invasion. But it would be an ungracious work to attempt, in every great action performed by these two illustrious characters, to exalt one at the expense of the other, and to do for them what they disdained to do for themselves. Some approximation, however, to an estimate of their separate parts in the great drama may be attempted. Never in the whole history of war did two men of such abilities work so well together: they were as two hands of one body, and the slightest shadow of jealousy never appears to have come between them. This harmonious result was brought about, doubtless, very much by the equable tempers and the suavity of manners which characterised both generals; but also, we imagine, the difference of age (thirteen years) contributed not a little towards it; Marlborough was now fifty-four and Eugene forty-one years old; and this seniority gave Marlborough some reason, in addition to his military skill, for taking the lead as he undoubtedly did on most occasions. With the Margrave of Baden, on the other hand, the jealousy, hauteur, and punctiliousness of his character, and the slow and pedantic method of his operations, rendered it difficult even for Marlborough to act; and his presence was a constant cause of embarrassment until Eugene and Marlborough cleverly got rid of him, by setting him down to the siege of towns, which suited the methodic pedantry of his military operations. The part which Eugene performed in this campaign has by no means so splendid an appearance in history as Marlborough's magnificent march from the Moselle to the Danube, which deceived all the generals of France till it was too late to oppose it, and kept all Europe in suspense with wonder and expectation. To Marlborough also exclusively belongs the brilliant victory at the Schellenberg, the triumphant manoeuvres by which he effected his junction with Eugene, and the sudden inspiration with which he masked the mass of Tallard's infantry cooped up at his right in the village of Blenheim, then hurled his squadrons across the Nebel on the ill-protected centre of the enemy, cut his army in two, and took nearly the whole of the infantry of the right wing prisoners. Nevertheless, Eugene, in command of the right wing, never had a harder day's fighting, and never exercised more self-denial, than on that occasion. Although he had the Elector of Bavaria in front in a very strong position, with far superior cavalry, he consented to be opposed to him with inferior numbers, knowing that the great stress of battle was to be on the left and centre. fought with desperation the whole day. Three times he led the Imperial cavalry across the Nebel, and three times they were repulsed. Stung to madness, Eugene put himself at the head

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of his infantry, charged again across the river, narrowly escaped being shot by a Bavarian trooper, and in sheer desperation turned the left flank of the enemy, and followed close upon the retreat of the Elector, when the centre was broken; his cavalry were so far advanced when the troops of Marlborough were in full pursuit, that a portion of them were mistaken by Marlborough for hostile squadrons, and the English general recalled his own men from pursuit, for fear of a flank attack, otherwise the victory would have been still more destructive to the enemy. And yet, though the total loss of the French army was 40,000 men, this was insignificant compared with the immense moral effect created throughout Europe, and the ulterior consequences. The prestige of the French monarchy was destroyed at a blow. There was a cry of exultation over the whole Continent: the invincible legions had been broken and shamefully captured, and the time of retribution was at hand.

After so immense a success-with the army of France dispersed or taken prisoners-both Eugene and Marlborough were for carrying the war into France, but they were over-ruled by the timid counsels of the Margrave. Landau was consequently invested and taken; Ulm also captured; and not only was the Court of Vienna delivered from all fear of invasion from Bavaria, but the Electorate was occupied by Imperial, troops, and never released until the conclusion of the war. The Emperor, also, being now able to reinforce his troops in Hungary, Heister obtained a great victory over the insurgents, and Vienna was in security on every side.

The next campaign did not fulfil the promise of the last. Marlborough and Eugene had separate commands. The English leader was confined to operations on the Moselle, where his efforts were lamed by the opposition of the deputies of the States and the want of support of the Margrave of Baden. Moreover, he was opposed to Villars, who kept him in check by a series of well-conceived demonstrations. And in Italy, where Eugene commanded, the campaign of 1705 was indecisive though skilful. The Duke of Savoy had now passed openly over to the side of the Allies. The French would not listen to his advances to get the Milanese, and secret offers were made to him from Vienna of Montserrat, the Lomellina, and the Val di Sesia. When his defection became known, Vendôme was sent with an army to overrun his country and seize upon its strongholds. One after another his fortresses were taken away. Turin and its protecting fortresses, however, maintained a desperate defence. Verrua, which commands the navigation of the Po, and is a sort of outwork of Turin, was

the last place taken by Vendôme, after a long siege and the loss of 18,000. From thence the French general was called to confront Eugene, who was sent to the relief of his distressed cousin and was driving before him the brother of Vendôme -Grand Prior of the Order of Malta -a man as profligate, shameless, and revolting in his habits as Vendôme himself without his abilities.

Eugene exhausted in vain every manœuvre in order to cross the Po and the Adda, to elude his antagonist and carry assistance to Piedmont. In the course of these operations the indecisive battle of Cassano was fought, in which, again, both sides claimed the victory. The campaign was, however, even so far, a brilliant example of Eugene's tactics; for, with inferior forces, he held his ground, and, by always taking the initiative, kept his adversary in check, and suspended the siege

of Turin.

