from the Epicurean point of view. Philodemus, in the treatise On Rhetoric,' as in all his other writings, is a thorough Epicurean. He considers rhetoric (which the great master had already stigmatised under the opprobious name of KakoTEXvía), if not solely, at least principally, in its bearing upon the great Epicurean principle of happiness, the aτapaţia, which, in their theory of life, ought to form the great object of the wise man's desires. His treatise, therefore, presents this novel feature, that it is a treatise not upon rhetoric, but against it; and its value consists not in the precepts of art which it contains, but in the views of life and the principles of utility and of happiness which it developes. It is true that this work is not solitary among the ancients in its opposition to rhetoric. Plato condemned it as an art, and the second book of Empiricus's great work against all positive philosophy may possibly suggest itself as a parallel for the work of Philodemus; but Plato's hostility was partial and exceptional, and Empiricus, it will be remembered, argues against rhetoric, as against all the other sciences, on entirely different grounds. He writes as an exponent of the sceptical point of view; Philodemus, as the representative of the philosophy of a quiet life. It would be curious to contrast the two lines of argument in their several parts; but unfortunately the papyri have restored to us but a portion of this remarkable treatise, and it is defective in what might have been expected to prove its most characteristic parts.

In like manner, the little reprint by Professor Göttling of Jena (reproduced, with a German version, in 1857, by M. Hartung), forms part of what, if complete, would have supplied an entire code of practical Epicurean ethics. The papyri which this publication reproduces, contained but two books, the ninth and tenth, of a treatise by the same prolific Philodemus, on Vices and their antagonistic Virtues.' Of the tenth book we shall speak again, but the subject of the ninth is peculiarly interesting in its bearing on that view of the Epicurean system which we have been considering.

It is on Economics,' or the management of a household; a subject eminently calculated to bring out the practical parts of a system of ethics, but which, although a favourite with the ancient moralists of the various schools, many of whose treatises are named by Stobæus and Diogenes Laertius, had hitherto been known to us only by two treatises the Οικονομικος Λόγος, which is the fifth book of Xenophon's Memorabilia,' and a treatise under the same title which had been commonly ascribed to Aristotle. It is a curious coincidence among the chances which have directed the fortunes of ancient literature, that the

fragment of Philodemus on 'Economics,' here restored to us, proves to be a criticism of these very treatises-that of Xenophon, and that which had been attributed to Aristotle, but which is now found to be the work of Theophrastus, the well-known author of the Characters.' Now, as both Xenophon and Theophrastus belonged to a widely different school from that of our author, his criticism of their opinions is in itself highly indicative of his own views upon the questions which he raises. The very circumstance which he himself suggests, that, whereas they treat of the household management of an agriculturist, while he discusses the subject in its bearing on the life of a philosopher, would suffice to constitute an essential difference.

But there are many points besides, on which it is interesting, even for its own sake, to learn what are the views of an Epicurean philosopher, discussing them solely in their relation to that happy tranquillity of mind, which, in his system of philosophy, is the first end of the wise man and the chief constituent of the sovereign good. The principles laid down regarding the treatment of servants, and on the comparative merits of the free and of the slave element, are very curious; as is also a discussion on the propriety of withholding wine altogether from the slaves. It is amusing, too, to read the author's reflections on the principles by which expenditure ought to be regulated. Nevertheless the Christian moralist can hardly fail, even while his curiosity is interested, to be painfully struck by the low and thoroughly utilitarian standard according to which every law of life is measured. We need but allude to a single example, in which (although the discussion is not complete, owing to the mutilation of the treatise) it would appear to have been formally discussed, whether, in point of expense and satisfactory domestic management, it be preferable to place at the head of a household a mistress or a lawfully wedded wife!*

In the same volume M. Hartung has also reprinted the tenth book of Philodemus, ' De Vitiis,' the subject of which is Arrogance,' and along with it, for the purpose of comparison and

* Philodemus is here criticising an opinion of Theophrastus, who had cited the passage from Hesiod's "Εργων καὶ Ημερῶν,

Οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα, γυναῖκά τε, βοῦν τ' ἀρητῆρα
Κτητὴν οὐ γαμετήν, ἥτις καὶ βουσὶν ἔποιτο,

in which it is taken for granted that the woman is to be intùv ov yaμerhv. He himself acquiesces in the same view. It has been conjectured that the passage ought to be read κτητὴν ἢ γαμετήν ; but even the alternative argues but a low standard of morality.

contrast, he has given Theophrastus's Characters.' In the text of Philodemus he had been anticipated by a very careful critical edition published in 1853 by Professor Hermann Sauppe of Weimar; but M. Hartung's German version will be found useful in clearing up many obscurities of the original; and at all events his plan falls in more exactly with the design for the illustration of those ethical views of the Epicurean system which we are now considering. For we confess that it is because they supply these curious illustrations of the ethical system of the Epicureans, and of its practical influence upon the moral and social condition of the ancient world, much more than on account of any intrinsic literary merit of their own, that we commend the enterprise of the German and French editors who have followed up by these critical reprints the original publications of Naples and of Oxford. There is another of the papyri still left without any such notice, and indeed, we grieve to say, so imperfect as to afford but little scope for the labours of an editor; we mean the curious treatise of the same Philodemus in the eighth volume of the Naples collection - Περὶ τοῦ καθ' Όμηρον ἀγαθοῦ λαῷ'On the things which, in the opinion of Homer, are advan'tageous to the People.' As an example of a critical examination of the moral tendencies of the great Homeric poem, this treatise might prove interesting. That Homer was habitually looked to by the ancients as a great moral instructor, is sufficiently clear from the well-known criticism of Horace:

