under the rules prescribed the claimants were unable to remove the tobacco. In the cases of Laurie, Son & Co. and Irvin & Co. it was alleged that the tobacco remained stored in Richmond until the burning of that city by the rebels on the 3d April, 1865. In the case of O'Connor it was further alleged that in April, 1865, claimant sent a vessel from Ireland destined for Richmond, for the purpose of carrying away his tobacco, which vessel arrived at Hampton Roads in June, 1865, but was warned off by a public armed vessel of the United States and compelled to return to Dublin without the tobacco. In this case it was further alleged that a part of the tobacco was destroyed by the conflagration kindled by order of the confederate authorities on the 3d April, 1865; that another portion was destroyed by an accidental fire in March, 1863, but which occurred in consequence of the disturbed condition of affairs then existing in Richmond; that another portion was seized for taxes levied by the confederate government, and another portion used and destroyed by the authorities of the Confederate States for experimental purposes; and it was alleged that all these losses of Mr. O'Connor were solely in consequence of the failure of the United States to maintain and enforce their authority in the State of Virginia, and to suppress the civil and military disorders then existing there.

A demurrer was interposed on behalf of the United States in each of the three cases.

Her Majesty's counsel filed an argument in Nos. 321 and 322, in which he contended that the memorials showed a case where, by the acts of the United States, the claimants were prevented from removing their tobacco from the seat of war, where it was exposed to danger; and that but for such prohibition they would have removed and saved it; but that they were compelled to leave it in the hostile country, where it ultimately perished from one of the dangers incident to the war; that the acts of the United States alleged in the memorial, by which the claimants were prevented from removing their tobacco, were not lawful acts under international law.

That, by the statute of 13th July, 1861, (12 Stat. at L.,) commercial intercourse between the States in rebellion and the loyal States was prohibited, subject only to the license and permission of the President "in such articles, and for such time and by such persons as he in his discretion may think most conducive to the public interest, and such intercourse, so far as by him licensed, shall be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury ;" that by the regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury under this act, a tax was imposed upon such permits, and a special tax upon property to be brought out under them, and it was provided that such permits should only be granted to loyal citizens of the United States.

That this act and the subsequent legislation of the United States did

not provide for blockade or non-intercourse jure belli, but were acts regulating intercourse by municipal statute between different sections of the territory of the United States; that these statutes worked injustice to the claimants, and deprived them of privileges to which they were entitled by the treaty between the United States and Great Britain; that the loss of the property in question was caused by them, and therefore was a legitimate subject of international reclamation before the commission.

That, considering the prohibition in the light of a belligerent act, the United States were bound, in analogy to maritime blockade, to allow a reasonable time for the claimants to bring out their property; and, in further analogy to the law of maritime blockade, that, as a belligerent cannot blockade a port against neutrals while he allows his own or his enemy's merchant-vessels privilege of ingress and egress for the purposes of trade, the United States cannot rightfully permit their own citizens to trade with the insurgents under permits, while prohibiting trade to neutral aliens and others without permits.

He cited the letter of Mr. Cass, Secretary of State, to Mr. Mason, United States minister to France, in June, 1859, reported in Dana's Wheaton, 672, n.; 1 Kent's Com., 146; The Grey Jacket, 5 Wall., 342; The William Bagaley, id., 408; The United States vs. Lane, 8 Wall., 185; The Francisca, 10 Moore's P. C. R., 87; The Ouachita Cotton, 6 Wall., 531; Mitchell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115.

The commission unanimously, and without hearing argument for the United States, sustained the respective demurrers, and disallowed the claims.

In the case of James Stewart, No. 339, it was alleged that the claimant, having purchased certain cotton situated upon the Mississippi River, at Dead Man's Bend, below Natchez, sent a steamboat to remove the cotton, but that the steamboat was improperly forbidden to land by the captain of a gun-boat then cruising opposite the place where the cotton was stored; that the claimant was thus prevented from removing his cotton, which was soon afterward burned by rebel scouts.

Various questions of fact arose in this case as to the title of the claimant; but it was maintained on the part of the United States that, upon the facts alleged, no reclamation could lie against the United States; that the discretion of the commanding officer of the gun-boat as to per. mitting or not permitting vessels to land, even for the removal of property for which permits from the civil authorities were held, was absolute; and that the alleged act of the officer, in prohibiting the steamboat from approaching the land and removing the property, was within the scope of his authority, and in the exercise of his duty; that the subsequent destruction of the property by the rebels was not a necessary or natural consequence of any wrongful act of the United States or any officer of the United States, and that no liability existed against the United States in respect of the transaction.

The claim was disallowed, all the commissioners agreeing.

4.-Claims for damages for alleged wrongful arrest and imprisonment. These claims were one hundred in number, and the total amount of damages claimed, in all, was nearly $10,000,000, exclusive of interest; or, adding interest at the rate allowed by the commission, say $16,000,000. In thirty-four of the cases awards were made in favor of the claimants against the United States, in all amounting to $167,911. In sixty-four cases these claims were disallowed; one case was dismissed without prejudice for impertinent and scandalous language used in the memorial, and one was withdrawn by Her Majesty's agent by leave of the commission.

The question early arose before the commission whether in case of death prior to the presentation of the claim of the party against whose person the wrongful acts were alleged to have been committed, the claim for such injuries was to be considered as surviving to the personal representatives. This question was raised by demurrer interposed on behalf of the United States, in the cases of Edward McHugh, No. 337; Elizabeth Sherman, No. 359; and Elizabeth Brain, No. 447.

In the case of Mrs. Sherman, No. 359, all connection between the injuries alleged and the death of the intestate was disclaimed by the memorial.

