shire), that learned justice said: "In re spect to the wills and the codicils admitted to probate, the exclusive jurisdiction as to the probate thereof belongs to the state courts of probate, and we have no authority whatsoever to inquire into it, or examine the validity thereof." And the reporter of the Federal Cases cites, in a footnote to this opinion, the following cases: Armstrong v. Lear, 12 Wheat. 169, 6 L. ed. 589; King v. Netherseal, 4 T. R. 258; Price v. Dewhurst, 4 Myl. & C. 76, 80; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 1 Story, 547, Fed. Cas. No. 14,091. It may be added that it is remarkable, indeed, that if the jurisdiction of a suit, the object and purpose of which is to settle nothing but the validity or invalidity of a will as a prelim

bate should be granted or denied, was so doubtful that it was never entertained by a Federal court so far as we have been able to ascertain, prior to the decision of Brodhead v. Shoemaker, that it should now be entertained under the act of 1888, which act was confessedly enacted for the specific purpose of curtailing the jurisdiction of the United States courts. (On the general question of the jurisdiction of Federal courts over the administration of estates of deceased persons, see notes to Barling v. Bank of British North America, 1 C. C. A. 510, 513, and Bedford Quarries Co. v. Tomlinson, 36 C. C. A. 272.)

risdiction always exercised in England by the ecclesiastical courts, and in this country by probate courts created for that and kindred special purposes-it will not be left to doubt ful construction, but will be provided for by definite and unmistakable language. The argument of the learned judge is well-nigh complete and conclusive, the authorities convincing, and we are content with the result reached in that case. It is precisely in point, and it is absolutely irreconcilable with Brodhead v. Shoemaker, which, in our opinion, is not only unsound, but is not supported by either authority or reasoning, nor does it give evidence of careful consideration or research. It could serve no wise purpose now to quote from the opinion in the case of Re Cilley, 58 Fed. Rep. 977. In Copeland v. Brun-inary step in determining whether its proing, 72 Fed. Rep. 5, District Judge Baker, for the district of Indiana, in a very clear and wellconsidered opinion rendered in 1896, reviewing many cases, follows Re Cilley, 58 Fed. Rep. 977. That case is important in this: that in Indiana the probate of a will is had in the circuit court,-a court of general jurisdiction. Under the statute of that state, William H. Bruning presented for probate, in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Jefferson county, Indiana, the alleged last will and testament of John F. Bruning. Clara Copeland, a child of the deceased, under the statute of the state, filed her objections to the probate of the will. Subsequently, under a statute of that state, she filed a complaint to contest the validity of her father's will, making William H. Bruning, one of the children and heirs at law of the decedent, and a devisee under the will, party defendant. Service was had upon the defendant. Thereupon he tendered a petition, accompanied by a proper bond, for the removal of the cause into the Federal court. The state court refused to make the order of removal. He then filed a transcript of the record in the Federal court, and the plaintiff, Clara Copeland, filed her motion to remand the same. The question now at bar was, therefore, squarely presented in that case. The learned judge in that case reviewed almost every case cited in this opinion, and, after the most careful consideration, remand-hearing. ed the case to the state court. In Oakley v. The law of Arkansas, and the jurisdiction Taylor, 64 Fed. Rep. 245. District Judge of its courts, touching the probate of wills, Priest, of the eastern district of Missouri, in have been settled by its own supreme court. a strong and well-considered opinion, In Ouachita Baptist College v. Scott, 64 Ark. reached the same conclusion; and this case 350, 42 S. W. 537, the supreme court said: is also important because of the statutes of "It has been held by this court that a court that state regulating the probate of wills. of equity has no jurisdiction to hear and deThe case is directly in point, and justly en- termine a contest of a will. Mitchell v. Rogtitled to much weight. In Everhart v. Ever-ers, 40 Ark. 91. It has also been held by hart, 34 Fed. Rep. 85, District Judge Hill, of the southern district of Mississippi (though retaining jurisdiction of that case), recognized the same rule, and in that case, as in almost every case cited. Gaines v. Fuentes and Ellis v. Davis are cited to support the doctrine announced in that case, thus evidencing the well-nigh unanimous interpretation placed by the courts upon those cases. In Langdon v. Goddard, 2 Story. 267. Fed. Cas. No. 8,060, decided by Mr. Justice Story at circuit (district of New Hamp

