in civil war on the subject of slavery, it is not surprising that many who had until this time adhered to and maintained the constitutional safeguards, deprecated the cause of dissension and disunion and wished it removed. The rebellion rapidly increased the antislavery sentiment everywhere, and politicians shaped their course accordingly. On the wave of this antislavery excitement the Secretary of State and the British Minister in the spring of 1862 negotiated a treaty for the suppression of the African slave-trade, a revival of which had been threatened by the secessionists in the cotton-growing states. If other and ulterior purposes were designed, it was an adroit movement on the part of the English diplomat who availed himself of the popular feeling which in free governments influences public men. The Secretary of State very naturally fell in with a movement which was in harmony with public sentiment and the current of affairs. The treaty was quietly negotiated. I knew nothing of it until after its ratification, for it was not submitted for Cabinet consultation in any stage of its progress. When promulgated in the second year of the war, it did not create the sensation which might have been expected. Other and more exciting matters absorbed the public mind. There began to be a conviction that not only the slave-traffic but slavery itself was doomed. I do not remember to have seen or read the treaty until after it had been ratified and duly exchanged by both governments. A certified copy was sent me by the Secretary of State about the first of September, and also a copy of a singular arrangement, contract, or treaty negotiated or

entered into by the Secretary of the Interior under advisement of the Secretary of State and the Charge d'affaire's of Denmark relative to the colonization in the West Indies of negroes captured under the treaty.

On the 17th of September I received the following letter from the Secretary of State with a list of some twenty or thirty naval vessels in Her Majesty's service, and a copy of the instructions of the British government to the respective commanders.

"SIR:

66 DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

17 Sept. 1862."

"I have the honor to invite your attention to the enclosed copy of a communication of the 13th inst. from the British Charge d'affaires here, embracing the instructions which it is intended to furnish to the commanders of Her Brittannic Majesty's cruisers who may be employed in carrying out the provisions of the recent slave-trade treaty between the United States and Great Britain as well as lists of Her Majesty's several ships employed on the African, North American and West India stations, whose commanders will be authorized to act under the treaty and asking for a similar list of United States cruisers.

"I am sir, your ob'd't serv't,

"HON. GIDEON WELLES,

66

Sec't'y of the Navy."

"WM. H. SEWARD."

This communication and the accompanying papers led to a critical examination of the treaty, which contained some extraordinary provisions that, if carried

into effect, were likely to impair the efficiency of our own navy during the war. Whilst examining and considering the treaty, then wholly new to me, and concerning which I had not been consulted, although the navy was to be employed in carrying out its provisions; and in its operation our cruisers would be seriously affected by the instrument, I received a second or duplicate of the foregoing letter, hastening early compliance, and asking for a list of United States vessels with my instructions to officers commanding such as were authorized by the treaty to capture slaves. I replied on the 29th, informing Mr. Seward the treaty was wholly incompatible with the existing condition of affairs—that it would be impossible during the war to detail any vessel with specific instructions to act under the treaty, for it would, for belligerent purposes, destroy the efficiency of any vessel so instructed that it would be virtually locking up a portion of the navy tying the hands of the government at a time when every vessel was wanted for blockade and independent cruising, and it appeared to me the full force and scope of the treaty could not have been well considered when negotiated. My letter was probably more pungent than was necessary or expedient. It aroused Mr. Seward's attention to certain conditions and stipulations, the operation of which had not attracted his attention while framing and assenting to the instrument. He evidently felt that he had been precipitate, and that there were unfortunate or unguarded stipulations in his arrangement with which we could not comply. He therefore wrote me an unofficial note on the 30th of September, enclosing the form of letter which he

wished me to substitute for mine of the preceding day. His reason for this, as stated by himself was that he might wish to give Lord Lyons a copy of my objections which he saw were insuperable. But this proposed substitute prepared by him was gentle and too pointless in its expressions, and on the whole, of such a tenor that I was not inclined to adopt and make it my own, though desirous to oblige him in the emergency. I however modified my communication of the 29th and sent to him the following:

"SIR:

"NAVY DEPARTMENT,

"Oct 9, 1862.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communications of the 17th and 26th ulto., enclosing a copy of a letter from the British Charge d'affaires, communicating the instructions which it is intended to furnish the commanders of Her Brittanic Majesty's cruisers who may be employed in carrying out the provisions of the recent slave-trade treaty between the United States and Great Britain, as well as lists of Her Majesty's several ships employed in the African, North American and West India stations, whose commanders will be authorized to act under the treaty, and asking for a similar list of United States cruisers.

"I have the honor to inform you that all our cruisers are at present exercising the belligerent right of search, and it would be highly detrimental to the service and unjust to the country to detach any of them at the present moment from the duties on which they are engaged and restrict their operations by instructions under the treaty for the present, or during the existence

of hostilities, under the unquestioned belligerent right of search, each and all of our national vessels will exercise the rights which appertain to them as belligerents —will visit and search suspected vessels not only within the latitude prescribed by the treaty, but elsewhere ; and in the exercise of this belligerent right, they will not hesitate to seize slavers or other piratical craft that are abusing our flag.

"To give our cruisers, now performing such general duties, instructions under the treaty, would be to limit their operations to a specific object, while the exigencies of the country require them to perform other necessary, legal and legitimate duties. So far as it is practicable on our part to use the belligerent right of search incidentally, in aid of the purposes of the treaty, we shall so use it.

"The important privilege of visit and search, and in some cases of detention and capture, is conceded by each of the two governments in this treaty, and offence cannot be taken at our waiving for a season the exercise of the privilege conceded. This waiver will not prevent British cruisers from searching and seizing suspected. vessels claiming to be American, while those claiming to be English will also be searched by them. Besides this, our cruisers searching all vessels under the belligerent right, will of course capture all slavers which use or abuse the American Flag or adopt that of the rebels.

"I do not propose during the existence of hostilities to impair the efficiency or usefulness of our cruisers as war vessels by giving their commanders instructions under the treaty, for the reason that any naval officer acting under such instructions would be restrained from the general belligerent right of search-the instrument itself compels him to declare, on boarding a vessel, that