with Lord Lyons, the Minister, who was then absent, but with Mr. Stuart a subordinate then temporarily in charge of the legation, and who improved his opportunity, which Lord Lyons would scarcely have asked to obtain concessions from our Secretary of State in the case of captured mails as well as captured vessels. In the case of captured mails, it will be remembered Lord Lyons disavowed to Mr. Sumner that he had ever made a demand, but that it was a voluntary renunciation of our right by our Secretary of State who was supposed to be the authorized organ of the government. In a letter of the 31st of December following, Lord Lyons, who had resumed his duties, admitted that by "a British statute authorizing the sale of a ship before the decision of an appellate court has been pronounced, is wellfounded," that "the exercise of such an abstract power of sale is not denied by Her Majesty's Government to the United States authorities," but, he thought "the claimant ought to be preferred as a purchaser," etc.

This letter of the British Minister disposed of the unofficial apprehensions of his subordinate-apprehensions in which the Secretary of State participated, and "hoped were unfounded," but which the Secretary of the Navy, thus admonished or rebuked, disregarded. The transfer in this and other cases, was carried into effect, notwithstanding hopes and fears and timid concessions of the experienced government official, who according to Mr. Adams, had the "solid power to direct affairs"-and possessed "breadth of philosophic experience" and "native intellectual power" greatly superior to Mr. Lincoln.

THE President had a happy way of illustrating questions and sometimes disposing of a subject by an anecdote, which, better than an elaborate argument, expressed his opinion. In the latter part of the winter of 1864, Mr. Seward came one day to the cabinet council with a full portfolio, and brow clouded and disturbed. The President ever watchful, immediately detected difficulty, and exhibited his concern as the Secretary of State slowly adjusted his papers. Mr. Seward commenced by alluding to the fact that Spain was sick of the European alliance, and was beginning to manifest towards our country a more friendly spirit; that her government had never been fully identified with Palmerston and Louis Napoleon in their intrigue for European intervention, but she had at the beginning of American troubles committed herself to some extent and been induced to undertake to recover her possessions in San Domingo. She had however been unfortunate and met unexpected resistance. The negroes were making a great struggle to maintain their independence, and had the sympathies of the abolitionists of our country with them. It was important in every point of view to detach Spain from the alliance and preserve her friendship, at the same time not give offence to our own countrymen whose sympathies in the present condition of affairs were enlisted in behalf of the negroes. In this SpanishDominican complication we were pressed from both quarters, and it was a delicate and grave question what position we should take and what course pursue. On one side was Spain, whom we wish to conciliate, on

the other side, the negroes who had become great favorites and wanted our good-will in resisting Spanish oppression.

The President's countenance indicated that his mind was relieved before Seward had concluded. He remarked that the dilemma of the Secretary of State reminded him of an interview between two negroes in Tennessee. One was a preacher, who with the crude and strange notions of the ignorant of his race was endeavoring to admonish and enlighten his brother African of the importance of religion and the dangers of the future. "Dere are," said Josh, the preacher, "two roads before you, Jo. Be careful which you take. One ob dem roads leads straight to hell-de odder goes right to damnation." Jo opened his eyes with affright and under the inspired eloquence, and awful danger before him exclaimed, “Josh, take which road you please-I shall go thro' de woods."

"I am not willing," said the President, "to assume any new troubles or responsibility at this time, and shall therefore avoid going to one place with Spain or with the negro to the other, but shall take to the woods. We will maintain an honest and strict neutrality."

THE relation of the circumstances attending the capture and release of the rebel emissaries, Mason and Slidell, is pregnant with error. The excitement which accompanied the intelligence of the capture of these mischievous men was great, and had at one time a threatening aspect. The final disposition of the question, with the restoration of the prisoners to British

authority, might well be mentioned as displaying the marked and in some respects perhaps happy trait of Mr. Seward in adapting himself to circumstances which he could not control. But Mr. Adams fails to bring out that shrewd diplomatic quality of Mr. Seward's mind, and strives to inculcate an impression that the Secretary of State stood alone; was wise, sagacious, reserved, and profound, when others were blind, precipitate, and weak; took upon himself "the whole weight of popular indignation," and, "like the Roman Curtius, who leaped into the abyss which could have been closed in no other way," he offered himself a sacrifice to secure the safety of the state. Mr. Seward should receive credit for the dexterous and skilful dispatch which he prepared on his own change of position. It exhibits his readiness and peculiar tact and talent to extricate himself from and to pass over difficulties. But in point of fact no man was more elated or jubilant over the capture of the emissaries than Mr. Seward, who for a time made no attempt to conceal his gratification and approval of the act of Wilkes. But while he and most of the Cabinet and country were hilarious, the President had doubts, misgivings, and regrets, which were increased after an interview with Senator Sumner, with whom he often-sometimes to the disgust and annoyance of Mr. Seward-advised on controverted or disputed international questions, and especially when there were differences between himself and the Secretary of State.

On the question of giving up the emissaries, Mr.* Adams says: "When the time came for the assembly of the Cabinet, not a sign had been given by the Pres

ident, or any of the members, favorable to concession. Mr. Seward, who had been charged with the official duty of furnishing the expected answer, assumed the responsibility of preparing his able argument, upon which a decision was made to surrender the men. Upon him would have rested the whole weight of popular indignation had it proved formidable. If I have been rightly informed, when read, it met with few comments and less approbation. On the other hand, there was no resistance. Silence gave consent. It was the act of Mr. Seward, and his name was to be associated with it, whether for good or for evil."

The truth is, not only had the President expressed his doubts of the legality of the capture, and had them increased, while Mr. Seward was rejoicing over and approving of the proceeding, but Mr. Blair from the first had denounced the act as unathorized, irregular, and illegal. Not being a special admirer of Wilkes, Mr. Blair recommended that Wilkes should be ordered to take the Iroquois and go with Mason and Slidell to England, and deliver them to the British government; for Palmerston and Russell would, he said, seize the occasion to make war. The prompt and voluntary disavowal of the act of Wilkes, and delivering over the prisoners, would have evinced our confidence in our own power, and been a manifestation of our indifference and contempt for the emissaries, and a rebuke to the alleged intrigues between the rebels and the English Cabinet. Mr. Seward took a totally different view; scouted the idea of letting the prisoners go; said the British did not want them, and we could not think of delivering them up. While Mr. Blair did not go about