It must be remembered that the question is not whether Congress has the power, under the Constitution, to confer that jurisdietion upon the Federal courts. The question is, Has it done so? And the action of the courts from the foundation of the government down to the passage of the act of 1888 should be accepted as an absolute denial thereof, and, unless it can be shown that by the act of 1888 the jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter under consideration was enlarged, the courts should await future action upon the part of Congress before assuming jurisdiction of this new and novel class of cases hitherto confided, in England, to the ecclesiastical courts, and in this country to statutory courts adapted especially for their

this court that such a contest cannot be made by proceedings on a writ of certiorari, but that the only remedy is by appeal. Petty v. Ducker, 51 Ark. 281, 11 S. W. 2. It has also been determined by this court that the circuit court has no original jurisdiction now, as formerly, to try such a contest, since the Constitution confers original and exclusive jurisdiction of wills, etc., upon the probate court. Dowell v. Tucker, 46 Ark. 451. It follows that such a contest, if made at all. must be made originally in the probate

court, or else, when that cannot be done, on | appeal from the probate order of the probate court to the circuit court, accordingly as the will has been probated in the more solemn form or in the common form.”

Sanborn, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Let it be conceded: (1) That under the act of 1887, as corrected by the act of 1888, this case was not removable to the United States circuit court for the district of ArkanAnd it is expressly provided by statute sas unless at the time of its removal it was that the trial in the circuit court shall be de a suit of a civil nature at common law or in novo. Sandels & H. Dig. § 1152. It is not equity, within the meaning of that term as therefore, an original proceeding instituted it had been interpreted by the Supreme in the circuit court, but it is a continuation Court of the United States prior to 1887; of the proceedings begun in the probate and (2) that the United States circuit court court. It is not a suit at law, nor is it a had no original cognizance of a proceeding suit in equity, as understood either at com- to probate a will as such. The question here mon law or in equity, nor as recognized by is not, however, whether or not the Federal the statutes and laws of the state. In its court has jurisdiction of a proceeding to proorigin a proceeding to probate a will in the bate a will. It is whether or not, after a probate court, if the probate is sought in will has been probated, and after a state has cominon form, that is, without notice to conferred upon its courts of law and its parties interested.—it partakes very little of courts of equity jurisdiction to hear and deeither. No complaint is filed, no pleadings termine in a suit between parties who are are required, and no service had. It is in citizens of different states, and who claim the nature of a proceeding in rem. If the property in that state, the crucial issue probate is sought in the more solemn form which determines the right to that property, (that is, after notice had to parties inter- the issue whether or not a will so probated ested,-which may be done either in the pro- which devises the property was procured by bate court or on appeal in the circuit court), fraud and undue influence, a Federal court the proceeding is the same in both, with one has concurrent jurisdiction of that suit. exception. In the probate court there can Let us refer to the statutes and the record be no jury impaneled; in the circuit court for a moment, that the question at issue may there may be, upon the demand of any one of be clear. The statutes of Arkansas as they the parties interested. The real contest of are printed in Sandels & Hill's Digest, so far the will, in that event, may be made, as said as they govern the proceedings in this case, in Ouachita Baptist College v. Scott, 64 Ark. provide that, when a will shall be exhibited 350, 42 S. W. 537, on the grounds set forth for probate, the court of probate, or clerk in the petition of the parties contesting the thereof in vacation, shall receive the same, will, which, of course, will necessarily show and grant a certificate of probate or of rejecthe relationship of the parties to the de- tion, without summoning any party, but that ceased. The statute only provides that the this action shall be subject to the confirmacase may be brought to the circuit court on tion or rejection of the probate court (§ appeal by simply filing the affidavit, and 7422); that wills may be proved and adwhen in the circuit court, "upon the demand mitted to record by the court of probate (§ of any one of them, a jury shall be impaneled 1599); that they shall not be received in evito try which or how much of any testamen- dence until they have been allowed and adtary paper produced is or is not the last will mitted to record by the court of probate; of the testator." If no jury be demanded, that they shall be received in evidence therethe question is determined by the court, and after; that the allowances of wills by the the final decision is a bar to any other pro- probate court shall be conclusive until the ceeding to call the probate or rejection of the same shall be superseded or amended (§§ will in question, subject to the right of ap- 7408, 7410, 7411); that an appeal shall lie peal or writ of error to the supreme court from the allowance of a will by the court of as provided by the statute; but it is provided probate to the circuit court of the state (§ that nothing contained in the statute shall 7409): that the circuit court of the state has preclude a court of chancery from its juris- jurisdiction of all actions for the enforcement diction to impeach such final decision for of civil rights or the redress of civil wrongs such reason as would give it jurisdiction over except where exclusive jurisdiction is given to any other judgment at law. Sandels & H. other courts: that its actions and proceedings Dig. § 7421. The contention of the defend- are to be had according to the course, rules, ant in error is not, therefore, advanced by and jurisdiction of the common law unless anything found in the statutes of Arkansas, otherwise provided (§ 1114); that it has a or the decisions of its courts. The conclu- superintending control and appellate jurission is that, within the meaning of the first diction over probate courts; that its appeland second sections of the judiciary act of late jurisdiction extends to errors of fact as 1888, the proceeding for the probate of a well as of law (§§ 1120-1122); that on an apwill is not a "suit of a civil nature at com- peal from the allowance of a will the circuit mon law or in equity," and therefore is not court shall proceed to try the case de novo removable either from the probate court or (§ 1152); that all necessary parties shall be from the circuit court into the Federal court. brought before the court; that upon the deThe judgment is reversed, with instruc-mand of any one of them a jury shall be imtions to the Circuit Court of the United paneled to try which or how much of any States for the Western Division of the East- testamentary paper produced is or is not the ern District of Arkansas to remand the case last will of the testator; that its decision to the Circuit Court of Garland county. shall be a bar to any other proceeding to call

