colonel, with drawn sword, stood on guard before the remains of his late commander. His coat of mail, his helmet and gauntlets, were suspended over his head. The Ducal Cap, the sign of his race, with the Order of the Golden Fleece, were placed on cushions of black velvet; there, too, lay his marshal's staff and sword, and the consecrated cap and sword sent by the Pope; sixty wax torches were kept burning near him night and day. He was interred with all the honour due to so illustrious a servant of the empire. His body was embalmed and buried in the Chapel of the Cross in St. Stephen's, and the Emperor attended incognito as a mourner at the funeral. The heart was sent to Turin, where it rests with the ashes of his ancestors in the mausoleum of the Superga.

Eugene's immense possessions were inherited by a niece, the Princess Anna Victoria of Savoy, daughter of his eldest brother, the Count of Soissons, then fifty-two years of age, and very ugly. She sold and dispersed all his beautiful collections - his medals, his statues, his pictures, and his works of art. Only his library and his favourite palace, the Belvedere, were purchased by the Crown. His two nephews died prematurely. He does not appear ever to have contemplated marriage, and is reported to have said that a soldier should not marry. It was suspected that there existed a tender relationship between himself and the Countess Batthyany, but they always denied it. Nevertheless, the Countess Batthyany had two children, whom Maria Theresa called Eugene's codicils.' Eugene, in the early part of his life at Venice, from his independence of the fascinations of the fair sex, was styled by an Italian, Mars without Venus. Nevertheless, scandal said (without reason, as Voltaire thought), that the loss of the battle of Denain was owing to the presence of a fair Italian whom he took with him in that campaign. Voltaire saw the lady in Holland.

Eugene, by the circumstances of his birth and by the caprice of Louis XIV., was a prince without a country; he was faithful in allegiance to the Royal House which adopted him, so that he became an Imperialist to the heart's core. He was jealous of the privileges of the Empire in the extreme, and for that reason could never speak calmly of the Peace of Westphalia, which, he said, had destroyed the unity of the Empire. He grew thoroughly German at heart, and said that in order to win a battle, One should have an Italian head, a German heart, and French legs.'

The rank of a commander in military history must always be difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it appears to us that, great as Eugene undoubtedly was, Marlborough was superior to

him as a strategist, in his conception of a campaign, and in the means by which the end of the war should be most quickly attained; nor does it appear that in the conduct of a battle Marlborough was in any way inferior to him. Eugene's chief fault in action was the rashness with which he exposed his own life and those of his soldiers. But it is singular that, as far as strategy is concerned, Marlborough on several occasions showed himself the boldest general of the two. In alleviation of the rashness with which he exposed himself and troops, it must be allowed that his quickness of perception and cool head combined marvellously with his great courage in extricating himself and his troops from a difficult position. Marlborough said that his was the rarest union of self-possession and desperate courage in the midst of danger. Eugene was, however, superior to Marlborough in one of the most important qualifications of a commander that of inspiring his soldiers with the highest degree of military enthusiasm and devotion to his person.

However, neither Marlborough nor Eugene have any claim to the very highest order of military genius that which has invented new methods of warfare, and applied them on a large scale to the deepest combinations of strategy and politics. They took the science of war as they found it, and were each consummate masters of methods already in practice. Not to speak of the greatest generals of antiquity, they do not rank in the history of military science in the same line of succession as Gustavus Adolphus, the princes of the House of Nassau, Condé and Turenne, Vauban, Frederic, and Napoleon. They made war methodically after the fashion of the old school; when campaigns were passed in encampments, in making the movements of an army altogether subsidiary to the besieging and relieving of places; when too generals designed their order of battle rather after methodical rules than after the nature of the ground which was the scene of action; and, above all, spent their resources on secondary operations without striking boldly at the end and object of the war. In the days of Eugene and Marlborough, the methods of war had just undergone a great revolution by the two inventions of Vauban- the science of modern fortification and the adaptation of the bayonet to the musket. The former of these inventions, from its scientific nature and its sudden development, occupied too much attention; the latter too little. War was converted into a protracted game of taking and retaking fortresses; generals plumed themselves on undoing the work of Vauban or Cohorn more than on winning a battle; and the daily news of the operations of a good siege kept all Europe in excitement, and princes and

