The truth is, Mr. Seward did not, even at that late day, realize to its full extent the nature of the impending conflict, but viewed it as a severe and embittered party controversy, not unlike others the country had experienced, and which, being really causeless, he hoped and believed time and the change of administration would pacify. Many of his associates as well as himself were of the party of expedients, and persuaded him and themselves that if once in power he could so manage as to allay dissension, prevent secession, and effect a restoration of Union feeling. Hence, without any avowed reason, nothing but past "experience," he predicted the speedy peaceful solution of a dispute or controversy that to others looked formidable, and which soon not only threatened but assailed the Union. His predictions were in harmony with the policy, so far as he had a policy, of himself and friends. He was for peace, and had faith, hope, and confidence that peace would be preserved by some expedient, device, or luck-he knew not how-and he therefore predicted it.

Mr. Lincoln was comforted by the assurances and predictions of his future minister then in the Senate, but he had apprehensions which no prophetic declarations could entirely put at rest. Results have shown that "in this perilous interval," he, "in his secluded abode in the heart of Illinois," with unpretending yet undoubted sagacity, had a more correct knowledge and better appreciation of the condition of affairs— foresaw with more accurate perception the threatened difficulties-than the experienced politicians who predicted and promised peace. Those who best knew

the two men are aware that their minds were widely different inherently and in their organization. The President was greatly superior in intellectual strength and vigor, had the more solid and substantial qualities, more earnestness and sincerity, a greater grasp and comprehension, a more intuitive and far-seeing sagacity, came almost instinctively to right conclusions, had more correct convictions, greater self-reliance, greater firmness of purpose, a stricter adherence to principles which he believed to be correct; points that were best understood by those who knew him best.

The Secretary of State had, with higher culture and scholastic attainments, quickness of apprehension, wonderful facility and aptness in adapting himself to circumstances and exigencies which he could not control, and a fertility in expedients, with a dexterity in adopting or dismissing plans and projected schemes, unsurpassed; qualities which made him an acceptable companion, if not always a safe adviser, but never the superior and controlling executive mind. His training and habit were partisan, and his acts often impulsive; but, accustomed through his whole official life to consult a faithful friend, to whose judgment and guidance he deferred, he had not in great emergencies the self-reliance, energy, will, and force of character which are essential to a truly great and strong executive. He sometimes acted rashly, not always wisely. But if he had not the will which is necessary for a chief, he had the sustaining qualities which are valuable in serving a capable leader with whom he might be identified. He was subordinate to Abraham Lincoln, and deferred to him as he had deferred to Thurlow Weed

-conformed to the views of the former as he had for thirty years to those of the latter and assumed credit in the one case as it had always been given him in the other, without being the originating and directing mind in either. After the subsidence of the anti-masonic excitement on which he was first carried into office, he became a Whig, and through all its changes and mutations, until the organization was extinguished, he “adhered to the party."

Mr. Lincoln, on the contrary, was divested of partisanship beyond almost any man in active public life; not that he was insensible to party and its claims, but they were secondary and subordinate to principles -the means rather than the end. He "drifted," as he used to say, into the Whig organization at the beginning; his associations were chiefly there, but he had no particular veneration for the party or regard for many of its professed doctrines. Time, experience, reflection, and observation weakened whatever feeling or sympathy he once entertained for mere party. Unlike Mr. Seward, he had no reluctance in giving up the Whig organization; no lingering affection for it, nor any hesitation to participate in and urge on the Republican movement from its inception. Mr. Seward was an adroit and skilful party tactician, familiar with the tricks and contrivances in which his fidus Achates indulged to carry an election; while Mr. Lincoln had no taste, inclination, or respect for such practices, and would not, to secure party success, intentionally, even in the most excited election, deceive or permit others to deceive those who trusted him. The minds of the two men ran in different channels, and when they.

came together on important questions, that of the President was the principal, and not, as represented in the address, the tributary.

Mr. Adams says:

"Mr. Lincoln could not fail soon to perceive the fact that whatever estimate he might put on his own natural judgment, he had to deal with a superior in native intellectual power, in extent of acquirement, in breadth of philosophic experience, and in the force of moral discipline. On the other hand, Mr. Seward could not have been long blind to the deficiencies of the chief in these respects, however highly he might value his integrity of purpose, his shrewd capacity, and his generous and amiable disposition. . . . Thus it happened that Mr. Seward voluntarily dismissed forever the noblest dreams of an ambition he had the clearest right to indulge, in exchange for a more solid power to direct affairs for the benefit of the nation, through the name of another, who should yet appear in all later time to reap the honors due chiefly to his labors."

On no consideration would I detract one iota from the just merits of the late Secretary of State, with whom, though sometimes differing, I for eight years, under two Executives, enjoyed uninterruptedly pleasant, social and official intercourse; nor am I willing to see the memory of the distinguished Chief Magistrate who served his country so faithfully and so well, and finally died in her cause, unjustly obscured, and his abilities and deeds belittled and wronged. As is elsewhere said in the address, "It is the duty of history, in dealing with all human action to do strict justice in

discriminating between persons, and by no means to award to one, honors that clearly belong to another." Yet a more flagrant violation of " the duty of history" in that respect, a more erroneous and unjust discrimination, or a more unrighteous "award to one honors that clearly belong to another," is scarcely to be found in all history than in the assumption that Mr. Seward directed the affairs of the nation through the name of Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Adams omits to state in what particular Mr. Seward, aside from his own department,

exercised the more solid power to direct affairs for the benefit of the nation" of which Mr. Lincoln was "in all later time to receive the honors."

It was not

in the management of the finances and establishing and maintaining the credit of the Government through a wasting war. I am not aware that he ever made a suggestion, proposed a measure, or in any way attempted to interfere with, or direct the affairs of the Treasury Department. There was a personal intimacy between him and the Secretary of War, but I do not remember that he proposed or directed the conduct of a single campaign, or originated any military or army movement, save some unfortunate and irregular proceedings early in the administration, when he took upon himself, as Secretary of State, to perform secretly and improperly the duties of Secretary of War without the knowledge of that officer. On one or two occasions when he attempted, in total disregard of good government and correct administration, to intermeddle with naval matters, the proceedings were, as with the War Department, disapproved as irregular, improper, and reprehensible. In the administration and opera