to be apprised that we will not be responsible for ships sailing singly, or without convoy, between this country and Spain or Portugal, or for any considerable distance along the coasts of those countries.' (Vol. viii. p. 224.)

These hindrances were the cause of delay, and of a great effusion of English blood; but at last their effects were overcome, and Wellington with his conquering legions was set free for active operations. We need not follow that tide of victory which, rolling from the heights of the Pyrenees, burst over the southern plains of France, and, notwithstanding the obstacles opposed to it by skill and valour, was only arrested on the banks of the Garonne by the peace which followed the fall of Napoleon. These volumes abound in interesting details respecting this glorious close of the struggle, and we wish we had space to quote the directions which Wellington gave for the passage of the Bidassoa, and the forcing of Soult's vast lines on the Nivelle, a rampart that seemed wellnigh impregnable. In this last campaign, it must be remembered that, though Wellington was stronger, on the whole, than Soult, who alone opposed him actively, he was much weaker than that marshal and Suchet, who might easily have joined his colleague; and, as General Napier justly observes, it was one of the strangest phases in that war that the great forces of those French leaders were never united against one army. Not that the Dukes of Dalmatia and Albufera were wanting in skill to effect this combination; on the contrary, Soult proposed a plan for effecting it on the grandest scale in a manner worthy of his reputation; but mutual jealousy prevented the attempt and betrayed the cause of France and the Emperor. To this, moreover, we should add the tenacity with which Napoleon, even to the last, insisted on keeping his hold on Spain, and isolating Suchet's army on its frontier,-a resolution which, whether it arose from ignorance of the true state of affairs, or, as Napier thinks, from deficient information, was fatal to the Duke of Dalmatia's efforts. Imperialism and Imperial commanders contrasted badly in this campaign with constitutional government and its general; and the following pertinent remark of Wellington, in a commentary on Choumara's work, shows how fully he appreciated the contrast:

'Here we find two Republican generals, with great titles and fortunes, and holding the greatest military rank and exercising the greatest authority, quarrelling, as did the sons, legitimate and illegitimate, and the Marshals in the service of Louis XIV.; neither party ever thinking of the public interest, excepting as connected with his own personal objects of ambition and aggrandisement, and

each appealing to Buonaparte, as the others did heretofore to Louis XIV., and Buonaparte following the example of Louis XIV. in giving no answer.' (Vol. viii. p. 752.)

A secondary cause of the splendid success achieved by Wellington in this campaign was the strict discipline which he enforced in preventing pillage and protecting the country after his army had crossed the French frontier. The effects of this were not only to deprive the French general of what he had hoped for, a patriotic resistance to the invader, but to aid powerfully the Bourbon cause, and so to invert the relations of the antagonists, with respect to the population of France, that Wellington was actually hailed as a deliverer, while Soult was hated as a systematic plunderer.

"We have found the French people exactly what we might expect -not from the lying accounts in the French newspapers, copied into all the others of the world, and believed by everybody, notwithstanding the internal sense of every man of their falsehood, but from what we knew of the government of Napoleon, and the oppression of all descriptions under which his subjects have laboured. It is not easy to describe the detestation of this man. What do you think of the French people running into our posts for protection from the French troops, with their bundles on their heads, and their beds, as you recollect to have seen the people of Portugal and Spain?' (Vol. viii. p. 510.)

From the following passage it would certainly appear that the excesses at San Sebastian had been exaggerated; and it must be remembered, they received publicity, in the first instance, through Spanish libels:

'I am perfectly certain also that all the commanding officers exerted themselves to the utmost, not only to prevent outrages to the inhabitants, but to give them every assistance to secure and transport out of the town whatever property could be saved from the flames, notwithstanding in so doing they were fired on by the enemy. I myself sat with a Court-martial in the Plaza Vieja, near to the gate, to listen to all complaints, with a gallows there erected, and a deputy Provost-Marshal (Williams)-now, I believe, at head-quarterswho can, I should suppose, report the exact number (I know there were a good many) of severe punishments inflicted by my orders on soldiers and sailors found with plunder. The plunder was put in a heap for the inhabitants to claim, which they did, and were escorted out of the place with it, and every assistance given to secure their effects. I can with confidence appeal to every inhabitant then in San Sebastian, to state whether they were not furnished with safeguards and escorts whenever they applied for them to me or the other commanding officers, and whether any men they complained of were not examined, and generally punished on the spot.' (Vol. viii. p. 310.)

