REVIVAL OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE.

143

But, with the whole Southern Territory secured for exclusive slave settlement, the insufficiency of the home supply to meet the necessities of the case would be more manifest than ever. With the advance in price breeding would no doubt be stimulated in the older states; but the process of augmentation by natural increase would be slow, while on the other hand, the high price of labour would greatly curtail the profits of cultivation. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the planters of the South would long tolerate an impediment which stood between them and the realization of vast schemes of aggrandizement, more especially when the maintenance of the obstacle could only be justified on grounds of morality which the whole South would reject with disdain. The continued prohibition of the trade would be denounced as an unworthy subserviency to the fanaticism of foreign governments-as (to quote language which has already been employed in this cause) "branding every slaveholder in the land with the mark of guilt and dishonour."* Slaveholders would be called upon as before, but in tones rendered more authoritative by the increased prestige which the cause of slavery would have acquired, to remove "the degrading stigma" from "their most essential political institution," and, as the means at once of filling their pockets and clearing their fame, to repeal a law jarring alike with their moral and material susceptibilities. As opposed to these considerations, the only counter-motive of the slightest weight+

*Mr. John Forsyth, late Minister to Mexico, in the Mobile Register.

† For I do not think that the provision in the Montgomery Constitution prohibiting the African slave trade will, by any one acquainted with the history of the party who framed it, or with the circumstances of the particular case, be so considered. The motives which dictated the provision are very clearly set forth by Mr. Everett in the following passage of a speech delivered some months ago:-"Now, to meet this state of things and this interest, supposed to be vital in Virginia, the skilful men that were employed in drawing up a new constitution for the Confederate States South introduced in the first place a clause prohibiting the African slave trade. This was intended to have the further effect of conciliating foreign influence; but then the next clause was that it should always be competent for a Southern Congress to prohibit the domestic slave trade, and in the debates at Montgomery on this clause no secret was made of the intention of these provisions. It was openly said that they meant to say to Virginia: 'The other border states join the Confederacy, and we allow the domestic slave trade to go on. Stand aloof from us, and we will amend that feature in the constitution which prohibits the African slave trade; we will supply ourselves from that quarter.' Thus you see there was at once in the same breath a bribe and a menace to Virginia, but for the time, and as far as we can judge, not with much effect. The Ancient Dominion' had a character in the world. She was not willing at home or abroad to assume the position of an ancient powerful state standing aloof from such a movement as this on the causes for which its authors inaugurated it, and then, months after, joining it that she might secure to herself the

144

UNANIMITY OF SLAVEHOLDERS.

which can come into play, is the interest of the breeding states in maintaining their monopoly. That they would have this interest in a pecuniary sense is, indeed, abundantly evident. But would this circumstance be allowed permanently to prevail against not merely the equal pecuniary interests of other states in the opposite policy, but against the requirements, in the largest sense, of the whole Slave Republic? A consideration of the course pursued under analogous circumstances on former occasions will show the extreme improbability of such a supposition.

There is perhaps nothing more remarkable in the past career of the Slave Power than the unanimity with which the whole body of slaveholders have concurred in supporting a given policy, so soon as it was clearly understood that the public interests of slavery prescribed its adoption; yet with the line of policy which, in view of this necessity, has been actually followed, the interests of the Slave States have been far from being equally identified. The slave breeding states of Virginia and Kentucky had a very distinct and palpable advantage in opening new ground for slave cultivation across the Mississippi. They thereby created a new market for their slaves, and directly enhanced the value of their principal property. But the slave-working States of Alabama and Mississippi, which were buyers, not sellers, of slaves, which were producers, not consumers, of cotton, had a precisely opposite interest as regards this enterprise. The effect of the policy of territorial extension in relation to them, was to raise the price of slavesthe productive instrument which they employed; and, on the other hand, to reduce the price of cotton-the commodity in which they dealt. It at once increased their outlay and

melancholy privilege of continuing to stock the plantations of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana."

The party which enacted this prohibition is the party which passed and repealed the Missouri Compromise; which accepted and repudiated the principle of the Nebraska Bill. In the former case the bargain was adhered to till the Southern party had appropriated its share of it; in the latter till it was proved unequal to what was required of it. In both cases solemn engagements were set aside the moment they became inconvenient. Considering the circumstances under which the prohibition of the African slave trade has been passed, is it likely that it will be regarded as more sacred than the Missouri Compromise, or than the Nebraska Bill? The following passage from a Florida paper, the Southern Confederacy, will show that the validity of the enactment has been already called into question, and on precisely the same grounds as those on which the former engagements were challenged. "For God's sake, and the sake of consistency, do not let us form a Union for the express purpose of maintaining and propagating African slavery; and then, as the Southern Congress has done, confess our error by enacting a constitutional provision abolishing the African slave trade. The opening of the trade is a mere question of expediency, to be determined by legislative enactment hereafter, but not by a constitutional provision.”

DESIRE TO APPROPRIATE CUBA.

