INVASION OF MARYLAND.

341

CHAPTER XIII.

INVASION OF MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA-OPERATIONS BEFORE PETERSBURG ANI: IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

T has been observed that the authorities at Washington feared a visit from Lee's troops when the Army of the Potomac should be placed on the south side of the James River.1 At about the time we are considering-the midsummer of 1864— these fears were realized. Finding the pressure of his antagonist very severe, and the dangers to his army at and around Richmond hourly increasing, Lee sought to avert impending calamity by diverting so much of the Union army to some distant point, as to practically relieve Petersburg and Richmond of siege. That contemplated point of diversion was the National Capital, the most feasible way to which, by Confederate troops, seemed to be by the Shenandoah Valley and across the Potomac into Maryland, taking it in reverse. Lee eagerly watched an opportunity for the movement. It was offered when Hunter fled from before Lynchburg into Western Virginia, with an exhausted and broken army,' and left the Shenandoah Valley, and its door opening into Maryland at Harper's Ferry, guarded only by a moderate force under General Sigel, posted at Martinsburg.

a

4

General Early, in command of troops in the upper part of the Valley, was directed by Lee to gather to his own all the troops in that region, and move rapidly to and across the Potomac into Maryland, with the threefold object, it appears, of drawing National troops from before Petersburg, procuring supplies, and attempting the capture of Washington City. Early quickly obeyed. With from 15,000 to 20,000 troops of all arms, he swept rapidly down the Valley toward Williamsport. Sigel, too weak to resist the avalanche, fled into Maryland, with a heavy loss of stores, and General Weber, in command at Harper's Ferry, retired to Maryland Heights. Grant, meanwhile, had directed Hunter, who was then on the Kanawha, to hasten to Harper's Ferry with all possible ,dispatch; but insuperable obstacles kept him back until it was too late to be of essential service, and Early found no troops at hand to oppose his invasion, except a few in the Middle Department, commanded by General Lewis Wallace, whose head-quarters were at Baltimore.

* July 8, 1864.

Early crossed the river at Williamsport, accompanied by Bradley T. Johnson as commander of a brigade, and a notorious guerrilla leader named

3

1 See note 3, page 332.

2 See page 316.

See page 416, volume I.

O Composed of two infantry corps, under Breckinridge and Rodes, a division of cavalry under Ransom, and three batteries of artillery.

342

CONFEDERATES RAIDING AND PLUNDERING.

Harry Gilmor,' both bitter Maryland rebels, who now, as the chosen guides and assistants of the chief of the invaders, brought war with all its horrors to the doors of their neighbors and

WEBER'S HEAD-QUARTERS, HARPER'S FERRY."

Vague rumors had reached General Wallace, at Baltimore, concerning the perils of Sigel. Then came positive information of the passage of the Potomac by the Confederates, and their raiding within the borders of General Couch's Department; and finally, on the 5th of July, he was informed that their movements indicated an intention to march upon Baltimore or Washington in heavy column. Finding his Department thus threatened, Wallace took measures for checking the invaders at the Monocacy River, with the few available troops under his command. General E. B. Tyler, was then at the railway bridge over the Monocacy, with about one thousand men, and thither Wallace hastened, to ascertain, in person, the true state of affairs in that direction. Wild rumors were afloat, but no reliable information concerning the number or the whereabouts of the invaders could be obtained. He prepared for any emergency, and chose a commanding position on the east side of the Mo

1 This young man was a member of a respectable Maryland family. He entered the Confederate service as one of Turner Ashby's cavalry in the Shenandoah Valley, in the summer of 1861, and the field of his operations, as follower and leader, was chiefly in that and the mountain region around. After the war he, with an obtuseness of moral perceptions hardly to be conceived, published a confession of his crimes against his country, in s book with the title of Four Years in the Suddle. His excessive egotism is the most prominent feature of the book, and continually inspires the reader with just doubts concerning the truthfulness of his narratives of exploits of which he says he was the hero. In the raid into Maryland which we are now considering, this man was one of the chief instruments in distressing the inhabitants of his native State. He appears to have taken special delight, according to contemporary writers, in plundering and devastating expeditions; and, according to his own confession (see page 210), he was chosen by General M'Causland as the proper person for burning the city of Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania. For a full account of the conduct of this man and his followers, at Chambersburg, see the narrative of the burning of that place, by the Reverend B. S. Schenck, D. D., who was an eye-witness.

2 This invasion produced great alarm, and caused the Government to issue an urgent call upon Pennsylvanis, New York, and Massachusetts, for troops to meet it. The President called for 12,000 from Pennsylvania, and 5,000 each from New York and Massachusetts.

3 This spacious building, on the corner of Shenandoah and High Streets, in the village of Harper's Ferry, and belonging to the Government, was used as head-quarters by all of the commanding officers there, of both parties, during the war.

4 General Wallace assumed command of the Middle Department, consisting of Delaware and a portion of Maryland, on the 22d of March, 1864. That Department was then seemingly remote from danger, external and internal, and the entire number of available troops in it, and composed chiefly of Home Guards and One Hundred days' men, did not much exceed 2,500. These were chiefly employed in garrisoning the forts and prisons in Maryland, and in co-operating with the troops in the Department of Washington, under General Augur, in guarding the fords of the Potomac as far up as Point of Rocks.