that it had been revoked, that it was procured by undue influence, and that it had been falsely represented to be the will of Molen. These averments were denied by the devisee, and the question was presented and heard upon evidence in the probate court whether the certificate of allowance made by the clerk should be confirmed or rejected, and on June 10, 1896, the probate judge confirmed it. Thereupon Mary E. Franz appealed to the circuit court of the state, and thereafter, but before the trial of the case in that court, she removed it to the Federal court on the ground of local prejudice. The circuit court, and they found that the pretended will was procured by undue influence, and was void, and the court rendered a judgment accordingly. Thus it appears that the question here is not whether the United States circuit court has original or other cognizance of a proceeding to probate a will. No application to prove such a will was presented to that court. No application to remove such a proceeding was made, and no such proceeding was removed. What was removed was the suit between Mary E. Franz and Adele Wahl, instituted in the circuit court of the state by appeal, which was to be tried in that court de novo, according to the course and practice of the common law, which was to determine whether or not the writing challenged was procured by fraud and undue influence; and which, in determining that question, was to decide whether a citizen of Ohio or a citizen of Arkansas was the owner of $20,000 worth of property in that state.

the probate or rejection of the will in question except by appeal to the supreme court of the state (§ 7421); and that any person who resides out of the state, who does not appear, and is not personally served with process, may, within three years after the final decision of the circuit court, impeach that decision, and have a retrial of the question devisavit vel non by an original suit upon a bill in chancery (§ 7423). Thus it will be seen that, while the state of Arkansas has conferred upon its probate court jurisdiction to allow or reject a will in the first instance when it is properly presented to it, it has granted to its court of general jurisdiction-case was tried by a jury in the United States to its circuit court-the right, and has imposed upon it the duty, to try de novo according to the course and practice at commonlaw, in a suit instituted in that court by appeal from the probate court, every question of fact and of law involved in the issue, whether the probated writing is such a will or not, when the controversy has arisen over that issue between opposing parties, and that it has conferred upon its court of chancery jurisdiction to hear and determine all these questions de novo in every case in which an interested nonresident has not appeared or been personally served with process in the suit in the circuit court. Such are the statutes. What is the case that was removed and tried in the court below? Was it an application to the probate court to allow or reject the will? Not at all. That application had been heard and granted, and the probate court had no further power over or jurisdiction of the issue. It was not a proceeding to establish the will that was removed to the court below. It was the suit between Mary Franz and Adele Wahl, instituted in the circuit court of the state by the appeal of the former from the probate court for the purpose of avoiding the will and its probate, and of trying de novo the issues of fact and of law presented by the pleadings which these two parties had interposed, and nothing more, that was removed to the Federal court. When that removal took place, there were two parties, and two only, to the suit and to the issues in controversy. The determination of those issues was decisive of the question whether Mary E. Franz, a citizen of Ohio, or Adele Wahl, a citizen of Arkansas, was the owner of all the property of which the decedent died seised, which was of the alleged value of $20,000. Mary E. Franz was his sole heir, Adele Wahl his sole devisee under the alleged will, and it the suit between these parties to determine the issues upon which the title to this property depended that was removed into the court below. The course of the proceedings through which this removal was secured was thus: Joseph H. Molen died on December 9, 1895. On December 24, 1895, the clerk of the probate court admitted to probate, in common form, without notice to anyone, his alleged will, which was propounded by Adele Wahl. On January 28, 1896, his sole heir, Mary E. Franz, filed in the probate court her petition, in which she averred that the writing presented was not the last will of Molen,