145

diminished their returns. Yet this did not prevent the whole body of Slave States from working steadily together in promoting that policy which the maintenance of the Slave Power, as a political system, demanded. A still more striking instance of the readiness to sacrificè particular interests to the political ascendancy of the body is furnished by the conduct of the South in its dealings with Cuba. The annexation of this island has long been, as all the world knows, a darling project of Southern ambition. The bearing of the acquisition on the general interests of the South is very obvious. It would add to its domain a district of incomparable fertility. It would give it a commanding position in the Gulf of Mexico. It would increase its political weight in the Union. But there is one state in the South which could not fail to be injured in a pecuniary sense by the acquisition. The principal industry of the State of Louisiana is the same as that of Cuba-the cultivation of sugar. But the soils of Louisiana are far inferior to those of Cuba-so much so that the planters of that State are only able to hold their ground against the competition of their Cuban rivals by the assistance of a high protective duty. Now the immediate consequence of the annexation of Cuba to the South would be the abolition of the protection which the planters of Louisiana now enjoy-an event which could not fail to be followed by the disappearance, in great part, of the artificial production which it sustains. Nevertheless, Louisiana has formed no exception to the general eagerness of the South to appropriate Cuba; so far from this, it has curiously enough happened that the man who has been most prominent among the piratical party who have advocated this step is Mr. Slidell,* the senator in Congress for the State of Louisiana. The sympathies which bind slaveholders together have thus always proved more powerful than the particular interests which would sunder them; and whatever course the necessities of slavery, as a system, have prescribed, that the whole array of slaveholders, with a disregard for private ends, which, in a good cause, would be the highest virtue, has never hesitated to pur

sue.

The precedents, therefore, afforded by the past history of the South would lead us to expect that, so soon as the expediency of the African slave trade, in promoting the political interests of the Slave Power, became clear, the private advantage of particular states would be waived in deference to the requirements of the whole Confederacy. But, though this should not be so *This was the gentleman selected by Southern tact to recommend the cause of the South to Europe.

146

FREE TRADE IN SLAVES.

-though the border states, when the trial came, should prove deficient in that public spirit which the working states in similar circumstances have never failed to exhibit-it is still quite inconceivable that what the public interests required should be permanently postponed to an opposition resting on such a basis. The men who now guide the councils of the Confederacy, from the moment of their accession to power to the present time, have never shrunk from any act essential to their ends: such men, having triumphantly carried their party through a bloody civil war, would hardly allow themselves to be baffled by the selfish obstinacy of a few of their number. Indeed already the particular expedient to which, in the event of protracted obstinacy, recourse might be had, has been hinted at in no obscure terms. Mr. De Bow has advocated the reopening of the African slave trade upon the distinct ground that it is necessary to extend the basis of slavery by bringing slaves within the reach of a larger number than, at their present price, are able to purchase them. By this means, he argues, increased stability would be given to the institution in proportion as the numbers interested in maintaining it should be increased. Of the soundness of this policy from the stand-point of the Slave Power there can, I think, be no question; and for the means of carrying it out in the last resort the extreme party could be at no loss. Let the reader observe the purpose to which this argument might be turned in the event of a schism between the breeding and the working states on the point in question. It is well known that the possession of a slave is the great object of the poor white's ambition, and the most effectual means of gratifying this ambition would be to make slaves cheap. To rally, then, to the cause of free trade in slaves this numerous class would be, indeed, an easy task. Nothing more would be needed than to appeal to their most obvious interest, to give play to their most cherished passion. Everywhere-in Virginia and Kentucky no less than in the states of the extreme South-the opening of the African slave trade would be hailed with enthusiasm by the great bulk of the people; and thus, whenever convenience demanded it, the resistance of an interested section might be overborne by the almost universal voice of the rest of the community.

To sum up the results of this part of the discussion :-on every hypothesis of Southern independence, save that which would be equivalent to the early extinction of the Slave Power, the reopening of the African slave trade would be recommended to the South by almost irresistible inducements-in one contingency by considerations which appeal to interests that are

DUTY OF EUROPE-NEUTRALITY.

147

vital. The only source of opposition would be the private interests of the breeding states; but private interests in the history of the South have always yielded to the demands of public policy, and would probably do so in this case. In the event, however, of the breeding states proving refractory, the leaders of the extreme party would have the remedy in their own hands. The protest of a narrow minority would be wholly powerless to stem the tide of popular feeling which they have it in their power at any moment to evoke.

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

WHAT is the duty of European nations towards North America in the present crisis of its history? I answer-to observe a strict neutrality between the contending parties, giving their moral support to that settlement of the question which is most in accordance with the general interest of the world. What ground is there for European interference in the quarrel? In the present aspect of affairs absolutely none-none, that is to say, which would not equally justify interference in every war which ever occurred. I say, in the present aspect of affairs, for in a different aspect of affairs I can well imagine that a different course would be justifiable, and might even become a duty. Supposing free society in North America in danger of being overborne by the Slave Power, would not the threatened predominance in the new world of a confederacy resting on slavery as its corner stone, and proclaiming the propagandism of slavery as its mission, be an occasion for the interference of civilized nations? If there be reason that civilized nations should combine to resist the aggressions of Russia-a country containing the germs of a vigorous and progressive civilization -would there be none for opposing the establishment of “a barbarous and barbarizing Power”—a Power of whose existence slavery is the final cause? But that contingency is happily not now probable; and in the present position of the American contest there is not even a plausible pretext for intervention. It is unhappily true that our trade is suffering, that much distress prevails in our manufacturing districts, and that we are threatened with even more serious consequences than have yet been felt. But is this a plausible pretext for interfering in a foreign war? How can a great war be carried on without dis