5 General Wallace left the direction of the affairs of the Department, at head-quarters, with Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel B. Lawrence, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief-of-Staff. Fortunately, Wallace had assisted the Union League of Baltimore to organize for military service, and they reported promptly for duty. To General W. W. Morris was assigned the command of the garrison of Baltimore, and General H. H. Lockwood, then in that city awaiting orders, was invited to take command of the civil forces. These two officers performed efficient service at that crisis.

MEASURES FOR SAVING WASHINGTON CITY.

"July 6,

1864.

343 nocacy for the concentration of his forces, so as to cover the Baltimore and Ohio railway crossing, and the chief highways leading to the menaced cities. On the evening of the 6th, all of his effective men that could be spared from watching the railways leading into Baltimore from the north, which the Confederates were evidently trying to seize, were gathered at the appointed rendezvous, under Tyler.' That night," Wallace ordered Colonel Clendennin to go out toward Middletown with four hundred men, in search of positive information concerning the Confederates. He marched at daylight,' with a section of Alexanders' artillery, and at that village he encountered a thousand horseman, under Bradley Johnson, who pushed him steadily back toward Frederick by threatening his flanks. Gilpin's regiment, with one gun, and the mounted infantry, were sent to help Clendennin; and late in the afternoon there was a sharp fight in front of Frederick with artillery and small-arms. At six o'clock Gilpin charged the Confederates, and drove them back to the mountains.

July 7.

C July.

Meanwhile, General Grant, aware of the peril that threatened the Capital, ordered the Sixth Corps to Washington. The advance division, under General Ricketts, arrived there late on the 6th, and were sent to Baltimore that night, with orders to push on to the Monocacy River as quickly as possible. Informed of the fact that veterans were coming, Wallace ordered Tyler to Frederick; and when, at dawn on the 8th, a portion of Ricketts's (First) brigade, under Colonel Henry, reached the Monocacy, they, too, were sent to join Tyler. At that time the wildest rumors filled the air of the force and position of the Confederates. Wallace was soon satisfied that the defense of Frederick was a secondary consideration, for news reached him that the invaders were pressing toward the Washington turnpike in heavy column, and were threatening his line of retreat. Impressed with the belief that Washington City was their chief objective, and knowing it to be without sufficient troops to defend it against the reported strength of the invaders, Wallace determined to throw his little army across their path, and, if possible, keep them at bay until succor should reach the Capital. So he withdrew his troops from Frederick to his chosen position on the Monocacy, where he found a greater portion of Ricketts's division.

Early on the morning of the 9th, Wallace made dispositions for battle. His right, under Tyler, covered the railway and the Baltimore pike, and Ricketts held the Washington pike, on the left, where the main attack was expected. Each had three guns. Colonel Brown, with his command and the mounted infantry, held a stone bridge of the Baltimore pike, on Tyler's

1 There, within the space of two miles and a half, converged the turnpikes to Baltimore and Washington, and the Ohio and Baltimore railroad; and there was the iron bridge of the railway upon which depended railroad communication with Harper's Ferry. The river covered the entire front of the position, making it very strong. That position was on commanding heights, while the ground on the other side of the river was low.

2 These were composed of the Third (Maryland) Potomac Home Brigade, Colonel Charles Gilpin; Eleventh Maryland Infantry, Colonel Landstreet; seven companies of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth, and three companies of the One Hundred and Fifty-ninth Ohio National Guard, under Colonel A. L. Brown; Captain Alexander's (Maryland) battery; and one hundred men of the One Hundred and Fifty-ninth Ohio, serving as mounted infantry, under Captains S. H. Lieb and N. S. Allen. In addition to these, Wallace had the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Clendennin's squadron of cavalry, two hundred and fifty strong, and four companies of the First (Maryland) Potomac Home Brigade, about two hundred in number, under Captain Brown. The Eleventh Maryland and all the Ohio troops were "hundred days' men."

344

THE BATTLE OF THE MONOCACY.

right, and was Wallace's chief dependence in the protection of that flank. Clendennin and his cavalry watched the lower fords, and skirmishers were sent out some distance in advance of the Monocacy bridges. At a blockhouse near the railway was a rude earthwork, bearing a 24-pounder howitzer. Such was the disposition of Wallace's little force to resist the attack of what proved to be an army full twenty thousand strong, with a large park of

July 9

1864.

artillery,' that advanced from Frederick at eight o'clock in the morning. Three of Ricketts's regiments were yet behind, but were expected by railway at one o'clock in the afternoon. Planting his Napoleon guns, sixteen in number, behind his skirmish line as he advanced, Early opened the battle at about nine o'clock. The contest rapidly grew warmer and more general as he drew near, and Brown soon found it difficult to maintain his position at the stone bridge. At the same time a large body of Confederates, moving by their right out of range of Ricketts's guns, forced a passage of the Monocacy at a ford on his left, and at half-past ten moved upon him in battle order. Ricketts changed front to meet the attack, his right resting on the river; but in so doing he exposed himself to an enfilading fire from Early's guns across the stream; and so over-matched was he in numbers, that he was likely to be soon enveloped. Perceiving this, the watchful Wallace sent, first, two of Tyler's guns to Ricketts, and then every man that could be spared from other points.