The siege of Turin was, however, the great event towards which all Europe looked forward with hope or fear. The probability of its success was discussed in every capital, in every coffee-house, and in every cabinet in Europe. The plans for its assault were deliberated upon again and again in the presence of Louis XIV. by his generals and ministers; and the aged Vauban himself (le grand preneur de villes) was desirous of adding this last success to his glory. La Feuillade, however, the son-in-law of Chamillart, was deputed to conduct the siege with an army of 50,000 men, and immense magazines were formed at Susa, Casale, Crescentino, and Chivasso. The city was invested in May 1706. For some time after the investment the Duke of Savoy remained in his capital to direct the plans for the defence. Before, however, the circumvallation was completed, he gave over the defence of the town to the Marquis de Carail, and of the citadel to Count Daun, passed through the French lines with his cavalry, and withdrew to the mountains to await events. When Eugene descended into Italy, for the year's campaign, he found the Imperialists had already been beaten in their winter quarters, and a task of immense difficulty before him. In order to arrive at Turin, he had to traverse two hundred miles of country; he had to march between numerous strongholds, to cross four navigable rivers, to pass through many defiles, to traverse innumerable canals, and the countless rivulets and torrents which descend one after another from the Alps to the Po, and all in the face of a superior and watchful enemy.

The same day that Eugene passed the Po, Vendôme gave up the command to the Duke of Orleans, afterwards Regent, nephew

of Louis XIV., and the husband of one of his daughters by Madame de Montespan: with Orleans was joined in command Marshal Marsin, one of the defeated generals of Blenheim. The Duke of Orleans in vain attempted to check the movements already partly accomplished in the face of Vendôme, and in spite of Vendôme's predictions. On the 29th of August Eugene, after a march of thirty-four days, in which his troops were supported by the ardour of their general under the sufferings caused by intense drought and want of provisions, joined, between Moncaglieri and Carmagnola, the Duke of Savoy, who descended from the mountains to meet him with an armed body of peasantry and a small body of troops.

On the morning of the 7th of September, at daybreak, Eugene and his cousin ascended the height of the Superga, on the brow of which stands the white and glittering temple, one of the most splendid in Italy, erected by Victor Amadeus in consequence of a vow made on this ever-memorable occasion. The Duke of Savoy looked down on his devoted capital, in which the whole hope of himself, of his state and dynasty were centred, and beheld the flag of distress of the inhabitants, which signified that their last sacrifice had been made, and their last strength exhausted. Meanwhile, Eugene was scanning the thirty miles of circumvallation which enclosed the city, and forming his plan of attack. Having completed his survey, he pointed out to his companion the indecisive movements and confusion of the besiegers in the presence of a relieving force, and exclaimed, Il me semble, Monsieur, que ces gens-la sont à demi'battus.' In the French camp, indeed, everything was in disorder, and up to the last moment they had hardly resolved on a plan of action. The Duke of Orleans wished to march out and meet the enemy, and not attempt to hold so vast a circuit of entrenchments, but was overruled by La Feuillade in a council of war. Marsin was without vigour, indeed he acted under a presentiment of coming death. Prince Eugene determined to attack the lines of circumvallation in a peninsula between the Dora and Stura, where they had been left incomplete because the assailant in that quarter was exposed by a flank march. He was resolved to hazard all for such a complete victory as would render him safe after the battle; for since the enemy had 80,000 men to his 30,000, a half or an undecided success would ensure his destruction.

The day was clear and brilliant, a day of September under an Italian sun. The garrison and people of Turin were made aware by signals of the approaching conflict. The ramparts on the side of the battle were crowded with spectators; while

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on the other, during the whole of the conflict, La Feuillade never ceased his attack on the town and citadel, which was defended by Count Daun and every citizen capable of bearing arms. The dauntless impetuosity which was imputed to Eugene as a fault, and which so often placed his life in danger, and got him wounded thirteen several times, on this day stood him in good stead; without the spirit which he infused into his troops by his constant presence at the most dangerous moments, the battle of Turin had never been won. The French defended the entrenchments everywhere with the greatest obstinacy. The right wing of the allied army, under the Prince of Saxe-Gotha, was delayed by the difficulties of the ground, and the left was the first to arrive at close quarters, and, consequently, had to endure the whole of the enemy's fire, and fell into confusion. Eugene instantly beheld their danger, and, despatching from the centre troops to support them, rode himself to the scene of action. His page and a domestic who followed him were shot by his side; his horse was wounded and fell under him, and he was precipitated into the trench. The soldiers on all sides cried out in terror, but the Prince scrambled up again covered with dust and blood, remounted his horse, and waved his hat; excited by this incident, the troops instantly carried the entrenchment. In the centre, the presence of the Duke of Savoy on the one side and the Duke of Orleans on the other, inspired the combatants with intense ardour; but the allied troops at length carried the ramparts, and the French rapidly gave way as Marsin, their general, fell mortally wounded, and the Duke of Orleans himself, twice struck with musket-shot, was obliged to retire from the field. The right wing, under the Prince of Saxe-Gotha, was the last to storm the line of circumvallation; but this, too, after a dreadful scene of carnage, succeeded. The French troops, however, still fought desperately, and their cavalry attacked the Allies in flanks and rear; but when the second line of the Allies, with the artillery, were brought up, the tide of battle was once more turned, and the French retreated in disorder by the bridges of the Stura, the Dora, and the Po; La Feuillade abandoned the whole of his siege artillery, cast his ammunition into the river, and the whole army straggled in flight on the way to Pignerol.

The quantity of ammunition, siege artillery, and baggage which fell to the spoil of the victors was enormous. The French lost 2,000 killed and 6,000 prisoners. The loss on the side of the Allies was 3,000 killed and wounded. But the ultimate consequences of the victory- the liberation of Italy from the