These facts are known beyond the Cabinet circle, and are consequently no secret. There were other marked cases of intelligent supervision of our foreign affairs and their management by the President in the final summing up on important questions, which overthrow the statements of Mr. Adams, who has an utterly false conception of the relative position, ability, and character of the two men of whom he speaks. To the Secretary of State, whose special duty it was to investigate and report upon international subjects, and prepare instructions to the respresentatives of the government abroad, the President gave the same, perhaps closer attention than to the Secretary of the Navy, who issued instructions and orders to the commanders of squadrons and officers on special duty. In no respect was the Secretary of State on a different footing in administering the government from other heads of departments nor did he infuse more vigor or character in the administration. He was more constant and unwearied than others in his attention to and attendance upon the President, made it a point to always accompany him in his visits to the army or wherever he appeared in public, and was personally very devoted to him, but never exercised higher executive authority or had “the more solid power to direct affairs for the benefit of the nation" than his associates. There were in the foreign policy of the government during Mr. Lincoln's administration fewer and less perplexing questions, less serious complications than under several of our previous Presidents. But the domestic administration from the commencement to its close was one of unprecedented labor and responsibility requiring

energy, vigilance, executive and administrative ability, such as had never before devolved on the Chief Magistrate or the government. The action and responsibility of others were far greater than those devolved on the Secretary of State.

IT is admitted by Mr. Adams that, while wanting in the qualities of President, and while "no experiment so rash has ever been made as that of elevating to the head of affairs a man with so little previous preparation for his task as Mr. Lincoln," "he afterwards proved himself before the world, a pure, brave, honest man, faithful to his arduous work." Nothing more. It is still left to be inferred that though he meant well, he was incompetent and without ability to discharge the duties of his position, except under the direction of one of his subordinates who had really less to do than others in the domestic administration

of the government. It does not occur to Mr. Adams that he under estimated the ability of the President of whom he personally knew little, and that the people formed a more correct estimate of their Chief Majestrate's capacity than himself. He gives no credit to President Lincoln for far-seeing sagacity, in which he excelled most men of his time; for knowledge of the structure of the government and information on public affairs, which he had studied with diligence and passionate fondness; for arduous and successful labors, though holding no office, endowed with no wealth, and aided by no metropolitan funds, in his great struggle for constitutional freedom; for execu

tive and administrative ability, for sound judgment, intellectual capacity, mental power, and practical knowledge, which enabled him to stand at the helm and guide the government through storms and dangers such as no country ever experienced. In all these qualities the impression is conveyed that this remarkable man was deficient, but that they were possessed by the Secretary of State, who was "not blind to the deficiencies of his chief." Indeed, the whole language, tone, tenor, sentiment, and intent of the address are to elevate Mr. Seward and depreciate Mr. Lincoln; to award to the Secretary honors that clearly belong to the President; to make it appear that the subordinate controlled and directed the principal; that the Secretary of State was de facto President, and the President himself a mere locum tenens, incompetent for the place from the want of "experience" and "previous preparation." Mr. Seward had influence in the administration, but not control. His mental activity, the "marvellous fertility of his pen," his proneness to exercise authority and to make himself conspicuous on every important subject and occasion, imposed on admiring and willing friends, who, like Mr. Adams, persuaded themselves that one so active and prominent must be the moving and directing spirit of the administration. It would be difficult, however, for his most partial friends to specify any financial, military, naval, territorial or general measure of administration, which had its origin with or was directed by the Secretary of State, while the President suggested some and directed all. Mr. Seward could adapt himself to, or adopt and appropri

ate the views of, others with wonderful facility and address could second their propositions, and support them with a zeal and earnestness which made them seem his own.

MR. ADAMS says he knows that in order to cut up by the roots the possibility of misunderstanding or rivalry between the President and Secretary of State, "Mr. Seward deliberately came to the conclusion to stifle every sensation left him of aspiration in the future, by establishing a distinct understanding with the President on that subject." "Thus it happened that Mr. Seward voluntarily dismissed forever the noblest dreams of an ambition he had the clearest right to indulge, in exchange for a more solid power to direct affairs for the benefit of the nation through the name of another, who should yet appear in all later time to reap the honors due chiefly to his labors."

That Mr. Seward signified to the President he should not be a competitor with him for the office of* Chief Magistrate in 1864 is not improbable, and but for the disparagement so ungenerously as well as unjustly thrown upon the President, who according to the "Memorial Address" was "in all later times to reap the honors due chiefly to Mr. Seward's labors," the latter should have the unrestricted credit of patriotic self-abnegation. But the truth must not be suppressed or perverted, and there are, aside from the act of declination but connected with it, certain facts and circumstances which are essential to a right understand

ing of the case, and which, if the subject be alluded to, truth requires should not be omitted.

In December 1862, the dissatisfaction which existed in Congress and the country against the imputed meddlesome interference and alleged mismanagement of the Secretary of State, and his supposed influence over the Executive, was such that a very general desire was expressed that he should leave the Cabinet and retire from the Administration. To some extent he had unwittingly and unintentionally contributed to the prevailing discontent by persistent and ostentatious exhibition of himself in public with the President when he visited the army, and indeed on every possible occasion, outside of the State Department. His claqueurs and supporters busied themselves in representing that Mr. Seward was de facto President, and the "Memorial Address" falls into the same error by declaring he was directing affairs. Mr. Seward gave encouragement to these representations. They gratified his vanity and that of his supporters, but did not strengthen and fortify him in Congress or with the public, as he and his friends anticipated would be the case, but really weakened him, and for a time were harmful to the President, towards whom the country was otherwise well inclined. Military reverses always weaken an administration. The people, however, are tolerant of the mistakes of their Chief Magistrate, and forbearing towards his honest errors, but are exacting and often intolerant towards subordinate or reputed favorites. Under national reverses they were lenient towards the President, and whatever was wrong they charged, sometimes improperly, on the secretaries,