In the cases of Mrs. Brain, No. 447, and of McHugh, No. 357, there were allegations that the injuries complained of caused or contributed to cause the death of the intestate; but there was no allegation of any local statute allowing damages in favor of personal representatives for a wrongful injury causing death.

On the part of the United States it was claimed that, as by the common law both of Great Britain and of the United States, claims for injuries to the person did not survive to the personal representatives, such claims were not to be considered as within the submission by article 12. That the claims which by that article were submitted could not be taken to comprehend claims of a character not recognized by the municipal laws of either of the countries parties to the treaty.

Her Majesty's counsel contended that the municipal laws of the two countries were not to be taken as controlling the rights of claimants in this regard; that claims for injuries to the person, whether such injuries caused death or not, were, in the diplomatic intercourse of civilized nations, treated as a proper subject of international reclamation in behalf of the personal representatives of the person injured after his death. He cited the practice of the commissions under the convention between the United States and New Granada, of 10th September, 1857, (12 Stat. at L., 985,) and under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, of 2d February, 1848, between the United States and Mexico, (9 Stat. at L., 933, art. 13.)

In the case of McHugh, No. 357, where the deceased died unmarried and leaving only collateral relatives not dependent on him for support,

entitled to inherit, the commission unanimously sustained the demurrer and disallowed the claim.

In the cases of Mrs. Sherman, No. 359, and Mrs. Brain, No. 447, in both which cases the deceased left a widow and minor children, the commission, Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting, overruled the demurrers. Mr. Commissioner Frazer read an opinion for sustaining the demurrers in each of the three cases, which will be found in the appendix, I. It may be added that on final hearing on the merits the claim of Mrs. Sherman was unanimously disallowed; and though an award was made (Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting) in favor of Mrs. Brain on account of property taken from her husband, that award included no damages for imprisonment.

The following cases are selected as class cases illustrating the holdings of the commission upon the various questions involved in these claims.

In the case of Ernest W. Pratt, No. 6, it was alleged that the claimant arrived in New York on a British mail-steamer from Nassau, on the night of the 17th March, 1865; that before leaving the vessel he was arrested by order of General Dix, then in command of the United States forces in and around New York, his luggage and papers searched, and he himself committed to prison, where he was detained until the 25th June following, a period of one hundred and seven days, when he was discharged without trial.

That he had received at Nassau, from the United States consul there, an endorsement upon his discharge from the steamship City of Richmond, of which he had been first mate, certifying that he was entitled to pass to the United States as a British subject, which certificate had been given to him by the consul with the assurance that it had all the effect of a regular passport.

It appeared that in October, 1869, he had been about to commence suit against General Dix to recover damages for his false imprisonment, and his counsel having informed the Secretary of State of the United States of his intention to bring such suit, the Secretary, by letter to his counsel in answer, suggested whether it was not expedient to "await the result of the deliberation of this (the United States) Government and that of Great Britain upon a proposition for the establishment or adjudication, among other things, of claims like that of Mr. Pratt;" and the claimant averred that in conformity with this suggestion he omitted to bring his suit against General Dix.

The City of Richmond, of which vessel the claimant had been first mate, had been engaged in January, 1865, in carrying crew, arms, and ammunition from London to the rebel cruiser Stonewall, which received substantially her entire crew and armament of small-arms and ammunition by that means. On parting with the Stonewall, the City of Richmond steamed to Bermuda, and thence to Nassau, where her officers and

men were discharged, the claimant immediately proceeding to New York, as above stated.

The claimant alleged in his memorial, however, that he shipped upon the City of Richmond in good faith for an ordinary voyage to the West Indies, and without information or suspicion that "her voyage was in any way connected with either of the belligerent parties in the United States," and that, on finding her engaged in supplying the Stonewall, he had protested to his captain, who paid no attention to his protest, and required him to obey orders on pain of arrest for mutiny. The fact of the claimant's having been thus engaged on the City of Richmond was reported to General Dix, and this, in connection with his arrival in New York from Nassau, constituted the grounds of his arrest by General Dix.

On the part of the United States it was claimed that the fact of the claimant's having been actively engaged in aiding the enemies of the United States, and that he immediately thereafter came from Nassau, the principal port in the Atlantic from which intercourse with the States in rebellion was kept up through the blockade, to New York, justified the authorities of the United States in arresting and holding him both as a prisoner of war and as a probable spy.

On the part of the claimant it was contended that there was no proof of any offence committed by the claimant against the laws of the United States, or the laws or principles of neutrality. That even if he had voluntarily participated in the cruise of the City of Richmond to equip the Stonewall, this fact would have furnished no justification for his subsequent arrest in New York, though it might have sufficed to determine Her Majesty's government not to interfere for his protection or indemnity. That the informality in his passport was caused, if not contrived, by the United States consul at Nassau, and that the assurance by that officer to the claimant that the passport was a sufficient one was in bad faith, and made with a view to the claimant's arrest when he should arrive in the city of New York, the consul having sent by the same ship a letter addressed to General Dix, giving him the information upon which he acted; and that the claimant's imprisonment was unnecessarily and unjustly severe and prolonged.

The commission unanimously awarded to the claimant the sum of $1,200.

The cases of John C. Rahming, No. 7; Joseph Eneas, No. 126; and Joseph W. Binney, No. 352, were of substantially the same character, and were all decided at the same time. These claimants were all domiciled in the city of New York, and there engaged in trade. All were carrying on a considerable trade with the port of Nassau, and were arrested on the charge of carrying on an unlawful traffic with the enemies of the United States under color of their trade with Nassau. Rahming and Eneas were both arrested on the 31st December, 1863, and confined