by such men as Chief Justices Jones, Oakley, Duer, and Bosworth, Ju tices Sandford, Hoffman, Woodruff, and others, some of whom have national reputation. Many of the most important commercial cases: ing in the city of New York have come before this tribunal, and, having received the most thorough and exhaustive discussion at the have, by the satisfactory manner in which they were disposed of 1 beuch, become leading cases in the law. Nearly all of these decisions have been reported by one of the of the Court. We cannot bestow too much praise upon the m which this has been done by the present Chief Justice. We know that he has brought to his work the most conscientious: taking thoroughness. Time has in no case been spared where necessary to the most complete and comprehensive prepara work. The result is, that in these volumes there is always and clear statement of the facts in each case, a condensed sketch of the argument of counsel, and an elaborate an analysis in the head-note of the points decided. We cordially commend these volumes to the profession. THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGL This appears to be an excellent work. The arrang We would suggest to the authors, on the pub tion, that they enrich its pages by more extensiv judgments within the last three or four years luminous decisions of Vice-Chancellor Wood. mined these can fail to be impressed with+1 received the highest profession other of the allegations which went to make up each plea. And as this denial was an admission of the other allegations not embraced in the issue, it put the plaintiff at great disadvantage. To remedy this the ingenuity of the ancient pleaders invented the traverse de injuria sua propria absque tali causa," as it was called, which, in cases to which it was applicable, had the effect of throwing upon the defendant the necessity of proving all the material allegations in his plea, just as the issue non assumpsit threw upon the plaintiff the burden of proving all the allegations in his declaration. The introduction in England, in Hilary Term 1834, of the New Rules of Pleading, as they are still called, by which the effect of the general issue in actions ex contractu was made to be the mere denial of the precise facts alleged in the declaration: thus compelling defendants to plead specially all defences by way of excuse or justification, and involving the plaintiff in the embarrassments and difficulties growing out of the rule which limited him to a single replication to each plea, induced an examination in England into the applicability of this replication to actions ex contractu, to which it was found as well suited as to actions ex delicto. Its availability in such cases is not recognised in any American. decisions known to the writer. Like most other forms of pleading, this derives its name from prominent words used in the original form the equivalent words at the present day being "of his own wrong, and without the cause in his plea alleged-" without," "absque hoc," "absque tali causa," are words adopted in all formal traverses. They express a negative, as used in this replication, signifying and not for;" accordingly the language of the older entries sometimes tiel cause." is "et nemy per Crogate's Case, 8th Reports 66, is the leading authority on this subject. Edward Crogate brought an action of trespass against one Robert Marys for driving his cattle, and the defendant pleaded in effect that the cattle were trespassing on the ground of one William Marys, and the defendant, as servant to the said William, and by his command, molliter (without unnecessary vio lence), drove the cattle out of the said place, &c. The plaintiff replied de injuria, &c., upon which the defendant demurred in law. The plaintiff contended that the replication was good, because the defendant did not claim any interest, but justified by force of a commandment, and that de injuria sua propria shall refe only to the commandment, and to no other part of the plea. Bu the replication was pronounced insufficient, and four resolutions were come to: First. That the words absque tali causa do refer to the whole plea; and therefore in false imprisonment if the defendant justifies by a capias to the sheriff, and a warrant from him to the defendant de injuria is no good replication, for then matter of record, namely, the capias, will be parcel of the cause, as well as the warrant from the sheriff to the defendant, for all makes but one cause; and matter of record ought not to be put in issue to the jury, but the plaintiff may in such case reply de injuria, and traverse the warrant which is matter of fact. But the resolution goes on to say, upon such justification by force of any proceeding in the Admiralty Court, hundred, or County Court, or any other which is not a Court of record, there de injuria generally is good, for all is matter of fact, and all makes but one cause. Second. Where the defendant in his own right, or as a servant to another, claims any interest in the land, or any common or rent growing out of the land; or any way or passage upon the land, &c., there de injuria generally is no plea. But if the defendant justifies as a servant, there de injuria in some of the said cases, with a traverse of the commandment, the same being made material, is good; for the general replication de injuria is properly when the defendant's plea doth consist merely upon excuse, and upon no matter of interest whatsoever." In New York it is held, notwithstanding the latter part of the first resolution, in Crogate's Case, that de injuria is not a proper replication when the plea sets up justification under the authority of a Court not of record. Because they say the second rule in Crogate's Case is that de injuria is only proper where the matter pleaded offers an excuse, not where it insists that the matter com plained of was done in the performance or discharge of a lawfully imposed right or duty: Coburn vs. Hopkins, 4 Wend. 577; Lytle vs. Lee, 5 Johns. Rep. 114; and see Catterall vs. Lees, 8 Mann., Grang., and Scott 113; 65 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 113; where Mr. Justice MAULE uses this language: "The replication de injuria is only applicable to a plea which shows that the plaintiff never at any time had a cause of action against the defendant;" and the Court apparently adopted the argument of counsel when they say, "The fallacy is in confounding an exemption from liability existing at the time of the act done, with an exemption from liability at the time of the action brought-de injuria can only be replied where the plea sets up matter existing at the time of the act done, which gives a prima facie and apparent cause of action. The defendant does not say by his plea that at the time at which the cause of action is alleged to have accrued he was not liable; he admits the cause of action, and sets up matter of subsequent discharge. But there is a manifest distinction between such pleas and those which rely upon matter of discharge and extinguishment of the right of action; as to which latter class no authority has been cited to show the general form of traverse is allowable, and indeed it is excluded by the very terms of the rule above referred to. Thus in a plea of payment, or accord and satisfaction, or release, or of any matter which extinguishes the right to sue, both the rules of pleading and the course and practice, from the earliest time, require the plaintiff to make a traverse of, or to deny the material fact stated in the plea, which constitutes the discharge or extinguishment of the right of action." The third resolution in Crogate's Case is, "That when by the defendant's plea any authority or power is mediately or immediately derived from the plaintiff, there, although no interest be claimed, the plaintiff ought to answer it, and shall not reply generally de injuria sua propria." This resolution is fully recog nised and acted upon in the case of Milner vs. Jordan, 8 Adol. & Ellis 620; 55 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 620. In Salter vs. Purchell, in the Exchequer Chamber, 1 Adol. & |