BATTLE OF BOYDTON ROAD.

361

of more than two hours of exhausting efforts, he reached a position directly on the flank of the Confederate line, with the run between his forces and Warren's main body. The latter, finding the nature of the country very different from what he supposed it to be, ordered Crawford to halt until Meade could be consulted. At the same time Gibbon's division, under General Eagan, was pushing out from Hancock's column, to form a connection with Crawford's; but so dense was the tangled wood of the swamp, that each commander was ignorant of the proximity of the other, though the distance between them was scarcely a mile.

These movements had been eagerly watched by the Confederates, and Hill's leading division, under Heth, was sent to attack Hancock's isolated force before the remainder of the Army of the Potomac should cross Hatcher's Run. Heth moved so stealthily, that the first intimation of his presence was given at four o'clock in the afternoon by volleys of musketry and a furious charge upon Pierce's brigade of Mott's division. That startled brigade gave way, and left two guns as spoil for the assailants. The latter eagerly pursued the fugitives over an open space along the Boydton road, when they were struck heavily by Eagan, who, on hearing the sounds of battle in his rear, had changed front and hastened to the rescue. He swept down the plank road with the brigades of Smythe and Willett of his own division, and McAllister's brigade of Mott's division, while the brigade of De Trobriand and Kirwin's dismounted cavalry advanced at the same time. The Confederates were driven back, the guns were recaptured, and a thousand of their men were made prisoners. Others, in their flight, to the num ber of two hundred, rushed into Crawford's lines, and were captured. Had that officer been ordered to advance at that moment, the capture or dispersion of Heth's whole force might have been the result. Ayres was on the way, but night fell, and he halted before reaching Hancock, who, meanwhile, had been sorely pressed on his left and rear by five brigades of cavalry under Wade Hampton. Gregg fought them gallantly, and Hancock sent him all the infantry supports he could spare. The conflict continued until after dark, and the Confederates had gained no ground, when the struggle known as THE BATTLE OF THE BOYDTON ROAD ended. In these encounters Hancock lost about fifteen hundred men, and his antagonist at least an equal number. Uncertain whether the forces of Ayres and Craw

ARMY CABIN.1

ford would join him in time to meet or make an attack the next morning, and his ammunition being short, Hancock withdrew at midnight, and the whole army was behind the intrenchments at Petersburg, and those of Warren on the Weldon road, the following morning."

• October 28, 1864.

1 This shows the form of some of the better class of army cabins. They were generally made of rough logs. in the common style of cabins on the frontier. Some of the chimneys were built of bricks procured by the destruction of houses, and others were made of wood and mud, and surmounted by a barrel.

362

GRANT'S CAMPAIGN, AND ITS RESULTS.

With these movements Grant's campaign was practically closed for the year 1864, and his army prepared themselves huts for comfortable winter quarters. The movement of General Butler, on the north side of the James, at the same time in co-operation with that on the extreme left, was made with vigor and success, and being intended chiefly as a feint, ceased with the other. The Tenth and Eighteenth Corps had pushed well out to the right, the latter as far as the battle-ground of the Seven Pines, within a few miles of Richmond. These fell back to their lines, extending from New Market Heights to the James at Dutch Gap, and went into winter quarters.

General Butler established his head-quarters at the mansion of a farm about two miles from Aiken's Landing, and one from Dutch Gap.'

1 This was the appearance of General Butler's head-quarters when the writer made the sketch at the close of 1864. The general occupied the two log-houses seen in the front, and his staff some of the smaller ones near. The mansion is seen in the rear of head-quarters.

2 Professor Coppée, author of Grant and his Campaigns, was furnished, by an officer of the LieutenantGeneral's staff, with the following tabular statement of casualties in the Army of the Potomac, from May 5 to November 1, 1864.

During the period above named, according to the same statement, the number of prisoners captured by the Army of the Potomac was 15,373; the number of colors captured, 67; the number of guns captured by the Army of the Potomac, 82; the number lost by it, 25.

The above statement does not include the losses of the Army of the James, which, if added, would make the aggregate loss of the forces operating against Lee and the post of Richmond, during six months, the appalling number of 100,000 men. General Hancock said, in a letter to General Burns, that from the crossing of the Rapid Anna to the crossing of the James, he had lost his entire corps (25,000 in number). Its ranks had been kept full by re-enforcements. It is estimated that of the whole number captured, wounded, and missing (mostly prison

SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

363

Let us now turn for a moment to the consideration of the movements of the detachments of the two contending armies in Virginia, under Generals Sheridan and Early, whom we left in the region west of the Blue Ridge, between the Potomac and Winchester.1

Sheridan assumed the command, with his head-quarters at Harper's Ferry, on the 7th of August. He spent a month in getting his forces well in hand for an aggressive campaign, and in maneuvers to prevent the Confederates from getting the bountiful crops in the Lower Shenandoah Valley. During that time there were some stirring events there. Early tried to lure Sheridan far enough up the Valley to allow him to swoop down to the Potomac and beyond, by the National flank and rear. Sheridan was too wily for his antagonist, and contented himself with driving him toward Strasburg, and keeping the way into Maryland and Pennsylvania closely guarded against another raid, until he was ready to move in force offensively. He had been anxious to begin such movements; but Grant, made extremely cautious by late experiences, withheld consent, for, in the event of defeat, Maryland and Pennsylvania would be laid open for another invasion. In order to understand the situation in that region, Grant visited Sheridan at the middle of September." "I met him," says the Lieutenant-General, "at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instruction necessary-Go in!" In those two words and no more, Grant showed his unreserved confidence in Sheridan's ability; and the events of a few weeks satisfied him and the country that he had judged and trusted wisely.

