CHAPTER XXVI. THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. THE day following the engagement | renton turnpike to defend the passage of described in the last chapter, the 19th Bull Run; has seized the stone bridge of July, was passed by General McDow- and made a heavy abattis on the right ell and his staff in a thorough reconnois-bank, to oppose our advance in that disance of the region round about the ad-rection. The ford above the bridge is vanced Union lines, the result of which, in connection with General Tyler's practical experience in the neighborhood of Blackburn's Ford, was a conviction that the strength and position of the enemy rendered it,unadvisable, without a diversion, to risk the main attack directly in front, or make the attempt, of which much had been said, to gain Manassas by an approach from the east. Above Stone Bridge, however, the ground appeared more practicable. The stream, Bull Run, might readily be forded, and though there were no good roads leading from the camps in that direction, the country afforded no serious obstacle to the movement of troops. It was accordingly resolved, by a flank movement, to turn the enemy's position on their left with a sufficient force which should coöperate with a direct attack on their position at Stone Bridge, and thus open the turnpike road from Centreville, and cut off the railway communication of Manassas with the army of Johnston in and about Win also guarded, whether with artillery or not is not positively known, but every indication favors the belief that he proposes to defend the passage of the stream It is intended to turn the position, force the enemy from the road, that it may be reopened, and, if possible, destroy the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, where the enemy has a large force. As this may be resisted by all the force of the enemy, the troops will be disposed as follows: The first division (General Tyler's) with the exception of Richardson's brigade, will, at half-past 2 o'clock in the morning precisely, be on the Warrenton turnpike to threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not open fire until full daybreak. The second division (Hunter's) will move from its camp at two o'clock in the morning precisely, and, led by Captain Woodbury, of the Engineers, will, after passing Cub Run, turn to the right and pass the Bull Run stream above the ford at Sudley's Spring, and then turning down to the left, descend the stream and clear In pursuance of this plan, General away the enemy who may be guarding McDowell, on the 20th, issued the fol- the lower ford and bridge. It will then lowing military orders for an advance bear off to the right and make room for early the following morning. "The en- the succeeding division. The third diviemy has planted a battery on the War-sion (IIeintzelman's) will march at half chester. DISPOSITION OF THE UNION FORCES. 385 past 2 o'clock in the morning, and follow ness, simplicity and truthfulness, "to the road taken by the second division, move the several columns out on the but will cross at the lower ford after it road a few miles on the evening of the has been turned as above, and then, 20th, so that they would have a shorter going to the left, take place between the march in the morning; but I deferred to stream and second division. The fifth those who had the greatest distance to division (Miles') will take position on the go, and who preferred starting early in Centreville Heights, (Richardson's brig- the morning and making but one move. ade will, for the time, form part of the On the evening of the 20th, my command fifth division, and will continue in its was mostly at or near Centreville. The present position.) One brigade will be enemy was at or near Manassas, distant in the village, and one near the present from Centreville about seven miles to station of Richardson's brigade. This the southwest. Centreville is a village division will threaten the Blackburn of a few houses, mostly on the west side Ford, and remain in reserve at Centreville. The commander will open fire with artillery only, and will bear in mind that it is a demonstration only he is to make. He will cause such defensive works, abattis, earthworks, etc., to be thrown up as will strengthen his position. Lieutenant Prime, of the Engineers, will be charged with this duty. These movements may lead to the gravest results, and commanders of divisions and brigades should bear in mind the immense consequences involved. There must be no failure, and every effort must be made to prevent straggling. No one must be allowed to leave the ranks without special authority. After completing the movements ordered, the troops must be held in order of battle, as they may be attacked at any moment." A general engagement was evidently looked for in these dispositions, which were well planned, and had, as we shall see, the effect of taking the enemy by surprise, and disconcerting their scheme of attack upon the Union lines. "It had been my intention," says General McDowell in his subsequent final report of the action which ensued-a masterpiece of military narrative in its clear of a ridge running nearly north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas Junction was along this ridge, and crosses Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge, through the village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between the crossing from northwest to southeast. The first division (Tyler's) was stationed on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge, two brigades on the same road, and a mile and a half in advance, to the west of the ridge, and one brigade on the road from Centreville to Manassas, where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th. The second division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of Centreville. The third division (Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the Old Braddock road, which comes into Centreville from the southeast, about a mile and a half from the village. The fifth division (Miles') was on the same road with the third division, and between it and Centreville. "On Friday night, the 10th, a train the Warrenton road, and commence canof subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents were ordered to be issued to the command, and the men required to have three days' rations in their haversacks, On Saturday orders were issued for the available force to march. My personal reconnoissance of the roads to the South had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th at Blackburn's Ford showed that he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss, and if we did that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired. Our information was that the stone bridge, over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run, to the west of Centreville, was defended by a battery in position, and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abattis. The alternative was, therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position. Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge, to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the valley of Virginia, before Winchester, which had been held in check by MajorGeneral Patterson. "Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on nonading the enemy's batteries, while OPENING OF THE BATTLE. great, misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the stream being oblique to the road, and we having the obtuse angle on our side. "General Tyler commenced with his artillery at half-past 6 A. M., but the enemy did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve, in case we should have to send any troops back to reinforce Miles' division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general orders. On reaching the ford at Sudley's Spring, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column and come forward separately as fast as possible. Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp was sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over. The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sud 387 ley's Spring south, and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was for about a mile from the ford thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile. from the road the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile further large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle through the valley of a small watercourse, a tributary of Bull Run. Shortly after the leading regiment of the first brigade reached the open space, and whilst others and the second brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following up with infantry. The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade, and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left, forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division to cross from their position on the Warrenton road. These drove the right of the enemy, understood to have been commanded by Beauregard, from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on, Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream, and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road, down which our troops had marched from Sudley's Spring, is a hill with a farm-house on it. Behind this hill the enemy had, early in the day, some of to allow our reinforcement (Schenck's brigade and Ayres' battery) to join us. "The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had been fighting since half-past ten o'clock in the morning, and it was after three o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since two o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was not more than nine and a half miles; and though they had three days provisions served out to them the day before, many no doubt either did not eat them, or threw them away on the march, or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much Some of the regiments his most annoying batteries planted. the removal of the abattis across the road, Across the road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge, or table of land. The hottest part of the contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it. The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division. Wilcox's and Howard's brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the centre and up the road, whilst Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island battery of Burnside's brigade also participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston. Rickett's battery, which did such effective service and played so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, aud allowing it to approach without firing upon it-in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by different corps in succession, and driven back, and the guns taken by hand, the horses being killed, and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, and so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession from the stone bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing severe fighting. |