that respect, by asking whether the best method of testing the fact would not be by giving the merchants an opportunity to manifest their views by their acts. Let us see, said he, who the men are that are ready and anxious to aid the government in this way; perhaps you are mistaken and Seward right. Chase who knows, or ought to know the commercial sentiment has come into Seward's views. It may be well to make the experiment. The State and the Treasury may know more correctly the feelings of the merchants than the Navy. I replied, the test would be hazardous. Should the merchants, as Mr. Seward believed, embark in the measure, adventurers would be likely to also engage in reprisals, and might involve us in war which with the load upon our hands would be disastrous. We ought therefore to act deliberately, and with a full and right appreciation of all the probable consequences. He said that was true and he had confidence in my judgment and my opinions, but I might be mistaken-the State and the Treasury took a different view, and if I was right in my belief that the merchants would not engage in privateering, no harm could come from the trial. If Seward was mistaken, and the substantial men of the country held off, the credit would be mine, and all would then be satisfied.

At the Cabinet meeting on Friday the 3d of April Mr. Seward had some side talk with me in relation to the assignment of a naval officer of character to the service of the State Department, on whom he could devolve the labor and details of examining applications and preparing papers. He had previously requested that Admiral Foote should be detailed for that service,

but that officer after looking into the subject requested to be excused. As all matters relating to privateers and letters-of-marque had in former wars been committed to the State Department and were to be on this occasion, I objected that the navy ought not to be blended with the movement. He very frankly said his purpose in asking for a naval officer of rank, was to be relieved himself of labor and details-in other words, I perceived the Navy Department was to share in the responsibility of any failure or imbroglio that might result from a policy which it disapproved. He named Rear-Admiral C. H. Davis as acceptable, who was assigned accordingly.

The President requested to see me on the following morning, Saturday, and as I entered the room he remarked that I would probably be surprised to hear that Seward already had application for letters-of-marque. I acknowledged I was disappointed if there were respectable and responsible parties to engage in the business. The President said he knew nothing of the gentleman whom Seward had brought him, farther than that he had a vessel, and was anxious to enter upon the service. Taking up and looking at a paper, he said the gentleman's name was Seybert, that he had a vessel of one hundred tons, into which he proposed to put a screw-that this gentleman was then in the audience room, and he would call him in, that I might examine him. This I informed him was unnecessary, for I was familiar with the case which had already been before me. There were, I assured the President no New York merchants or capital in this enterprise. Seybert was, I had learned, a Prussian adventurer,

who called himself a citizen of South Carolina, and I preferred that the Secretary of State should dispose of this and all other similar applications. With a twinkle in his eye the President said he certainly would not trouble me farther in this instance, but wait for the merchants.

Senator Sumner informed me at the same time that the President had experienced great difficulty in getting a sight of my letter of the 31st of March. Mr. Seward did not bring it to his notice as was expected, and when he asked for it, one excuse after another was given, but the President persisted until it was sent him, when he notified the Senator, and together they read it, and discussed the whole subject of privateering and reprisals.

This, with Seybert's application, the only one that ever after came to my knowledge, terminated the privateer policy, closed the subject of letters-of-marque and reprisals during the rebellion. I never again saw the Regulations or heard them alluded to. That Mr. Seward was earnest and sincere in his belief that privateers might render efficient service, I never questioned, but it was fortunate for the administration and the country, that he did not direct affairs for the nation in regard to the policy of letters-of-marque during our civil war. Mr. Lincoln proved himself on that subject and others through that whole exciting period, the " superior in native intellectual power," and in administrative ability.

OFFICIAL intercourse between the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Navy was probably more frequent than between any other two departments.

The service of naval officers on foreign stations where courtesy and the obligations of treaties were to be observed and maintained, and questions growing out of the exercise of belligerent rights, including those of blockade, contraband and the right of search, brought the heads of these two departments in contact, and rendered consultations necessary. These consultations, often in personal interviews, but sometimes by correspondence, brought out the points in which they agreed and disagreed, developed the views of each and to some extent the policy and principles and the working of the administration. But however antagonistic their opinions, there was between the two Secretaries always harmony and mutual good-will and friendly personal relations during the years they were associated together. When they did not agree on any public measure, the subject was submitted to the President who usually decided for himself; but sometimes the differences were made the subject of Cabinet consultation. As a general thing the Secretary of State was averse to bringing department differences before the Cabinet. Visiting the President daily, there were occasions when Mr. Seward obtained a decision without the President's being aware of any difference, or that the point was contested. A decision once made and promulgated it was often difficult to have it reversed. In mentioning these and other incidents. rendered necessary in remarking on the "Memorial Ad

dress," my object has been to exhibit the executive ability and peculiar management of Mr. Seward, which Mr. Adams assumes, and many have believed, controlled and directed the administration of Mr. Lincoln. Such was not the fact. The ideas of the two as to the extent and exercise of executive authority were different, the grants and limitations of power by the constitution were less respected by the Secretary of State than by the President, hence Mr. Seward often and especially when Congress was not in session, freely and sometimes inconsiderately if not rashly, gave unfortunate opinions-conceded away important rights, and himself, exercised questionable executive authority, on the assumption, apparently, that the executive was the government, and his power in the administration almost absolute. Nevertheless Mr. Seward was timid in facing Congress, felt his responsibility to the legislative department more than to the Constitution and disliked controversy, especially with associates who were compelled to sometimes question the correctness of his views. His readiness to manifest his authority and magnify his position led him to make off-hand promises and to decide questions without first investigating and ascertaining their true merits, or his authority to act and his power to fulfil his engagements. This precipitancy not unfrequently begat embarassment and betrayed not only a want of wise diplomatic reserve, but of calm and intelligent executive ability. But if he was at times rash and arbitrary it was from personal weakness, a desire to show his power rather than from malevolence or want of patrioitsm. Towards the demands of foreign gov