particularly the one who assumed the "more solid power to direct affairs," and whom they held accountable, not entirely without reason, for certain executive indiscretions and for national misfortunes.

When Congress convened in December, the sentiment or prejudice against Mr. Seward was deep and severe, but he seemed not cognizant of it, nor was the President himself aware of its full extent. He could not have been wholly ignorant of the fact that there was a growing dislike of Mr. Seward and that he was opposed by many friends of the administration as well as opponents; but he knew that others of the Cabinet were improperly censured and abused, and that he as well as they were in some cases unjustly assailed. No one, however, had warned either of the extreme disfavor with which almost the whole community in those days viewed Mr. Seward-their want of confidence in his sincerity and judgment, and their belief that his intimacy and influence with the President were pernicious. This erroneous, or, more properly speaking, exaggerated impression of the influence and power of the Secretary of State which the partisans of Mr. Seward had inculcated, in the mistaken belief that it would increase his strength to the same extent that it injured the President—a mistake into which Mr. Adams appears to have fallen-carried with it the idea that the President permitted himself to be persuaded and misled by his subordinate to do acts against his own better judgment. The assiduous attentions of the Secretary of State could scarcely fail to have some effect on the President, especially in minor matters, to which he could not always, in the overwhelming mul

tiplicity of affairs, give that minute attention which he wished. Intimacy, companionship would unavoidably carry with it more or less influence, and in that view the Secretary had influence which he was forward to exhibit and not reluctant to exercise, sometimes unfortunately for the President and the country. It was notorious that the partisan friends of Mr. Seward were anxious to have it believed he was the power behind the President who controlled the action of the government, and some of his own oracular sayings and doings tended to that belief.

A brief interchange of views among the members after Congress assembled led to the disclosure of great unanimity of opinion adverse to the Secretary of State, which resulted in a meeting of the Republican Senators on the 17th of December, at which, resolutions in opposition to him and requesting that he should be dismissed, were adopted with but one dissenting voice. A committee of nine Senators, embracing some of the ablest and most eminent men of that body, at the head of which was the venerable Judge Collamer of Vermont, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, was appointed, and instructed to wait upon the President and communicate to him the general conviction that the continuance of Mr. Seward in office would be injurious to the administration and the country, and to make known to him a request on the part of the Senators assembled that the services of Mr. Seward should be dispensed with.

These extraordinary proceedings were immediately communicated to Secretary Seward, before the committee had waited upon the President, by Senator

King of New York, the only gentleman who had opposed them. Mr. Seward promptly and properly tendered his resignation. It is not essential to enter into the details of that movement further than to say that Mr. Lincoln defeated it, and in doing so, demonstrated to Senators and Cabinet executive ability, tact, and power such as Mr. Adams never knew he possessed, and consequently fails to appreciate. Although surprised and grieved by what was done and what he learned, the President did not submit to Senatorial dictation, nor permit the Executive Department of the government to be overborne or invaded. Mr. Seward was not dismissed, nor was his resignation accepted, nor did he wish it to be accepted. The attempt to drive him from the State Department really strengthened him in the position, but there is no doubt the movement had in some respects a beneficial effect in restraining his officiousness and in arousing Mr. Lincoln's attention to it. The scheming party management, which had been defeated first at Chicago and subsequently in the formation of the Cabinet, but which had adroitly undertaken to control and regulate the Administration, was by these Senatorial proceedings rebuked and again defeated. Some of the active Congressional friends who had favored the nomination of Mr. Seward at Chicago had become dissatisfied with him and his demonstrations, and were most forward in asking that he should not be permitted to longer discharge the duties of Secretary of State.

It was at this juncture, when he became conscious that he had no longer a party to sustain him-when he saw all the Senate, and it may be added, about the

whole of the representative body opposed to him— when there was not a single state, nor any party' in any state, in his favor that "Mr. Seward deliberately came to the conclusion to stifle every sensation left in him of aspiration in the future," and "dismiss forever the noblest dreams of ambition," not that he might be or was thereby able to "direct affairs," nor yet with the conviction that Abraham Lincoln "should reap the honors due chiefly to his labors," but because any idea of political preferment was to him utterly hopeless. It is an incontrovertible truth that he had the confidence and support of no party, and was consequently wanting in that power which derives its strength from public opinion.

Perhaps no one occurrence better illustrates the executive and administrative course of Mr. Seward, than certain proceedings in relation to mails taken on captured vessels. Very little publicity was given to the subject at the time, though it was the cause of frequent and earnest discussion, and of a somewhat extensive and elaborate correspondence.

I received on the last day of October, 1862, a brief note from Mr. Seward, saying: "It is thought expedient that instructions be given to the blockading and naval officers, that in case of capture of merchant vessels suspected or proved to be vessels of the insurgents or contraband," the mails should "not be searched. or opened, but be put as speedily as may be convenient on the way to their designated destinations." By whom it was "thought expedient" that such ille

gal "instructions" should be given, and an essential national right renounced in the midst of war when most needed, did not appear. The note, though characteristic, was of such a tenor that I gave it no attention whatever, except to say to Mr. Seward within a day or two, probably at our next meeting, that I had received it, that I disliked its tone, and knew not its object, or whether it was private or official, but it could not be expected I would carry it into effect. He made a passing reply that he had great difficulty in keeping the peace and satisfying foreign demands, particularly the English, who were very exacting. There the matter rested, and I supposed was ended; but six months later he came to my house, Saturday evening, the 11th of April, with a letter from Lord Lyons enclosing an extract from Mr. Archibald, the English Consul in New York, who had written his lordship that the mail-bag of the Peterhoff, a captured vessel, was in the prize commissioner's office, "that the court had directed the mail parcels should be opened in order to see what letters were enclosed relating to the cargo on board the ship, and requested that I would open the package and select such letters as appeared to me to relate to the cargo on board or to the consignee mentioned in the manifest, and to take charge of the residue, with a view of forwarding them to their destination." With this request the consul refused to comply, and immediately informed Lord Lyons, who wrote Mr. Seward that "all these proceedings seem to me to be so contrary to the spirit of your letter to the Secretary of the Navy of the 31st