"Sept. 16,

1964.

Sheridan's troops, at that time, lay in front of Berryville, on the turnpike leading from that town across the Opequan Creek to Winchester. Early was on the same road, west of the ford of the Opequan, which is about four miles east of Winchester, and thus covered that city. Contemplating an offensive movement, he had extended the bulk of his army, by his left, to Bunker's Hill, leaving his right on the Berryville road, weak and isolated. Sheridan, who was about to make a bold movement to Early's rear, had watched him with keenest scrutiny; and when, on the 18th, the Confederate leader sent half his army from Bunker's Hill, on a reconnoissance to Martinsburg (which Averill repulsed), he determined to "Go in!" at once, and crush that weak right, and cut up the remainder in detail. He put his forces under arms that evening, and at three o'clock in the morning ⚫ Sept. 19. they were all in motion toward Winchester, Wilson's cavalry leading. The Sixth Corps, under General Wright, followed in double columns, flanking the Berryville turnpike, with its artillery and wagon-train moving along that highway. The Nineteenth Corps, under General Emory, followed in the same order, it being the intention of Sheridan to have his whole force across the Opequan before Early could bring back his troops

b

ers), 30,000 afterward rejoined the army, making the total loss of effective force 70,000. The estimated loss of the Confederates, during the same period, including over 15,000 prisoners, was 40,000.

1 See page 350.

2 The Union army was then inspirited by the success of Wilson and his cavalry, a few days before, who struck the flank of Kershaw's division, and captured 171 of the Eighth South Carolina, with their colonel.

364

SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON WINCHESTER.

from Bunker's Hill to his endangered right. Crook's (Eighth) corps, then in the vicinity of Summit Point, was ordered to join the main forces at the Opequan ford, while Averill and Torbett were to make demonstrations on the Confederate left.

Wilson crossed the Opequan at daybreak, and moved swiftly along the pike, which passed through a narrow mountain gorge, charging upon and

sweeping away all opposers, and securing a space within two miles of Winchester, for the deployment of the army. He was closely followed by the Sixth Corps; but the Nineteenth was so delayed by the wagon-train of the former, that the battle-line was not formed until nine o'clock in the morning. Then it stood with the Sixth Corps on the left, flanked by Wilson's cavalry, the Nineteenth Corps in the center, and Crook's Kanawha infantry in the rear, in reserve. In the mean time, Early had hurried the bulk of his troops up from Bunker's Hill to Winchester, and before Sheridan was ready for attack, these were strongly posted in a fortified position on a series of detached hills northwestward of the town. They had a powerful line thrown forward for the purpose of breaking that of the Nationals by a vigorous charge, and seizing the gorge already mentioned, through which, alone, the Unionists, if beaten, might retreat. Averill had followed the Confederates closely from Bunker's Hill, and now formed a junction with Merritt's horsemen. These two powerful cavalry divisions enveloped Winchester on the east and north. Early's position compensated him, in a degree, for his inferiority in numbers, while Sheridan's superior cavalry gave the Nationals a very great advantage.

Between the two armies lay a broken, wooded country, over which it was difficult for troops to move; and to reach the left and center of Early's

1 This is from a sketch. from the eastern bank of the stream, looking toward Winchester, made by the author in October. 1866. It shows the place where the whole of Sheridan's army crossed the stream on the morning of the 19th of September, 1864.

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.

365

line (which seemed to be the only vulnerable points, for the right was too strongly posted to be moved by assault), the Nationals had to go through the narrow pass among wooded hills already mentioned. This was undertaken at ten o'clock, first by Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, followed by Grover's of the Nineteenth. These pressed forward vigorously over the rough country, in the face of a terrible storm of shells, and charging Early's center furiously, carried his first line, and inflicted upon him the loss of the gallant General Rodes, who was killed. Early quickly hurled upon the assailing columns two of his most powerful divisions, hoping to succeed in his plan of breaking the line and seizing the pass. The Nationals were thrown back in great disorder, and with heavy loss, the confusion and the bereavement being greatly increased by a heavy fire on their flank, as they reeled toward the pass from which they had emerged, and which the victors were striving to reach first. It seemed, for a moment, as if the day was lost to the Nationals, when Captain Rigby, with a sergeant and twelve men of the Twenty-fourth Iowa, on reaching a designated rallying point, turned and faced the pursuers. In the

space of a few minutes, scores of brave men were added to their number. At the same time, Grover ordered two guns of the First Maine Battery, Captain Bradbury, to a position in a gap. These opened upon the Confederates, who were pressing forward to seize them, and at the same moment the enemy received a volley in their rear from the One Hundred and Thirty-first New York, which Emory had rallied and placed in a projecting wood. This caused the Confederates to recoil, when the new-forming line poured upon them a shower of musketry that sent them flying back to their lines. This was followed by a rapid rallying of the broken columns, and re-forming of