The battle of Toulouse, which closed this campaign, was gallantly contested and subsequently was claimed by M. Choumara as a French victory. General Napier has shown with his usual skill that this claim is without foundation, and, that once Mont Rave had been taken by the Allies, the whole position became untenable. The concurring testimony of Wellington is decisive :—

'M. Choumara pretends that the position of Toulouse was the whole position that is to say, the town, the tête de pont on the Garonne, the canal, its fortified bridges, houses, the works on Mont Calvinet. The last only were taken. Marshal Soult remained during the night of the 10th and the day of the 11th, in possession of the remainder; therefore he won the battle. If Toulouse was to be considered as a fortress, of which possession was to be held till the body of the place should be entered, M. Choumara's idea would be correct. In that case, Marshal Soult must have been prepared with means of all descriptions to enable him to remain in the town. Even in that case the possession of Mont Calvinet would have given the Allies the means of a fire by enfilade upon the canal, very near to its junction with the Garonne. But Toulouse could not be considered as a fortress. It was a field of battle, of which the principal fortified position, most important in the view of those who attacked as well as of those who defended it, was taken by the Allied army after a desperate combat. The consequence of the battle was that the Allied army took possession of the passages of the Canal de Languedoc above the town. In his letter to the Ministre de la Guerre (p. 265.), of the 12th April, Marshal Soult says that the Allied army occupied the heights of Bazièges, by which he was to retire. In his letter on the 11th, he had expressed to the same minister, and to Marshal Suchet, his apprehension that he should have to fight his way out of Toulouse, as he certainly would if he had not marched when he did.' (Vol. viii. p. 757.)

While Wellington was invading France, he was, of course, in constant communication with the Allies, in their long and doubtful struggle with Napoleon. These volumes are full of curious details respecting the operations of 1813-14; and several letters from Lords Cathcart and Burghersh, describing the shifting phases of the war, and a sketch of Leipsic by Sir Hudson Lowe, will well repay a careful perusal. They also contain abundant proofs of the diplomatic relations of the Alliance, with their long train of disputes and uncertainties, and of the reluctance with which they resolved to throw down the gage of battle to Napoleon. The following letter from Lord Liverpool to Wellington shows how faint was the hope of a general Coalition before the news of the battle of Vittoria had arrived to balance Lutzen and Bautzen.

'The information of your success, which will be transmitted to the

north of Europe this night, will arrive there most opportunely, and cannot fail to produce the most important effects. If Austria would now declare, we might really hope to put an end to the tyranny which has been so long oppressing the world; but on this event no reliance can, I fear, be placed. The dispositions of Russia and Prussia are good, and Bernadotte is using every endeavour to persuade them not to make peace. . . . (Vol. viii. p. 50.)

Vittoria, however, had a decisive effect, as Count Nugent thus wrote to Wellington:

'The account of the state of affairs in Spain, and your plans,-in short, everything you desired me to say,-had the greatest effect, and contributed very much to the decision of the Austrian Government; and the battle of Vittoria, I think, finished the matter. Things are now so far advanced that I am authorised to inform your lordship that there is no doubt that hostilities will commence on the 16th of August.' (Vol. viii. p. 133.)