was

The only question the case presents, therefore, is whether or not, when the state has conferred upon its courts of general jurisdiction at common law the right and power to hear and try de novo in a suit instituted by an appeal, and upon its courts of chancery the right to hear and try de novo in a suit commenced by original process, the question whether or not a writing that has been allowed as a will in the probate court of that state was procured by fraud and undue influence, a Federal court sitting in that state has concurrent jurisdiction to hear and try that issue where the property in controversy is of the value of $20,000, and the parties to the suit are citizens of different states. This question has been answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court in Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10. 20, 23 L. ed. 524; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 496, 497, 27 L. ed. 1006, 1010, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327; and Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 610, 620, 621, 37 L. ed. 867, 868, 873, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906; by the circuit court of appeals of the ninth circuit in Richardson v. Green, 15 U. S. App. 488, 61 Fed. Rep. 423, 429, 435, 9 C. C. A. 565; by Judges Pardee and Newman in the circuit court in Brodhead v. Shoemaker, 44 Fed. Rep. 518, 11 L. R. A. 567; by Judge Hill in Everhart v. Everhart, 34 Fed. Rep. 82, 85; and by Judge Williams in this case in Franz v. Wahl, 81 Fed. Rep. 9; and in view of all the decisions upon the question the author of a leading text-book upon this subject has declared the rule to be

that "while the probate of a will ex parte is in rem, and, not being between parties, cannot be removed to the Federal courts, yet, where such will is contested in pursuance of statutory provisions, and becomes a suit inter partes residing in different states, the Federal courts take jurisdiction as they would in any other controversy between the parties." 1 Woerner, American Law of Administration, 2d ed. § 156, *357.

the court of general jurisdiction to annul a will and its probate after it was established, a like suit might be maintained in the Federal court.

In Gaines v. Fuentes the suit was commenced by petition in the parish court of New Orleans to annul a will probated years before, and to recall the decree by which it was established. That is the exact purpose of the appeal in the case in hand. Under The question has been answered in the neg- the Code of Louisiana there was no suit in ative by Judges Colt and Aldrich in the cir-equity, and the Supreme Court divided upon cuit court of appeals of the first circuit, in the question whether or not the proceeding Re Cilley, 58 Fed. Rep. 977; by Judge Wel- in that case fell within the term a "suit of ker in Reed v. Reed, 31 Fed. Rep. 49; by a civil nature at law or in equity." The maJudge Swayne in Re Frazer, 18 Alb. L. J. jority held that it did, that it was a suit,in 353, Fed. Cas. No. 5,068; by Judge Baker in equity, and that the Federal court had jurisCopeland v. Bruning, 72 Fed. Rep. 5; and diction. The minority held that it was by Judge Priest in Oakley v. Taylor, 64 Fed. neither an action at law nor a suit in equity, Rep. 245. The cases of Broderick's Will, 21 and that the Federal court was without juWall. 503, sub nom. Kieley v. McGlynn, 22 risdiction. Mr. Justice Field, who delivered L. ed. 599; Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 174, 9 the opinion of the majority, said of that proL. ed. 91; Fouvergne v. Municipality. No. 2, ceeding, what is equally true of the suit in18 How. 470, 15 L. ed. 399; and Simmons v. stituted in the state court by appeal in this Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 34 L. ed. 1054, 11 Sup. case: "The suit in the parish court is not Ct. Rep. 369,-from the Supreme Court; and a proceeding to establish a will, but to annul Re Aspinwall, 83 Fed. Rep. 851; Langdon it as a muniment of title, and to limit the v. Goddard, 2 Story, 267, Fed. Cas. No. 8,- operation of the decree admitting it to pro060; and Ball v. Tompkins, 41 Fed. Rep. 486, bate. It is, in all essential particulars, a are cited in support of the negative answer, suit for equitable relief,-to cancel an inbut they fail to meet the issue. The case of strument alleged to be void, and to restrain Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 34 L. ed. the enforcement of a decree alleged to have 1054, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369, does not been obtained upon false and insufficient testouch the question. All the other cases timony." 92 U. S. 20, 23 L. ed. 528. He from the Supreme Court, except Tarver further said: "Whenever a controversy in v. Tarver, were commenced when the statutes a suit between such parties arises respecting of the states in which they were brought the validity or construction of a will, or the did not authorize the trial in the respective | enforcement of a decree admitting it to prostate courts of general jurisdiction of the questions whether the wills there in controversy were fraudulently procured or invalid at the times when the suits in the Federal courts were commenced. Moreover, these are the earlier cases in the Supreme Court, and, so far as the opinions rendered in them contain expressions at variance with the later decisions in Gaines v. Fuentes, Ellis v. Davis, and Byers v. McAuley, they must be deemed to be overruled.