'Quid sit turpe, quid utile, quid non

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Plenius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.' But there is a special value in such a criticism from a member of the Epicurean school, in which, as we are assured by Cicero, the study of letters was habitually neglected; and we must add that, imperfect as are the remains of Philodemus's essay, the familiarity which it exhibits with the characters, the sentiments, the plan, and the entire structure of the Iliad' and the 'Odyssey,' fully justifies the eulogy which Cicero passes upon him at the cost of his brethren. It is interesting to study the use which he makes of the various characters of the Iliad' in illustrating the advantages of virtue, or the evil effects of vice; exhibiting the ignominious punishment of the foul-mouthed braggart in Thersites; the happy results of docility and prudence in Telemachus; the beauty of piety to the gods in Achilles, submitting, in the very flush of his passion, to the slightest admonition of Minerva; the folly of unnecessary wars in the mutual sufferings of the Trojans and Greeks before Troy; and, in a word, drawing, as occasion arises, whether from the incidents of the poem, or

from the sentiments expressed by the poet, such lessons, either of encouragement or of warning, as it seems calculated to convey. This treatise, fragment though it be, appears to us to deserve the careful attention of some of our own Homeric scholars. And there is another among the papyri of the Neapolitan collection, of which, although for a different reason, we should equally desire to see a critical reprint undertaken by a competent authority. We refer to a very curious tract (likewise by Philodemus), which is contained in the sixth volume of the Naples series, and bears the singular title, Περὶ τῆς τῶν Θεῶν εὐστοχουμένης διαγώγης κατὰ Ζηνώνα 'Conjectures on the Manner of Living of the Gods according 'to Zeno.' The opinion of Epicurus as to the existence of one God, and in a general way as to the nature of God, is distinctly stated by Diogenes Laertius, who quotes the words of Epicurus's own letter to Menaceus. Epicurus teaches that 'God is a being incorruptible and happy;' and he cautions us against attaching to our ideas of God anything which is in'consistent with incorruptibility and happiness.' But he also lays down the polytheistic doctrine in another passage, and adds 'that our knowledge of the gods is indistinct,' and that they ' are not of the character which people in general attribute to 'them.' Now the object of Philodemus's treatise is to discuss philosophically the popular notions regarding the gods; nor can we well imagine a more curious illustration of the degree in which even the wisest of the philosophers of old became vain ' in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened,' than is presented in these conjectural discussions as to the manner of living of the gods.' Philodemus adopts the popular notion as to the gods being endowed with a corporeal form, which he holds to be of equal size in them all. The portion of the roll in which the various questions as to the limbs of the gods' were considered, is unfortunately destroyed. He distinctly holds that they have blood, but of a different nature from human blood, and incorruptible; also that they use food and drink, although of a super-earthly character. The question regarding the food of the gods naturally raises the discussion as to whether we are to suppose that they are liable to sleep, like mortals. Philodemus vehemently argues the absurdity of the affirmative. Whereas,' he contends, in the sleep of animals there arises a 'new ordination of parts which has a strong analogy to death, and on which is founded a not improbable argument of the 'corruptibility of animals, inasmuch as sleep in them dissolves the parts of the soul, the same, or a very nearly analogous, principle 'would, apply to the gods, if we suppose them to undergo sleep.'

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A further argument he deduces from the unchangeable happiness and tranquillity of mind which is essential to the idea of the gods, and with which, he amusingly argues, sleep would be irreconcilable; since, if we admit that the gods are subject to sleep, it will follow that they are also liable to dreams, which are often of a highly painful and disturbing nature, and, therefore, entirely inconsistent with the tranquil happiness which we must attribute to the gods!

Still more curious are his speculations as to the dwellings of the gods. On all these silly trivialities he argues upon principles which, to judge from his language, one might suppose to be founded on the very essences of things, and to enter as necessarily into the idea of the gods, as into that of a fish, that it should live in the water; of a bird, that it should have wings; or of a chariot, that it should be furnished with wheels! From the dwellings of the gods, there is an easy transition to the furniture and appurtenances of their habitations. The reader will be amused at the solemnity with which Philodemus lays down that the notion which supposes the gods to be supplied with couches, seats, and other furniture such as mortals possess, is entirely inadmissible. The main ground of this assertion is, that such things are not needed by the gods. And as they do not stand in need of them, so neither can it be supposed that they exhibit them;' whence he concludes that the representations in which the poets indulge of the golden couches, the ivory chairs, the purple tapestry, and other similar decorations of the dwellings of the gods, are but fabulous inventions of the poetic fancy. On the other hand, that the gods should be held to be endowed with speech, he considers to follow from their being capable of the functions of respiration and expansion of the lungs. We 'cannot doubt, therefore,' he argues, that they are gifted with a voice by which they can make themselves audible to one another. Nor shall we add to their happiness or their freedom 'from disturbing cares by supposing them to be naturally voice'less, like persons deprived of speech. As in our own case < the power of speaking is an evidence that we are not destitute ' of the organs of speech, so, as the gods also naturally possess 'these organs, we must either suppose them to speak, or we 'must believe that their organs of speech are mutilated or im'peded.' He argues, moreover, that as good men derive pleasure from mutual converse, so it may be presumed that the converse of the gods, the subject of which must be virtue, science, and philosophy, is, for them also, one of the main sources of enjoyment. It need hardly be added, that, in his