hoped to get into its rear; but night | failure. And now, at 4 A. M.-the came on before he was ready; and, so imminent seemed the danger on this flank, that Lee drew" five of his eight remaining divisions across the James to avert it, affording the opportunity which Grant was awaiting. fuse having been rölighted-the explosion took place; hoisting the fort into the air, annihilating its garrison of 300 men, and leaving in its stead a gigantic hollow or crater of loose earth, 150 feet long by some 60 wide and 25 to 30 deep. Instantly, our guns opened all along the front; and the astounded enemy may well have supposed them the thunders of doom. But it was indispensable to success that a column of assault should rush forward instantly and resolutely, so as to clear the chasm and gain the crest before the foe should recover from his surprise; and, on this vital point, failure had already been secured. The 9th corps, as then con Burnside's corps held a position directly in front of Petersburg, including a point where our lines, owing to the nature of the ground, had been pushed up to within 150 yards of the enemy's, where a fort projected beyond their average front. Under this fort, a mine had been run from a convenient ravine or hollow within our lines, which was entirely screened from the enemy's observation; and this mine would seem to have been completed not only without counter-stituted, was not that from which mining by the Rebels, but without being even suspected by them; though a report of its existence (probably founded on the story of some deserter or prisoner) was printed in one of the Richmond journals. All being ready, the morning of July 30th was fixed for springing the mine; which was to be instantly followed, of course, by the opening of our guns all along the front, and by an assault at the chasm opened in the enemy's defenses by the explosion. It was calculated that, if a crest barely 400 yards behind the doomed fort could be gained and held, Petersburg must fall, with heavy loss to its defenders. any commanding general would have selected a storming party; yet, because it was Burnside's mine, his corps was, without discussion, allowed to furnish the column of assault. His inspecting officer had reported that, of its four divisions, that composed of Blacks was fittest for this perilous service; but Grant, discrediting this, had directed that one of the three White divisions should be chosen. Thereupon, the leaders of these divisions were allowed to cast lots to see which of them should go in-or rather, which two of them should stay out-and the lot fell on the 1st, Brig.-Gen. Ledlie-and no man in the army believed this other than the worst choice of the three. It need hardly be added that no preparation had been made during the night preceding the explosion, by quietly removing (or opening paths through) the abatis, &c., which protected our front from sudden dashes 7 July 27-29. The mine was to be fired at 3 A. M.; when the match was duly applied, but no explosion followed. After a considerable pause, Lt. Jacob Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees, of the 48th Pa., ventured into the gallery, detecting and removing the cause of BURNSIDE'S MINE EXPLOSION-BARLOW'S ASSAULT. 591 of the enemy, for the instant advance | of unresisted slaughter. The Black in force of our column of assault. charge, feeble as it was, had given us a few prisoners; but now our men could no more retreat than advance; the enemy's guns sweeping the ground between the chasm and our front. A first Rebel assault on our unfortunates was repulsed in sheer desperation; and thousands, of course, took the risk of darting out of the death-trap and racing at top speed to our lines; but our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,400; while that of the enemy, including 300 blown up in the fort, was barely 1,000. Undismayed by the disastrous re The explosion had occurred; the Rebel fort had been hoisted 200 feet, and had fallen in fragments; our guns had opened all along the front, eliciting a far feebler and ineffective response; but several minutes passed-precious, fatal minutes !-before Ledlie's division, clearing with difficulty the obstacles in its path-went forward into the chasm, and there stopped, though the enemy at that point were still paralyzed and the deciding crest completely at our mercy. Then parts of Burnside's two remaining White divisions (Potter's and Wilcox's) followed; but, once in the crater, Ledlie's men bar-sult of "this [needlessly] miserable red the way to a farther advance, and all huddled together, losing their formation and becoming mixed up; Gen. Potter finally extricating himself, and charging toward the crest; but with so slender a following that he was soon obliged to fall back. Two hours were thus shamefully squandered, while the Rebels, recovering their self-possession, were planting batteries on either side, and mustering their infantry in an adjacent ravine; and now-when more men in the crater could only render the confusion more hopeless and magnify the disaster-Burnside threw in his Black division; which, passing beyond and rather to the right of the crater, charged toward the crest, but were met by a fire of artillery and musketry which speedily hurled them back into the crater, where all order was lost, all idea of aught beyond personal safety abandoned, while the enemy's shells and balls poured into it like hail, rendering it an arena affair," as he fitly characterizes it, Grant paused scarcely a fortnight before he resumed the offensive; returning to successive operations on both flanks. Once more, Hancock was impelled" against the front of the Rebel left, facing Deep Bottom; his depleted corps being strengthened by the 10th, now led by Birney, and by Gregg's division of cavalry. Again pushing out to the right, Hancock attempted to flank the Rebel defenses across Bailey's creek: Barlow, with two divisions, being sent around to assault in flank and rear; while Mott's division menaced their eastern front, and Birney's corps assailed them next the river. Birney gained some