In the case of Broderick's Will it was expressly admitted that, if a state by statute authorized the bringing of a suit to declare a will void in its courts of appeal or equity after its probate, such a suit could be maintained, in a proper case, in a Federal court. 21 Wall. 503, 520, sub nom. Kieley v. McGlynn, 22 L. ed. 599; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 21, 23 L. ed. 528.

bate, there is no more reason why the Federal courts should not take jurisdiction of the case than there is that they should not take jurisdiction of any other controversy between the parties." 92 U. S. 22, 23 L. ed. 529.

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley follows the line of argument adopt ed by the circuit court of appeals in the first circuit in Re Cilley, 58 Fed. Rep. 977, and by the trial judges who have agreed with the opinion in that case that a suit to annul a will and avoid a decree allowing it is a proceeding to probate it, that a proceeding to probate a will is not a suit at common law or in equity, and that, therefore, a Federal court has no jurisdiction of it. This contention met the reprobation of the majority of the Supreme Court in Gaines v. Fuentes, and it finds no support in the subsequent deIn the case Re Aspinwall, 83 Fed. Rep. cisions of that court. In Ellis v. Davis, 109 851, the proceeding to be removed was an ap- U. S. 487, 27 L. ed. 1006, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327, peal from the register of wills to the or- that court held: (1) That, where the phans' court. The orphans' court was a spe- courts of general jurisdiction of a state are cial statutory court having probate jurisdic-authorized to try the validity of a will in a tion, but without general jurisdiction to try suits at common law and in equity. The holding was that the proceeding before the orphans' court was not removable, and it was expressly declared in the opinion in that case that the decision there rendered was not at variance with the decisions in Gaines v. Fuentes and Ellis v. Davis that where, under the state practice, a suit could be brought in'

suit involving the title to real property, the Federal court has like jurisdiction in cases in which the necessary amount in controversy and the diverse citizenship exist (page 496, 109 U. S., page 1009, 27 L. ed., and page 333, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep.; (2) that, conceding that the judicial power of the Federal courts embraces only such suits as arise "in law and equity," this does not necessarily ex