Still discord remained in the allied camp, and, even in July 1813, Napoleon spoke with perfect confidence of the certainty of the triumph of his arms. The following is from a letter of Lord Cathcart:

'Metternich's audiences with Buonaparte were very long: one lasted eight or nine hours. Buonaparte's temper changed very often, and he was in several violent passions. He said he knew Austria could not go to war, and that he would not forget her having proposed humiliating conditions. That he would be in Vienna early in September. That Austria was a fat country, and his army should pass the winter in it. That the Russian and Prussian troops were very fine, and fought well, but that they had no head, and he would always beat them; and that Austria should never forget the visit he would now make.' (Vol. viii. p. 135.)

The 10th of August, however, came; and after a long and terrible struggle, Napoleon was dislodged from the Elbe, and driven out of Germany at Leipsic. It may be doubted whether, in this campaign, he displayed his wonted genius and calculation, or whether he was seconded by his lieutenants with the zeal and energy of former years; but setting aside the defection of allies, unquestionably one of the causes of his overthrow was the physical weakness of his army of conscripts. They 'melted like snow,' was his pitiless remark, comparing them to the old Guard; and the following description, in September 1813, of the dejected state of the French soldiers will account, perhaps, for the rout at Leipsic:

Vous ne croirez jamais que les Français jetaient armes et bagages, fuyant à la débandade: un seul Cosaque en prit cent dans un village, s'empara de leur argent, et donna leurs hardes à quelques paysans Prussiens qui se trouvaient là. La grande nation n'est plus à reconnaître. Je peux vous en citer des traits qui vous surprendront, et qui je vous garantis sur ma parole d'honneur. D'abord c'est que

A

lorsqu'ils se retirent, la cavalerie s'en va la première, et l'artillerie, mêlée à un peu d'infanterie, couvre la retraite.' (Vol. viii. p. 294.) When the Coalition approached the Rhine, the well-known propositions of Frankfort were offered by the Allies to Napoleon, and, though reluctantly, Lord Aberdeen assented to them. fair comparison of subsequent dates, and a just review of the Emperor's conduct, will acquit the Allies, in our judgment, for having afterwards evaded these conditions, when Caulaincourt struggled to claim their benefit; but the following letter from Sir Charles Stewart shows how heavily the obligation weighed as late even as January 1814:

'I must, however, first premise that I shall ever deplore not only the manner, but the whole tenor of the Frankfort negotiations: we shall find them hang like a log round our neck, and we shall in vain try (now France is prostrate) to disembarrass ourselves from those promises we have voluntarily shackled ourselves with in a moment of neither cause nor necessity. We find even in the last note of M. de Caulaincourt that he relies upon our own proposed basis. Can nations (like Buonaparte) depart from the line they themselves chalk out? A despot without character may do anything. The Powers of Europe, on the other hand, must in some degree uphold themselves by the great principles of faith, justice, and moderation.

'Where was the necessity, if the state of France as to her beaten forces was actually ascertained (and that the Austrian Minister could be ignorant of this, one can hardly imagine), of a furtive negotiation at Frankfort which every hour brings on its more baneful effects? Is it not clear that the manner in which we are committed, influences present ideas and future decisions on the most important points? This I shall hereafter more plainly elucidate.' (Vol. viii. p. 498.)

The sword, however, was thrown into the balance, and the invasion of France determined by the Allies. The fearful exhaustion of the country at this time has been vividly described by M. Thiers, and is thus portrayed by Lord Burghersh, a contemporary observer:

'No single act of hostility has been committed against them, and in some places they have been received with acclamations. The people of the country express a most anxious hope of peace; they accuse their government of the misfortunes which at present, as for years past, have weighed upon their country, and they seem desirous any change which would open to them a prospect of better times. The conscription lately decreed by Buonaparte has in no place in this part of the country been attended to. The spirit of the people is broken; they seem destitute of the means of an exertion.' (Vol: viii. p. 542.)

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It will always be a matter of astonishment that Napoleon, with a people in this mood, and an army which at no time in this campaign exceeded 60,000 combatants, should have long bade defiance to his foes, and even nearly destroyed the