326

BATTLE OF THE NORTH ANNA.

Hancock, in the mean time, had been preparing to force a passage of the stream at Chesterfield bridge, where he was confronted by McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps. These troops were mostly on the south side of the river, but held a tête-du-pont, or bridge-head battery of redan form, on a tongue of land on the north side. This, after a brief cannonade by three sections of field-pieces, planted by Colonel Tidball, the chief of artillery, was stormed and carried at six o'clock in the evening by the brigades of Pierce and Eagan, of Birney's division. They lost one hundred and fifty men, and captured thirty of the garrison. That night the Confederates tried in vain to burn the bridge; and before morning they abandoned their advanced works on the south side of the stream, and withdrew to a stronger posiMay 24, tion a little in the rear. Hancock passed over the bridge in the morning which his troops had preserved, without feeling the enemy, and at the same time Wright's corps crossed the river at Jericho Ford, and joined Warren's.

1964.

The Army of the Potomac was now in peril. Its two powerful wings were on one side of a stream, difficult at all times to cross, and liable to a

The

ing on Little River; and the right, covering Sexton's junction of the two railways running into Richmond, rested on the marshes of Hanover. powerful center, at the point of the wedge, was near the river, and menaced Grant's center. And so it was, that when Burnside's (Ninth) corps, of that center, attempted to cross between the two wings of the Army of the Potomac, his advance division (Crittenden's) was quickly met, and repulsed with heavy loss. And when Warren, on the right, attempted to connect with Burnside, by sending Crawford's division in that direction, an overwhelming force fell upon him with almost fatal weight.

b

Grant paused, and for more than two days he studied the position of his adversary, and came to the conclusion that Lee could be dislodged only by a flanking movement, which he proceeded to make. He secretly recrossed the river on the night of the 26th, and going well eastward, so as to avoid a blow on his flank, resumed his march toward Richmond, his objective being the passage of the Pamunkey, one of the affluents of the York, formed by the junction of the North and South

May.

THE ARMIES ACROSS THE PAMUNKEY.

327

Anna rivers, which would force Lee to abandon the line of those streams, and give to the Army of the Potomac an admirable water base of supplies, at White House.'

2

a

" May 25,

1864.

May 27.

Sheridan, who, as we have seen, had just returned to the army after his great raid toward Richmond and across the head of the Peninsula, now led the flanking column with two divisions. of cavalry, immediately followed by Wright's corps, leading Warren's and Burnside's. Hancock's remained on the North Anna until morning, to cover the rear, at which time the head of the column, after a march of more than twenty miles, was approaching the Pamunkey at Hanovertown, about fifteen miles from Richmond. Wright's corps crossed that stream at once, and early on Saturday, the 28th, the whole army was south of the Pamunkey, and in communication with its new base at White House.

May.

Grant's movement summoned Lee to another compulsory abandonment of a strong position, and he again fell back toward Richmond. Having, as usual, the shorter and better way, he was already in a good position to confront the Army of the Potomac before it had reached the Pamunkey. He had taken a stand to cover both railways and the chief highways leading into Richmond, and to dispute the passage of the Chickahominy.

The only direct pathway to the Confederate capital, for the Army of the Potomac, was across the Chickahominy. Before its passage could be effected, Lee must be dislodged, and to that task Grant and Meade now addressed themselves. Reconnoissances to ascertain the strength and exact position of the Confederate army, were put in motion. Sheridan was sent out southward on the afternoon of the 28th, with the brigades of Davis, Gregg, and Custer. At Hawes's store, not far from the Tolopatomoy Creek, they encountered and vanquished cavalry under Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee. Both parties were dismounted and fought desperately. The Confederates lost nearly eight hundred men, and the Nationals about one half that number. This success inspirited the army, and it was followed by a reconnoissance in force, in which Wright moved on Hand May 29. over Court-House; Hancock marched from Hawes's store in the same direction; Warren pushed out toward Bethesda Church, and Burnside held a position to assist either Hancock or Warren. The right and rear were covered by Wilson's cavalry. This movement quickly developed Lee's position, which was in front of the Chickahominy, and covering the railway from well up toward Hanover Court-House, southward to Shady Grove and the Mechanicsville pike, with pickets toward Bethesda Church.