clude those which may involve the exercise | came entitled to his property, which was of of jurisdiction in reference to the proof of greater value than $2,000, and, under the wills (page 497, 109 U. S., page 1010, 27 L. Constitution and the acts of Congress, had ed., and page 334, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep.; and (3) the right to maintain a suit in equity in the that the terms "law" and "equity" do not Federal court against Adele Wahl, a citizen restrict the jurisdiction of the Federal of Arkansas, to recover this property, and courts to the rights and remedies which were to enjoin the use of any fraudulent will to employed and recognized in courts of law create a cloud upon the title of the real esand equity when the national judicial sys- tate included within it, and no state legislatem was adopted, but that they also embrace tion could curtail or destroy the jurisdiction all rights and remedies newly created by the of that court to hear and decide for itself statutes of the states which may be admin- every issue between these citizens which was istered according to the nature of the case determinative of their rights to this proper in the courts of the United States. Ibid. ty. (2) Because the larger portion of the In Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 610, property devised by the will was real estate, 620, 621, 37 L. ed. 867, 868, 873, 13 Sup. Ct. and after its probate the Federal court sitRep. 906, a distributee of an estate, who was ting in equity had plenary jurisdiction, dea citizen of another state, brought a bill in rived from the court of chancery in England, the Federal court in Pennsylvania to avoid to entertain a suit in equity to avoid the dea will which had been probated there, and to vise of the real estate for forgery, fraud, or recover his share of the property of the es- undue influence, and, upon the trial of the tate while it was yet in process of adminis- issue which it was empowered to frame and tration in the orphans' court; and obtained submit, to a jury, to set aside the will, and a decree that the writing which had been al-render futile the decree of probate. And lowed as a will in that court was not a will, (3) because the statutes of Arkansas gave but was a mere declaration of trust, and that to the contestant of a will the right to instihe was entitled to a certain share of the es-tute in its courts of general jurisdiction, and tate; and the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction and the decree so far as it determined the rights of citizens of different

states.

In Brodhead v. Shoemaker, 44 Fed. Rep. 518, 522, 11 L. R. A. 567, the contest of a will was first heard on pleadings in the court of ordinary, then appealed to the superior court of Floyd county, Georgia, where it was tried according to the practice at common law under the statutes of that state. Thereupon it was removed to the Federal court, and Judges Pardee and Newman held that it was an action at law, and removable under the act of 1887-88.

In Richardson v. Green, 15 U. S. App. 488, 61 Fed. Rep. 423, 429, 435, 9 C. C. A. 565, an original suit was brought in the Federal court in Oregon to avoid a will and the decree of the probate court allowing it on the ground that it was forged. There was a statute of the state of Oregon which permitted the maintenance of such a suit in its state courts of general jurisdiction. The circuit court of appeals of the ninth circuit held that it was a suit in equity, and that the Federal court had jurisdiction. Judge McKenna, now Mr. Justice McKenna of the Supreme Court, said: "The nature of this suit is not precisely defined by the decisions, but it is certainly inter partes, and seems to be within the doctrine declared in Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 496, 497, 27 L. ed. 1009, 1010, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327. This remedy existing in the Oregon courts, it could be exercised by the United States court."

In Everhart v. Everhart, 34 Fed. Rep. 82, 85, a similar case, Judge Hill rendered a like decision.

In this state of the law the court below was right in maintaining the removal of this case, and for the following reasons: (1) Because upon the death of Molen, Mary E. Franz. a citizen of Ohio, his sole heir. be

there to try de novo, a suit involving the question of the validity of the will after its probate; and under these statutes the Federal court had like jurisdiction of all suits involving the requisite amount between citizens of different states.

1

1. When the owner of property dies, his estate is immediately impressed with a trust for the benefit of his creditors, heirs, and legatees. The court of chancery of England and the courts of equity of the United States have plenary jurisdiction, at the suit of any proper creditor, heir, or legatee, to enforce this trust against any occupants, executors, administrators, or parties into whose control any part of the estate may come. Story, Eq. Jur. § 532, etc.; Atty. Gen. v. Cornthwaite, 2 Cox, Ch. Cas. 44: Comstock v. Herron, 6 U. S. App. 626, 627, 55 Fed. Rep. 803, 5 C. C. A. 266; Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. 29, 14 L. ed. 312; Adams, Eq. 257; Green v. Creighton, 23 How. 90, 93, sub nom. Kendall v. Creighton, 16 L. ed. 419; Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, 598, 599, 30 L. ed. 532, 536, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342. In suits between citizens of different states to enforce this trust this jurisdiction vests in the Federal courts, and, while statutes of the various states may provide for the appointment of administrators, the allowance of claims and the probate of wills as muniments of title and as prima facie evidence of their validity in their courts, they can make no valid provisions which will deprive the national courts of the right or the duty to determine for themselves, independently of these provisions, every issue which involves the rights of citizens of different states to the property of the decedent, when these rights are drawn in question in proper suits brought in apt time.

In Green v. Creighton, 23 How. 90, 93, sub nom. Kendall v. Creighton, 16 L. ed. 419,-a suit against a legatee by a creditor whose claim was barred under the statutes