romish Church, he having obtained a special license to do so, on the ground that V. was a Roman Catholic and O. a Protestant: Held, that as by the law of the country where the solemnization took place the marriage was invalid, and, as the forms prescribed by 12 and 13 Vict. c. 68, had not been complied with, there was no marriage.

Ecclesiastical Law-The Guibord Case. The facts of this celebrated case are, no doubt, familiar to many of our readers. Guibord, a Catholic of Lower Canada, belonged to a society which persisted in keeping in its library books prohibited by the Church. The whole society were, therefore, excommunicated; and Guibord having died pending the sentence, the ecclesiastical authorities refused to permit his body to be buried in consecrated ground. A mandamus was petitioned for in one of the civil courts, and after a long delay the case has been determined in the English Privy Counsel, and is reported in 31 Law Times Reports, N. S. 555, under the title of Brown v. The Cure of the Parish of Montreal and others. The following are the points ruled: Under the instrument of cession of 1762, confirmed by the treaty of 1763. and by Stat. 14 Geo. 3, c. 83, the Roman Catholic church, as then existing in Lower Canada, though not "established" in the full sense of the term, is

recognized by the state, and has certain rights enforceable at law which beget corresponding obligations, and may give rise to questions between the laity and clergy of a mixed spiritual and temporal character, which can only be determined by the municipal courts. And, therefore: (1) It is not competent to a bishop to deprive a Roman Catholic subject of his rights by pronouncing against him ex mero motu ecclesiastical penalties; but, if the act be questioned, a court of justice has a right to inquire whether it was in accordance with the law and rules of the church. (2) Words in the "Quebec

Ritual," which imply a duty on the part of a cure to consult the ordinary as to the application of the law in doubtful cases, give no power to the ordinary

to extend the law to cases beyond those specified in the "Ritual." (3) is

no answer to a writ of mandamus, issued against a Roman Catholic cure, that the act or omission complained of was done by the order of his ecclesiastical superior, unless he can show that such order was regularly issued by competent authority. The decrees of the Council of Trent, never having been admitted in France to have effect proprio gore, and France having expressly repudiated the decrees of the Congregation of the Index, such decrees can have no authority in Lower Canada, unless it be shown that Her Majesty's

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Roman Catholic subjects in that country have consented, since the cession by France to England, to be bound by them. In a case in which the cure and ecclesiastical burial to a parishioner on the ground that he was a member of

churchwardens of a Roman Catholic parish in Lower Canada refused to give

a society which had been condemned by the bishop, held (reversing the judgment of the court below), that they were not justified in so doing by the ecclesiastical law of Lower Canada, in the absence of a personal sentence of excommunication regularly passed against the deseased The principles laid down in Long v. The Bishop of Capetown (1 Moo. N. S. 461), approved and followed.

Right of Action for Injuries Resulting in Death. We ask attention to a well written communication published in another column, on the recent decision of Judge Dillon in Sullivan v. The Railroad Company (1 CENT. L. J., 595). By the way, we notice that this case has been republished in the Western Jurist for January, and that the learned editor takes occasion to express his unqualified disapproval of it. The ground of this disapproval is, "its actual and direct, as well as confessed, disregard of all precedent, and because of its arrogation of legislative powers.'

We do not understand, that the opinion confessedly disregards all precedents. The language of Judge Dillon is: "The authentic evidence of what the common law is, must be found in the judicial reports. It will be seen that all the cases, English and American, on this subject, rest on the nisi prius decision in 1808, of Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton. Considering that it is not reasoned, and cites no authorities, and the time when it was made, and that the rule it declares is without any reason to support it, my opinion is that it ought not to be followed in a state where the subject is entirely open for settlement. It would be different if the rule had been settled in England by a long course of decisions made prior to the settlement of this country, as in that event the courts here would find it less difficult to receive it. In view of the tenor of these cases, some of which, however, are not well considered, and all of which rest on Baker v. Bolton, it requires some courage to disregard them; but as the rule they assert is incapable of vindication, and cannot be shown to be deeply rooted in the common law, my judgment is, that I am free to decide the rights of the parties without applying it."

The position of Judge Dillon is found to be in effect this: The "principle" was not "well settled" as a principle of the common law of this country. There were several American decisions against it: Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, and authorities cited; Cutting v. Seabury, 1 Sprague, 522; Hirer v. The Sea Gull, 2 Am. Law Times Rep. 15; Price v. The Highland Light, Ibid. 118; James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162. Still, there was, perhaps, a numerical preponderance of cases in its favor. He must repudiate these decisions and throw himself with the minority, or else drive common sense He chose the former and common justice out of his court. alternative; and although over-technical lawyers may cavil, yet we believe the good opinion of his countrymen, professional and lay, will attend him in this instance, as it has attended him throughout his judicial career.

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