• May 30.

Wright reached Hanover Court-House without much opposition, but the march of both Hancock and Warren was arrested by strong forces in advance of Lee's line. The former was checked at Tolopatomoy Creek, after a sharp encounter, by intrenched troops; and the latter encountered Rodes's division of Ewell's corps, with cavalry, reconnoitering near Bethesda Church. These struck the flank of Colonel

1 The chief base of the army, while it was at Spottsylvania Court-House, was at Fredericksburg; while it was on the North Anna that base was Port Royal, on the Rappahannock. 2 See page 313.

328

THE NATIONAL TROOPS AT COOL ARBOR.

Hardin's brigade, of the Pennsylvania Reserves, and compelled it to fall back to the Shady Grove road, when General Crawford brought up the remainder of the Reserves, and Kitching's brigade, and effectively repulsed an impetuous assault by Rodes, who attempted to turn Warren's left. This repulse enabled the Nationals to establish the left of their line on the Mechanicsville pike, not much more than seven miles from Richmond. To relieve General Warren, when first assailed by Rodes, Meade had ordered an attack along the whole line. Only Hancock received the order in time to act before dark. He moved forward, drove the Confederate pickets, and captured and held their rifle-pits. Meanwhile, Wright had formed on the left of Hancock and Burnside on his right; while Lee strengthened his own right, now menaced by Warren.

June 1,

1864.

Grant was now satisfied that he would be compelled to force the passage of the Chickahominy River, and he was equally satisfied that it would be folly to make a direct attack upon Lee's front. So he planned a flank movement, and prepared to cross the Chickahominy on Lee's right, not far from Cool Arbor, where roads leading to Richmond, White House, and other points diverged. That important point was seized by Sheridan on the afternoon of the 31st, after a sharp contest with Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry and Clingman's infantry; and toward it Wright's corps, moving from the right of the army, in its rear, marched that night, unobserved by the enemy, and reached it the next day." At the same time, and toward the same place, a large body of troops under General W. F. Smith, which had been called from the Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred, were moving, and arrived at Cool Arbor just after Wright's corps reached that place, and took position on the right of the latter. General Smith had left Bermuda Hundred on the 29th, with four divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, sixteen thousand in number, which had been taken in transports around to White House. The two armies were now upon the old battle-field of Lee and McClellan two years before. The Confederate line, which had just been re-enforced by troops under Breckinridge, extended, with its cavalry on its flanks, a short distance from Hanover Court-House, down nearly to Bottom's Bridge. A. P. Hill's corps occupied its right, Longstreet's its center, and Ewell's its left.

On the morning of the first of June, an attempt was made by Hoke's division to retake Cool Arbor. Sheridan had been ordered to hold it at all

hazards, and he did so. His men dismounted, and fought desperately with their carbines. The assailants were repulsed, but were quickly re-enforced by McLaws's division. Wright's corps arrived in time to meet this new danger; and when, at three o'clock in the afternoon, General Smith came up, after a march of twenty-five miles,' he was met by an order to form on the right of the Sixth Corps,3 then in front of Cool Arbor, on the road leading to Gaines's Mill, and co-operate in an immediate attack upon the Con

1 See note 2, page 386, volume II.

2 He had been erroneously directed to march to New Castle, instead of New Cool Arbor, and he had, by that means, made the journey from White House, more than ten miles further than was necessary.

3 General Martindale commanded Smith's right: General W. H. Brooks his center, and General Devens, nis left. General Rickets commanded the right of the Sixths Corps, General Russell the center, and General Neill the left.

BATTLE OF COOL ARBOR.

329

federates. These were now in heavy force and in battle order, in that vicinity, for when Lee discovered the withdrawal of the Sixth Corps from Grant's right, he suspected its destination, and had sent the whole of Longstreet's corps to strengthen his own right, which was then partially concealed by thick woods.

