Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy

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Cambridge University Press, Dec 25, 2006 - Law
For millennia, policymakers and statesmen have grappled with questions about the concept of victory in war. How long does it take to achieve victory and how do we know when victory is achieved? And, as highlighted by the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, is it possible to win a war and yet lose the peace? The premise of this book is that we do not have a modern theory about victory and that, in order to answer these questions, we need one. This book explores historical definitions of victory, how victory has evolved, and how it has been implemented in war. It also subsequently develops the intellectual foundations of a modern pre-theory of victory, and discusses the military instruments necessary for victory in the twenty-first century using case studies that include US military intervention in Panama, Libya, Persian Gulf War, Bosnia/Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
 

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Contents

Section 1
15
Section 2
41
Section 3
42
Section 4
43
Section 5
49
Section 6
52
Section 7
53
Section 8
55
Section 24
150
Section 25
156
Section 26
163
Section 27
164
Section 28
172
Section 29
177
Section 30
178
Section 31
186

Section 9
68
Section 10
70
Section 11
72
Section 12
74
Section 13
75
Section 14
76
Section 15
82
Section 16
83
Section 17
91
Section 18
100
Section 19
104
Section 20
105
Section 21
126
Section 22
139
Section 23
149
Section 32
198
Section 33
205
Section 34
215
Section 35
219
Section 36
223
Section 37
230
Section 38
232
Section 39
237
Section 40
243
Section 41
244
Section 42
263
Section 43
265
Section 44
276
Section 45
278
Section 46
291

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About the author (2006)

William C. Martel is Professor of National Security Affairs and Alan Shepherd Chair of Space Technology and Policy at the Naval War College. He received his doctorate in international relations from the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), and was a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow and MacArthur Scholar at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. A member of the professional staff of the RAND Corporation in Washington, he directed studies on proliferation, US governmental process for managing proliferation, and research and development. His scholarly works include Strategic Nuclear War (Greenwood Press, 1986), How to Stop a War (Doubleday, 1987), The Technological Arsenal (Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001).

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