The invader's first line made a furious charge, and was quickly thrown back. The second then charged, and after a more protracted struggle, was also repulsed, and fled to the woods in confusion. So great was the disparity in numbers, that Wallace would have been justified in retreating at that time, and could easily have done so; but his desire was to develop the strength of the invaders, and to keep them at bay as long as possible. Expecting Ricketts's three fresh regiments at one o'clock, and believing that with them he might maintain his position, he stood firm and fought desperately until that time and an hour beyond. Then, having no tidings of the approaching troops, and seeing the Confederates issuing from the woods in two strong columns to make another charge, he reluctantly ordered Ricketts to retreat by the Baltimore pike. That retreat began at four o'clock in the afternoon.

In the mean time, Tyler had been as gallantly fighting the foe on the right of the National line, and Brown yet possessed the stone bridge which Wallace had said must be held at all hazards until Ricketts could cross over to the Baltimore pike. This position was now of vital importance. Tyler sent Brown all of his reserves, and held his own position firmly, though pressed by an eager and vastly superior foe. He fought on with the greatest gallantry until Ricketts's column was safe, when at five o'clock Brown was compelled to abandon the bridge, and retreated down the Baltimore pike.

1 In a memorandum of events connected with these operations, given to the author by Colonel Lawrence Wallace's chief-of-staff, he avers that an officer of Early's staff, after the battle, said that the Confederate army (nearly all of which was in the engagement) consisted of about 16,000 infantry, 52 pieces of artillery, and nearly 6,000 of the best cavalry.

2 "At one o'clock," says Wallace, in his report, "the three re-enforcing regiments of veterans would be on the ground; and then the splendid behavior of Ricketts and his men inspired me with confidence. One o'clock came, but not the re-enforcements; and it was impossible to get an order to them, for my telegraph operator, and the railroad agent with both his trains, had run away."

THE NATIONAL CAPITAL SAVED.

FREDERICK

345

Tyler's remaining force, half enveloped by the swarming foe, was compelled to follow; and the general and his staff, separated from them, dashed into the woods, and barely escaped capture. "His gallantry and self-sacrificing devotion," said Wallace, "are above all commendation of words." Pursuit was feeble, for the bulk of Early's cavalry, under Johnson, was then marching on Baltimore by the Liberty road, and the remainder, under M'Causland, were too badly cut up in the fight, for any vigorous action after it. The fugitive army was joined by Ricketts's three absent regiments at Newmarket, and covered the retreat of the wearied troops; and at the distance of twelve miles from the field of strife, the whole army bivouacked.

So ended THE BATTLE OF THE MONOCACY, in the ultimate

defeat of the few National

BAL

MARCH

OHIO RAILWAY

开

RIVER

PIKE

2

POSION

UNION

CONFEDERATE

FREDERICK
BRANCH TO

BALTIMORE

YLER

TONE BRIDGE

០

BATTLE OF THE MONOCACY.

RAILWAY

troops there engaged, but in triumph for the National cause; for the check given to the flushed invaders, by Wallace, in that gallant fight of eight hours, which gave time for re-enforcements to reach Washington, saved the Capital. So declared the Secretary of War and the Lieutenant-General. But for that check of full thirty hours (for Early was so smitten that he could not move until noon the next day), the Capital would doubtless have been his prize, and a heap of black ruins its possible fate. In view of all the circumstances, the battle of the Monocacy appears as one of the most important and brilliant of the war.

On the evening after the battle, the inhabitants of Baltimore were in

I Wallace warmly commended the gallantry of Colonel Clendennin, who, he said, was "as true a cavalry soldier as ever mounted a horse." He was cut off from the main body at the time of Ricketts's retreat. Throwing his followers into the village of Urbana, he there repeatedly repulsed the pursuing cavalry, and in one bold charge, saber in hand, he captured the battle-flag of the Seventeenth Virginia.

2 The number of National troops engaged in the battle, including Ricketts's command, was about 5,500, while about 20,000 of the Confederates were in the fight, or near enough to furnish assistance. The character of the battle may be inferred from the fact that the loss of the Nationals was more than thirty per cent. of their number, being 1,959, of whom 98 were killed, 579 were wounded, and 1,282 were missing, many of the latter having straggled in the retreat. The Confederates took only 700 of them prisoners. The estimated loss of the Confederates was equal to that of the Nationals.

On account of the urgency of the retreat, the want of ambulances, and especially because of the desertion of the railway agent with his trains, Wallace was compelled to leave his dead and wounded on the field. In his report he said that orders had been given to collect the bodies of the slain "in one burial-ground on the battlefield, suitable for a monument, upon which I propose to write: These men died to save the National Capital, and they did save it."

3 General Grant, in his final report, said: "His (Wallace's) force was not sufficient to insure success; but he fought the enemy, nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two divisions of the Sixth, and the advance of the Nineteenth Corps, before him."