June 1, 1864.

Between the two armies was a broad, open, gently undulating field, and a thin line of woods, beyond which, and in front of the thicker forest, the Confederates had lines of rifle trenches. Over this open field the Nationals advanced at four o'clock, with great spirit, the veterans of Smith seemingly unmindful of their fatigue, and in the face of a murderous fire, quickly captured nearly the whole of the first line of rifle trenches and about six hundred men. They pushed on and assailed the second and much stronger line, but the Confederates gallantly held it until night fell and the struggle ceased. In these desperate encounters, the Nationals lost full two thousand men,

but they held the ground they had gained, and bivouacked upon it that night, partly in the shelter of the thin wood, where some of the troops constructed rude bullet-proofs, that they might repose in safety. But they found little opportunity even for rest, for during the night the Confederates made desperate efforts to retake the lost rifle trenches, and greatly annoyed the troops by an enfilading fire. The assailants were repulsed; and the result of the day's work on the part of the Nationals was the firm occupation of Cool Arbor, which commanded the road to White House, and was the chosen place from which to force a passage of the Chickahominy.

That night Grant ordered important but dangerous movements. cock was directed to move from the right, and take position on the left of the Sixth Corps, at Cool Arbor. Warren was ordered to extend his line to the left, from Bethesda Church, so as to connect with Smith; and Burnside was withdrawn entirely from the front to the right and rear of Warren. These movements were nearly all accomplished, but not without some trouble and loss. The Confederates observed that of Burnside, which took place on the afternoon of the 2d, and following up his covering skirmishers, captured some of them. Then striking Warren's flank they took four hundred of his men prisoners. But so satisfactory were all arrangements that night," that Grant and Meade, then at Cool Arbor, determined to attempt to force the passage of the Chickahominy the next day, and compel Lee to seek shelter within the fortifications around Richmond. Grant was now holding almost the position of Lee in the battle of Gaines's Mill,' two years before, and Lee had the place of McClellan on that occasion.

1 See page 423, volume II.

June 2.

330

BATTLE OF COOL ARBOR.

At dawn on the morning of the 3d, the National army was in battle order, Hancock's corps on the Dispatch Station road on the left, the Sixth next, Smith's command adjoining these, and Warren and Burnside on the right, extending to the Tolopatomoy Creek. Wilson's cavalry were on the right flank, and Sheridan's were holding the lower crossings of the Chickahominy, and covering the roads to White House. Orders had been given for a general assault along the whole lines, at half-past four. A few minutes later the signal for advance was given, and then opened one of the most sanguinary battles of the war. The Confederates were equally ready, equally brave, and equally determined to gain a victory.

a June 3, 1864.

Swiftly the Nationals advanced to the attack. On the right it was made by the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon, of Hancock's corps, that of Birney

low's second line reached the front, the Confederates rallied in stronger force, and retook the position from which they had been pushed. Barlow was driven back about fifty yards, when he so speedily covered his front, that he could not be dislodged. Gibbon, who charged at the same time, at the right of Barlow, was checked by a marsh of the Chickahominy, which partly separated and weakened his command. A part of them gained the Confederate works. Colonel McKeen planted the National flag on their intrenchments; but a moment afterward he fell, mortally wounded. Gibbon's troops did not hold any part of the Confederate works; yet some of them intrenched themselves so close to them, that they could not well be reached, nor could they get away, excepting under the cover of fog or thick darkness. In these assaults Hancock lost about three thousand men.

Smith's command and the Sixth Corps were heavily engaged at the same time; and on the extreme right, Wilson's cavalry had a sharp fight with Hampton's, without any decisive results. But Warren's corps was too extended to allow him to do more than to hold his line intact, while Burnside brought two divisions of the Ninth to bear upon the left of Lee's line. These were hotly engaged, and would doubtless have vanquished their adversaries on that part of the field, had not the assault quickly ceased along the front. The battle had been "quick, sharp, and decisive." The Nationals had been repulsed, at nearly every point, with great slaughter. It was estimated that within twenty minutes after the struggle began, ten