own.

thirty years maturing was so deep seated, its proportions were so vast, the passions had become so excited that no earthly power could have saved the country from war. The men who combined against the government for alleged grievances had, after long preparation, finally succeeded in obtaining control of the civil organization of the states in one section of the union and were determined to have the ascendency in the general government, or a new confederacy of their But if hostilities could not have been prevented, it is scarcely to be doubted they would have been of less proportions had the administration of Mr. Buchanan put forth the strong hand of power against the first organization to disorganize, and protected, defended and held the fortresses and public property intrusted to its keeping. But the friends of the incoming and outgoing administrations in Washington, concurred in acting on a different policy, though from different motives. The secessionists felt truly that to them delay was important, that it would be an embarrassing and unhappy, if not a disastrous complication for them to make open war on the government while it was administered by a man of their own selection and whose general course they approved. Mr. Seward who was in pretty free communication with, though politically opposed to them, persuaded himself that if the contestants did not take the field until there was a change of administration, he could then, with his fertility of resources, expedients and means, tranquillize the country. In this he was as sincere as in any political act of his life. Those who charge him with unpatriotic and ulterior designs against the

government and the union, do him injustice; he was a centralist in his tendencies, not a disunionist, and in his efforts to delay action he was on what Mr. Adams calls "the delusive track of expediency," without fixed principles, or any clear and well defined policy. His prophecies of pacification within ninety days, iterated and reiterated, were based on no facts. He never made known what he proposed to do to reconcile differences except as declared in his speech of the twelfth of January, by meeting exaction with concession, submitting to the doctrine of coercion and evacuating the national fortresses in the seceding states. With faith in expedients he expressed his readiness for a national convention to revise the constitution, and also for an amendment to prohibit forever, beyond revocation, any authority in Congress to interfere with the subject of slavery. As the war was inevitable and soon came "with all its horrid cost," it was fortunate for the. country that so honest, so determined, so sagacious and capable a man as Lincoln was President to meet it, with his comprehensive ability, human instincts, fixed principles, calm forbearance and regard for Federal and state rights.

For several weeks after the inauguration, no stated Cabinet meetings were held, though the members were frequently assembled in council-sometimes only a part; but whenever convened, it was by special notice from the Secretary of State. This irregular practice, initiated and pressed by the Secretary of State, who was supposed to be familiar with usage and to have great executive experience, was after some weeks corrected, and stated meetings on Tuesdays and Fri

days were ordered, against the remonstrance of Secretary Seward, who thought stated meetings caused unnecessary interruptions of business, and that often only a part of the members, such as were specially interested in the subjects under consideration, need be called to meet him and the President. It is mentioned in the "Memorial Address," that "Mr. Seward himself came into the State Department with no acquaintance with the forms of business other than that obtained incidentally through his services in the Senate." This was soon obvious to the whole council, who were much annoyed for a time by this want of proper system and that correct administration which is essential to intelligent unity in the Government. Under evident misapprehension of his own powers and duties, and in disregard of what belonged to others, the Secretary of State undertook too much, found himself embarrassed by promises and assurances inconsiderately given; and with no clear and well-defined policy, but with assumption of pretty unlimited authority and faith in expedients, on which, rather than substantial principles, he relied, there were for a brief period some singular proceedings. President Lincoln bore with these things patiently, though greatly embarrassed, for the omens abroad were portentous. Incidents and occurrences which actually took place will best illustrate the condition of affairs, the men, and their relative positions in administering the govern

ment.

Within a month after the advent of Mr. Lincoln and the organization of his Cabinet, the Secretary of State exhibited his loose ideas of government, his want

of system and defect of correct executive and administrative talent by preparing and sending out an irregular military expedition for the relief of Fort Pickens, without consulting the Secretary of War and without his knowledge or that of any of his associates. There is not in the archives and history of the Government a record of such mischievous maladministration, when all the circumstances are considered, as this secret scheme of the Secretary of State to send, without consulting the War Department or the General-in-Chief, 3 a military expedition to Pickens, which had already been relieved. Military and naval appropriations were not at his disposal, but he assumed their expenditure. Officers and men of both the War and Navy Departments were surreptitiously, and without the knowledge of either the Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy, withdrawn from legitimate dutý; the funds and means provided for their respective departments by Congress, and legally under their control, for which they, and not the Secretary of State, were responsible, and which were destined by them and the government for different objects, were secretly abstracted and diverted to purposes of which neither of them, nor any member of the Cabinet, was informed. In consequence of this strange misgovernment there was confusion, disorganization, and demoralization; the records of the War and Navy Departments were made unreliable and apparently false; officers were away from their assigned duty; funds were misapplied; important movements were paralyzed and defeated; the course of the Administration was interrupted and incomprehensible, and it is not surprising

that it was accused of weakness and mismanagement. No satisfactory solution was ever made or attempted for these erratic and intrusive proceedings, other than rumors or charges that the Secretary of State had given assurances in regard to Fort Sumter that were unauthorized, and which could in no other way be carried out.

The condition of Fort Sumter and the necessity of measures for its relief were the first matters pressed upon the President, even before his Cabinet was organized. In his Inaugural Address he had said, "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government." This was his policy; but the Secretary of State, who had different views, opposed sending reinforcements to Sumter, and in his opposition he was sustained by General Scott, to whom the subject was first properly referred as a military question. General Scott gave his "hearty coöperation," to Mr. Seward, and reported against sending supplies. All the Cabinet, except Mr. Blair, acquiesced in the military recommendation; but the President, after repeated discussions, rejected the advice of Mr. Seward and adhered to his own original policy. The decision was a great disappointment to the Secretary of State. It was subsequently alleged, and has never been denied, that he had promised the rebels that Sumter should be evacuated. Thurlow Weed admitted in the Albany Evening Journal that such a promise had been made, but though Mr. Weed appears to have been informed of the fact, the Cabinet was not. The President was not a party to any such assurance, knew not of it, and