men could not fairly be expected to arrest and repel a determined advance of the entire Rebel army, whereof two choice divisions, numbering 15,000 men, were hurled directly upon them. That some of our men behaved badly is true; but the responsibility of their failure rests on the Generals by whom they were badly handled. They were sent up by brigades to confront Rebel divisions, and thus beaten in detail; and, when at last the time came for fighting with the advantage of numbers on our side, the directing, impelling will was absent.

Gen. Hooker, next morning," by Heintzelman's order, made a reconnoissance in force, advancing to within four miles of Richmond, unresisted save by pickets. Gen. McClellan, on learning this movement, ordered Hooker to be recalled to and take position at Fair Oaks. The General commanding wrote this day to the Secretary of War:

"The enemy attacked in force and with great spirit yesterday morning; but are everywhere most signally repulsed with great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both days, and uniformly broke the enemy. The result is, that our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fortress Monroe. But the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much. I do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete; and all credit is due to the gallantry of our offi

cers and men."

149

Call's division of McDowell's corps should follow as speedily as might be. Gen. McClellan responded:"

"I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward reenforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forMcCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have addriving off the Rebel pickets, and securing vanced my pickets about a mile to-day; a very advantageous position."

ward and take Richmond the moment

He soon afterward" telegraphed:

"I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are literally impassable for artillery-almost so for infanstate. We have another rain-storm on our try. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful hands. I shall attack as soon as the

weather and ground will permit; but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether abnormal. In view of these cirtion the propriety of detaching largely from cumstances, I present for your consideraHalleck's army, to strengthen this; for it would seem that Halleck has now no large organized force in front of him, while we have. If this cannot be done, or even in connection with it, allow me to suggest the

movement of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done, it would better conform to military princialthough the reenforcements might not arples to strengthen this army. And, even rive in season to take part in the attack upon Richmond, the moral effect would be sistance in ulterior movements. I wish to great, and they would furnish valuable asbe distinctly understood that, whenever the weather permits, I will attack with whatforce would enable me to gain much more ever force I may have, although a larger decided results. I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent forward by water at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry."

Secretary Stanton promptly responded: "

"Your dispatch of 3:30, yesterday, has been received. I am fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, and which no art

or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am striving to the uttermost to render you every aid in the power of the Government. Your suggestions will be immediately com

municated to Gen. Halleck, with a request that he shall conform to them. At last ad

na.

"Fremont had a hard fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was badly handled. It is clear that a pretty strong force is operating with Jackson, for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies.

"Be assured, General, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my

whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met; and, whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be

at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arins.'

18

Gen. McCall's division arrived by water during the two following days; on the last of which, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with 1,500 Rebel cavalry and 4 guns, attacked and dispersed two squadrons of the 5th U. S. cavalry, Capt. Royall, near Hanover Old Church; thence proceeding to make a rapid circuit of our grand army, via Tunstall's Station, seizing and burning two schooners laden with forage, and 14 wagons; capturing and taking off 165 prisoners, 260 mules and horses; halting three hours to rest at Talleysville, in the rear of our army; resuming his march at midnight; crossing the Chickahominy near Long Bridge, by hastily improvised bridges, next forenoon; and reaching Richmond unassailed next morning. This was the first of the notable cavalry raids of the war,

18

involving a squandering of horseflesh and an amount of useless devastation which rendered them decidedly unprofitable, and hardly reconcilable with the legitimate ends of warfare.

Gen. McClellan, at midnight on the 14th, telegraphed to the War Department as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"CAMP LINCOLN, June 14, 1862.

“All quiet in every direction. The stampede of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable. I hope two days shall advance as soon as the bridges are more will make the ground practicable. I completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time, I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage.

"It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are com

pletely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him

immediately on his arrival.

"That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me good. I do not feel that, in such circummust be disposed of so as to do the most stances as those in which I am now placed, Gen. McDowell should wish the general in

terests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command.

"If I cannot fully control all his troops, I fight the battle with what I have, and let want none of them, but would prefer to others be responsible for the results.

"The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me; but Gen. McD., and all other troops sent to me, should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is to be entertained; you know that I have too great to allow personal considerations

none.

"The indications are, from our balloon reconnoissances and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily in

and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked Richmond; but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that, while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here."

That day, having his bridges completed, Gen. McClellan ordered an advance of his picket-line on the left, preparatory to a general forward movement; and, during the day, Heintzelman's corps, with part of Keyes's and Sumner's, were pushed forward," he reports, through a swampy wood, though smartly resisted, with a loss on our side of 51 killed, 401 wounded, and 64 missing: total, 516. Returning from overlooking this affair, Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the War Department

as follows:

"Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong rëenforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The Rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed

to represent repeatedly the necessity of reenforcements; that this was the decisive

21 But Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright, of Huger's division, who opposed this movement, reports that he had 3,000 men in all, resisting not less than 8,000 or 10,000 on our side; and adds:

"The object of the enemy was to drive us back from our picket-line, occupy it himself, and thereby enable him to advance his works several hundred yards nearer our lines. In this, he completely failed; and, although

point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a General can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command; and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But, if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence, confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange

for the defense on that side. I feel that

there is no use in again asking for reen

forcements.".

"WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862. "Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statemaking your point, are very gratifying. ment that you completely succeeded in The later one, suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000 men, and talking of to whom the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what

you have; while you continue-ungene. rously I think-to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted-I

shall omit-no opportunity to send you reenforcements whenever I can."

Gen. Robert E. Lee, having succeeded to the chief command of the Rebel army, had, in counsel with the master spirits of the Rebellion, at length resolved on striking a decisive blow. To this end, rëenforcements had been quietly called in from all available quarters, swelling the Rebel Army of Virginia, including JackGen. McClellan at night telegraphed, over his own signature, to the War office in Washington, that he had accomplished his object, had driven me back for more than a mile, had silenced my batteries, and occupied our camps, there is not one word of truth in the whole statement. When the fight ceased at dark, I occupied the very line my pickets had been driven from in the morning; and which I continued to hold until the total rout of the Federal army on the 29th."