military connoisseurs flocked to the scene of action as to a carnival; while the consequences of the invention of the bayonet, which was to make the infantry the great arm of modern warfare, were not yet sufficiently developed nor understood. It was reserved for the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau and for Frederic the Great to show what infantry could effect by the aid of discipline and improved strategy and tactics. Eugene himself learnt the art of war-as then practised, however, in its perfection under the Duke of Lorraine, whom Louis XIV. styled the greatest, best, and wisest of his adversaries, who was himself brought up under Montecuculli, and in the school of the princes of Nassau, and had fought against the great Condé and Luxembourg at Seneff and Neerwinden. sufficient for Eugene's glory that he was one of the seven generals whose campaigns Napoleon recommended to the study of the military student, and that he raised the Austrian army to a reputation which it had never attained under Tilly, Wallenstein, or Montecuculli, and which it has never equalled since; and a study of his career and of the great wars of Louis XIV. point a moral which is at the present exemplified in a remarkable manner on the other side of the Atlantic-that great armies without great commanders are treacherous and deceptive weapons, which may betray a state to destruction, and are rarely or ever a means of salvation.

ART. XI.-1. The Slave Power; its Character, Career, and probable Designs; being an Attempt to explain the real Issues involved in the American Contest. By J. E. CAIRNES, M.A., Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Economy in Queen's College, Galway. London: 1862.

2. The American Union; its Effect on National Character and Policy, with an Inquiry into Secession as a Constitutional Right, and the Causes of the Disruption. By JAMES SPENCE. London: 1861.

3. An Oration delivered on the 4th of July, 1862, before the Municipal Authorities of the City of Boston. By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS. Boston: 1862.

MORE than a year and a half has elapsed since the taking of Fort Sumter. Before that day the North and South stood looking one at the other, like two men each threatening to strike, but each afraid to deal the first blow. From that day the South had committed itself to the struggle, and the passions of the North were roused to resistance and to vengeance.

At the beginning of the contest the position of things was this:-The Southern States, properly so called, were united in one bond, and had adopted a federal constitution of their own; it was doubtful whether Texas and Missouri would be secured to the new confederacy; it was still more doubtful whether 'the Border States' of Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware would adhere to the Government at Washington or join the Confederates.

The indignation of Northern men was roused by the treachery which had prepared the means for secession. The feebleness and falsehood of Buchanan's Government were perhaps enough to make men take up arms to resist the party which had profited by them; but the wisdom of such a course was another matter. We consider that the Union ceased when the first shot was fired. Mr. Spence has quoted words of Hamilton which describe only too truly the condition of things implied by such a war.

'When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of resentment, would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extreme to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.' (P. 219.)

In a debate in the New York State Convention, the same statesman is reported to have said:

To coerce a State would be one of the maddest projects ever devised. No State would ever suffer itself to be used as the instrument of coercing another.'

Hamilton was in this case no true prophet as to the course which his countrymen would take. Tocqueville in like manner foretold that an attempt to maintain the Union by force would never be made.*

The Southern States, though divided from the North by a great difference of institutions, manners, and opinions on certain subjects, had in fact come to an understanding with their fellowcitizens. They were willing enough, on certain terms, to allow their trade and their money affairs to be in the hands of the merchants and brokers of New York. After the quarrel on the subject of nullification, they acquiesced in tariffs which served to protect the iron-masters of Pennsylvania and the manufacturers of New England at the cost of the rest of the Union; but they did all this on the implied understanding, that they were to have perfect protection against the efforts of the Abolitionists, and perfect security for their property in slaves.

It soon appeared, however, that the only method for preserving this security was the possession of political supremacy, by keeping their predominant influence in the Senate; this object could be accomplished only by preventing the aggregation to the Union of fresh States pledged against slavery. Hence the struggle for Kansas: slavery was never likely to flourish in Kansas, but if the Missouri compromise was to hold good, and every North-western State admitted hereafter was to be a free State, the supremacy of the South was gone. Mr. Lincoln's election was the signal for secession, because it proved conclusively that the majority of the people of the Union were adverse to the sway of the South. We cannot admit the justice of the views expressed by Mr. J. W. Cowell in an able letter to Captain Maury, published early in the year. In this pamphlet the Southern States are represented as the victims of fraud and avarice on the part of the North, by whom they are supposed to have been cajoled and cheated into an abandonment of that free trade, which it was so much their interest to uphold. We must not blind ourselves to the fact that during the greater

* Vol. ii. p. 369.

† Southern Secession; a Letter addressed to Capt. M. T. Maury, Confederate Navy, on his Letter to Admiral Fitzroy. London: Hardwick. 1862.