advantage, taking 4 guns; but Barlow's assault was delivered by a single brigade, and came to nothing. In fact, Hancock had been delayed in landing his men, so that Lee, forewarned, had begun to rëenforce this flank; as he did more fully next day: so that, when our troops again ad72 Aug. 12. vanced to the assault"-Terry's division having meantime been moved to the left of Barlow-though Terry at first carried the Rebel intrenchment, taking over 200 prisoners-he was soon driven out of it, and the enemy was seen to be in such force that a further assault was deemed impracticable. Meantime, Gen. Gregg's cavalry, supported by Miles's infantry brigade, advanced on the Charles City road, driving the enemy before him with considerable loss on their part -Gen. Chambliss being among their killed. Still, the movement, on the whole, had no decided success; and an attempt to draw out the enemy, to leave his lines and attack ours, by the ruse of seeming to send off most of our men on steamboats, proved wholly abortive. A night attack by the Rebels on the 18th was repulsed. Hancock was soon withdrawn in earnest our total losses in the movement having been about 5,000; that of the enemy probably less, but still heavy: Gen. Gherardie being killed. 74 Lee was probably aware that this demonstration on Richmond covered an advance on the other end of his attenuated line; but he was obliged to strengthen his lieutenant north of the James or risk the fall of Richmond. No sooner had he done this, however, than Warren struck out" from our left at the long coveted Weldon railroad, barely three miles distant from our flank; reaching it unresisted before noon. Leaving here Griffin's division, he advanced, with Crawford's and Ayres's, a mile toward Petersburg, where he found the enemy awaiting him. After a pause, he moved on; and was soon struck Aug. 20. 73 Aug. 16. 74 Yet, though Warren's position was good, it was unconnected with our lines, still on the Jerusalem plankroad; Brig.-Gen. Bragg, who had been ordered to fill the gap, having neglected promptly to do so. Warren, perceiving the fault, reiterated his order; but, before it could now be executed, Hill pushed a considerable force into the vacant space, and, striking Crawford's division impetuously in flank and rear, rolled it up; taking 2,500 prisoners, including Brig.-Gen. Hays. But now, the brigades of Wilcox and White, of Burnside's corps, came up, and the enemy made off in a hurry with his spoils; enabling Warren to recover the lost ground and rëestablish his lines. Warren was well aware that his position astride the Weldon road was not adapted to tranquillity, and governed himself accordingly. Hardly three days had elapsed, when he was suddenly saluted" by 30 Rebel guns; and, after an hour's lively practice, an assaulting column advanced on his front, while another attempted to reach and turn his left flank. But Warren was prepared for this ma Aug. 21. 75 Aug. 18. 76 HANCOCK'S FIGHT AT REAMS'S STATION. 593 noeuver, and easily baffled it, flank- | 8,000) men, and 5 guns. Hill's loss was also heavy, but considerably smaller. ing the flanking column and routing it, with a net loss of 302 on our part, and at least 1,200 to the enemy, of whose dead he buried 211, while he took 500 prisoners. He had lost in this entire movement 4,455 menmost of them prisoners-while the enemy had lost scarcely half that number; but he had lost and we had gained the Weldon road. Hancock, returned from the north of the James, had moved rapidly to the Weldon road in the rear of Warren. Striking" it at Reams's station, he had been busily tearing it up for two or three days; when his cavalry gave warning that the enemy in force were at hand. Their first blow fell on Miles's division, on our right, and was promptly repulsed; but Hill ordered Heth, under a heavy fire of artillery, to try again, and at all events carry the position; which he ultimately did at the fourth charge, capturing three batteries. Hancock ordered Gibbon's division to retake it; but they failed to do so. Miles, rallying a part of his scattered division, and fighting it admirably, recovered part of his lost ground and one of his captured batteries. Gibbon's division, assailed by a force of dismounted cavalry, was easily driven from its breast works; but the enemy, attempting to follow up his success, was checked and repelled by a heavy flank fire from our dismounted cavalry, posted on the left. Though but four miles from Warren's position, no rëenforcements, owing to various blunders, reached Hancock till after he had been forced to retreat, abandoning Reams's station, after a total loss of 2,400 (out of " Aug. 21. VOL. II.-38 Warren's hold on the road had become too strong to be shaken, and there ensued a pause of over a month; during which the Rebels planned and executed a smart raid on our cattleyard at Coggin's Point on the James; running off 2,500 beeves at no cost but that of fatigue. 78 The calm was broken at last by Grant, who ordered an advance by Warren on the left, to cover one more determined by Butler on the right. Gen. Warren pushed westward " with two divisions of his own corps and two of the 9th, under Parke, with Gregg's cavalry in advance; reaching the Squirrel Level road, and carrying two or three small works at different points. There was fighting along our new front throughout this and the following day; we holding the newly gained ground and intrenching on it; our losses in the movement having been 2,500; those of the enemy probably less, including Gen. Dunnovan, killed. The ground thus taken was promptly joined by proper works to Warren's former position across the railroad. Gen. Butler, in his turn, crossing the James, advanced with the 10th corps, now commanded by Birney, and the 18th, now under Ord, and struck" the, enemy's outpost below Chapin's farm, known as Fort Harrison, which he assaulted and took, with 15 guns, and a considerable portion of the enemy's intrenchments. He attempted to follow up his blow with the capture of Fort Gilmer, which was next in order; but was repulsed by Maj. Gen. Field, "Sept. 29. : Oct. 1. |